contract for a larger rate-say as much as ten or fifteen per cent per annum, or without having any limitation whatever-it seems to us that it would be better adapted to the wants of the community, particularly in our larger cities, than the present law. The late Henry Thomas Buckle (who was one of England's brightest intellects), in descanting upon Aristotle-whom he considered little inferior to Plato in depth, and much his superior in comprehensiveness- of his speculative idea, that no one should give or receive interest for the use of money, remarks: "An idea, which, if it had been put into execution, would have produced the most mischievous results; would have stopped the accumulation of wealth, and thereby have postponed for an indefinite period the civilization of the world." Thus, upon Mr. Buckle's philosophy, the receiving a reward for the use of money, during the past few centuries, has not only not made the world more corrupt, but has produced a healthy zest in trade, yield-❘ ing wealth and all the desirable elements of a true civilization. Keeping in view the wants of commerce, the courts of New York state have invariably leaned toward the side of equity-deprecating the plea of usury. And who can deny but that it is better for a people to have laws which will be administered with respect and meet a ready acquiescence, than to have them evaded by the business community and the courts. There are but five states that have the same law governing usury as the one of our state, and those are New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, and Florida; and in each of those states shifts and devices are continually being propagated by business men to avoid the penalty. Prior to May 15, 1837, the laws against usury had much relaxed; but by an act of that date, the rigor of this prohibition was restored in fullest force, and usury thereby is made a penal offense. In 1850 (Laws, chapter 172), an act was passed prohibiting corporations interposing the defense of usury in any case. That was a step, at least, in the right direction. Fortunes are daily being made in Wall street by money begetting money, despite this rigorous law; and no one rails on the man now-a-days who loans his money to the best advantage, taking his chances of the breach of honor and of law, nor is the matter even tauntingly cast up to such lenders, as was the wont a few centuries ago, against which old exacting Shylock is represented as having retorted: "he rails, Even there where merchants most do congregate, The incommodities or disadvantages of this usury law of New York must be apparent to every candid and thinking mind. If the law were to be repealed or modified, who can doubt that there would be more merchants and greater thrift, as more capital would then be employed in a thousand avenues where now is nought but inactivity. For certainly nothing can promote thriftiness in every branch of trade more readily than perfect freedom to buy and sell. The statute makes an exception in contracts of bottomry and respondentia, when, in fact, in money loans the compensation received for the benefit, we submit, ought to be commensurate with the use and inconvenience or hazard incurred by the lender. And we fail to discover any thing in the nature of such contracts necessitating this sharp distinction. The theory that prodigality would follow by greater facility in borrowing has been exploded; and it has never been so demonstrated by history. On the contrary, we hold that by restrictive laws in times of emergency or panic, money is largely enhanced, causing the pressure greater upon the distressed, compelling ruinous sacrifices of property, as in such times men will not lend at regular rates of interest, and if more be stipulated for, would continuously tremble under usury's fearful arm. Men have thus been bankrupted and ruined rather than run the risk of violating this law, which in doing, perhaps, would lose for him both "itself and friend." The prohibitory system thus aggravates the very evils which it was intended to mitigate, making often the poor poorer, as was realized in the panic of 1857; the rich more avaricious, the cautious more timid, the prodigal more prodigal, the rash more rash, and introducing many perturbations in society, which secretly impair or sap the foundations of truth and commerce. The statutes of some of the states have wisely provided, that a greater rate than simple interest may be recovered if specified in writing, which provision has proved to be (as in Michigan and Illinois, for example) far more advantageous than a law like that of New York. And even in California, where they have no penalty for usury, but parties are left free to contract for money or goods, commerce thrives almost beyond comparison. A usury law of some kind may possibly be shown to be necessary in New York, but we hold that the present one works indubitable evils. From our experience and observation, we would earnestly recommend that interest be still legalized at six or seven per cent, to be taken by moneyed corporations; but we hold that it would be most politic and beneficial, at the present time, to allow individuals to make such contracts relative to money advances or loans as they shall determine, limiting them, say to two per cent a month, Such a reform in our law would, without doubt, work