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those who would follow in their steps must give their days and nights to study, and emulate their greatness by emulating their love of labor. In our next number we shall offer some suggestions as to the best means of improvement in forensic rhetoric.

THE DUTY OF CARRIERS AS TO PROVIDING ROAD-WORTHY CARRIAGES.

delivery in any event. This we understand to be the distinction drawn by the great body of authorities between the two classes of carriers.

But in this State the Court of Appeals has attempted to establish a rule ignoring this distinction, and rendering the obligation of the carrier of passengers as extensive as that of the carrier of goods.

In Alden v. The N. Y. Central Railroad Co. (26 N. Y. R. 102), the court lays down the broad proposition that the passenger carrier is bound, absolutely and irrespective of negligence, to provide road-worthy vehicles. In that case the accident was caused by the breaking of an axle of the car. The weather was, and had been for some time, extremely cold, which tended to render the iron brittle. There was a small, old crack in the axle, so covered by the wheel that it was absolutely out of reach of discovery by any practicable examination of the axle, unless by taking off the wheel, with great difficulty and labor. No claim was made that the axle had not been properly manu factured.

The English Court of Exchequer has recently decided a case - Redhead v. The Midland Railway Co. (20 L. T. Rep. 628)—which is of interest in this country, and which will probably hereafter be taken as a precedent in all cases relating to the liability of carriers of passengers. In that case, the plaintiff, whilst a passenger on the defendant's road, was injured by an accident, caused by the breaking of the tyre of one of the wheels of the car in which he was seated; it was proved that such breaking was owing to an air-bubble, which could neither be discovered in the course of manufacture nor afterwards, and that in fact there was no negligence on the part of either the manufacturer or the railway company.

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The opinion in the case is very brief and seems to have been prepared without an examination of the many cases bearing on the question. This may account for the extraordinary proposition it attempts to establish. The judgment is founded on the case of Sharp v. Grey (9 Bing. 457), which was the only case cited, except that of Hegeman v. The Western Railroad Company, which we shall notice hereafter, and which had evidently no influence in shaping the opinion of the court.

LUSH, J., who tried the case, directed the jury that if the accident could not be foreseen, and was not due to any fault or carelessness on the part of the defendants, they were entitled to a verdict; and this ruling was afterwards upheld by MELLOR and LUSH, JJ., in the Queen's Bench, though dissented from by BLACKBURN, J. (Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 412). The Exchequer Chamber has now unanimously sustained this judgment, after a most careful review of both the English and American decisions, and established, so far at least as England is concerned, the principle that carriers of passengers are not warranters of the absolute roadworthiness of their vehicles, or in other words that there is no implied contract that their carriages and machinery are free from those defects which neither skill, care nor foresight can detect.

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If the interpretation given to the case of Sharp v. Grey by the Exchequer Court in the case of Redhead, before cited, be correct, it is evident that the judgment in the Alden case is unwarranted by it, and stands without a precedent. Speaking of that case SMITH, J., who delivered the opinion of the Exchequer Court, says: "That case, when examined, furnishes no sufficient authority for the extensive liability which the plaintiff seeks to impose upon the defendant. There the plaintiff was injured by an accident caused by the breaking of the axletree of a stage-coach. The defect might have been discovered if a certain examination had taken place; and it was made a question of fact at the trial whether it would have been prudent or not to make that examination.

This decision is commended alike by sound sense and an almost unbroken current of authorities. Carriers of goods are insurers against all events but the act of God and the king's enemies. The reason of this rigid rule is, as Lord HOLT says, in Cogg v. Bernard (1 Sm. Lead. Cas.), that men are obliged, when they intrust their goods to carriers, to part with all control over them, and that, if carriers were not insurers, it would be easy for them to combine with thieves, and that "in such a clandestine manner as would not be possible to be discovered." But with regard to the carriers of passengers, the same rule has not, with one or two exceptions, to be hereafter noticed, been applied, "and for the obvious reason," as Judge HUBBARD remarked in Ingalls v. Bills (9 Met. 1), "that a great distinction exists between persons and goods-the passengers being capable of taking care of themselves, and of exercising that vigilance and foresight in the maintenance of their rights, which the owners of goods cannot do, who have intrusted them to others."

