valueless, as the widow never had any title to the goods. On these facts appearing at the trial of an action against defendant for slander of title in making the statement he had so made at the sale, the judge directed a nonsuit. Held, that the nonsuit was right, as defendant was not liable for making such statement unless he acted maliciously, and that, notwithstanding the letter from the auctioneers, there was no evidence on which a jury could properly have found that he had so acted. Stewart V. Young, C. P., 39 L. J. R. 85.

STAMP DUTY.

1. Exemption: friendly society: transfer of mortgage.—A transfer of mortgage made to a friendly society is not exempt from stamp duty, under the 18 and 19 Vict. c. 63, 8. 37, although such society is empowered by its rules to invest surplus funds on mortgage. Walker v. Giles, commented upon. Trustees of the Royal Liver, Friendly Society v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Ex., 39 L. J. R. 37.

2. Lease "further or other valuable consideration": covenant to complete house on demised land. A covenant by a lessee to whom land is demised in consideration of the rent and covenants reserved and contained in the lease"to complete and make fit for use in every respect a messuage on the land demised, with all necessary fixtures, etc., to the satisfaction of the lessor," is "a further or other valuable consideration" within the meaning of the sixteenth section of 17 and 18 Vict. c. 83; and such lease is therefore chargeable with the duty of 35s., in addition to the ad valorem duty on the rent reserved. Boulton v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Ex., 39 L. J. R. 51.

STAYING PROCEEDINGS.

1. Action: traverse of plaintiff's alleged equity.—On an interlocutory application to stay an action, plaintiff's equity must be clearly established, or he must pay the money into court; therefore, where the plaintiff's equity rested on an alleged parol agreement, which was denied by the defendant, and plaintiff declined to pay the money into court, a motion to stay the action was refused. Greech v. Oram, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 126.

2. Claim against directors. —The court of chancery has no jurisdiction to stay actions at law against the directors of a company being wound up by the court. In re The New Zealand Banking Corporation, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 128.

VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT.

Subsequent creditor: pre-existing debts: settlement set aside though no intention to defraud. — The result of the authorities decided upon statute 13 Eliz. c. 5, is, first, that where a debt contracted antecedently to the settlement exists, a subsequent creditor has the same rights as an antecedent creditor would have against the settler; and, secondly, that whether or not the settler had any intention to defraud his creditors, a creditor having a debt existing at the date of the settlement, has a right to have the settlement set aside if the ultimate effect of it is to delay or defraud him with regard to his debt. Freeman v. Pope, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 148.

WILL.

1. Appointment of executor: parol evidence as to persons named.-Testator appointed his "said nephew, Joseph Grant, executor" of his will. His wife's nephew of that name had resided with him for many years, and managed his business. There was also living a nephew (a brother's son) of the like name. Both claimed probate of the will: Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show the relation and circumstances in which the respective parties stood to the testator, and the sense in which he habitually used the word "nephew," when referring to his wife's nephew. And the evidence showing that the wife's nephew was the person meant, probate of the will was decreed to him accordingly. Grant v. Grant, P. and M., 39 L. J. R. 17.

2. Attestation: name of witness written by another. - An attesting witness must himself subscribe the will. It is

not essential that a witness should sign his own name, provided it is clear that his subscription is intended as an act of attestation. In the goods of Duggins, P. & M., 39 L. J. R. 24.

3. The name of A, an attesting witness to a will, was at his request subscribed by B, who was himself present at the execution: Held, that as A had not subscribed, and B's subscription was not intended as an act of attestation, the will was not duly executed. Ib.

4. Of mortgagee: general devise and bequest: tenancy in common: executory limitations: legal estate in mortgaged premises. A mortgagee devised and bequeathed all the residue of her property as to one moiety to her two daughters, to be equally divided between them, and as to the other, to a trustee in trust for her two sons, half for each, to be paid on his attaining twenty-five. Power was given to the trustee to sell, and to maintain and advance the sons out of the income and capital, respectively, of their respective shares; and there was a clause giving a benefit of survivorship between the sons and daughters. Held, that the legal estate in the mortgaged lands did not pass by the will. Martin v. Laverton, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 166. 5. Power to appoint by will only: wills act, 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 27: execution of power by a general bequest: remoteness. — A power to appoint to any persons, by will only, is a general power of appointment within the meaning of section 27 of the wills act (1 Vict. c. 26). And accordingly, a general devise or bequest will operate as an execution of such power. But such a general testamentary power of appointment given to a tenant for life, being a married woman, is not equivalent to ownership, so that, as regards the operation of the rule against perpetuities, the interests arising under the execution of the power by the will of the tenant for life must be considered as created under the deed or will conferring the power. In re Powell's Trusts, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 188.