very beneficent results, and commercial men and the courts would then respect and strenuously uphold the law; as with Lord Bacon, we believe, "it is better to mitigate usury by declaration than to suffer it to rage by connivance." CURRENT TOPICS. The time has gone by when the belief was generally entertained that English law was the perfection of human reason, and, consequently, the reluctance to alter it is found only among a small class, that might properly be termed ancient conservatives. The bills of Lord Chancellor Hatherly, to reform the law and practice in England, have stirred up a couple of these ancients, in the persons of Lord St. Leonard, and Lord Chief Justice COCKBURN, who have severally written letters to the lord chancellor, strongly denouncing his proposed reform. We confess our inability to understand, from the data at hand, the ground of the opposition; but that it is not the proposed at this, since the union of law and equity is the very climax of revolution. The result of these letters, coming as they do from such high sources, may be to postpone for the session legislation on the subject. A strong effort was made in the house of lords, on the 30th ult., to postpone the high court of justice bill; the Marquis of Salisbury said all the judges and two ex-chancellors were opposed to the measure, and Lord Cairns announced his intention to oppose the bill clause by clause. But the lord chancellor refused to postpone, and the house went into committee on the bill and adopted several amendments. Both the new court of appeals and the commission of appeals are to meet and organize at the capitol, in Albany, on the first Monday (4th) of July next. On Tuesday following the court of appeals will commence a term for the hearing of causes in the senate chamber. The causes and matters on the existing calendar not pending on the first day of January, 1869, are to be placed upon the new calendar, and are to be deemed regularly noticed and ready for hearing. Causes and matters not upon the existing calendar, and brought into the court of appeals since the above date, may be noticed for hearing at such term and placed upon the calendar. The commissioners of appeals are to commence a sitting on the same day - Tuesday 5th to dispose of the business on the calendar on the first day of January, 1869. The calendar prepared for 1870 is to be taken as the calendar of the commission, and causes are not required to be further noticed. The election of Judge GROVER to the new court of appeals devolves upon the governor the duty of selecting two commissioners of appeals. The three other commissioners are the remaining judges of the old court-John A. Lott, Robert Earl and Ward Hunt. The United States senate has passed the bill to change the judicial circuits. The amendment of Mr. Ferry, to add Connecticut to the second circuit was lost, so that New York alone constitutes that circuit. The bill constitutes the various circuit courts as follows: First-Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. Second-New York. Third-New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland and Virginia. Fourth-Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas and Arkansas. Fifth-North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama and Tennessee. Sixth-Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky and West Virginia. souri. Ninth - California, Oregon and Nevada. The supreme court justices, except the chief justice, are required to reside in their respective circuits. Mr. Drake, who believes that there is something in a name, succeeded in putting in an amendment, which he explained as intended, in any possible future impeachment trial of the president, to prevent the chief justice of the supreme court from arrogating to himself the title of chief justice of the United States, which, he said, was done by Mr. Chase when presiding at the trial of President Johnson. The supreme court of Kansas has decided that an Indian has an inalienable right to go to Washington whenever he pleases, provided he pay his own expenses and refrain from a too free use of the tomahawk and scalping knife. The case arose in this wise: Keokuk, chief of the Sac and Fox tribes, having discovered that Washington was the Mecca to which great white men and great negroes made pilgrimages, concluded that great Indians should do the same. When lo, one Wiley, the agent whom the government had in its generosity appointed to look after the temporal welfare of these tribes in general, and of himself and special friends in particular, notified the aforesaid Keokuk that Commissioner Mix, of the Indian department, had directed that no delegation from any tribe should visit Washington, as there was no appropriation to pay their expenses. priation himself; and, having put money in his Keokuk, however, determined to make an appro purse, started. At Lawrence, Kansas, he was overtaken by the aforesaid Wiley, arrested and put in durance vile, from which he was at length liberated by a writ of habeas corpus. Whereupon he brought suit against Wiley for assault and battery and false imprisonment, and recovered a verdict of $1,000. On appeal the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. The argument of James Christian, counsel for Keokuk, of which we have received a copy, was a very able and