say in as far as it is relative, always implies the hypothesis of the truth of the fact; while in as far as as it is absolute, it must always be based on the truth, seeing that its object is the persons of the saints who are honoured. The same is true of relics. Finally, We entrust to the Councils of. Vigilance the duty of overlooking assiduously and diligently social institutions as well as writings on social questions so that they may harbour no trace of Modernism, but obey the prescriptions of the Roman Pontiffs.

7.-TRIENNIAL RETURNS.

Lest what We have laid down thus far should fall into oblivion, We will and ordain that the Bishops of all dioceses, a year after the publication of these letters and every three years thenceforward, furnish the Holy See with a diligent and sworn report on all the prescriptions contained in them, and on the doctrines that find currency among the clergy, and especially in the seminaries and other Catholic institutions, and We impose the like obligation on the Generals of Religious Orders with regard to those under them.

This, Venerable Brethren, is what we have thought it our duty to write to you for the salvation of all who believe. The adversaries of the Church will doubtless abuse what we have said to refurbish the old calumny by which we are traduced as the enemy of science and of the progress of humanity. In order to oppose a new answer to such accusations, which the history of the Christian religion refutes by neverfailing arguments, it is Our intention to establish and develop by every means in our power a special Institute in which, through the co-operation of those Catholics who are most eminent for their learning, the progress of science and other realms of knowledge may be promoted under the guidance and teaching of Catholic truth. God grant that we may happily realise our design with the ready assistance of all those who bear a sincere love for the Church of Christ. But of this we will speak on another occasion.

Meanwhile, Venerable Brethren, fully confident in your zeal and work, we beseech for you with our whole heart and soul the abundance of heavenly light, so that in the midst of this great perturbation of men's minds from the insidious invasions of error from every side, you may see clearly what you ought to do and may perform the task with all your strength and courage. May Jesus Christ, the author and finisher of our faith, be with you by His power; and may the Immaculate Virgin, the destroyer of all heresies, be with you by her prayers and aid. And We, as a pledge of Our affection and of divine assistance in adversity, grant most affectionately and with all Our heart to you, your clergy and people the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at St. Peter's, Rome, on the 8th day of September, 1907, the fifth year of our Pontificate.

PIUS X., POPE.

No apology is needed at the present moment for a paper concerning the Divine Personality. The truth is one that lies at the root of religion. Its importance affects both the intellectual life of the religious thinker and also the practical life of the multitudes whose attention to religion is that of action rather than of thought. Throughout the intellectual world there are the most varied theories afloat; and the pantheistic and the agnostic views would appear to have taken a new lease of life. In the busy world of non-thinkers, so our parochial clergy tell us, there is a diminishing sense of God's reality and overlordship. The infinite dignity of His Person is becoming less and less appreciated. That such habit of mind in the non-thinking many is the result of the influence of the thinking few, I, speaking for myself have no doubt. But whether it be so or not, certain it is that haziness of understanding about the divine personality is at least one of the most fruitful sources of loose thinking and loose living both amongst the intellectuals and amongst the millions who look up to them. If I am uncertain about the personality of God, to whom am I morally responsible for my conduct?

All moralists however have recognised that divine personality is one of the starting points both in the life of religious thought and in the life of moral action. It is a point which may be affirmed, denied, questioned, discussed. But it cannot be ignored. Hence teachers of all shades of thought have striven to push their respective opinions or convictions to the front. Attempts at restatement have been made first in terms of this philosophy and then in terms of that, but so far without any appreciable sign of agreement. The Catholic

apologist has now no choice as to what philosophical standpoint he must take. The Holy Father has commanded that the philosophy of St. Thomas must be the basis of our apologetic. In sympathy with these principles I offer the following study on the divine personality.

What is a person? Let us take the word in its world-wide signification. Ask the question of a number of intelligent workingmen whose minds are as yet unsophisticated, who have not yet done their year's course at a university hall, who have not yet constructed and formulated their Weltanschauung. One will reply: "A man or a woman." Another will say: "Same as myself or you or anybody.” Another: "A being that can talk or think." Another: "Not a dog or a cat." Another: "Well, each one of us: two of us would be two persons." Press a further question as to whether God or an angel is a person and the answer will be: "Well, anybody who has a spirit." In these replies there is contained the very essence of what the world understands by a person. In these replies also is contained the classical definition of Boethius adopted by St. Thomas and underlying the whole structure of his doctrine concerning all personality, human, angelic and divine.

The first note which shines from these popular definitions is that of individualness. I am a person, you are a person; anybody is a person; you are not I, and I am not you. The derivation of the word itself is from persono, to sound through. In this its original sense it denoted the mask used by actors. The actor put off his own individuality as it were and put on that of the hero whom he impersonated. The Latin term still finds place on our theatre programmes: dramatis personae. To appear in person is to appear in one's own individual self and not through the agency of another. To make "personal" remarks is to criticize the individual. Personal property denotes goods, chattels and movable things which belong to the individual and which are distinguished from real property, the land and houses belonging rather to the family. Individualness therefore is that aspect of a person in which he is seen to be a self, undivided in himself, yet divided off from all other things.

The second note which shines out from the popular idea of a person is one for which there is no equivalent English word. It is rendered by the Latin "suppositum," which may, in the absence of a better word, be rendered "substantialness." Ask the workingman whether he is a substance, and he will tell you that he is but

that he is different from other substances, such as pieces of things. He is a substance but different from a piece of chalk or a lump of coal. What he means is that he is a substance complete in itself, a suppositum, a vπóσтασis. His arm is not a person, nor his leg, nor his whole body, nor yet his soul. Only that which is complete in itself, the soul and body united together constitute a person.

The third note which shines out from the popular thought-formsis that of rationality. A stone is not a person; a bird is not a person. A man is a person; an angel is a person; God is a person. A person is a being that can talk and think and be responsible for his actions.

Having analyzed the popular conception we are now able to synthesise the scientific conception. It must contain the notes of substantialness, individualness and rationality. Thus a person is an individual rational substance.

Or the conception may be built up by reference to the various. categories of being. A being is either a substance or an accident: it exists either in itself or in another. But a person is not an accident since he exists in himself and not in another. He is therefore a substance. This category of being is again divided into first substance and second substance. By first substance we understand that which. is singular or individual; by second substance we understand the collection of individuals, that is, the common nature of the species. Manifestly a person is a first substance. It is the individual man who is a person, not mankind in general. Again, individual substancesare further divided into rational and non-rational. And clearly that individual substance which we call a person belongs to the rational order. Moreover, the category of the rational order is the most. exalted order of being. Rationality is the most dignified of the essential notes of a person. The reason of this is because it implies a right and control over one's constituent parts and actions. A brute must. necessarily follow the laws of instinct. A stone must necessarily follow the laws of gravitation. But a rational being is free and determines himself. Probably the derivation of the word person from the actor's masque was owing to the fact that the actors simulated the mythical heroes of such exalted dignity. It was the same sentiment too which in old English times named the parish priest "the parson." He was the person of the place, the chief dignitary of the parish. Thus again we have the definition of Boethius: a person is an individual substance of a rational nature; or the paraphrase