in this century were those of the New York Code of Procedure of 1848: "It is expedient that the present forms of actions and pleadings in cases at common law shall be abolished, that the distinction between legal and equitable remedies should no longer continue, and that an uniform course of proceeding in all cases should be established."

PETRONIUS ARBITER.

The Troy Whig newspaper says: "Two thousand years ago the following was said of the lawyers:

Quisquis habet nummos secura naviget aura Fortunamque suo temperet arbitrio. Uxorem ducat Danaen, ipsumque licebit Acrisium jubeat credere, quod Danaen. Carmina componat, declamet, concrepet, omnes Et peragat causas, sitque Catone prior. Juris consultus paret, non paret, habeto, Atque esto, quidquid Servius et Labeo. Multa loquor: quidvis nummis præsentibus opta; Et veniet: clausum possidet arca Jovem,' "We will thank our friend Irving Browne to copy the above, with the translation, into his next chapter on Lawyers in Literature."

It seems to me that this passage refers less to lawyers than to that class of whom Christ said that it was easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for one of them to enter the kingdom of heaven. As a rule, despite the popular belief, law and lucre do not go together. But here is the most I can make of my friend's author:

He who has wealth may sail with fav'ring wind,
And temper Fortune's laws to suit his mind;
In Danǎe's lap may pour the golden shower,
And satisfy Acrisius with the dower;
Make laws, declaim, his fingers snap, dispatch
All suits, and Cato's dignity o'ermatch.

Let lawyers say, I see, or I don't see,
And be, like Servius, his who pays most fee.
Ask what you please; 'twill come for ready pelf;
The money box incloses Jove himself.

SERVING PROCESS.

We extract the following from "The Law: What I have Seen, What I have Heard, and What I have known," by Cyrus Jay, an immethodical and garrulous but rather amusing book, which is dedicated "To the Lawyers and Gentlemen with whom I have dined for more than half a century at the old CheshireCheese Tavern, Wine Office court, Fleet street:"

"The writ-server, who in the sister island is styled a process-server, is a singular character in the law. Many men of this class have been attorney's clerks, who through drunkenness were discharged; but, notwithstanding which, their employers sometimes took compassion on them, and gave them writs to serve. Some of this fraternity are very knowing, and make not a bad income. I remember an attorney who informed me that he was, after using every exertion, unable to serve a clergyman with a copy of a writ, the service of which was of the greatest importance. I said, 'I will introduce you to a man who is very clever in these matters; but you will have to give him a good fee.' 'O,' said he, 'I do not care about the money; send him to me.' As I was leaving the gentleman's office I met the writ-server just outside, and I returned with him. After the attorney had described to him the defendant's person and calling,

that he lived near Kennington common, and had formly resided at Cambridge, it was amusing to hear the writ-server ask about the antecedents of the clergyman. 'Why,' said the attorney, 'when he was at Cambridge he was a very great cricketer.' "That's enough,' was the reply; and, after depositing the writ and copy in his pocket-book, he departed. This conversation took place the day before Good Friday. Much to my astonishment, my friend informed me on the Saturday that the writ had been served. And how do you think it was done?' said he. 'It appears that the writ-server was a married man, and had a large family; he went on the common, erected a wicket, and played cricket with his children for several hours. Whilst the children were enjoying the game, a gentleman, who came out from one of the houses opposite the common, went up to him and said, 'Sir, I am delighted to see you enjoy with your family this noble game.' 'Thank you, sir. Here is a copy of a writ for you.' The wicket was immediately struck, and the writ-server and his children went home to dinner. He was acute enough to know that the gentleman was the defendant, and lawyer enough to know that he could be served on a Good Friday."

man.