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TINDAL, C. J., who tried the cause, is reported to have directed the jury to consider whether there had been, on the part of the defendant, that degree of vigilance which was required by his engagement to carry the plaintiff safely. Now, if the learned Chief Justice had supposed there was an absolute warranty of road-worthiness, this direction could not have been given, as it would then have been immaterial whether the defendant had used vigilance or not, and the degree of vigilance would have been an utterly immaterial consideration. The jury having found, on his direction, for the plaintiff, a motion was made, in the absence of TINDAL, C. J., for a new trial. Two of the learned judges, in refusing the rule (GASELEE and BOSANQUET, JJ.), are certainly reported to have used expressions which seem to indicate that they thought the defendant bound to supply a road-worthy vehicle. PARK, J., used language which, as reported, is ambiguous. But the judgment of ALDERSON, J.,

The carrier of passengers undertakes that as far as human foresight can go he will provide for their safe conveyance. The ground upon which his liability rests is negligence, while the ground of the liability of the carrier of goods is the absolute warranty for safe

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is distinctly opposed to the notion of a warranty against latent and undiscoverable defects. He says: "A coach proprietor is liable for all defects in his vehicle which can be seen at the time of construction, as well as for such as may exist afterwards, and be discovered by investigation. We have referred somewhat fully to this case, because it was put forward as the strongest authority in support of the plaintiff's claim which can be found in the English courts, and because it was relied on by the judges of the Court of Appeals, in New York, in a decision which will be hereafter referred to. But the case, when examined, furnishes no sufficient authority for the unlimited warranty now contended for. The facts do not raise the point for decision, and the authority of TINDAL, C. J., and ALDERSON is against the plaintiff."

On such unreliable and misapprehended authority has our Court of Appeals imported a new and extraordinary condition into the contract between carrier and passenger.

The Supreme Court of the seventh district, in the case of McPadden v. New York Central Railroad Co. (47 Barb. 247), repeats the rule of the Alden case, but the principle was not involved, and the remarks of the learned judge are wholly obiter. That case was for an accident caused by a broken rail. It appeared that an express train had passed over the place where the rail was broken but a short time before the train on which the plaintiff was riding, and that there had been no examination of the track between that time and the time of the accident. The plaintiff, at the trial, asked to go to the jury upon the question whether the rail was not broken before the train on which the plaintiff was a passenger came up, but his request was refused, and a non-suit granted. It was a proper question for the jury even within the rule of the Exchequer Chamber. It has never been questioned that carriers were bound to exercise the uttermost care and foresight in preventing accidents; and a neglect to examine the track, after the passage of a train, may justly be regarded as a violation of that rule. Indeed, under the rule of the Alden case, the question whether the rail was broken previously to, or at the instant of the accident, could not properly be submitted to the jury, as it was entirely immaterial—the company being absolutely liable for a breakage of its machinery.

So far as we have been able to learn, the law, as laid down by the Court of Appeals, has never been followed outside of this State.

In Massachusetts it has long been settled that carriers of passengers are not responsible for hidden defects which it is not in their power to discover by any ordinary means. The case of Ingalls v. Bills (9 Met. 1), was for an injury caused by the breaking of an axle-tree of a coach, in which there was a very small flaw, entirely surrounded by sound iron one-fourth of an inch thick, and which could not be discovered by the most careful examination externally. The court held, after a most elaborate examination of the authorities, that the action could not be maintained; and said: "Where accidents arise from a hidden and internal defect, which a careful and thorough examination would not disclose, and which could not be guarded against by the exercise of a sound judgment, and the most vigilant oversight, then the proprietor is

not liable for the injury, but the misfortune must be borne by the sufferer as one of that class of injuries for which the law can afford no redress in the form of pecuniary recompense."

In Edwards v. Lord (49 Maine, 279), it was held that if a passenger receive an injury which any reasonable care or skill could have prevented, the carrier is liable therefor. In Sales v. Western Stage Company (4 Iowa 547), the court says: Carriers of passengers, for hire, are bound to exert the utmost skill and prudence in conveying their passengers, and are responsible for the slightest negligence or want of skilfullness either in themselves or their servants. In Galena and Chicago R. Co. v. Fay (16 Ill. 558), the court says: The care, skill and diligence required of carriers of passengers are of the highest degree, and must be proportionate to the danger of their particular mode of conveyance; but they are not insurers against all accidents, and the passengers take all the risks incident to the mode of travel. Such, in short, has beer. the purport of every decision on the subject, in every State in the Union where the question has arisen. Such was also the doctrine of the courts of this State before the innovations of the Alden case. In Camden and Amboy Railroad Co. v. Burk (13 Wend. 626); Hollister v. Nowlen (19 Wend. 236); Curtis v. Syracuse and Rochester R. R. Co. (20 Barb. 282); Weed v. Panama R. Co. (5 Duer, 193); Caldwell v. Murphy (1 Duer, 233), and other cases, the courts have held the carriers of passengers responsible only for the exercise of human care and foresight.

