it acts. But obviously that by which a body primarily lives is the soul. And when life is manifested according to the different operations in the different grades of living beings, that by which we primarily perform any one of these works of life is the soul. For the soul is that by which we are primarily nourished, and feel, and move about from place to place, and likewise that by which primarily we think. This principle therefore by which we primarily think, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body."

2915

And again: "In this man there is no other substantial form but the rational soul; and through this same rational soul man is not only man, but also animal, living thing, body, substance and being." In hoc homine non est alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis; et per eam homo non solum est homo, sed animal, et vivum, et corpus, et substantia, et ens.10

We are now in a position to draw the parallels together and to make a synthesis. St. Thomas begins with the abstract definition of personality and applies to it his foundation principle of act and potency. An act is limited only in so far as it is received in a potency. The human soul can exist only in so far as it is limited by its potency. But its ultimate potency is its primary matter. So there can be no intermediate form. If therefore man sets out to search for truth using his intellect as his instrument it must be the whole man who sets out. And since the soul is of its very nature simple and spiritual, it must be the whole soul which must be the receptacle of all his experiences. The soul is not divided into three water-tight compartments with a sort of telephonic communication between them. It has no quantitative parts. It has however different operations but these operations are all from one and the same principle and so must take their forms from that principle. If a man thinks, it must be in vital conjunction with his volition and sensation. This is the theory, and it is a theory which is supported by a decree of the Church. "Whoever" says the Council of Vienne "shall pertinaciously presume henceforth to assert, defend, or hold that the rational or intellectual soul is not of itself and essentially the form of the human body, let him be counted as a heretic."

This theory Cardinal Newman reduces to practise when he takes his own personality and in that observes the working of the illative

15 Summa, p. 1, qu. 76, a. 1.

16De Spirit. Creat. a. 3.

.sense. He realises that truth can be attained only by the right use of reason and then he sees that the right use of reason depends on its working in its natural surroundings, working as an integral function of the whole living man. Notional truth may be acquired by mere logic. But real truth can only be attained by thought and action combined. Every man who has a soul to save must think and feel and will for himself. In fear and trembling he must work out his own salvation. Every sin that he has committed and every sin that he has omitted when he might have committed it, all these acts have left an impression for weal or for woe on his whole soul. They have all to be recokoned with in the working out of what is left to him of mortal life. He may not remember them explicitly, but the total result is there and expresses itself by way of an illation. The supreme faculty of reason sits in judgment on past experiences and future contingencies. The sanction of the illative sense is absolute. Infidelity to it spells disintegration of the whole man, physical, mental and moral. Perfect obedience to it spells eternal life.

THOMAS J. GERRARD.

THE HUMAN KNOWLEDGE OF
CHRIST (IV)

Edward J. Hanna, D. D.'

In former articles, (NEW YORK REVIEW, Vol. I, Nos. 3, 4 and 5), we gave a rapid survey of the history of opinions concerning the human knowledge of Christ, and we made an historical study of the data of Scripture and tradition on which the solution of this interesting question must ultimately depend. We have seen that neither in Scripture or patristic tradition is there any warrant for the kenotic theories espoused by Delitzsch, Hoffmann, Godet, and Gore, which would interpret the avròv ékévwoev of St. Paul (Philippians ii, 6) as applying to the divine nature of the Word made Flesh. Nor does the tradition adown the ages give the slightest help to the Modernist who would admit possible error in the words and in the thoughts of Christ (NEW York Review, Vol. I, p. 429; cf. Syllabus Lamentabili Sane, Prop. 33). Aside from these positions which are manifestly against Catholic teaching, we touched the broader question, whether or not there were any limitations in the human knowledge of Christ, except those which creation and the created nature naturally imposed. We said that the first thing that impresses one who carefully peruses the New Testament, is the overwhelming evidence in favor of supernatural knowledge in the Man-Christ, and so striking is this testimony that one instinctively hesitates about asserting any limit whatever when there is question of what Christ really knew as man. (NEW YORK REVIEW, Vol. I, p. 425; cf. Luke xxii, 10; Luke xix, 30; Matthew xvii, 27; John ii, 47-50; Luke ix, 47; Matthew xi, 21-27; John ii, 24-25). Without drawing any conclusion, we brought forward from Scripture, from tradition, and from theological writers evidence on the special question, whether or not the soul of Christ from the first moment of its existence until the close of Christ's mortal life always enjoyed the beatific vision, and seeing God as he is, knew all things that human mind may know and human ken embrace. We concluded our third article with the tradition of the Fathers down to the beginning of the seventh century.