"An attorney employed a man, known familiarly by the nickname of Boss, to serve a copy of a writ on a master carpenter, a Mr. H, who, as Boss shortly afterward discovered, lodged at a house at Highgate hill. The defendant was a remarkably good-looking man, dressed well, and had the appearance of a gentleBoss having knocked at the carpenter's door, it was opened by a little girl, who, in reply to his question whether Mr. H- was at home, said he had just left the house to go up the hill. Boss thereupon journeyed up the hill with stick in hand, puffing at each step, for he was not a quick walker. Defendant, hearing the tramping of footsteps behind him, and espying the man whom he had seen knocking at the door of his lodgings, quickened his pace; and coming up to a large gate he slammed it back as if he were the owner of the premises; and, the gate having settled, he walked leisurely up an extensive lawn in front of the mansion of a gentleman of fortune, with his hands behind him, avoiding turning his face to the road. Boss, who had heard the gate slam, came up to it as soon as it was settled, put his arms on it, and said to himself, 'this man surely cannot be the owner of the mansion, for the shrubs do not seem to know him - the laurustinuses certainly do not; so I will give him the Westminster halloo;' and thereupon he shouted out at the top of his voice, 'hulloo! I want to speak to you.' The defendant looked round, whereupon Boss went suddenly up to him; and he then, full of trepidation, said, 'What do you want with me?' 'Here is a copy of a writ,' was the reply, which was immediately served on him. The carpenter and writ-server then adjourned to a public house, the former treating the latter with a steak and plenty of gin, and also giving him a sovereign, on condition that he would say he could not meet with him."

"A cunning writ-server, among his other exploits, signalised himself by serving a gentleman living at

Hackney with a copy of a writ- a feat which no one else of his fraternity had been able to accomplish. The gentleman had, for very potent reasons, never allowed any one to see him at his house; but he was constantly in his garden, in one part of which he kept many fowls. At the back of this garden there was a wall, in which there was a small door, which was always kept fastened. The process-server, finding that nothing could be done at the front of the house, discovered the back of it through tramping over some fields; and, observing that there was a small opening in the garden door, and that he could see the whole length of the garden through it, he procured an egg, and, after carefully cutting it in two, inclosed therein a copy of the writ; which done, he with much skill fastened the two parts together with cement; and, the eggshell with its contents being very light, he threw it over the wall on the grassplat, where it safely alighted without breaking. It was not long before the process-server espied, through the opening in the gate, the gentleman walking on the grass-plat, who, on observing the egg upon it, took it up and said, 'why, one of my hens has laid me an egg for breakfast on the grass-plat!' No sooner had he uttered these words than the egg separated in his hands, and the copy of the writ then became visible. At the same time he saw a large pole above the wall, with the parchment writ stuck at the end of it, and heard the process-server shouting out at the top of his voice, 'here's the original writ.' But the most amusing part of the whole affair was the attempt of the gentleman, while the proceedings were going on, to set aside the service by a summons before a judge at chambers, on the ground that he had never been served with process; but the judge, on reading the affidavits, amidst roars of laughter, decided that it was a good service; and among process-servers it is known to this day as 'the eggshell oase.'"

To the above we might add the instance of a cunning New York attorney who had a summons to serve, in an action for divorce, on a woman who kept herself concealed, but whose whereabouts were known. He at length effected his purpose, after many rebuffs, by disguising his clerk in the likeness of an express messenger, who conveyed the writ to her in a parcel purporting to be jewelry. The vanity of the sex succumbed to the same means which Mephistopheles used to overcome Margaret.

CURRENT TOPICS.

A San Francisco lawyer, named Hastings, has filed a petition in the house of representatives, which has been referred to the judiciary committee, charging Justice FIELD, of the supreme court of the United States, with misbehavior and gross misconduct in office. He sets forth that FIELD is guilty of rendering decisions for corrupt purposes; that he has been interested in litigations where he has given decisions as a judge, and that he is generally corrupt. Judge FIELD's friends say that Hastings is a disreputable lawyer of San Francisco, who was disbarred by Judge FIELD while acting as United States circuit judge for California, and that he takes this method of revenging himself. Hastings will

be allowed to make a statement to the judiciary committee as to the proof he has to sustain the charges, but it is not supposed any thing will come of it.

That to the lawyers of a state should chiefly be left the duty of selecting nominees for judicial positions, is a proposition which very few intelligent men ought to question. No class of men are so well qualified as they to judge of the legal attainments, judicial ability, and personal integrity of aspirants for the bench. We have frequently urged the association of lawyers, believing that one of the most important results that would flow therefrom would be a salutary influence over judicial nominations and elections. The lawyers of Chicago, appreciating the importance of exerting their influence, and, as they declare in their call, "believing that political conventions cannot make a man fit to be a judge, who otherwise is not, and that no party convention should be called, under existing circumstances, to nominate men for a purely judicial position," have called a meeting of the bar for the purpose of putting in nomination men known to them to be every way qualified. Such course is eminently proper, and we commend it to their brethren elsewhere.