We regard the rule as laid down in the case of Hegeman v. The Western Railroad Co. (13 N. Y. R. 9), sufficiently rigid to afford the necessary protection to travelers, and believe that, should the question again come before the Court of Appeals, it will be taken as a precedent rather than the Alden decision. The case was also for injuries occasioned by the breaking of a car axle, caused by a slight crack or flaw. It was proved that the axle was made of the best iron, and by reputable manufacturers, and that the only way of detecting the flaw was by bending the axle, after its manufacture—a test which, it appeared, was used by some manufacturers, but which had not been applied to the axle in question. It was a defect in construction resulting from a want of skill or care on the part of the manufacturers. The court held that the railroad company was bound to the exercise of the utmost skill and foresight, not only in running their cars, but in their construction; and that it was a question for the jury to determine whether there had been negligence either on the part of the company or of the manufacturers. Only five judges concurred in the decision; MARVIN and DENIO, JJ., dissenting, on the ground that the company was not liable for the negligence of the manufacturers. In the case of Sharp v. Grey, before cited, ALDERSON, J., expressed views similar to those of the majority of the court in the above case. He says: "A coach proprietor is liable for all defects in his vehicle, which can be seen at the time of construction, as well as for such as may exist afterwards, and be discovered on investigation."

From this cursory examination of the authorities it would seem, as is the fact, that the case of Alden v. The New York Central Railroad stands alone and un

supported in the broad proposition it attempts to establish. Indeed the learned judge who delivered the opinion in that case seems to have been conscious that he was annexing to the contract of the carrier of passengers what had not hitherto been understood to form a part of it, and attempts to palliate it by saying: "Though this may seem a hard rule, it is probably the best that can be laid down, since it is plain and of easy application, and, when once established, is distinct notice to all parties of their duties. And, practically, it will be likely to work no more burdensome results to carriers of passengers than to leave them, with an uncertain criterion of responsibility, to the trouble and expense of strongly litigated contests before juries." We had never before supposed that any plea of conveniency, or ease of application, was a sufficient excuse for a departure from, or innovation upon the common law, especially so far as to introduce new and onerous obligations into the contracts of parties.

We are in favor of holding all carriers of passengers to the exercise of the highest degree of human skill, care and foresight, but to make them liable for a disaster arising from a latent defect in the machinery which they are obliged to use, which no human skill, care or foresight could either have prevented or detected, is neither just nor reasonable, nor requisite to the safety of the public.

LAW AND LAWYERS IN LITERATURE.

Law and lawyers have always been a prominent subject for comment, and not infrequently, of ridicule, in literature. A good deal of this is too familiar to justify review. Every school-boy has grown gloomy over Eugene Aram, and cried at the court scenes in The Heart of Mid-Lothian. The first law book read by the young man on entering the study of our profession is usually Ten Thousand a Year, by the amiable and funny, but rather mean-spirited Mr. Samuel Warren, who mixes up some bad law with a good deal of toadyism and servility. We are all quite well acquainted with Mr. Dickens' legal charactersTulkinghorn and Vholes, Sampson Brass and his sister Sally, Justice Nupkins and his clerk Jinks, Sergeant Buzfuz and promising young Mr. Phunkey, Messrs. Doddson & Fogg, the inexorable partner Jorkins, etc., and with the admirable and humane spirit of his satire on the abuses of the chancery system. If Mr. Dickens had done nothing else in this way except to draw that wonderful scene in Our Mutual Friend, in which Rogue Riderhood makes his "Alfred Davy," he would have demonstrated at once his acute knowledge of human nature and of the workings of legal affairs. I suppose there are certain other weak persons beside myself who have been tempted into reading certain of Mr. Anthony Trollope's novels, in which legal matters are marvelously but dully dealt with. Those who are favorable to the admission of women to the bar will find warrant for their opinions in two works of fiction-to mention the sublime and the ridiculous in one breath-The Merchant of Venice and Griffith Gaunt. All these things are familiar, and have been well commented on by a writer for the

American Law Review, in an article entitled Law in Romance, in the number for April, 1867.

