term, rests upon the doctrine, that if he neglected to avail himself of his right within this period, the law presumed that he voluntarily relinquished his claim in favor of the landlord. This presumption cannot arise where the term, being uncertain in its continuance, may be terminated suddenly, and without previous notice. Ib.

FORGED CHECK.

On the 20th of December, 1868, H. presented himself at the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank, to whose officers he was unknown, and stated that he desired to open an account, and presented a check on the First National Bank for $4,600.15, purporting to have been drawn by A., dated the 18th of December, and payable to the order of H., who indorsed it, and the amount of the check was entered to his credit as cash in a bank-book furnished by the bank; but on the same day the teller was directed by the cashier not to allow the account to be drawn upon until the deposited check was known to be good or was paid. On the following morning, this check was sent to the clearing house, and thence was taken to the First National Bank, where it was passed as genuine by the proper officers of the bank, charged to the account of A., and credited to the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank. By the custom and usage of all the banks in the city of Baltimore, where a check is sent through the clearing house to the bank on which it is drawn, and is not heard from before eleven o'clock of the day on which it is so sent, the bank sending it has the right to assume it was good or had been paid, and to act accordingly. On the 22d December, H. called at the bank where he had made the deposit, with his bank-book, filled up a check for $4,500, payable to his own order, and handed it for payment to the paying teller, who, after satisfying himself by inquiry of the receiving teller as to his identity, and by the examination of the books of the bank as to the state of his account, paid him the amount of his check. On the 24th December, the account of A. was overdrawn to the amount of $372, on the books of the First National Bank, and the overdrawing continued until the 29th, when his account was overdrawn $2,297; after bank hours of that day, A. was for the first time informed by the bank officers of such overdrawing, when, upon an examination of his account and checks, he pronounced the check deposited by H. a forgery. Notice of the forgery was given by the First National Bank to the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank, on the 31st of December, and repayment of the money demanded; but the latter denied its liability beyond the $100.15, still remaining to the credit of H. The First National Bank having refunded to A. the amount of the forged check, sued the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank to recover the amount thus paid. Held: 1. That the law imposed upon the First National Bank the obligation of knowing the signature of A., one of its depositors, and it is therefore not entitled to recover from the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank the sum of $4,500, paid by the latter to H.; for as between parties equally innocent and equally deceived, but where one is bound to know and to act upon its knowledge, and the other has no means of knowledge, the loss should be thrown upon the former rather than upon the latter. 2. That the sending of the check deposited by H. through the clearing house by the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank, and the failure to communicate to the First National Bank the fact that it was received from a stranger, was not such negligence as should throw the loss upon the former bank. 3. That the First National Bank is entitled to a judgment for $100.15, the balance remaining in the Commercial and Farmers' National Bank to the credit of H. Commercial and Farmers' National Bank v. First National Bank.

GUARDIAN AND Ward.

The sureties in a guardian's bond are not responsible for any property their principal may have received as

guardian without competent legal authority, and to which the ward had no legal title or claim during his minority. Gunther and Canfield v. The State, use of Bouldin.

INSURANCE.

The plaintiffs procured from the defendant a policy of insurance, by the terms of which they were not to keep, in the buildings occupied by them, any articles, goods, or merchandise, denominated hazardous, or extra or specially hazardous in the conditions of insurance annexed to the policy, except as provided in the policy or thereafter agreed upon by the insurer in writing upon the policy. Subsequently an indorsement was made on the policy in the following language: "Permission given to keep one barrel of benzine or turpentine in tin cans, and one-half barrel of varnish for use, in No. 9 Commerce street." The plaintiffs were engaged in the business of rectifying and selling liquors, and their business required the use of benzine for certain purposes. The benzine was always brought in a barrel, rolled into the warehouse, and transferred by means of a syphon into a single can, capable of holding the contents of one barrel. On one occasion, while this transfer was being made, an explosion took place which set fire to and destroyed the warehouse. In an action on the policy of insurance, Held, 1. That a fair and reasonable construction must be given to the indorsement so far as the intention of the parties can be deduced from the terms employed. 2. That said indorsement was not a warranty, but a permission given by the insurer, and to be substantially complied with on the part of the insured, to enable them to claim the benefit of the privilege. 3. That there was a substantial compliance with the provisions of the indorsement, in keeping the quantity specified in one tin can. 4. That under the permission to keep the benzine for use to the extent specified, the insured were not restricted in their right to procure it in any usual way; and the purchase of it from merchants or other persons having it, and its introduction and transfer from the wooden barrel to the tin can, were allowed to the insured by every reasonable intendment. 5. That the temporary introduction into the barrel, was not the keeping of it, in the wooden barrel, and cannot in any just sense be considered violative of the terms of the indorsement. 6. That although the fire may have been attributable to the want of ordinary care, or the fault and negligence of the insured or their employees or agents, yet in the absence of fraud or design their right of recovery was not barred thereby. 7. That what may have been the habit of the insured in regard to the keeping of the benzine, could neither, under the terms of the original policy (which provided that the keeping of any of the prohibited articles, or the storing thereof on the insured premises, only operated to make void the policy so long as they were so used), or the indorsement, have any application, unless at the time of the occurrence of the fire, the barrel of benzine was actually stored or kept upon the premises in the wooden barrel. Maryland Fire Insurance Co. v. Whiteford et al.