Many of our readers will recollect that somewhat over a year ago Judge FISHER, of Washington, struck the name of Joseph H. Bradley from the roll of attorneys for violent and disorderly conduct during the trial of a cause, followed by a personal assault upon the judge after the adjournment of the court. Bradley has now demonstrated the propriety of Judge FISHER'S action by making a most brutal and cowardly assault upon the latter. It seems that he had long meditated the assault whenever FISHER should

leave the bench for the attorney-generalship, an office to which the latter had been recently appointed. On the afternoon of the 18th inst., as FISHER was passing toward his office, he was met by Bradley, who dealt him a heavy blow with his walking stick. They then attempted to clinch, when the judge tripped Bradley, who fell heavily to the ground, Judge FISHER going down with him, and the two rolling over each other on the pavement. The spectators interfered at this juncture, and the combatants were separated, with slight injuries.

That the fair sex are aggressive and determined in their assault upon the legal citadel, is evident. It is said that no less than one hundred women are now studying law in different parts of this country. This fact appears to soothe the ruffled feelings of the Tribune, and leads it to "hope that certain members of the bar may yet be civilized by the admission to legal practice of women, gentle, lovely, and good-mannered." Who can doubt that every member of the bar will be civilized by such gentle, lovely, and goodmannered influences? But we look forward to still stronger civilizing agencies. When charming ladies shall lounge and shake their curls within the bar; when judicial opinions shall be rendered in verse and set to music; when women shall hold the jury-box, and "babies be criers in court;" when the tedium of trial shall be relieved by the heavenly strains of an

written on the back: "All gone to h-11." Judge W.'s attention was called thereto by a member of the profession, who pleasantly remarked: "It's always a handsome sight to see Parks well laid out."

A man with four wives was brought before Hans Swarihart, a Mohawk justice, for commitment on charge of bigamy. "Four vives!" exclaimed the astonished Hans, "four wives, that was a most hinocious crime. Discharch him at vanst." "Why," protested the prosecutor, "discharge him, when the proof is positive? Will the court explain?" "Yes, I exshplains, iff he lifs mit four vives he got bunishment enough. I lif mit von and I got too much bunishment already."

! A man who called at the surrogate's office in New York one day last week, to file a petition for the probate of a will in which he was named as executor, was asked, as usual, to give the date of the testator's death. "An' shure," was the reply, "he ain't dead yet, but he is very sick, and we expect him to die to-night." The petitioner was advised to call again after the man was really dead and buried, and as he has not since made his appearance it is to be presumed that the maker of the will has disappointed him in his anticipations.

A very pretty Oakland girl, not over 18 years of age, brought a suit for breach of promise against a young merchant, who had changed his mind and taken a richer bride. The trial came on; and the girl's mother, a fat, red-faced old dame, was present in the bar, to give moral effect to the recital of her daughter's wrongs. The counsel for the plaintiff, in summing up, discanted at length and with moving pathos upon the enormity of the defendant's guilt in creeping into the bosom of this family (here the old lady pinned her shawl closer), "and deceiving and disappointing this young girl." Here the venerable mother could contain herself no longer, but, with gushing tears, exclaimed: "He deceived us all, gentlemen! Me and all the rest-me and all the rest!" The effect was magical, but not just what the old lady expected.

Epapheres J. Sherman v. Sarah M. Bartholomew, ex'x, etc. Where the defendant executed and delivered to the plaintiff a paperdeclaring that he had deposited a certain sum of money with a third party to be paid to the plaintiff, if, through professional advice and information given by the latter to the defendant, he should recover and collect within ninety days of a certain debtor a large amount of money due defendant. The information was given, and the money collected. In an action against defendant for the sum stipulated, the jury found for the plaintiff. Held, that both law and equity united in support of the verdict. That, however defective the papers containing the alleged contract might have been, had the question been raised by demurrer, these defects have been cured by the verdict. Opinion by INGALLS, J.

William D. Robinson v. The International Life Assurance Society, of London.