It has long been a favorite project of mine to carry this research further back and more extensively into literature, and to trace how law and lawyers stood in the estimation of the older and less familiar moralists, dramatists, and novelists. The field, I am sure, is a rich and inviting one, and however incompletely I may succeed in developing its interest, I shall be entirely satisfied if my essay shall operate to induce the study of our more ancient authors.

I shall endeavor at first to preserve something like a chronological series, but if in the course of my investigations anything new turns up, which ought to have been inserted before, I shall not allow any restriction to the order of time to prevent its insertion out of place. Nor shall I permit my predilection for the English tongue to prohibit some little rambling into foreign countries and literatures. In short, I propose to be as rambling and desultory as Dr. Foster's children, under the influence of the paternal rod, when they danced

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Before this, Chaucer had described a lawyer as one of the Canterbury Pilgrims:

"A Sergeant of the Lawe, ware and wise,
That often hadde yben at the paruis,*
Ther was also, ful riche of excellence.
Discrete he was, and of gret reverence:
He semed swiche,† his wordes were so wise,
Justice he was ful often in assise,

By patent, and by pleine commissioun ;
For his science, and for his high renoun,
Of fees and robes had he many on.
So grete a pourchasour was nowher non.
All was fee simple in him to effect,
His pourchasing might not ben in suspect.
Nowhere so besy a man as he ther n'as,
And yet he semed besier than he was.
In termes hadde he cas and domes? alle,
That fro the time of King Will weren falle.
Thereto he coude endite, and make a thing,
Ther coude no wight pinche¶ at his writing.
And every statute coude he plaine by rote.
He rode but homely in a medlee cote,
Girt with a senit** of silk, with barres smale;
Of his array tell I no longer tale."
Parvis, church portico. † Such.
** Girdle.

Opinions. ¶ Find flaw.

What a vivid description, especially the touch "seemed busier than he was."

SELDEN.

The learned Selden, in "Table Talk," has an interesting section on law, in which the most striking observation is: "Ignorance of the law excuses no man; not that all men know the law, but because 'tis an excuse every man will plead, and no man can tell how to confute him."

BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

The legal profession and Frenchmen were held up to scorn in Beaumont and Fletcher's comedy, entitled "The Little French Lawyer," in which, strange to say, the lawyer is by no means the principal personage, and is not closely connected with the plot. The character of La Writ, the lawyer, is ascribed by several editors to Beaumont's pen. La Writ is a fussy, busy, choleric, mean-spirited fellow, who, by an accidental success in a duel forced on him by a ruffling gallant, is filled with the idea that he is a man of spirit, and courts strife until his affected bravery is cudgeled out of him. He makes his first appearance in a sort of general answer to a crowd of clients:

"I understand your causes;

Yours about corn, yours about pins and glasses —
Will you make me mad? have I not all the parcels?
And his petition, too, about bell-founding?

Send in your witnesses - What will you have me do?
Will you have me break my heart? My brains are
melted!

And tell your master, as I am a gentleman,

His cause shall be the first. Commend me to your
mistress,

And tell her, if there be an extraordinary feather,
And tall enough for her- I shall despatch you too,
I know your cause, for transporting of farthingales;
Trouble me no more. I say again to you,

No more vexation! Bid my wife send me some pud-
dings;

I have a cause to run through requires puddings;
Puddings enough. Farewell."

he is permitted to depart, "an advocate new-vamp'd." After this, La Writ is as meek as Katherine after her taming by Petruchio, and gives Sampson and his clients as good advice as Katherine her friends. He dissuades Sampson from revenge, saying:

"I find I am wiser than a justice of peace now:
Give me the wisdom that's beaten into a man!
That sticks still by him.

Go, my son Sampson, I have now begot thee,
I'll send thee causes; speak to thy lord and live,
And lay my share by; go, and live in peace;
Put on new suits, and show fit for thy place;
That man neglects his living is an ass.

Come cheerly, boys, about our business!
Now welcome tongue again; hang swords!"

In "The Widow," Martino, clerk of Brandino, the justice, gives a warrant to a suitor, with:

"Nay, look upon 't, and spare not; every one cannot get that kind of warrant from me, signior. Do you see this prick i' the bottom? it betokens power and speed; it is a privy mark that runs betwixt the constables and my master; those that cannot read, when they see this, know 'tis for lechery or murder; and this being away, the warrant comes gelded and insufficient. * # Look you, all these are nihils; they want the punction."