6. P. bequeathed a sum of stock to his married daughter, H., for life, with remainder to such persons as she should by will appoint. By a general bequest, not referring to the power, but held to be an exercise thereof under section 27 of the wills act, H. appointed the stock to her daughter, S. L., for life, with remainder to her said daughter's children who should attain twenty-one, or marry. Held, that this exercise of the power was void for remoteness. Ib.

WINDING UP.

1. Proof of debt: secured creditor: amount of claim. - The debt of a secured creditor is to be ascertained in a winding up, as it existed at the time of sending in a formal claim under rule 20 of the general order, 1862. Where a company had given a guarantee to the acceptor of a bill that it would provide funds to meet the bill at maturity, the presentation of the guarantee to the official liquidator of the company, and the demand for payment two days before the bill fell due, but after the company had been ordered to be wound up, was held (affirming the decision of the master of the rolls) not to constitute a formal demand within the above rule; and it was therefore also held that the holder of the guarantee who subsequently, but before making any further claim, realized some securities which he held in respect of the guarantee, was not entitled to prove for more than the balance of his claim after deducting the proceeds of the securities. In re Barned's Banking Co., Forwood's Claim, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 133.

2. Proof against two estates: interest subsequent to proof.A creditor of a company in liquidation, whose debt bore interest, received, from a collateral source, dividends which, with the dividends from the estate in liquidation, amounted to 20s. in the pound upon the principal debt due at the date of the winding up. Held, reversing the decision at the rolls, that he was entitled to participate in further dividends in respect of his principal debt, in the same

way as if he had received nothing from the collateral source, until the whole amount due for principal and interest was discharged. In re the Joint Stock Discount Co., ex parte the Warrant Finance Co., Ch., 39 L. J. R. 122.

3. Priority of petitions: advertisement. Where two or more petitions are presented for winding up a company, they will have priority according to their dates of advertisement, not of presentation. The United Ports and General Insurance Co., Ch., 39 L. J. R. 146.

4. Disputed debt: action at law: petition adjourned: payment into court: costs. —A winding up petition, based upon a disputed debt which the petitioner was simultaneously seeking to recover by an action at law, was adjourned till the debt should be established at law, but the court refused to put the company upon terms not to delay the action. In re The Imperial Guardian Assur. Co., Ch., 39 L. J. R. 147.

5. The petitioner having refused an offer by the company to pay the amount claimed into court, and to pay such costs of the petition as the court should adjudge, was ordered to pay all costs of the petitioner subsequently incurred. Ib.

6. Locus standi of opponent to petition. -A petition for the winding up of a company under the companies act, 1862, may be opposed by parties having an interest in the existence of the company, although neither creditors nor contributories thereof. In re The Bradford Nav. Co., Ch., 39 L. J. R. 161.

7. Appropriation of dividends: interest on debt: appeal from chambers. — A company on borrowing 25,000l. gave promissory notes and a debenture for the amount, to be paid at a certain date, and agreed to pay interest on the loan if not paid at such date. They also assigned arrears of calls to be received by trustees and paid to the lender if default were made in payment of the loan at the appointed date. The company was ordered to be wound up before such date, and the lender received arrears of calls and dividends on his proof, together exceeding the principal debt. Held, reversing the order of the master of the rolls, that the creditor could not be called upon to refund the surplus, but might appropriate it to the interest due. In re The Humber Iron Works & Shipbuilding Co. Ex parte the Warrant Finance Co. No. 2, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 185.

8. The court of appeals will only hear an appeal from an order made in chambers, when the judge who makes the order certifies that the case has been so fully argued before him, that he does not desire to hear it re-argued in court. Ib.