elaborate review of the status and rights of "Lo, the poor Indian." The June number of the Galaxy has an interesting chapter from the autobiography of the Hon. Thurlow Weed, entitled "Early Incidents of the Rebellion," from which we extract the following reference to the death of Col. Edward D. Baker, of whose life we gave a brief sketch on page 365: "Several weeks afterward, but during that disastrous summer, I was again in Washington, when the news of that appalling defeat at Ball's Bluff was received. Coming as it did when we were disheartened by repulses in other quarters, it had a sickening effect upon the public mind. I was sitting, about 9 o'clock in the evening, alone with Mr. Lincoln, endeavoring to find encouragement or hope from intelligence received from the operations of the army in other places, when a messenger announced an officer from Ball's Bluff. That officer proved to be a brother of Colonel Baker, who had fallen in that battle. He was accompanied by a young son of Colonel Baker, the brother and son having been both engaged in the fight. An impression had already reached Washington that Colonel Baker had imprudently engaged a superior force, and was, therefore, responsible for the disaster. The colonel's brother handed to the president the order from General Stone under which Colonel Baker acted. That order was found in the colonel's cap, so saturated with blood (the colonel was shot through the head) that it was scarcely legible. The president, however, succeeded in reading the whole of it. Its preservation, fortunately for Colonel Baker, was a perfect vindication of his conduct. Не had acted in strict obedience to its letter and spirit. I left the brother and son of Colonel Baker with the intention of informing the secretary of war that Colonel Baker had lost his life in the gallant discharge of his duty, and in obedience to the orders of his superior officer. Near the residence of Secretary Seward I met Colonel Thomas A. Scott, the assistant secretary of war, who informed me that he was on his way to the office of the agent of the associated press, with a dispatch in relation to Ball's Bluff. I informed him that I had information which might change the character of his dispatch. He replied that he had just left General McClellan (whose house was but a few rods off), who had made up the dispatch from the latest information. He went with me, however, into Secretary Seward's library, where, on reading the dispatch, I found that it threw the responsibility of the battle and the defeat upon Colonel Baker, though expressed in kindly language and with mitigations. Colonel Scott, at my suggestion, went immediately to the White House, and, I believe, from there back to General McClellan's, where the dispatch was so modified as to relieve the memory of a gallant officer of the greatest injustice. "The body of Colonel Baker was rescued from the field by Louis Bierrel, a soldier from the city of New York, who stood by his gun until the enemy were upon him, when, with a comrade, he bore away the lifeless body of his commander. At the close of the war I obtained a situation for this faithful soldier in the Custom House; but I regret to say that some two years ago, for no fault of his own, he was discharged." We noticed an advertisement lately, "Law office to let, - porter, furnished with gas and water." Porter furnished with gas and water, we should imagine, might exhibit some of the pleasing and exhilirating effects of whisky and soda-water, concerning which we only can speak, of course, from hearsay. In the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts recently an attorney asked leave to take up a case. Judge. What is it? Attorney. Libel for divorce, your honor. Attorney. Fifty dollars, your honor. His honor could not have thought that unreasonable, though he had to put the question again to find out whether "cruelty" or "adultery" was alleged. Jerry Slocum is a pretty good sort of a fellow, but, as the French say, he never invented gunpowder. His talents were not exactly adapted for an effective address to the jury. Jerry could not wax eloquent without a good deal of effort; and if any thing occurred to change the current of his observation Jerry was certain to go hard and fast ashore. One day he was pleading for a rather sorry looking plaintiff, who sued on a grocery bill for cheap whisky,- where the other side set up a liquor defense. Jerry concluded to go in "on the pathetic." "Gentlemen, my client comes here and sues on this bill, and they are trying to cheat him out of it. He is an honest, hard working man; a poor man, gentlemen, who is trying to eke out a precarious subsistence by selling a little liquor" "No I aint!" interrupted his client, who, though pretty seedy in appearance, wanted the jury to understand that he stood somewhere in the community, Jerry did not enjoy arguing the rest of that case. DIGEST OF RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. (Concluded.) (Q. B. refers to Queen's Bench; C. P. to Common Pleas ; Ex. to the Exchequer; P. C. to the Privy Council; Ch. to Chancery; M. C. to Magistrates' Cases; P. & M. to Probate and Matrimonial, and L. J. R. to Law Journal Reports.) LIBEL. Army: reports made by commanding officer: military discipline: articles of war.