Much of the "Spanish Curate" seems designed to "crucify the lawyer." In this admirable comedy, the character of Bartolus, the lawyer and one of the principal personages, and the standing of lawyers as evidenced by the luxurious habits of their wives, is strikingly and succinctly exhibited in the opening speeches of his handsome spouse, Amaranta:

"You know your own disease, distrust and jealousy.

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If that be rank'd a virtue, you have a rich one.
Set me, like other lawyers' wives, off handsome.y,
Attended as I ought; and, as they have it,
My coach, my people, and my handsome women,
My will in honest things."

From another speech of Bartolus, it appears that one of the learned professions brought grist to the lawmill, which, in modern times, does not except

indirectly:

That it was the fashion in those days for attorneys to carry bags, is evidenced by the fact that in the duel La Writ's life is saved by his bag, which he hangs in front of him. His antagonist loses his sword, and La Writ triumphs-an example of nonsuit applied to the duel. He takes this success so kindly that he becomes intoxicated, sings lewd songs, asks for "a wench or two," says he "hates a coward"-a reminder of Falstaff's "a plague o' all cowards say I." But while he is winning glory in this unaccustomed field, his causes go by default, and he flings away his bag, with "Avaunt, thou buckram budget of petitions! Thou spital of lame causes!" He challenges the president-yer's judge for dismissing his causes, and when told that he is no swordsman, says: "Let him learn; time, that trains chickens up, will teach him quickly." The judge, on receiving the challenge from this "wranggling advocate," this "little figent thing," this " notable talking knave," pleads his old age as an excuse for not meeting him in person, and deputes his kinsman to fight in his place. The kinsman Sampson appears, and the seconds, by preconcert, strip both combatants to the skin for the purpose of discovering any concealed armor, and then run away with their clothing and their swords. After a noisy combat of words, in which the shivering La Writ proposes "to fight at buffets," which Sampson scoffs at,-"My lord, mine uncle's cause depend on boxes!"- the two fall in with the judge and his friends, and La Writ is beaten by one of the latter, who says:

"Nay, never look; your lawyer's pate is broken, And your litigious blood about your ears, sirrah. Why do you fight and snarl?

La Writ. I was possessed.

Champernel. I'll dispossess you. (Beats him.)" After promising to "fall close to his trade again, and leave brawling," and asking the judge's forgiveness,

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"Tis some honest client, Rich and litigious, the curate has brought to me." But the curate brings instead a law student in the person of Leandro, a gallant disguised, who is in love with the beautiful Amaranta; and, as a means to prosecute his suit, proposes to become an inmate of Bartolus' house and office. It would be pleasing to the profession to meet a law student of equal ability and willingness to pay now-a-days, for this one offered twenty ducats a month for the privilege, besides three hundred down, and to "defray his diet." Of course, he was accepted. Diego, the sexton, who accompanies him, bids him adieu with:

"Take a good heart; and when you are a cunning lawyer,

I'll sell my bells, and you shall prove it lawful." Amaranta's suspicions are aroused by the liberal payments which her husband tells her the student has made, and the student serenades her in some verses, which she says are no law; they sound too sweetly." Don Henrique employs Bartolus in a dishonest cause, upon which hinges the other branch of the plot. Bartolus scruples not; "we surgeons of the law do

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desperate cures; good fees beget good causes; the prerogative of the crowns will carry the matter; the assistant sits to-morrow, and he's your friend; your moneyed men love naturally, and as your loves are clear, so are your causes. Hang the penurious! their causes, like their purses, have poor issues." But he "must have witnesses enough and ready-substantial, fearless souls-that will swear suddenly-that will swear anything; for variety, they may swear truth, else 'tis not much look'd after." He then advises his client to "see" the judge, and dismisses him with 'go, and believe i' the law." Before they come into court, the defendant assails Bartolus with foul language, and insinuates that he "would plead a needy client's cause for a starv'd hen, or half a little loin of veal, though fly-blown." Bartolus' opening speech in court is quite in the modern vein:

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"If I stood here

To plead in the defence of an ill man,
Most equal judge, or to accuse the innocent,
(To both which I profess myself a stranger),
It would be requisite I should deck my language
With tropes and figures, and all flourishes
That grace a rhetorician; 'tis confess'd
Adulterate metals need the goldsmith's art
To set 'em off; what in itself is perfect
Contemns a borrowed gloss."