DIGEST OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

(From 8 Wallace). ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS.

1. In aid of the certificate of acknowledgment, or proof of a deed, reference may be had to the instrument itself, or to any part of it. Carpenter v. Dexter, 513.

2. It will be presumed that a commissioner of deeds, in a particular state, whose authority to act was limited only to his county, exercised his office within the territorial limits for which he was appointed, although the only venue given to his certificate of acknowledgment be that of the "state" where he lived. Ib.

3. Unless the statute of a state requires evidence of official character to accompany the official act which it authorizes, none is necessary. And where one state recognizes acts done in pursuance of the laws of another state, its courts will take judicial cognizance of those laws, so far as it may be necessary to determine the validity of the acts alleged to be in conformity with them. Ib.

ADMIRALTY.

1. Nautical rules require that, where a steamship and sailing vessel are approaching from opposite directions, or on intersecting lines, the steamship, from the moment

the sailing vessel is seen, shall watch with the highest diligence her course and movements, so as to be able to adopt such timely measures of precaution as will necessarily prevent the two boats coming in contact. The Carroll, 302.

2. Porting the helm a point, when the light of a sailing vessel is first observed, and then waiting until a collision is imminent before doing any thing further, does not satisfy the requirements of the law. Ib.

3. Fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the moment preceding collision does not absolve a steamer, which has suffered herself and a sailing vessel to get in such dangerous proximity as to cause inevitable alarm and confusion, and collision as a consequence. The steamer, as having committed a far greater fault in allowing such proximity to be brought about, is chargeable with all the damages resulting from the collision. Ib.

4. Although the duty of vessels propelled by steam is to keep clear of those moved by wind, yet these latter must not, by changing their course instead of keeping on it, put themselves carelessly in the way of the former, and so render ineffective their movements to give the sailing vessels sufficient berth. The Potomac, 590.

5. The confessions of a master, in a case of collision, are evidence against the owner. Ib.

6. Although, if a vessel be sunk by collision in so deep water, or otherwise so sunk, that she cannot be raised and repaired, except at an expense equal to or greater than the sum which she would be worth when repaired, the rule cannot apply, still the mere fact that a vessel is sunk is not, of itself, sufficient to show that the loss is total, nor to justify the master and owner in abandoning her and her cargo. The Baltimore, 377.

BILL OF LADING.

1. May be explained by parol evidence, in so far as it is a receipt as distinguished from a contract. The Lady Franklin, 325.

2. An explosion of the boiler on a steam vessel is not a" peril of navigation," within the meaning of. Propeller Mohawk, 153.

BURDEN OF PROOF.

1. In a suit brought by the assignee of a chose in action in the federal court, on a contract assigned, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, when the instrument and assignment are offered, under the plea of the general issue, to show affirmatively that the action could have been sustained if it had been brought by the original obligee. Bradley v. Rhine's Administrator, 393.

2. A court having fairly submitted to a jury the evidence in a case, and charged as favorably to a party as he could properly have asked, may, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse a request by that party to charge as to which side the burden of proof belongs. Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 641.

COMITY JUDICIAL.

1. The supreme court will not follow the adjudication of state courts upon the meaning of the statutes of their states, when the former court considers the adjudications wrong in themselves, and when in action their effect is practically, by rendering the power of enforcing obligation ineffective to impair the obligation of a contract entered into before the adjudications were made, by parties living in the state. Butz v. City of Muscatine, 575. 2. A question which is pending in one court of competent jurisdiction cannot be raised and agitated in another by adding a new party and raising a new question as to him, along with the old one, as to the former party. The old question is in the hands of the court first possessed of it, and is to be decided by such court. The new one should be by suit in any proper court, against the new party. Memphis City v. Dean, 64.

COMMON CARRIER.

1. Where insurers, to whom the owners have abandoned, take possession, at an intermediate place or port, of

goods damaged during a voyage by the fault of the carrier, and there sell them, they cannot hold the carrier liable on his engagement to deliver at the end of the voyage in good order and condition. Propeller Mohawk, 153.