In an action upon an insurance policy issued by the defendants to the plaintiff's assignor, then a resident of Richmond, Va., the defense was set up that the premiums after June 8, 1861, had not been paid. It appeared that the defendants, a foreign corporation, had an agent in Richmond, who had effected the insurance, and to whom the premiums had been paid. Prior to, and until the 8th of June, 1861, the agent at Richmond forwarded the plaintiff's assignor's premium to the general agent in New York, and gave the plaintiff's assignor receipts signed by such general agent, which had been forwarded for

the purpose. After the 8th of said June, the war having interrupted communication, the premiums paid the agent subsequently were not forwarded to New York, and were also paid and accepted by the Richmond agent in confederate currency. The plaintiff's assignor died in 1862. The authority of the Richmond agent was in no manner revoked until in the year 1865. Held, that the defendants being a foreign corporation, and belonging to a neutral country, the principle of law which would avoid or suspend such contracts between the citizens of states at war with each other, was inapplicable. The status of the defendant was simply, that of a neutral contracting or continuing a contract with a citizen of a belligerent country. Such contracts are valid by the laws of all countries. Held, also, that the company not having revoked the authority of the Richmond agent, the plaintiff's assignor was justified in paying the premiums to him; and that, under the circumstances then existing, the agent was at liberty to receive, and the plaintiff's assignor to pay, the currency of the confederate states in payment of such premiums. Opinion by HUNT, J.

John Underwood v. John Green.

The defendant, acting under the direction of the city inspector of New York, removed a number of dead hogs belonging to plaintiff from the cars of the Hudson River Railroad, at the depot in New York. The hogs had died of suffocation on the way from Albany down, and had been dead but a few hours. Defendant removed them immediately on their arrival, without requesting or giving the plaintiff time to remove them, and in opposition to the requests of his agent, who was present. It was shown that the dead hogs were valuable for a lawful purpose. The defendant claimed to act in pursuance of the 7th section of the ordinance of 1859, which authorizes the city inspector to cause "all dead animals, and every putrid, offensive, unsound or unwholesome substance found in any street or other place in the city, to be forthwith removed," etc. Held, that the defendant could not justify his act under such ordinance; that the dead hogs were not per se a nuisance or necessarily dangerous to the public health; that the term "dead animals," used in the ordinance, related to such only as were detrimental to the public health; that the owner of the hogs was entitled to a reasonable time to remove such hogs after their arrival. Held, also, that while the inspector, in the discharge of his duties, under such ordinance, is clothed with a judicial discretion, yet he is an officer of a limited and special jurisdiction, and when, in any case, his power is challenged, he must prove some facts invoking, or tending to invoke, the exercise of his discretion. Opinions by EARL, C. J., and INGALLS, J.

Robert A. Smith et al. v. John Orser, Sheriff. When a judge at circuit charge that a sheriff, under attachment against two members of a firm, consisting of three members, had no right to take and hold possession of the partnership property: Held, that such charge was in conflict with well settled law in this state. Phillips v. Cook, 24 Wend. 389, approved. Opinion of E. DARWIN SMITH, J.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.*
ACTION. See Guardian and Ward.
ADMINISTRATORS, APPEALS BY. See Equity Pleadings and
Practice, 2 and 4.

APPEAL. See Appeal Bonds.

APPEAL BONDS.

The bond required to be given by chapters 191 and 192 of the revised statutes, as a condition of taking an appeal from the court of common pleas to the supreme court, or

*From Hon. John F. Toby, Reporter, to appear in the Ninth Volume of Rhode Island Reports.

of filing a bill of exceptions in the latter court to the rulings of the former, must be signed by the party appealing, and where the bond has been signed by a stranger to the suit, the appeal, or exception, must be dismissed, because the statute has not been complied with. Town... send v. Hazard and others.

ARBITRATION AND AWARD. See Award.

ATTACHMENT.

The provisions of chapter 525 of the statutes are to be construed as provisions in addition to, and not by way of substitution for, those of the statutes previously existing upon the subject of attachments. Hence, an attachment of personal estate is void, where the officer charged with the service of the writ left a copy with the defendant as directed by said chapter 525, but did not leave an attested copy of the writ with a copy of his doings thereon, at the defendant's usual place of abode, as directed by chapter 181, § 5, of the revised statutes. Whitaker v. Jenckes. APPEALS IN EQUITY. See Equity Pleadings and Practice, 3 and 5.

APPEALS FROM ORDERS OF TOWN COUNCILS REMOVING POOR PERSONS.

An appeal by the overseer of the poor of a town, from the order of the town council of another town, removing to the one in which he is such overseer a poor person, is properly taken, if taken to the supreme court next to be holden after twenty days from the delivery of said poor person, and the leaving with him of an attested copy of such order, and need not necessarily be claimed within forty days after the making of the order, the provisions of chapter 346 of the statutes not being repealed by those of chapter 681. Paine v. Town Council of North Providence.

