gers, and regarded the mere laws of their coexistence with brain-states as the ultimate laws for our science. The reader will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into queries which only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope successfully to deal with. That will perhaps be centuries hence; and meanwhile the best mark of health that a science can show is this unfinished-seeming front. The completion of the book has been so slow that several chapters have been published successively in Mind, the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, the Popular Science Monthly, and Scribner's Magazine. Acknowledgment is made in the proper places. The bibliography, I regret to say, is quite unsystematic. I have habitually given my authority for special experimental facts; but beyond that I have aimed mainly to cite books that would probably be actually used by the ordinary American college-student in his collateral reading. The bibliography in W. Volkmann von Volkmar's Lehrbuch der Psychologie (1875) is so complete, up to its date, that there is no need of an inferior duplicate. And for more recent references, Sully's Outlines, Dewey's Psychology, and Baldwin's Handbook of Psychology may be advantageously used. Finally, where one owes to so many, it seems absurd to single out particular creditors; yet I cannot resist the temptation at the end of my first literary venture to record. my gratitude for the inspiration I have got from the writings of J. S. Mill, Lotze, Renouvier, Hodgson, and Wundt, and from the intellectual companionship (to name only five names) of Chauncey Wright and Charles Peirce in old times, and more recently of Stanley Hall, James Putnam, and Josiah Royce. HARVARD UNIVERSITY, August 1890. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY, Mental Manifestations depend on Cerebral Conditions, 1. CHAPTER II. THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN, . Reflex, semi-reflex, and voluntary acts, 12. The Frog's nervecentres, 14. General notion of the hemispheres, 20. Their Education-the Meynert scheme, 24. The phrenological contrasted with the physiological conception, 27. The localization of function in the hemispheres, 30. The motor zone, 31. Motor Aphasia, 37. The sight-centre, 41. Mental blindness, 48. The hearing-centre, 52. Sensory Aphasia, 54. Centres for smell and taste, 57. The touch-centre, 58. Man's Consciousness limited to the hemispheres, 65. The restitution of function, 67. Final correction of the Meynert scheme, 72. Conclusions, 78. CHAPTER III. ON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY, The summation of Stimuli, 82. Reaction-time, 85. Cerebral blood-supply, 97. Cerebral Thermometry, 99. Phosphorus and Thought, 101. НАВІТ, . CHAPTER IV. Due to plasticity of neural matter, 105. Produces ease of action, 112. Diminishes attention, 115. Concatenated performances, 116. Ethical implications and pedagogic maxims, 120. CHAPTER V. THE AUTOMATON-THEORY, The theory described, 128. Reasons for it, 133. Reasons against it, 138. PAGE 1 . 12 . 81 104 . 128 - CHAPTER VI. THE MIND-STUFF THEORY, . Evolutionary Psychology demands a Mind-dust, 146. Some alleged proofs that it exists, 150. Refutation of these proofs, 154. Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible, 158. Can states of mind be unconscious? 162. Refutation of alleged proofs of unconscious thought, 164. Difficulty of stating the connection between mind and brain, 176. 'The Soul' is logically the least objectionable hypothesis, 180. Conclusion, 182. CHAPTER VII. THE METHODS AND SNARES OF PSYCHOLOGY, Psychology is a natural Science, 183. Introspection, 185. Experiment, 192. Sources of error, 194. The 'Psychologist's fallacy,' 196. CHAPTER VIII. THE RELATIONS OF MINDS TO OTHER THINGS, Time relations: lapses of Consciousness-Locke v. Descartes, 200. The unconsciousness' of hysterics not genuine, 202. Minds may split into dissociated parts, 206. Space-relations: the Seat of the Soul, 214. Cognitive relations, 216. The Psychologist's point of view, 218. Two kinds of knowledge, acquaintance and knowledge about, 221. CHAPTER IX. PAGE 145 183 199 Consciousness tends to the personal form, 225. It is in constant change, 229. It is sensibly continuous, 237. Substantive' ⚫ and transitive' parts of Consciousness, 243. Feelings of relation, 245. Feelings of tendency, 249. The fringe' of the object, 258. The feeling of rational sequence, 261. Thought possible in any kind of mental material, 265. Thought and language, 267. Consciousness is cognitive, 271. The word Object, ● 275. Every cognition is due to one integral pulse of thought, 276. Diagrams of Thought's stream, 279. Thought is always selective, 284. 224 CHAPTER X. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF, The Empirical Self or Me, 291. Its constituents, 292. The material self, 292. The Social Self, 293. The Spiritual Self, 296. Difficulty of apprehending Thought as a purely spiritual activity, 291 299. Emotions of Self, 305. Rivalry and conflict of one's different selves, 309. Their hierarchy, 313. What Self we love in Selflove,' 317. The Pure Ego, 329. The verifiable ground of the sense of personal identity, 332. The passing Thought is the only Thinker which Psychology requires, 338. Theories of Self-consciousness: 1) The theory of the Soul, 342. 2) The Associationist theory, 350. 3) The Transcendentalist theory, 360. The mutations of the Self, 373. Insane delusions, 375. Alternating selves, 379. Mediumships or possessions, 393. Summary, 400. CHAPTER XI. PAGE ATTENTION, Its neglect by English psychologists, 402. Description of it, 404. To how many things can we attend at once? 405. Wundt's experiments on displacement of date of impressions simultaneously ⚫ attended to, 410. Personal equation, 413. The varieties of , attention, 416. Passive attention, 418. Voluntary attention, 420. • Attention's effects on sensation, 425;-on discrimination, 426;on recollection, 427;-on reaction-time, 427. The neural process in attention: 1) Accommodation of sense-organ, 434. 2) Preperception, 438. Is voluntary attention a resultant or a force? 447. The effort to attend can be conceived as a resultant, 450. Conclusion, 453. Acquired Inattention, 455. CHAPTER XII. CONCEPTION, The sense of sameness, 459. ceptions are unchangeable, 464. Conception defined, 461. Con- 473. The conception of the same' is not the same state' of mind, 480. . 483 Simul Locke on discrimination, 483. Martineau ditto, 484. taneous sensations originally fuse into one object, 488. The principle of mediate comparison, 489. Not all differences are differences of composition, 490. The conditions of discrimination, 494. The sensation of difference, 495. The transcendentalist theory of the perception of differences uncalled for, 498. The process of analysis, 502. The process of abstraction, 505. The improvement of discrimination by practice, 508. Its two causes, 510. Practical interests limit our discrimination, 515. Reactiontime after discrimination, 523. The perception of likeness, 528. The magnitude of differences, 530. The measurement of dis |