MISNOMER.

Where a party is sued by a wrong name, and the writ is served on the party intended to be sued, and he fails to appear and plead the misnomer in abatement, and suffers judgment to be obtained by default against him in the erroneous name, he is concluded, and execution may be issued on the judgment in that name and levied upon the property and effects of the real defendant. First National Bank of Baltimore v. Jaggers.

MORTGAGE.

1. When a mortgagee acquires the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property, it does not follow as a necessary consequence, that the mortgage becomes merged and extinguished. A person becoming entitled to an estate, subject to a charge for his own benefit, may,

if he elect so to do, and manifest such election, take the estate and keep up the charge. Polk v. Reynolds.

2. A court of equity will sometimes hold a charge extinguished, when, by the strict rules governing the subject at law, it would be regarded as subsisting; and sometimes preserve it, where at law it would be merged; the question being as to the intention, actual or presumed, of the person in whom the interests are united, founded upon the reason or necessity of the case. Ib.

3. A bona fide assignee of a mortgage has unquestionably the right to file a bill in equity to relieve the mortgaged estate from the cloud and embarrassment produced by the unfounded pretensions of a purchaser at a tax sale, and his assignee. Ib.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. In an action under the statute, by a father to recover damages from a railroad company, for the death of his child, aged about five years, caused by its negligence, the plaintiff is entitled to recover if it appear that the death resulted from the want of ordinary care and caution on the part of the defendant, and that the child used such care as might reasonably be expected under the circumstances from one of her age and intelligence, and that the parent or person to whose care she was intrusted at the time, did not by his negligence directly contribute to produce the result complained of. Baltimore and Ohio R. R. Co. v. State, use of Fryer.

2. The terms “ordinary und reasonable care" are relative and dependent, and whether such care has been used can only be determined by considering the age and capacity of the person injured. Ib.

3. In actions under the statute, or in other cases, where parties sue for personal injuries suffered by others than themselves, no recovery can be had if the party entitled to the action be guilty of negligence or the want of care, whereby the injury occurred. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Where a party by his conduct held himself out as a partner of another, in a transaction affecting a third person, who had reasonable grounds to believe that he was such partner, and so trusted the firm, and had no knowledge to the contrary, they will be clearly held partners as to such third person. Thomas v. Green,

2. Whether a person held himself out as a partner is a fact to be ascertained by the jury from all the evidence in the case. Ib.

PRACTICE.

1. As a general rule, in actions upon partnership contracts, all the partners ought to be made defendants, but the omission to do so can only be taken advantage of by plea in abatement. Smith v. Cooke.

2. In default of such plea, a joint contract may be offered in evidence in support of the separate contract declared on. Ib.

3. The objection to an interrogatory that it is "leading," being to the form and manner in which the question was put, should be taken before the commissioner by whom the evidence is taken. 1b.

4. Where evidence has been offered to prove partnership between the defendant and his son, and that the business was carried on in one place in the name of the son, and in another in the name of the father, it is competent and proper for the plaintiff to explain why the goods (the price of which was the subject of the action) were charged to the father, and the circumstances under which they were delivered. Ib.

