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for the Boers, and, however regrettable the circumstance, war can hardly fail to be the resort.

We have spoken of the dynamite monopoly and its grinding exactions levied upon the British mining companies in the Transvaal by a friend of President Kruger. The injustice of this impost may be gathered from the statement that the British workers in the gold mines have had to pay as high as $37.50 a case for the dynamite used by them,-four times its value in the open market; while at that price (subsequently reduced to $18.75 a case) the quality has been poor and ineffective for the uses for which it was required. But the injustice does not end here; the wrong is intensified by the fact that no one can import the commodity save through the President's friend, who enjoys the sole monopoly of importation, and no one, moreover, is permited to manufacture it in the Republic. The grievance is one of many which the British residents in the Transvaal have to suffer at the hands of the Boer government, and the monopoly is said, with truth we believe, to be the means of personally enriching the President and his closest friends. The extent of the enrichment is seen when it is stated that about 250,000 cases of dynamite are used in the mines every year, yielding in clear profit to the Transvaal monopolist fully $2,000,000 annually. The sum, it may be said, is a comparatively small mulct in face of the gold yield of the mines, which at the present rate of production amounts to about $70,000,000 a year. That, however, is not the point: the point is the existence of the unjust impost (against which many of the influential burghers of the Republic have strongly protested), and the questionable use made of the gains of the monopoly, which do not benefit the Boer State, but, as stated above, go into the pockets of President Kruger and a few of his personal friends, with a moiety expended on the government's secret service mission.

With the outbreak of hostilities, which, as we write, appears perilously imminent, it will be interesting to glance at what is known of the fighting strength of the two Boer Republics, and of the composition. and character of the forces they are likely to be able to put in the field. The combined strength which England will have against her is estimated at from 25,000 to 30,000 men of all ages. To oppose them,

Britain has or will immediately have in the country a like numerical strength, consisting of the varied branches of the service, under the most eminent and welltried commanders. To this strength a further army corps, of about 10,000 men, is to be at once added, composed of the élite of the English army, with possible contingents drawn from the British colonies. Such of the force as is already in South Africa is stationed at strategic points in Cape Colony, in Natal, and in Rhodesia. To it important additions, of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, are now currently arriving at Cape Town and Durban from England, from the Mediterranean, and from India; while strong reserves are under orders to proceed to the Cape, as soon as Parliament meets, to be placed under the chief command of Sir Redvers Buller, an officer of great distinction, who has moreover the advantage of knowing the country.

On the score of military efficiency and the technical training of a soldier, the superiority must largely lie with the British. We say this without disparagement to the known excellence of the Boers in marksmanship, and to that quality which distinguishes them as mounted infantry or guerillas, with a genius for taking cover. Herein lies their chief strength, added to their intimate knowledge of the country and the advantage they must have in choosing the strong natural posts of defence. For fighting in the open they have no liking, while they are said to be afraid of the sabre and the bayonet and chary of close contact with cold steel. The lesson of 1881 has, on the other hand, not been lost on the British; they, too, have learned the use of mounted infantry and of irregular corps of horse; while even the linesmen now take advantage of cover and are expert at skirmishing and skilful in the use of the rifle.

One material drawback from which the British must suffer is, as we have hinted, in not knowing the country as the Boers know it, while they will, no doubt, be at a disadvantage in finding the enemy ensconced in the naturally strong defensive positions rather than on the open veldt. They must also be at much disadvantage in the extended area over which the fighting is likely to range, with vast frontier lines to guard or invade, and immense distances to cover from the several bases of support and supply. But these are

matters upon which it is perhaps premature to speculate. If the war comes, however, there is no question that it will be a grim though probably brief contest, and, on both sides, a stubborn test of race endurance and hardihood.

To those who, like ourselves, have been hoping for peace, it must have been a matter of regret to learn that the ties of consanguinity had induced the Orange Free State to espouse the cause of the Boers in the Transvaal. We especially regret this decision of the President and Volksraad at Bloemfontein, since England has no quarrel with the Free State, which has always been friendly to her, as well as reasonable and just toward aliens within her borders. Our regret is the keener since, in joining hands with the Dutch in the Transvaal, the Free State runs the risk of losing her own independence, while adding to the area of hostility and race disaffection. To Britain the action of the Free State must have come with surprise, for its Executive, in questions between the Transvaal and England, has always counselled submission to the less intelligent and more bigoted burghers in the neighboring State, and has hitherto joined with their Dutch brethren in Cape Colony in expressing a desire for justice and peace. The crisis evidently, however, has been too disturbing for President Steyn's "sweet reasonableness," and its effect can only be to arouse England to more determined action, however loth she may be to exercise it, to suppress disaffection and protect in South Africa the interests of her widespread imperial power.