2. Insurers so accepting at the intermediate port are liable for freight pro rata itineris on the goods accepted. Ib. 3. A common carrier of merchandise is responsible for actual negligence, even admitting his receipt to be legally sufficient to restrict his common law liability. And he is chargeable with actual negligence, unless he exercises the care and prudence of a prudent man in his own affairs. Express Company v. Kountze Bros., 343.

CONFEDERATE MONEY.

1. A contract for the payment of treasury notes of the Confederate States, made between parties residing within those states, can be enforced in the courts of the United States; the contract having been made in the usual course of business, and not for the purpose of giving currency to the notes, or of otherwise aiding the rebellion. Thorington v. Smith.

2. Evidence may be received that a contract payable in those states, during the rebellion, in "dollars," was in fact made for the payment in confederate dollars. Ib.

3. The party entitled to be paid in such dollars can receive but their actual value, at the time and place of the contract, in lawful money of the United States. Ib.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The term "import," as used in that clause of the constitution which says that "no state shall levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports," does not refer to articles imported from one state into another, but only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States. Woodruff v. Parham, 123.

2. A state statute which enacts that no insurance company, not incorporated under the laws of the state passing the statute, shall carry on its business within the state without previously obtaining a license for that purpose; and that it shall not receive such license until it has deposited with the treasurer of the state bonds of a specified character and amount, according to the extent of the capital employed, is not in conflict with that clause of the constitution of the United States which declares that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states;" nor with the clause which declares that congress shall have power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states." Paul v. Virginia, 168.

3. The issuing of a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce within the meaning of the latter of the two clauses, even though the parties be domiciled in different states, but is a simple contract of indemnity against loss. Ib.

4. The same principle applies to the case of an institution of learning. The Washington University v. Rouse, 439. 5. Congress has no power to make paper money a legal tender, or lawful money, in discharge of private debts, which exist in virtue of contracts made prior to its acts attempting to make such paper a legal tender and lawful money for payment of such debts. Hepburn v. Griswold, 603.

6. When a state has enacted that the notes of a particular bank chartered by it shall be receivable in payment of all taxes due to it, a "contract," attaching itself to the note, and running with it into the hands of any one who has it, is entered into by the state that it will so receive the notes. And a subsequent enactment, that it will not receive them, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and is void. Furman v. Nichol, 44.

DIRECT TAX.

A tax laid by congress on the notes of state banks, issued for currency, is not one within the meaning of that clause

1. Where specific execution of a contract, which would work hardship when unconditionally performed, would work equity when decreed on conditions, it will be decreed conditionally. Willard v. Tayloe, 557.

2. Fluctuations in the value of property contracted for between the date of the contract and the time when execution of the contract is demanded, are not allowed to prevent a specific enforcement of the contract, where the contract, when made, was a fair one, and in its attendant circumstances unobjectionable. Ib.

3. Where a party, prior to filing a bill for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land had sent to the other side for examination, and in professed purpose of execution of the contract, the draft of a mortgage which he was ready, on a conveyance being made, to execute, it is no defense to the bill, if the defendant have wholly refused to execute a deed, that the draft is not in such a form as respected parties and the term of years which the security had to run, as the vendor was bound to accept, especially where such vendor, in returning the draft, had not stated in what particulars he was dissatisfiled with it. Ib.

ESTOPPEL.

A record of a judgment on the same subject matter, referred to in a finding, cannot be set up as an estoppel, when neither the record is set forth nor the finding shows on what ground the court put its decision; whether for want of proof, insufficient allegations, or on the merits of the case. United States v. Lane, 185.

EVIDENCE IN CASES GENERALLY.

1. To admit the declaration of a third person in evidence on the ground that one party to the suit had referred the other party to him, it is necessary that the reference should be for information, relating to the matters in issue. Allen v. Killinger, 480.

2. The declarations of a party himself, to whomsoever made, are competent evidence, when confined strictly to such complaints, expressions, and exclamations as furnish evidence of a present existing pain or malady, to prove his condition, ills, pains, and symptoms, whether arising from sickness, or from an injury by accident or violence. If made to a medical attendant, they are of more weight than if made to another person. Insurance Company v. Moseley, 397.