-To a declaration, in an action for libel, setting out letters written of and concerning the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded, in substance, that when he wrote the letters he was the superior military officer of the plaintiff, and that it was his duty, as such superior officer, to forward to the adjutant-general letters written by the officers under his command, and sent to him in relation to their military conduct, etc., and to make reports in writing to the adjutant-general upon such letters for the information of the commander-in-chief; that he (defendant) had received such letters from the plaintiff, and had forwarded them in the ordinary course of his military duty, as such superior military officer, to the adjutant-general as an act of military duty, and not otherwise, and had made certain reports in writing, etc., which letters and reports were the libels complained of. To this plea the plaintiff replied that "the said words in the declaration mentioned were written and published by the defendant of actual malice on his, the defendant's, part, and without reasonable, probable, or justifiable cause, and not bona fide or in the bona fide discharge of the defendant's duty as such superior officer, as in the said second plea alleged," Held, by Mellor, J., and Lush, J., that even though the words complained of were published of actual malice, and without any reasonable, probable, or justifiable cause, as alleged in the replication, yet that, inasmuch as the question raised was one purely of military cognizance, the plaintiff and the defendant being officers in the army, and both bound by the articles of war, the plaintiff had no remedy at law. Held, by Cockburn, C. J., that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment. Dawkins v. Paulet, Q. B., 39 L. J. R. 53. LIEN. See carriers by railway. LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT. 1. Land owners having absolute title between them: cost of re-investment in land to be conveyed to different uses. — A railway company took, under their compulsory powers, land which was settled in such a way that a father and son had at that time between them the absolute beneficial interest. The purchase-money, as fixed by arbitration, having been paid into court: Held, that the owners were entitled to have part of the fund paid out to them as absolutely entitled, and at the same time to have another part re-invested in the purchase of land, to be settled to somewhat different uses, at the expense of the company. Re Jones's Trust Estate, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 190. 2. The petition having asked that part of the fund should be applied in paying off a mortgage created after the payment into court, the petitioners had to pay the costs of the mortgagees' appearance. Ib. LEASES AND SALES OF SETTLED ESTATES. 1. Undivided share: entirety: title under order of court. — Testator devised an estate in fee, upon trust to let and manage it during the life of his wife, and the minority of any of his children, and to pay a moiety of the net profits to the wife for life, and subject thereto in trust for the children in fee in equal shares. The trustees, with the widow and children, having obtained an order for the sale of part of the estate, under the settled estates act, the purchaser objected that one moiety of the estate was not "settled": Held, that the whole was a settled estate within the act. Held also, that, if the order was wrong, the purchaser having the concurrence of all persons beneficially interested would take an indefeasible title under the 28th section of the act. In re Shepheard's settled estate, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 173. 2. Semble: Where an undivided share of an estate is settled, the entirety may be dealt with as a settled estate within the act. Ib. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. 1. When the statute begins to run: mercantile law amendment act, 1856: retrospective enactment. -The word "return" in the 7th section of 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, means being in England at the time when the statute begins to run, although the person has never been in England before. Pardo v. Bingham, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 170. 2. The 10th section of the mercantile law amendment act (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97) is retrospective in its operation. Ib. MANDAMUS. Declining of jurisdiction. — At courts respectively holden under 5 and 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 18, the mayor and assessors held that certain notices of objection were insufficient, and retained the names upon the lists without inquiring into the qualifications of the persons objected to. Held, that there was such a declining of jurisdiction, that this court would interfere by mandamus, and would order the mayor and assessors to hold courts and hear the objections. R. v. Mayor, etc., of Monmouth, and R. v. Mayor, etc., of Bolton, Q. B., 39 L. J. R. 77. MARINE INSURANCE. 1. Valued policy, how far binding on assured: ship valued at less than actual value: right of underwriter to damages recovered by assured. — Where a vessel assured by a valued policy is destroyed by collision, the underwriters, after paying the amount insured, are entitled to the damages recovered from the colliding vessel, although the amount insured by the policy is less than the actual value of the vessel insured. North of England Iron Steamship Insur. Assoc. v. Armstrong, Q. B,, 39 L. J. R. 81. 