In the light of this evidence, to say naught of the subsequent teaching of the Fathers and theologians, what position must the

Catholic teacher take concerning the beatific vision in the soul Christ? The doctrine of the Church is thus put by Petavius (De Incarnatione, Lib. xi, Cap. 4): "Facile tamen assentiar theologis qui licet nondum hoc ad fidei dogmata pertinere dicunt (quod locus in scriptura sit nullus qui id perspicue declaret; nec ullius auctoritate synodi generalis aut alia quapiam fidei regula decretum aut constitutum fuerit) errori tamen et hereticæ impietati proximum censent, etc." He puts his conclusion thus strongly though he grants in the same place that some of the Fathers can hardly be interpreted in this light ((NEW YORK REVIEW, Vol. I, pp. 599-615). Concerning the teaching of the Fathers which at first blush may seem contrary to the accepted teaching of the Church, we may remark: (1) That the Fathers are not treating the subject of the beatific vision in Christ "ex professo," and (2) that the Fathers who wrote thus were in the midst of the Arian controversy, and therefore wholly intent upon proving the divinity of the Logos, and consequently while insisting that texts like Mark xiii, 32, Luke ii, 40 and 52, Philippians ii, 6, seqq., which seemed to put limitations in Christ, were not applicable to his divine nature, they would grant for the sake of argument, that they might indicate a real limitation in that which was human in the ManGod-but mark, always for the sake of argument. (Petavius, Ibidem, Cap. i, n. 5). Certainly after the Arian controversy had passed and the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon had closed the questions then rife, Christian tradition, both in the East and in the West, became more and more emphatic in asserting no limitation, but on the contrary, the greatest possible knowledge in Christ as man. (NEW YORK REVIEW, Vol. I, pp. 611-615). This tradition Cassiodorus (NEW YORK REVIEW, Ibidem, p. 614), voices when he writes that it is "nefarium judicare si illa omnipotens Verbi humanatio aliquod de futuris ignorasse putaretur quod Patrem scire prædicavit"; and Eulogius, in writing to St. Gregory the Great, asserts that it is simply impious to say that even as man Christ could have been ignorant.

The Venerable Bede, following the Benedictine tradition laid down by Gregory the Great, seems to admit that even as a growing child, Christ had all fulness of knowledge, and still, in some way, he seems to think that Christ advanced in wisdom. "Quæ tamen in sapientia nullatenus proficeret si naturalem intelligentiam quæ hominibus rationis causa concessa est, non haberet." Without expressing it openly he doubtless had in mind the "scientia acquisita," taught later by St. Thomas Aquinas, because he immediately adds: "Non

quia hoc susceptor, Deus eguit, præsertim cum supra plenus sapientia puer describitur." (Migne, Patr. Lat. 92, col. 350, also col. 348).

Alcuin (Patr. Lat. 91, col. 303), asks the question whether or not the soul of Christ knew fully Christ's divinity? He quotes John iii, 34: "Non enim ad mensuram dat Deus Spiritum," and agrees that the spirit was given to Christ without limit or measure. This fulness of the Spirit would seem impossible were Christ to lack in any degree a knowledge of his own divinity. "Ubi enim mensura dicitur non esse plenitudo perfectionis et perfectio plenitudinis invenitur...non enim æstimandum est animæ Christi in aliquo plenam divinitatis deesse notitiam, cujus una est persona cum verbo, quum sic sapientia suscepit, ut cum ipsa divinitate sua una sit in Trinitate persona, id est, Christus crucifixus, quem Dei virtutem et sapientiam Paulus Apostolus prædicat" (I Cor. i, 24). With Alcuin a full knowledge even of the Godhead is bound up irrevocably with the hypostatic union. Concerning the difficulty from St. Mark xiii, 32, cf. Ibid. Cap. xii, col. 37.

St. John Damascene teaches (De Hæres. Migne, Patr. Græca, 94, col. 756), that the Agnoita were heretics because they impiously taught that Christ was ignorant of the day of judgment. He also remarks that they were the same as the followers of Themistius whose tenets were decidedly Eutychian (Natalis Alexander. Selecta Hist. Eccles. vi, cap. iii, art. 3)

Anselm in Cur Deus Homo (Lib. II, cap. xiii; Migne, Patr. Lat. 158, col. 413), is even more explicit. He asks why Christ could not. have taken upon himself our ignorance when he assumed our mortality. He answers: "Illa hominis assumptio in unitatem personæ Dei non nisi sapienter a summa sapientia fiet, et ideo non assumet in homine quod nullo modo utile, sed valde noxium est ad opus quod idem homo facturus est. Ignorantia namque ad nihilum illi utilis esset, sed ad multa noxia; quomodo enim tot et tanta opera quæ facturus est, faciet sine summa sapientia, aut quomodo illi homines credent si eum scient nescium?" Not only does he deny all lack of knowledge on the part of Christ, but he even hints at the principle put forward later by St. Thomas Aquinas that fulness of knowledge is required for the working out of the purpose of the Incarnation.

The school of St. Bernard puts this doctrine even more emphatically. St. Bernard (De Laudibus B. Mariæ Virginis) in his homily entitled Super Missus est (Migne, Patr. Lat. 183, col. 65-66), writes thus concerning the growth in wisdom of which St. Luke speaks ii,