As a matter of course, the court is with Bartolus and his client. On another occasion Bartolus says:

"I have been atoning two most wrangling neighbors; They had no money, therefore I made even.'

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But Leandro finding scant opportunities to court Amaranta, his friends, the curate and the sexton, enter into a plot to entice Bartolus from home. Diego feigns mortal sickness, and sends Lopez for Bartolus to draw his will. Then ensues a most amusing scene. It is represented to Bartolus that Diego is very rich, and, after making sundry bequests, intends most of his estate for the covetous lawyer. Diego's attendants give him drink to sustain his strength, and he, becoming tipsy, makes the most extravagant and absurd provisions for all sorts of strange objects, and the lawyer is in an agony at seeing his prospects dissipated. After spinning out this will as long as possible, the conspirators confess that they have been fooling Bartolus. He raves, and Diego "finds this cataplasm of a well-cozened lawyer, laid to his stomach, lenifies his fever." In the meantime, the handsome wife and the law student are improving the opportunity at home, and in a pretended attendance at church. On Bartolus' return he rages horribly, but is quieted by Lopez's mention of the inquisition as a terror to those who deny their wives the privilege of church. He pretends to be reconciled, and invites the conspirators to breakfast. They attend, he deprives them of their weapons, surrounds them with officers, and instead of edibles, puts in one dish "an execution for a thousand ducats" against the guest; in another, "a capias from his surgeon and his silk man;" in another, 66 a strong citation;" and in another, "a warrant to appear before the judges." Out of this mess they are rescued by a deus ex machina, and in the end all parties are reconciled.

In "A Wife for a Month" a "Lawyer, Physician, Captain, and Cutpurse pass over the stage," and Tony, a fool, in his remarks to Podrano concerning the vari

ous

"suitors to the widow lady," deals out hard measure to our profession, in respect to our gallantry toward the fair sex :

"Podrano. Why, these are rascals.
Tony. They were meant to be so:

Does thy master deserve better kindred?
Pod. There's an old lawyer,

Trimm'd up like a galley-foist; what would he do with her?

Tony. As usurers do with their gold; he woul I look on her,

And read her over once a day, like a hard report,
Feed his dull eye, and keep his fingers itching;
For anything else she may appeal to a parliament;
Subpoenas and posteas have spoil'd his codpiece."

When the suitors present themselves and urge their claims, the lawyer says: "I am a lawyer; I can and make her a jointure of any man's land in Naples; she shall keep it, too; I have a trick for it." To which Tony answers:

"Canst thou make her a jointure of thine honesty, Or thy ability, thou lewd abridgement?

Those are nonsuited and flung o'er the bar." When, to test their sincerity, it is inquired of the suitors which of them will "dare take her for one month, and then die?" the lawyer excuses himself, because

"This is like to be a year of great dissention
Among good people, and I dare not lose it;
There will be money got.'
[To be continued.]

THE MORAL STANDING OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION.

A recent writer in the New York Independent makes a violent onslaught on lawyers. "What profession," he asks, "has sent so many representatives to corrupt legislation, and to disgrace human nature by the successful glorification of crime? What profession has given so few saints, so few martyrs, so few moral heroes to the world?" To which we answer, that to lawyers is due a state of social affairs in which there is no longer any possibility of martyrdom or necessity for moral heroism. It is highly probable that if it were not for the profession he reviles, this writer would never have had a chance to publish his foolish article, for these are the days of unlicensed printing. Nearly every trace of social and religious liberty on earth is due to lawyers. No class has been so fruitful of "saints, martyrs, and moral heroes" as the clergy, and yet what a world this would be if ruled by priests! A priest-governed people is synonymous with an ignorant, degraded, superstitious, and unaspiring people. The priests have always been the cause of all "martyrdom," and "moral heroism" was an outgrowth. The physical safety of society, the liberty of religious opinion, the cohesion of our moral system, are all in great measure due to, and dependent on, law and its officers. If it were not for ameliorations which lawyers have effected, some Cotton Mather would still be hanging witches; some Calvin would still be burning Servetus; slavery would overspread the world; lazy monks would still be scaring rich and moribund sinners into large gifts to fatten pretended religious uses. In his recent great work on European Morals," Mr. Lecky says that no other agent is so potently beneficial in moulding public

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