A still later development of the situation is the cabled dispatch from England, to the effect that the army reserves in the United Kingdom have been called out and that Parliament has been summoned. In the reassembling of the imperial legislature the English Liberalssome of the leaders of which have been stoutly opposed to war - hope to keep the country from a conflict, and if possible force the government, even at the last hour, to open the way to an agreement. They still speak very volubly of the Boers being goaded into fighting by Mr. Chamberlain's hectoring, behind which they profess to see only the Rhodesian mining speculators, who covet the Transvaal for

its gold, and who are constantly being inflamed by the jingo war fever. They of course deem war both unjust and unnecessary and aver that there is no cause for England's interference. Some even go the length of saying that the English Foreign Secretary is in league with Mr. Cecil Rhodes and his imperialist friends in seeking to overthrow Republican institutions in the Transvaal and subvert Dutch rule. This, however, is not the attitude of the Liberals as a whole: many of them, indeed, are not only with the government in insisting that President Kruger shall respect England's suzerain rights, but are sick of his narrow intolerance and his impudent trifling with the imperial Power, which he has the hardihood to accuse of unscrupulous aggrandizement and characteristic bad faith. They of course do not wish to see hostilities, but will not weakly shirk them where England's cause is, as they properly deem, good, and while the Outlanders' grievances go unredressed. They do not care to haggle with the Boer oligarchy over the term "suzerain," but they want recognition of the bargain made with England when she gave them the internal independence of the State, the admission of the Outlanders to equal political rights with the Dutch burghers. They feel, it is true, that if this is resisted it is hardly a matter to fight over, in the case of a big Power in its dealings with a weak one. But what is to be done when not merely local but vast imperial interests are at stake, and when a great historic principle is involved, of "no taxation without representation"? This is the dilemma in which the fair-minded Liberals, in common with the government and the nation, find themselves; and, though they do not love Mr. Rhodes and barely trust Mr. Chamberlain, they remember that they are Englishmen and are neither weaklings nor poltroons. A few days now must settle the matter, either for peace or for war. In the meantime delay is favorable to Britain in enabling her to mass her forces at the Cape, while it must be disadvantageous to the Boers and put severely to the test the resources of their commissariat and transportation services.

AKRON, O.

G. MERCER ADAM.

THE WORLD AND ITS DOINGS:

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Release

It must be with a sense of of Dreyfus relief that our readers see the "affaire Dreyfus" relegated to the limbo of the past. In the poor victim's case truth called for acquittal, not for pardon; but in the condition France has long been in, given over to frenzied hatred of the Jew, to slavish deference to military rank, and to every unreasoning and iniquitous passion, justice was not in that quarter to be looked for. The pardoning act of the French government is, however, to be hailed with some measure of satisfaction, since though it has been suggested merely by expediency, it gets rid, for the time being at least, of an extremely disquieting and disturbing affair as well as a matter of grave national menace to France. The outrage is that though clemency has been shown the accused, it has not exonerated him from the crime with which he was charged; nor does the pardon given him vindicate either justice or the accused's fair name. For both of these, it may be taken for granted, Dreyfus will unremittingly still strive, despite the Minister of War's complacent wish to see "the incident closed." Closed it cannot well be while the victim of these years of exile and physical and mental distress remains still under the aspersion and the double conviction of guilt, and is entitled to acquittal as an innocent and sorely maligned man. can the affair be considered by the Dreyfusards to be ended after all the insult and contumely that have been heaped upon them, while the scoundrels of the army staff, who have lied and intrigued all through the affair, are permitted to come off with flying colors, in spite of their villainies and the depths of moral infamy to which they have descended. Nor closed can the incident be to M. Zola and Colonel Picquart, whose cases have yet to be tried and their brave defence made good of an infamously treated and much calumniated man. Still less can the case be considered closed by the French government, which must be held responsible for the gross perversion of

Nor

justice that has taken place, or by the nation at large, that has to bear the dishonor which attaches to the French name for acquiescing in the foul wrong that was committed in the verdict of Rennes. Thankful Captain Dreyfus may himself be that he has at length regained freedom and liberty, with the comfort of reunion with his devoted wife and family. But while he has this boon- and to the poor victim of the caballings and machinations of a military despotism we can well believe it is a great and highly appreciated one he has as yet no salve for his wounded honor or reparation for the years of torture he suffered in the humiliating garb of a convict. This is fully and righteously his due, and until he has both reparation and vindication no fair-minded man can say that he has had justice; still less can he be expected to acquiesce in the official eagerness to "close the incident."