2. Plaintiff subscribed a policy valued at 6,0007. on the defendants' vessel. Pending the risk this vessel was sunk by a collision. Plaintiffs paid defendents 6,000l., and proceedings having been taken in the admiralty against the colliding vessel in the name of the defendants, a sum exceeding 5,000l. was recovered as damages. The vessel insured was really worth 9,000l. at the time she was lost. Held, that the valuation in the policy was conclusive, so that the whole of the damages recovered must be regarded as salvage, and would pass to defendants. lb. 3. Constructive total loss: form of notice of abandonment: insurable interest: disbursements. It is not necessary to use the word "abandoned” in a notice of abandonment; any equivalent expressions which inform the underwriters that it is the intention of the assured to give up to them the property insured, on the ground of its having been totally lost, is sufficient. Currie & Co. v. The Bombay Native Ins. Co. P. C., 39 L. J. R. 1. 6. The assured must not delay to give notice of abandonment, but sufficient time must be allowed to enable the assured to exercise their judgment whether the circumstances entitle them to abandon. Ib. 5. Advances made by the charterer to the master at the port of loading, to be repaid by deductions out of freight, give the charterer an insurable interest in a policy on disbursements. Ib. 4. The appellants chartered a vessel for a voyage, and insured the cargo against total loss. In the course of the voyage the vessel went aground, became hogged, and sustained other injuries, and surveyors recommended her to be stripped with dispatch, and steps taken to save the cargo, but no attempt was made to do so; and after several days the master, fearing bad weather, sold the vessel and cargo for the benefit of all concerned. The vessel remained for some days in the same state, and the weather proving fine, the purchasers saved a large part of the cargo. Held, that the appellants were not entitled to treat the cargo as having been totally lost. Ib. MARRIAGE ARTICLES. Covenant to give by will: death of object of covenant in the life-time of the covenantor.- By marriage articles, the father of the lady covenanted that if she should survive him, or die before him, leaving any child or children, he would, by will, give and devise, or otherwise well and effectually settle and assure, to trustees a "child's share" in his real and personal estate upon trust for his daughter for life, with remainder to the children of the marriage, the shares of sons to vest at 21, with remainders over. One child only of the marriage, a son, attained 21, and he died a bachelor in the life-time of the covenantor. Held, reversing the decision of one of the vice chancellors, that the covenantor was not bound to provide by his will against a lapse, and that the representatives of the deceased child took no interest under the covenant. In re Brookman's Trust, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 138. MINING LEASE. Dead rent: covenant to work: specific performance. — The lease of coal mines, which were capable of being worked by instroke from adjoining mines, reserved a minimum rent and royalties in the usual manner, but contained a proviso, that in case of pits being sunk the minimum rent was to be increased. It also contained a covenant on the part of the lessee to work, "uninterruptedly, efficiently and regularly, according to the best and most approved mode." Held, that, under the circumstances, although the most approved mode of working was by sinking pits, the lessees were not bound to sink them; that the lessees were not bound to work so as to produce royalties in excess of the minimum rent; and that this court would not grant an injunction to restrain the lessees from breaking NEGLIGENCE. Fire spreading from combustible materials on banks of the railway. In an action charging that by the negligence of the defendants in the management of their railway engines and banks, cut grass, etc., was heaped on the banks and ignited, and a fire occasioned, which spread along a stubble field to the plaintiff's cottage and set it on fire; it appeared that, the summer being exceptionally hot, the country in an unusually dry and combustible state, and fires in consequence happening, the hedges and grass on the banks of the railway had been trimmed, and the trimmings left on the banks for a fortnight, so as to become highly combustible; that some hours before the accident the defendants' workmen were seen burning these trimmings about half a mile from the spot where the fire originated, and working toward it; that a short time before the fire broke out these men were finishing their dinner and smoking on the bank opposite to the spot; that a train passed, and shortly afterward the fire begun; that these men (who must have been on the spot and were not called by the defendants) tried in vain to put it out; that it burned through the hedge, and, there being a high wind, ran for 500 yards diagonally across a stubble field and set fire to the plaintiff's cottage, which was separated from the field by a lane, and was distant from the nearest part of the railway about 200 yards, and from the spot where the fire originated about 500 yards. Held (per Bovill, C. J., and Keating, J.; dissentiate Brett, J.), that there was evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Smith v. The London and South Western Rail. Co., C. P., 39 L. J. R. 68. 