5. Where the defendant had offered evidence to prove that the "cans" mentioned in the declaration were sold to T. R. S. (not a defendant in the action), it is competent for the plaintiff, in rebutting this testimony, to prove what was the credit of T. R. S., and to explain why he would not have furnished to him the cans in controversy. Ib.

6. A contracted with B to manufacture and deliver to the latter certain cans; in an action by A against B for the price of the cans, B offered to prove that H, the agent of A, while the cans were being manufac tured, stated, on several occasions, that he was selling the same to T. R. S. Held, that the evidence was liable to two objections. 1st. If offered for the purpose of impeaching the witness H, he should have been first asked whether he had ever made such declarations; and 2dly. Having been made after the alleged contract, the declarations were not binding on A. Ib.

7. In an action against a party to recover sundry claims placed in his hands for collection, and upon which he had obtained judgments before a justice of the peace, the justice testified (the executions on four of said judgments not being produced at the trial) that the entry "made and satisfied" on his docket in each of said four judgments, was made by himself, from information communicated by the defendant; but that independent and apart from the entries aforesaid on his docket, he had no knowledge or recollection of the admission by the defendant, that he had collected these four judgments. Held, that while the entries themselves were not admissible, as evidence, they could be used by the witness for the purpose of refreshing his recollection as to the admissions of the defendant, and the parol testimony was proper to go the jury to charge the defendant. Spiker v. Nydegger.

8. Claims placed in the hands of a constable for collection and receipted for by him as such, and which he collected, may be recovered from him by the assignee of said claims in an action of assumpsit, in his own name for money had and received. Ib.

9. An owner of claims may, by parol, authorize another to assign them in writing. 1b.

10. The entry of a judgment to the use of a party implies, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, that it has been legally assigned to him. Ib.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

1. If the creditor release or compound with the principal debtor, without the consent of the surety, although the principal debtor may be in insolvent circumstances, and the arrangement with him be in truth to the surety's advantage, it will, nevertheless, discharge the latter from all responsibility. Oberndoff, trustee, v. Union Bank of Baltimore.

2. But before a surety or indorser can be exonerated from his responsibility upon the ground that there has been an unauthorized indulgence given, or composition made with the principal debtor, it must be shown that such indulgence or composition has been effected by some express agreement founded upon a valid consideration, and which is legally binding on the creditor. Ib.

3. Part payment of the amount due, whether by principal or surety, will not discharge the surety, even where it is agreed that such part payment shall have that effect. Ib.

4. Where a party is bound to pay a certain sum, there is no consideration, in contemplation of law, for a promise that a less sum shall be received in satisfaction. Ib. 5. A and B, by a written agreement, assigned to a bank a number of collaterals as security for their liability to it, whether then existing or thereafter to arise, as drawers, indorsers, or otherwise, with power to the bank in case of default on the part of A and B to pay promptly their liabilities, to collect the said collaterals by suit or otherwise, to make compromise in the settlement of the same, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of said liabilities. A and B subsequently failed, being largely indebted to the bank upon notes indorsed by them, and discounted by it for them, and assigned all their property to C in trust for their creditors. Subsequent to the failure, the bank compromised with the makers of certain of the discounted notes, at fifty cents on the dollar, and also made large collections upon other collaterals held

by it under said agreement, and claimed the right to apply the moneys so collected to the payment of the entire Indebtedness of A and B to it, which claim was resisted by the assignee of C. upon the ground that by the compromises aforesaid, the makers of the notes compromised were released, and the liability of A and B as indorsers upon said notes was discharged. The agreement between the bank and the makers of the notes compromised was by parol, after the notes fell due, and the notes were not surrendered. On a suit brought by the assignee of A and B against the bank, held: 1. That there was no legal consideration for the relinquishment, on the part of the bank, of the balance due on the notes compromised, after the receipt of one-half of their face value. 2. That, in the absence of some sufficient consideration, the agreement between the bank and the makers of the notes was wholly inoperative, and could not be set up or relied on by the makers of the notes, either as against the bank or the indorsers. 3. That the bank was not bound to any active diligence in their collection, to give it the benefit of the collaterals deposited with it by the indorsers. Ib.

PROMISSORY NOTE. See Principal and Surety.