Whatever theories may be offered in explanation of the extraordinary miscarriage of justice, it is surely madness in a nation of presumably intelligent men to stand by the ipse dixit of a highly prejudiced and unscrupulous military staff, instead of by the manifest truth and the unimpeachable evidence. To maintain the prestige of the army (this is the French contention) "by making a victim of one man rather than sacrifice the interests of all," is surely a discreditable as well as an ungallant and unpatriotic proceeding. It is upon this ground that we find the judgment of the Rennes courtmartial so boldly and defiantly iniquitous. Upon no hypothesis can the decision of the court be explained, far less be defended. Nor could any valid plea be made for mitigation of the sentence, or even for pardon, on the score, as the court held, of "extenuating circumstances." If Dreyfus is to be deemed guilty, then in the whole history of the case there were no extenuating circumstances, unless perhaps we find such in the lengthened imprisonment already borne by the accused and the

cruel severity of his sufferings. On the supposition that he is innocent, the extenuating circumstances become not only illogical but farcical, and the new sentence is thus an outrageous judicial error as well as a national scandal. On the hypothesis of innocence-and what sane man who has followed the evidence can question that view of the case?- the conviction is a vile and unredeemed iniquity and a hideous triumph of falsehood and prejudice.

That the conviction is an insult alike to Germany and Italy, both of which nations have unmistakably affirmed that they had no dealings whatever with Dreyfus and had no traffic with him of any treasonable kind, is, in one sense, a minor matter, though it is important as presumptive evidence of innocence. That this evidence was refused a hearing shows the length the court went in its defiance of public opinion and want of sympathy for the accused, while it also shows its own moral obtuseness in weighing the pros and cons of the case. Nor did the mind of the court, collectively at least, and throughout the entire proceedings of the trial, seem to have any appreciative sense of right and wrong. Everything, in fact, was rejected that did not make for conviction and utter disregard of the truth. Happily Dreyfus was tried not only by the court-martial at Rennes, but before onlooking nations and at the bar of the public conscience of the civilized world. The verdict there has not been re-condemnation, but the annulling of the previous conviction, with restoration to the accused of every right and honor and a frank and unreserved acquittal. Outside of France this has been the judgment unanimously rendered, and that with common sense and reason. It is the verdict that ought to have been that of the court at Rennes, in place of the infamous one that has shocked the conscience of the world and brought an added shame to France.

Only a word need be said of the rather foolish talk indulged in outside of France, to boycott the Paris Exposition of next year. As a protest against the Rennes verdict, and considering the indignation aroused by the truculent decision of the court, it is not unnatural that some such step should be seriously proposed. Reprisals of this sort seem, however, a trifle childish, while they are inexpedient in the interests of commerce. Nor can govern

ments, with due regard to international courtesies, very well lend themselves to such an unfriendly and undiplomatic procedure. To put forward or acquiesce in a national boycott on the part of any country would be very properly construed as an insult to the French nation, though individual action may thus express itself - probably without harm though with doubtful good-in showing personal hostility to the country and countrymen of the French military staff. In this Dreyfus matter, if any one wants to show his personal abhorrence of the verdict, he may do so perhaps more effectively, if he really cares for that sort of thing, by abjuring French manufactures and products, such as wines and silks, by eschewing French watering-places, or, with positive advantage to morals, by refusing to read a French novel or to witness a French play. A still more effective way would be to discountenance by his presence such sports as have in the past summer been discreditably drawing thousands of Englishmen and Americans to Boulogne to witness the bull fights. Nothing, to our mind, shows more palpably the degeneracy of France in recent years than the introduction on French soil of these brutalizing sports from the other side of the Pyrenees. Here, at least, the boycott and censorship may well be applied, and an end, we hope, made of the insidious introduction on French soil of a cruel and morally degrading public spectacle.