1. Register of proprietors: amendment of erroneous entry. -The court will, on the motion of the persons aggrieved, correct an entry in the register of proprietors of patents which purports to affect the rights of persons not parties to the deed registered. In re Horsley & Knighton's Patent, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 157. 2. One of two joint patentees by deed assigned his interest in the patent to a third person, and released to him all the rights of action, etc., against him of both the patentees; and the deed was set out completely on the register. Held, that the other joint patentee was entitled to have the entry struck out. lb. POWER OF APPOINTMENT. See Will. 1. In the case of an order directed to be published in church where defendant is in an extra-parochial place. Finney v. Godfrey, 162. 2. Hearing as to cost only: solicitor: costs by way of damages: decree of foreign court. In a suit to compel defendant to deliver up certain deeds and execute certain conveyances, defendant having at last done what was required, and having been paid on the other hand a small part of his counter demand, held (notwithstanding the general rule as to suits which have been compromised), that plaintiffs were entitled to bring the suit to a hear ing for the purpose of getting their costs, and decree against defendant accordingly. Griffin v. Brady, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 136. PROBATE. Paper simply revoking a will. -An instrument which disposes of no property, but simply declares an intention to revoke a previous will, is not a will or codicil, and is therefore not entitled to probate. In the goods of Fraser, P. and M., 39 L. J. R. 20. PRIORITY. Assignment for value of fund in court: bankruptcy: stoporder. The assignee of a fund in court, whether in bankruptcy or otherwise, must obtain a stop-order to perfect his title; therefore, an assignee for value who obtained a stop-order, although not until after the bankruptcy of the assignor, had priority over the assignee in bankruptcy, who had omitted to obtain a stop-order. Grainge v. Warner, 6 N. R. 219, disapproved of. Stuart v. Cockrell, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 127. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. Cesser of appointment: assistant overseer: collector of rates.Defendant was sued on a bond whereby he became bound to plaintiffs as surety for A's due performance of the duties of assistant overseer of the poor for the parish of West Malling. A was appointed at a salary of 201, a year, and the bond (which was not to be vitiated by a change of salary) given in 1865. Before the expiration of the first year, the vestry recommended to the board of guardians of the union in which West Malling was, that A should be appointed assistant overseer at a salary of 251. a year. The guardians appointed him collector of poor rates for the parish at a poundage of 6d., and submitted this to the poor-law board, who pointed out that this was not authorized by the poor-law orders of 1836, but, seeing no objection, eventually issued a fresh order in 1866, allowing the appointment on the terms proposed. No additional or different duties were imposed on A by the second appointment; he performed only the same duties after it; and the alleged breaches of duty were also afterward. Held, that defendant was not liable, because the second appointment was within 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101, s. 62, and therefore the first thereupon ceased. Held, also, that the inference from the facts was that there was a cesser of the first appointment within 59 Geo. 3, c. 12, s. 7. Semble, that the two offices were different and incompatible. Guardians of the Malling Union v. Graham, C. P., 39 L. J. R. 74. REMOTENESS. See Will. SECURITY FOR COSTS. 1. Next friend of married woman: 'poor circumstances :' costs of adjourned summons. The court will not order the next friend of a married woman to give security for costs, unless upon a distinct allegation that he is believed to be insolvent, or unable to answer the costs of the suit; a mere statement of belief that he is in poor circumstances is not sufficient. Beach v. Sleddon, Ch., 39 L. J. R. 123. 2. Where an adjourned summons is refused the applicant will, as a general rule, have to pay the costs of the summons as well as the adjournment. Ib. SLANDER OF TITLE. Actual malice: evidence. -The widow of an intestate, to whom she had acted as executor de son tort, executed a bill of sale of the goods of such intestate to A, one of his creditors, for securing the debt due. After her death plaintiff became the lawful administrator of the estate of the said intestate, and as such caused the goods which had been assigned by the bill of sale to be put up for sale by auction, when defendant, who was A's agent, attended and forbade the sale taking place, saying he held a bill of sale over every thing in the house in favor of A. fendant had received a letter from the auctioneers the day before the sale telling him that the bill of sale was De |