1. The purchaser of a patent right gave in part payment two promissory notes, payable six and twelve months after date. When the first note matured, in March, 1866, it was protested for non-payment; and was subsequently, together with the twelve months note, which had not matured, assigned to the plaintiff; in May, 1866, the maker of the notes was approached by the holder, and at his instance substituted a new note for the overdue and dishonored one, making it payable to the order of the original payees, refusing the request of the indorsee to make it payable to his order, and warning him to have nothing to do with it. The maker informed the indorsee, at the time, that he had been swindled in the purchase of the patent right, and that he should make the renewal note payable at the same date with the twelve months note, which had not matured, so that the controversy between himself and the original payees might be settled by one suit; in an action on the notes brought by the indorsee against the maker, Held, 1. That the indorsee of the note overdue took it subject to any equities between the makers and the payee, and that he took the renewal note with notice of the defense intended to be set up against the claim of the payees. 2. That while there was no evidence to show that the indorsee was not a bona fide holder for value without notice of the twelve months note, which had not matured when he got it, still as the notes were sued on together, there was error in the court's instruction to the jury, that there was no evidence in the case by which they could infer that when the plaintiff took the notes he was aware of any infirmity in the title of the payees, Clarke v. Dederick.

2. It is for the court to decide as to the sufficiency in law of the evidence, but its sufficiency in fact is for the exclusive cognizance of the jury. Ib.

3. A notarial protest is prima facie evidence of the trutn of its statements, and where the protest is exclusively relied upon to prove the necessary facts to fix liability upon the party to be affected, it must contain sufficient averments to show that every thing requisite has been done on the part of the holder of the note, or his agent, to authorize the demand upon the indorser. People's Bank of Baltimore v. Brooke,

4. In action against an indorser on a promissory note, payable at the People's Bank of Baltimore, the notarial protest was the only evidence offered to establish due demand of payment of the note, its dishonor by the maker and legal notice thereof to the defendant as indorser. The protest failed to show that presentment of the note was made at the bank for payment at its maturity, or that it was left at the bank for payment. The protest merely stated that the note was presented, without saying where it was presented. Held, that the evi

dence was insufficient to make the indorser responsible for the payment of the note. Ib.

SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY.

1. On the 23d of August, 1867, the appellants, who were engaged in the business of buying and selling horses in Baltimore, received into their possession, to be sold on commission, a horse belonging to the appellee, who resided in Frostburg. The horse, at that time, was apparently sound and in good condition. On the 12th of September, 1867, the appellants addressed a letter to the appellee, stating that the horse had been sick, but was doing well at that time, and offering $140 for her, clear of all expenses, and adding "you can draw on us at sight for $140." This letter was received on the 15th or 16th of September. On the 16th, the appellee signified his acceptance of the offer by drawing on the appellants for $140. The draft was sent on that day, and on the 17th, the appellants refusing to pay the draft, it was protested. On the 16th of September the appellants addressed a letter to the appellee, stating that when they wrote they did not think the horse was so bad, but since it had turned out to be "farcy," and they would not buy her at any price; and directing him not to draw on them for the money, as they would not pay the money until they saw how the mare got. This letter was not received by the appellee till after he had accepted the offer contained in the letter of the 12th, by sending the draft. In an action brought by the vendor to recover the price of the horse,-Held, 1. That until the notice of withdrawal actually reached the vendor, the offer was continuing, and the acceptance thereof by him completed the bargain. 2. That the vendees could not maintain the objection that they made the offer under a mistake of fact, and were therefore not bound by it. 3. That in a case where there is a mutual mistake of the parties, as to the subject-matter of the contract, or the price, or terms, going to show the want of a consensus ad idem, without which no contract can arise, such a defense may be made; but not where the mistake is in relation to a fact wholly collateral, and not affecting the essence of the contract itself. 4. That the vendees cannot escape from the obligation of their contract, because they have been mistaken or disappoitend in the quality of the article purchased. 5. That in the absence of a warranty, the rule caveat emptor applies, and the buyer takes the risk of quality upon himself. 6. That the offer of the 12th of September was not, according to its legal construction, a conditional offer which might be withdrawn at any time. Wheat et al v. Cross.

2. Where a prayer is granted erroneously, at the instance of the appellants, and inures to their advantage, they cannot ask a rever. al on account of any error therein. Ib.

SET-OFF.