3. So is a declaration made by a deceased person, contemporaneously, or nearly so, with a main event by whose consequence it is alleged that he died, as to the cause of that event. Though generally the declarations must be contemporaneous with the event, yet, where there are connecting circumstances, they may, even when made some time afterward, form a part of the whole res gesta. Ib.

4. Where the principal fact is the fact of bodily injury, the res gestæ are the statements of the cause, made by the injured party almost contemporaneously with the occurrence of the injury, and those relating to the consequences, made while the latter subsisted and were in progress. Ib.

5. An accidental loss or disappearance in a bank, of a bill sent to it to collect, from the bank's not taking sufficient care of letters brought to it from the mail, carries with it a presumption of negligence in the bank; and on suit against it, the burden of proof is on the bank to explain the negligence. Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 641.

6. Although a bill of lading, in so far as it is a contract, cannot be explained by parol, yet, being a receipt as well

as a contract, it may in the last regard be so explained, especially when used as the foundation of a suit between the original parties to it. The Lady Franklin, 325.

7. Where one state recognizes acts done in pursuance of the laws of another state, its courts will take judicial cognizance of those laws, so far as it may be necessary to determine the validity of the acts alleged to be in conformity with them. Carpenter v. Dexter, 513.

8. The admissions of the master of a vessel are evidence, in case of collision, against the owner. The Potomac, 590.

FEDERAL AND STATE LEGISLATION.

The mortgage of a vessel duly recorded, under an act of congress, cannot be defeated by a subsequent attachment under a state statute enacting that no mortgage of such property shall be valid as against the interests of third persons, unless possession be delivered to, and remain with, the mortgagee, or the mortgage be recorded in a manner specified, in which a mortgage, whose lien in this case was the subject of controversy, was not. White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wallace, 646, affirmed. Aldrich v. Etna Company, 491.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE.

A sale of personal property, made much below its cost, by a man indebted to near or quite the extent of all he had, set aside as a fraud on creditors; it having been made within a month after the property was bought, and before it was yet paid for; made, moreover, on Saturday, while the account of stock was taken on Sunday (the parties being Jews), and the property carried off early on Monday. Kempner v. Churchill, 362.

FREIGHT. See Common Carrier.

HABEAS CORPUS.

1. In all cases where a circuit court of the United States has, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, caused a prisoner to be brought before it, and has, after inquiring into the cause of detention, remanded him to the custody from which he was taken, the supreme court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, may, by the writ of habeas corpus, aided by the writ of certiorari, revise the decision of the circuit court, and, if it be found unwarranted by law, relieve the prisoner from the unlawful restraint to which he has been remanded. Ex parte Yerger, 85.

2. The second section of the act of March 27th, 1868, repealing so much of the act of February 5th, 1867, as authorized appeals from the circuit courts to the supreme court, does not take away or affect the appellate jurisdiction of this court by habeas corpus under the constitution, and the acts of congress prior to the date of the last named act. 1b.

INSURERS.

Accepting goods abandoned by their owners at an intermediate port, which the carriers were bound to carry to the port of destination, are liable to freight pro rata itineris. Propeller Mohawk, 153.

INTERNAL REVENUE.

Under the act of June 30th, 1864, to provide internal revenue to support the government, etc., which requires a license to persons exercising certain occupations, and fixes the limit to its duration, the parties to the bond given on the granting of the license are not bound to answer for any breach of the condition of the bond after the expiration of the license. United States v. Smith, 587.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, 2, 3. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

(a) It has jurisdiction,

1. To disregard and declare void an act of congress which it considers as passed in violation of the constitution. Hepburn v. Griswold, 603.

2. If the case be otherwise within its cognizance, it

has jurisdiction of a judgment rendered on a voluntary submission of a case agreed on for judgment, under the provisions of the code of a state. Aldrich v. Eina Company, 491.

3. It need not appear that the state court erred in its judgment. It is sufficient to confer jurisdiction that the question was in the case, was decided adversely to the plaintiff in error, and that the court was induced by it to make the judgment which it did. Furman v. Nichols, 44. 4. So it may have, although the citation is not signed by the judge who allowed the writ of error, provided the defendant have waived the irregularity by an appearance. Aldrich v. Insurance Co., 491.

(b) It has not jurisdiction.