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Thanksgiving Kindly custom in the United States has for many years past kept the last Thursday of November in each year as a day of religious, national, and social thanksgiving. The festival, as we all know, dates back to the era of the Pilgrim Fathers of New England, when days of prayer and fasting were instituted by the little colony as an expression of dependence upon a Divine Being and of gratitude for mercies intermittently vouchsafed to it. At certain seasons, particularly after harvest, or on the arrival of a new ship from England, bringing added store to the colony's scant supplies, and, above all, the fellowship and communion of new immigrant friends, the little community was fain to make devout acknowledgment of its gratitude by setting apart a day of thanksgiving. Then was undertaken the search in the woods for game,

that the festival might be one of good cheer, as well as one that warmed the heart with thankfulness for merciful dispensations, loving care, and gracious bounties. The festival, as we to-day have it, though it has had grafted on to it the genial practise of family and social reunion, is still, in its primary aspect, as the President's proclamation annually reminds us, an occasion of praise and thanksgiving for Divine favors. If worship means anything at all, and is seemly in the attitude of the finite toward the Infinite, then the November call to the nation to give praise and thanks is no less a duty than it was in the Plymouth Plantation two hundred and eighty years ago.

Nor is a grateful Nunc Dimittis on the part of this nation to-day less fitting than it was at the time of the little "Mayflower" colony. We have had a bountiful harvest, with well-filled garners, much general prosperity, and reviving trade. But for the pitiful war on our hands in the Far East, our cup of national blessings would be full. Is it not then our duty-nay even our privilege, to be thankful, and to own the High Source whence cometh every national as well as communal and social good? Should not, at the same time, the spirit of the season lead us to be charitable, and prompt us, as we gather round the festive board, to think of those whose meed of comfort is far below ours, and whose wants are many because their opportunities are few and their purse has long been wofully and depressingly lean?

The Home

Coming of
Dewey

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The national hero has returned to his native shores and has had a great and thoroughly democratic welcome. New York may be said to have surpassed herself in the magnificence as well as in the enthusiasm of her demonstration. The two days' celebration drew hundreds of thousands of spectators to the city, not only to see Dewey and his brave command, but to witness the great water and land pageants organized as tributes to the paladin-admiral, upon whom the patriotism of a continent and a large share of the attention of the world have for a year and a half been centred. Needless to say that on the occasion the great city was given up to jubilation: great public issues. were for the time being forgotten, and with them even the venomous passions of

conflicting parties in the stronghold of Tammany. The reception was in itself a severe test of a sailor's endurance, as it must have been trying in its effect on the personal character of the modest admiral. Perhaps of all the sightseers who had gathered to pay honor to the occasion, no one was more surprised at the extent and heartiness of the demonstration than the hero-subject of it. In New York, as well as subsequently in Washington, the admiral was acclaimed with more than royal honors, for Democracy, when it has the opportunity, is in no degree behind Imperialism in its liability to excess. At the national capital most enthusiastic also was the reception by the President and the Executive, and interesting the presentation of the sword, the gift of a grateful nation. From the pinnacle of fame to which he has thus tumultuously been elevated, Admiral Dewey, if we do not mistake his character, will soberly step down, and, with ready alacrity, resume the performance of his every-day duties. With all his honors and trophies, we may be sure that adulation has not spoiled him, nor is he the sort of man who has any liking for mere honorary functions, still less for self display. He is made of robuster material than to care for these things, and so his good sense will no doubt have been preserved by him. In the maintenance of his accustomed balance of mind and mental saneness he can, at the present juncture of affairs in the Philippines, be of great service to the Administration, and so add to the country's obligations.

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Death of Mr. Despite the possession of a Cornelius hundred millions, death has Vanderbilt levelled the late Cornelius Vanderbilt to the common lot of all. To minds not heavenly in manifesting resignation with their earthly estate, we can well believe that that lamented occurrence has given if we dare say it—some modicum of real though doubtless concealed satisfaction. And yet, with all his colossal wealth, it would perhaps be difficult to find a more hard-worked toiler, or one more simple in his tastes and exemplary in his life, than the multimillionaire who has recently closed his labors and passed from this evanescent mundane sphere. Lucky he may be said to have been in inheriting vast riches, but more lucky still was he in having made

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