1. An unliquidated and uncertain claim for damages cannot be set off against a judgment. In equity, as at law, a set-off is only allowed where there is mutuality in the demands, and the amounts are certain and determined. Smith v. Washington Gaslight Company.

2. Where a plaintiff, located and doing business in the city of Washington, recovers a judgment in the superior court of Baltimore city, and the defendant has a claim for damages growing out of the same transaction, the mere fact that the plaintiff is a non-resident does not give a court of equity in Baltimore jurisdiction to restrain the judgment against the defendant, and to enforce a setoff. lb.

SETTLEMENT.

If a creditor of the principal settle with the agent, and takes a note or other security from the latter for the amount due by the principal, although, as between the parties, it is intended only as a conditional payment, yet if the creditor gives a receipt as if the money were received, or the security were an absolute payment, so that the agent is thereby enabled to settle with the prin

cipal, as if the debt had been actually discharged, and the principal would otherwise be prejudiced, the debt will be deemed, as to the latter, absolutely discharged. Brown v. Bankers' and Brokers' Telegraph Co.

TAX SALE.

A purchaser of a house and lot in the city of Baltimore, sold by the city collector for non-payment of an assessment levied thereon, for opening the street upon which it was located, paid the purchase-money, received from the collector a deed for the property, and entered into possession; subsequently he was ejected by the owners, upon the ground that the collector had omitted to give the notice, as required by ordinance, of such sales, and was obliged to pay costs and mesne profits. He thereupon brought an action to recover damages from the city collector. Held, that the purchaser was bound to inquire whether the city collector, in selling the property, acted in conformity with the law authorizing the sale; and coming strictly and rigidly within the rule of "caveat emptor," he is not entitled to recover. Hamilton v. Valiant.

TENANTS IN COMMON.

1. One tenant in common, who solely occupies the common property, cannot be held liable to his co-tenants for use and occupation, unless there has been an actual ouster of his co-tenants. Israel v. Israel and wife.

2. A tenant in common, occupying the common property, will not be allowed for expenses which were incurred, not for the preservation of the property, but rather to gratify his taste and contribute to his convenience. Ib.

WILL.

A testator died in 1835, leaving a will by which he disposed of his property as follows: "I give and bequeath to my wife L. P. all my property, both real and personal, that now belongeth or in any wise appertaineth unto me, or that may or shall at any time hereafter belong unto me, to be wholly hers during her widowhood, out of which property she is to pay all my legal debts, and, at the determination of her widowhood, I give and bequeath unto M. D., I. S., T. O. and A. W. all the property, both real and personal, that my wife shall possess at the termination of her widowhood, to dispose of according to his or their verbal directions, should her widowhood terminate in death; but should her widowhood terminate in marriage, I give and bequeath unto the said M. D., I. S., T. O. and A. W. only three-fourths of the property, both real and personal, that shall be possessed by the said L. P. at the termination of her widowhood by marriage, and the said three-fourths to be disposed of according to the verbal directions of the said D., S., O. and W., or either of them; and the remaining one-fourth I will and bequeath unto the said L. P., to be wholly hers to make use of as she may see or think proper." The widow lived until 1866, and after her death there was found among her papers an instrument of writing, signed by the testator, without date, containing directions to the said D., S., O. and W. as to the manner in which he desired them to dispose of the property upon the termination of the widowhood of his wife, either by marriage or death. On the back of this instrument was found the following indorsement: "This paper with the contents is not to go to court, but to be kept at home in the hands of the executrix, or D., S., O., or W." On a bill filled after the death of the widow, to obtain a construction of this will,-Held: 1. That no positive rule can be laid down which shall determine in all cases what terms or expressions will carry a beneficial interest, or which will create a trust. 2. That any language which satisfactorily indicates an intention to stamp upon the devise the character of a trust, will be sufficient. 3. The heir is always favored in law, and is not to be excluded on mere conjecture; on the contrary, there must be satisfactory evidence of an intention to give a beneficial interest to the

devisee, and not merely negative evidence that no benefit was intended to the heir. 4. That the devise to M. D., I. S., T. O., and A. W., was upon a trust, the terms of which were not declared in the will, and the paper found after the death of the widow was not a valid declaration of the trusts intended, and therefore a trust arose by implication of law in favor of the heirs of the testator in regard to the real estate, and as to the personal property in favor of his personal representatives. Taylor v. Plaine et al.