5. Under the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act, unless the record show, either by express words or necessary legal intendment, that one of the questions mentioned in that act was before the state court, and was decided by it; and, in deciding this, neither the argument of counsel nor the opinion of the court below can be looked to for this purpose. Gibson v. Chouteau, 314.

LEGAL TENDER.

The promissory notes of the United States, declared by certain acts of congress, passed in 1862 and 1863, to be a legal tender and lawful money for the payment of private debts, are not such a tender or such money in discharge of such debts if created by contracts made before the acts were passed. Hepburn v. Griswold, 603.

MANDAMUS.

The extent to which the writ of mandamus from the federal courts can give relief against decisions in the state courts, involves a question respecting the process of the federal courts; and, that being so, it is peculiarly the province of this court to decide all questions which concern the subject. Butz v. City of Muscatine, 575.

MORTGAGE OF VESSELS.

The mortgage of a vessel, duly recorded, under an act of congress, cannot be defeated by a subsequent attachment under a state statute, enacting that no mortgage of such property shall be valid, as against the interests of third persons, unless possession be delivered to, and remain with, the mortgagee, or the mortgage be recorded in a manner specified, in which a mortgage, whose lien in this case was the subject of controversy, was not. White's Bank v. Smith, 7 Wallace, 646, affirmed. Aldrich v. Eina Company, 491.

NATIONAL BANKS

1. The 50th section of the national bank act of June 3d, 1864 (13 Stat. at Large, 116), which provides that suits under it, in which officers or agents of the United States are parties, shall be conducted by the district attorney of the district, is in so far but directory, that it cannot be set up by stockholders to defeat a suit brought against them by a receiver, under the act, which receiver, with the approval of the treasury department, and after the matter had been submitted to the solicitor of the treasury, had employed private counsel, by whom alone suit was conducted. Kennedy v. Gibson and others, 498.

2. It is no objection to such a bill properly filed against stockholders within the jurisdiction of the court, that stockholders named in the bill and averred in it to be without the jurisdiction, are not made co-defendants. Ib. 3. Creditors of the bank are not proper parties to such a bill. The receiver is the proper party to bring suit, whether at law or in equity. Ib.

4. Suits may be brought under the 57th section of the act, by any association, as well as against it. Ib.

NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

1. Although a bill payable at a particular bank, be physically, and, in point of fact, in the bank, still, if the bank be wholly ignorant of its being there, as when, ex. gr., a

letter, in which the bill was transmitted when brought from the post-office to the bank, has been laid down with other papers on the cashier's desk, and before being taken up or seen by the cashier has slipped through a crack in the desk, and so disappeared, the fact of the bill being thus physically present in the bank does not make a presentment. Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 641.

2. And this is so, although the acceptor held no funds there, did not call to pay the bill, and in fact did not mean to pay it anywhere. Ib.

3. In such case, therefore, the holder cannot look to prior parties, even though, by having been informed, after inquiry by him, that the bill had not been received at the collecting bank, they could have inferred that it had not been paid at maturity by the acceptor. Ib.

4. An accidental loss or disappearance in a bank, of a bill sent to it to collect, from the bank's not taking sufficient care of letters brought to it from the mail, carries with it a presumption of negligence in the bank, and, on a suit against it, the burden of proof is on the bank to explain the negligence. Ib.

5. If, through this negligence alone, it is inferable that notice of presentment, demand, and non-payment, were not given to the holder, so as to enable him to hold parties prior to him, the bank guilty of the negligence is responsible to the holder for the amount of the bill, even though the holder himself have not been so entirely thoughtful, active and vigilant as he might have been. Ib.

PUBLIC LANDS.

1. Where a patent for land has issued to one who protests against the survey on which it is made, and the record shows that he never accepted it, the secretary of the interior may recall it. Maguire v. Tyler, 650.

2. Where a patent is issued on a claim which has no certain limits, reserving "all valid adverse rights," a second patent to another claim, and for a portion of the same land, is valid and operative to convey the title. Ib.

3. Where there is a specific tract confirmed according to ascertained boundaries, the legal effect of the confirmation is to establish the right and locate the claim. But it is otherwise when the claim has no certain limits, and the confirmation is on the condition that the land is to be surveyed. Ib.