AUDITORS.

1. Under the statute referring cases to auditors (statutes, chapter 660), exceptions to their reports regarding matters of fact are more properly corrected by an appeal to a jury than by a recommitment of the report. Hunt, Tillinghast & Co. v. Reynolds.

2. Exceptions from an auditor's report regarding matters of fact not disclosed by the record cannot be sustained unless supported by affidavit. Ib.

AWARD.

The award of a referee, under a rule of court, is conclusive as to matters of law as well as to matters of fact, and cannot be set aside unless for a cause which affects the fairness of his decision, or which shows that the party objecting did not have a fair and impartial trial. Cutler v. Wall.

BANK DIRECTORS.

1. Where no qualification is required, and there is no usage to control, a person who is elected a bank director is presumed to accept the office unless he declines it. This presumption may be rebutted. Whether simple non-action as a director for five months would be ordinarily sufficient to rebut it-query. But where the stockholders of a bank, in an instrument authorizing its conversion from a state to a national bank, named all the directors who had been elected at the last annual election as those "who are now the directors of said bank," the court cannot hold that two of those so named were not directors at the time of such conversion, because they had never acted in that capacity since their election five months previously. Lockwood and others, trustees, v. American National Bank.

2. By the provisions of section 44 of the National Currency act of 1861 (chapter 106, 1st session, 38th congress), upon the conversion of a state to a national bank, all the directors of the former become those of the latter, until an election or appointment by the national bank. Semble, that no oath is required from these ad interim directors, the oath prescribed by section nine of the afore

said act being designed for those regularly elected by the national bank; but, assuming its necessity, a majority of those who were the directors of the state bank before its conversion is necessary to make a quorum of the board of the national bank. lb.

3. In all cases where an act is to be done by a corporate body or a part of a corporate body, and the number is definite, a majority of the whole number is necessary to constitute a legal meeting, although at a legal meeting, where a quorum is present, a majority of those present may act. Ib.

4. Hence, a by-law adopted at a meeting of six ad interim directors of a national bank, which had twelve directors before its conversion, is invalid, because not adopted by a majority or quorum of the board. 16.

BY-LAW-ADOPTION OF. See Bank Directors, 4. CONTEMPT. See Habeas Corpus.

CONTRACTS.

When two parties enter into a contract, and one of them makes a memorandum of its terms, reads it over to the other party who assents to its correctness, and then retains it in his own possession for his individual use, the contract will be construed to be a verbal and not a written one. Nor does it become a contract in writing because the party making the memorandum affixes his initials thereto. Hunt, Tillinghast & Co. v. Reynolds.

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS.

The provision in section 9 of chapter 221 of the revised statutes, that penalties or forfeitures, the whole or any part whereof is given to any town by any penal statute, may be sued for by the town council in the name of the town, or by the proper prosecuting officer in the name of the city entitled to the benefit thereof, does not apply to fines of upwards of twenty dollars, which are recoveraable by indictment under the provisions of section one of the same chapter. State v. Slocum.

See Evidence, 2; Jurisdiction, New Trials, 1.

DIVORCE.

1. When one E. C. T. petitioned for a decree declaring the marriage of his son, O. M. T., a minor, with one A. J., null and void, and divorcing him from the bond of marriage with said A. J., it was held that the court, being satisfied by the evidence that the said O. M. T. was not of sound mind at the time of his marriage with the respondent, would not grant her application to postpone pronouncing its decree in order to allow the said O. M. T. to be produced before them, her application being based on the claim of his being of sound mind at the time of the marriage, and not of any subsequent recovery, and a physician's affidavit having been presented which stated that he could not be produced in court without suffering injury. Thayer v. Thayer.

2. A lunatic or a person non compos is duly represented in a petition for divorce by the person who, being authorized by the statute (statutes, chapter 706), petitions in his behalf. Personal notice to him of the pendency of the petition, although expedient in some cases, is not expedient when he is a minor without means of his own, and the petition is preferred by his father. Ib. See Evidence, 3.

EQUITY PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE.

1. Where an equity cause is heard and decided by a single judge, under the provisions of chapter 692 of the statutes, it is no prejudice to the rights of the parties to enter decrees of dates after the time when the decision was rendered, inasmuch as the right of appeal to the full court runs from the date when the decree is actually entered. Daboll and others, administrators, v. Field.

2 Administrators represent their intestate's estate so far as regards the allowance of any accounts or claims