BOOK NOTICES.

Reminiscences of an old Georgia lawyer: By Garnett Andrews, judge of the superior court of Georgia. Atlanta; J. J. Toon. 1870.

The object of this little book, as we gather from its pages, is to give "a local habitation and a name" to the witty and humorous sayings and doings of the profession of the south, in years gone by, and which have heretofore had a place only in the memory of those who heard or saw them. It is written in an easy, gossipy style, and is withal a pleasant book to read.

The Law Magazine and Law Review, or Quarterly Journal of Jurisprudence. May, 1870. London: Butterworths. The May number of this able and venerable law periodical is of more than ordinary interest. T. L. Murray Browne has a review of the Civil Code of New York. Mr. Browne measures the code by the standard of the English law, and comes to the conclusion that it is "meager and ambiguous." For instance, he says, in speaking of the subject of servitudes, "the important head of Lights is scarcely adverted to." Mr. Browne, before undertaking the work, should have made himself sufficiently familiar with our law to know what are and what are not important subjects in this state. He should have known that the servitude of lights is not recognized here. There is also a valuable article by the Hon. W. Beach Lawrence, on "The marriage laws of various countries as affecting the property of married women." The other articles are: "The Law Military as Distinct from Martial Law;" "The Diary of a Barrister;""Friendly Societies;" "Mr. Justice Hayes;" "A MS. of Vacarius;" "Church Patronage in England and Scotland;" "On the proposed abolition of compulsory Pilotage as regards Liverpool;" "The Lord Chancellor's Judicature bill:" "Digest of Scotch Decisions;" "Book Notices," etc.

AN EMINENT ENGLISH LAWYER.- Sir Roundell Palmer might have been lord chancellor on the accession of the present government, but he could not subscribe to the policy of the cabinet on the Irish church question. He is a man of marvelous appreciation, and makes an immense income, a large part of which comes from his chamber practice, $500 being the price of an opinion from him. The life of a great lawyer in parliament is about the most laborious in England. He has to be early at chair bers, and yet has to stay late in the house of commons, while a member can lie abed in the morning if detained in the house at night. Lord Palmerston, who used always to sit out the proceedings, never rose till about eleven in the morning. More than one great English lawyer has sunk under hard work. Sir William Follett, the most brilliant English barrister of the century, was in his grave before he was fifty; and Lord Cairns, an Irishman, who, without any advantages of birth and position, was chancellor before he was fifty, and subsequently leader of the house of lords, is now in a very delicate condition. Sir Roundell Palmer never seems to fail. On Sundays he regularly takes his school class of boys in humble circumstances; and many of our readers are familiar with his "Book of Praise," almost as well known in England as "Hymns, Ancient and Modern." He is a son of a country clergyman, and the ablest of a very able family.

TERMS OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR JUNE.

4th Tuesday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Sandy Hill, Potter.

Last Monday, Special Term, Monroe, J. C. Smith.
Last Tuesday, Special Term, Albany, Peckham.

LEGAL NEWS.

does not include something of the sort. A little commonplace item, not worthy of special attention, was tucked away in the Chicago papers on the 8th inst., stating that defaults were entered in 24 divorce cases on the previous day.

Judge Joseph P. Bradley was tendered a dinner by the bar of Houston, Texas, on his recent visit to that city. In his letter, declining the invitation, he said that they might well be proud of their noble state, and added: "Such a state with such a foundation, fos

Miss Barkaloo, the brilliant female member of the St. Louis bar, has been appointed a notary public.

Hon. Thomas Dawes Eliot, a leading lawyer and politician of Massachusetts, died at his late residence in New Bedford, a few days since.

Colonel Augustus Kenon, a lawyer of eminent ability, died at his home, in Milledgeville, Ga., on the 2d inst. He was a member of the confederate congress, and had often served in the state legislature.

Governor Alcorn, of Mississippi, has appointed Col. W. G. Henderson to a judgeship, on the strength of a letter in his favor, written by a colored member of the legislature of that state, who was a former slave of the colonel.

The Boston Advertiser reports that William Shakespeare and Walter Scott appear as parties to actions on the docket of the supreme judicial court of York county, Me., and that Francis Bacon is counsel in both cases.