SOLDIER'S PAY.

The act of June 20th, 1864, increasing the pay of private soldiers in the army, cannot be construed as having the effect of increasing the allowance to officer for servants' pay. United States v. Gilmore, 330.

STATES

Many bind themselves permanently by a promise made by one legislature, and which subsequent legislatures cannot set aside, not to tax the property of particular charitable institutions, or institutions of learning; and if the institutions are organized on the faith of such promise the promise becomes a contract, whose obligation the state cannot impair. Home of The Friendless v. Rouse, and Washington University v. Rouse, 430, 439.

STATUTES, RULES OF CONSTRUING.

1. A section of one statute, not very reasonable as read in the section itself, may be read by the light of a section of an earlier statute on the same general subject; and the effect of the former largely extended thereby. Kennedy v. Gibson et al., 498.

2. Construction of statutes, in relation to the accounts Individuals with the United States, made by the accounting officers of the treasury, especially when so long continued as to become a rule of departmental practice, are entitled to great consideration, and will, in general, be adopted by this court. United States v. Gilmore, 330. 3. But when, after such a construction of a particular class of statutes has been long continued, its application to a recent statute of the same class is prohibited by

congress, and, following the spirit of hat prohibition, the accounting officers refuse to apply the disapproved construction to a still later statute of the same class, its application will not be enforced. Ib.

TORTS.

The government cannot be proceeded against in the court of claims, on an implied assumpsit for the torts of its officers, committed while in its service, and apparently for its benefit. The remedy is through congress. Gibbons v. United States, 269.

TRIAL BY JURY.

Where a seizure of property on land is made under the acts of July 13, 1861, or of August 6, 1861, or July 17, 1862, passed in suppression of the rebellion, the claimants are entitled to trial by jury, though the suit be in form a libel of information; and the suit can be removed into this court by writ of error alone. Union Insurance Co. v. United States, 6 Wallace, 765; and Armstrong's Foundry, Ib. 769, affirmed, Morris' Cotton, 507.

TRUST.

1. In May, 1835, an agreement was entered into between Price and Seymour, which provided, on the part of Price, that he should devote his time and best judgment to the selection and purchase of land to an amount not exceeding $5,000 in certain designated states and territories, or in such of them as he might find most advantageous to the interest of Seymour; that the purchases should be made during the then existing year, and that the contracts of purchase should be made, and the conveyances taken, in the name of Seymour; and on the part of Seymour that he should furnish the $5,000; that the lands purchased should be sold within five years afterward, and that of the profits made by such purchase and sale, one-half should be paid to Price, and be in full for his services and expenses. Under this agreement lands having been purchased by Price and the title taken in the name of Seymour, Held, I. That Seymour took the legal title in trust for the purposes specified; that is, to sell the property within the time limited, and after deducting from the proceeds the outlay, with interest and taxes, to pay over to Price one-half of the residue; and that, to this extent, Seymour was a trustee, and Price the cestui que trust.

II. That the trust continued after the expiration of the five years, unless Price subsequently relinquished his claim, the burden of proof, as to such relinquishment, resting with the heirs of Seymour.

III. That the principle of equitable conversion being applied to the case, and the land which was to be converted into money, being regarded and treated in equity as money, the personal representative of Price was the proper person to maintain this suit, and it was not necessary that his heirs at law should be parties. Seymour v. Freer, 202.

2. The statute of limitations has no application to an express trust, where there is no disclaimer. I.

BOOK NOTICES.

Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States, December Terms, 1868 and 1869. Reported by John William Wallace. Vol. VIII. Washington: W. H. & O. H. Morrison. 1870.

With the exception of the legal-tender cases, this volume contains but little of novel or lasting interest in respect to law. In regard to style, too, we miss Mr. Wallace's peculiar graces. He seems to have taken a reef in his rhetoric since the compliments of the American Law Review in 1867. Just enough of his idiosyncracies crop out to assure us that he is not dead, but only sleeping; that the volcano is not extinct, but ready to break out on sufficient provocation. This is evinced in the case of The Camanche, a salvage case, not only in substance, but in name. Perhaps the name inspired Mr. Wallace