It was regarded as a strong case of circumstantial evidence in a Pittsburg court the other day, when the plaintiff produced the skillet with which his wife struck him, and showed the jury how nice the three legs fitted into the holes of his head.

The first case east of the Mississippi of a female counselor before the courts is recorded at New Albany, Indiana. A young man was arraigned for slander by a colored female, and a wealthy lady of that city appeared as volunteer counsel on his behalf. A number of the members of the sophomore and junior classes at Bowdoin College, who intended entering upon the study of law after graduating, have organized a law association, and hold a mock court once a week.

Ex-Gov. Henry A. Wise and his son have been retained as counsel on behalf of the United States government, by Attorney-General Hoar, to assist in the defense of James Madison, a soldier, whose trial for the murder of Wm. P. Boley, a citizen of Campbell county, Va., several months since, began last Thursday in Judge Garland's court at Lynchburg.

A

The common pleas court of Zanesville was adjourned last week on very singular grounds. woman was in jail awaiting sentence, and was sent for, but the sheriff reported that she had not sufficient clothing in which to make her appearance, her mother having carried off her garments to wash them. The judge smiled and dismissed the court for the day.

The Charleston Courier learns that a number of billholders of the Bank of the State of South Carolina have determined to make an issue in the courts as to the obligation of the state to receive the bills of their bank for taxes, as provided for in its charter. They claim that the decision of the supreme court of the United States in the case of the Bank of Tennessee is final and conclusive, and that the ruling of the South Carolina courts must be sooner or later in accord.

The general belief that there is a slight superfluity of divorce proceedings in Chicago may be justified by the actual fact that not once in ten times, on an average, is there a day's law reports which

glorious future; and upon whom do its institutions and laws more closely depend than upon those who, by their profession, are called upon to assist in the administration of justice? A pure, incorrupt and learned bar, more than a standing army, is the bulwark of a nation's strength, because the bulwark of civil freedom. A corrupt magistracy cannot long endure a stern and indignant gaze. A corrupt state is incompatible with an incorrupt and intelligent bar."

At an adjudication of the bankruptcy case of a firm in Michigan, the wife of one of the members desired to prove a note for $10,500 against the estate, which amount she had loaned to her husband to enable him to enter the business in 1864. The note was given to the firm by the husband, and indorsed by him to the wife, and it was claimed that such a note, in the hands of a third person bona fide, may be proved against the firm in all respects like any other obligation of the firm. The creditors dissented, and the counsel agreed as to the facts. The court decided that the wife knew what her husband was to do with the money, and she would not be allowed to prove her note against the partnership estate, although the judge saw no objection to her being permitted to participate in any dividend of the proceeds of her husband's individual estate.

The first suit under the social equity law of Louisiana, brought against the proprietor of an ice-cream establishment who refused to receive colored applicants for refreshments, has resulted in a disagreement of the jury. It is said that a variety of races were represented among the jurymen, and that a colored juror was prominent in opposing the intentions of the framers of the law, alleging that he himself did not want white men as visitors at colored people's balls, "to come there and take my colored ladies away." After long and heated discussion, the other jurors agreed to take the opinion of a grave and silent German. He decided that, as it had been evident that the lawyers in the case were at variance upon the law, the justice, and the evidence adduced, it could not be expected that a jury which knew far less about such matters should agree. And this sagacious opinion was adopted as the finding of the jury.

A rather curious trial has just terminated in Cincinnati. A husband sued a man for seducing his wife, who seems to have been a woman of loose habits before and after her marriage, and from whom he had been divorced on the ground of her adultery before the beginning of the trial for seduction, he having also, in the mean time, married another woman. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $8,000. The counsel for the defendant showed, or tried to show, that the husband was himself a man of immoral life; that he was in connivance with his wife's seducer, and that she had been guilty of improper conduct with other persons than her alleged seducer; but the judge charged that the defendant was not relieved from his culpability by any of these things, though they might be taken into consideration in mitigation of damages. In his charge the judge said that a husband is bound to protect the chastity of his wife; that the elements of a recovery consist in the loss of the society and duty of a wife, and the nature of the injury which the husband has suffered; and that the deliberate seducer of a married woman from chastity and marital duty deserves to be severely punished. It was on these principles that the jury rendered its verdict and gave damages.