refused the defendant's request to give to the jury the following instruction, to wit: "Where two mining companies take up adjoining claims, and the one last taken up overlaps the other, and neither company is working that portion of the claim which overlaps the other, but are working in different portions of their respective claims, the fact that the locators of the last claim located have been in possession of their claim for five years, does not divest the owners of the first claim of the right to their claim to the extent of the original boundaries, and such a possession by the locators of the last claim located is not adverse to the possession of those who located the first claim." Held, that the instruction correctly declared the law, and, in view of the fact that plaintiff's said instruction had been given, the court erred in refusing at. Ib.

JUDGMENT.

1. Collateral attack of judgment for want of jurisdiction of the person of defendant. — On a collateral attack of a judgment rendered by a court of record for want of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant: Held, first, that in ascertaining whether a want of jurisdiction appears, the whole record, which consists exclusively of the judgment roll, must be consulted; and, second, that in case of service of summons by publication, neither the affidavit nor the order for its publication form a part of the judgment roll. Quincy v. Porter.

2. Where, in an action brought in the district court by Q. against Joseph S. Ruckle, the return made by the sheriff of service of the summons showed only that George & Ruckle had been served, while the judgment recited that Joseph S. Ruckle had been duly served with process, etc.; Held, that said recital in the judgment is not contradicted or overcome by said return of the sheriff, and that such judgment is not liable to a collateral attack for want of jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. Ib.

3. Affidavit of publication of summons.— Where the affidavit of the publication of a summons, made by one who therein styles himself "the proprietor" of the newspaper in which the publication was made, instead of "the printer," as required by the practice act: Held, that the terms "printer" and "proprietor" are, in the sense of the statute, synonymous. Ib.

JURY.

1. Impaneling in a criminal case. -Twelve names must be drawn from the box by the clerk, and the defendant must be allowed to examine the whole twelve before exercising his right of peremptory challenge as to any; and those not challenged or excused must then be sworn; after which as many more names as will make up the deficiency must be drawn, when the same process must be repeated until the jury is completed. (SANDERSON, J., and SPRAGUE, J., dissenting.) People v. Scoggins.

2. If a party omit to challege a juror peremptorily until after he has been sworn, he may be permitted to do so, for good cause shown, at any time before the jury is completed, but not thereafter. Ib.

3. It is error for the court to direct the clerk to draw but one name at a time, and require the parties to examine him for cause, and interpose, if at all, a peremptory challege before another name is drawn, and then direct him to be sworn to try the case. Ib.

MECHANIC'S LIEN ACT OF 1862.

1. Written contracts under it. It appeared at the trial of an action by W. against H. to foreclose a mechanic's lien under the act concerning the liens of mechanics and others (Stats. 1862, p. 384), that H. entered into a contract with W., by which W. agreed to build upon the lot of H. a barn, "agreeable to the drafts, plan, and explanation hereto annexed, marked 'A,'" and H. agreed to pay for the same three hundred and twenty dollars, "upon the completion of said barn, as per specifications;" that, in fact, no draft, plan or specifications were attached to the

contract, but an unsigned paper was produced, and testimony received, under the objection of H., tending to prove that it contained the plans and specifications alluded to in the contract. Held, first, that "the specifications" were an essential part of the contract; second, that the reference made in the contract to "the specifications" being false, cannot be helped out by oral evidence; and third, that without "the specifications" there was not such "a contract in writing, subscribed by the party to be charged thereby," as is required by the second section of said act to entitle the contractor to acquire the lien therein provided for. Worden v. Hammond.

2. To what lien the interest attaches. - Said act provides only for the acquisition by the contractor of a lien on the interest of the employer in the property sought to be charged, whether that be a fee simple interest or less. Ib. 3. T. was the owner of a lot of land, of which H. was in possession, under a contract of sale from T.; W. erected a building on the lot, under a contract made by him with H., and against T. and H. recovered judgment enforcing a lien for the contract price on the interests of both T. and H. in the land. Held, that W.'s lien did not affect the interest of T., and that T. was improperly made a party of the action. Ib.

MORTGAGE.

1. Tender of sum due on mortgage. - The question whether a tender by a subsequent mortgagee of the amount due on a prior mortgage, if made after the law day of the mortgage, or after Judgment foreclosing the mortgage, discharges the lien of the mortgage or judgment, without keeping the tender good, discussed, but not decided. Ketchum v. Crippen.

2. Dismissal of bill for want of equity. — A subsequent mortgagee, who has been made a party to an action foreclosing a prior mortgage, cannot maintain a separate action to enjoin a sale under the judgment, and to be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff, on the ground of a tender of the amount due on the judgment; his remedy is by motion in the action foreclosing the mortgage. Ib.

3. Remedy for relief in equity. - Where a party to an equitable action has a plain and speedy remedy by motion in the action, he cannot maintain a separate suit in equity to obtain the desired relief. Ib.

4. Power of court to control its judgments. In a suit foreclosing a mortgage, the court has full power, on motion made by a subsequent mortgagee who is a party, to subrogate him to the rights of the judgment creditor, or to enter a discharge of the lien of the judgment, or to prevent a sale, or to enter a satisfaction of the judgment, upon a proper showing being made. Fb.

NEW TRIAL.

1. Conflict of evidence. This court, on review of the proper motion made in the court below and there denied, will order a new trial where the evidence given at the former trial was, without substantial conflict, opposed to the verdict. Maine Boys' T. Co. v. Boston T. Co.

2. Notice of motion for new trial. — The reasons for which a motion for a new trial will be made may be stated generally in the notice that such motion will be made. Butterfield v. C. P. R. R. Co.

3. Statement for new trial. -The judgment roll need not be inserted in a statement on motion for a new trial. Ib. 4. A statement on motion for a new trial must contain a specification of the particular errors upon which the party moving for a new trial will rely; and if one of the grounds is that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, it must specify the particulars in which the evidence is insufficient, or it will be disregarded by the court. Ib.

5. An assignment of errors appended to the end of a transcript, but not included in the statement on motion for a new trial, is not a specification of the particular errors upon which the party will rely, even if sufficient in form as such specification. The specification must be in the statement itself. Ib.

6. Specification of errors in statement. An assignment of errors at common law, even if included in a statement on motion for a new trial, is not such a specification of the errors upon which a party will rely as is required by our practice act. Ib.

7. Conflict of evidence. - On appeal from an order denying a new trial, this court will not in any case disturb the Judgment because not supported by the evidence where there was a substantial conflict in the evidence. Morgan v. Higgins.

PAYMENT OF DEBT.

1. By one not legally responsible. - The payment of a debt by a person not legally responsible for it is a satisfaction of the debt, if the money is accepted for that purpose. Martin v. Quinn.

2. Action to recover overpayment made by sheriff to judgment creditor on sale of judgment debtor's property.-In 1861 Q. recovered a money judgment in justice's court against K. and C., from which, in 1862, K. and C. appealed to the county court, and procured M. and S. as sureties to execute an undertaking in the sum of five hundred dollars, in the usual form on appeal, to stay execution. The undertaking was not executed by K. and C. Thereafter judgment was rendered by the county court in said action against K. and C. for a sum greater than five hundred dollars. Thereupon Q. demanded of M. and S. said five hundred dollars expressed in their undertaking, to be applied in satisfaction of the last-named judgment, which they paid. Q., however, failed to enter satisfaction of said judgment pro tanto, but on an execution issued thereon, collected, under a sheriff's sale of K. and C.'s property, the whole amount of his judgment recovered in the county court. K. and C. then assigned their demand against Q. for the money received by him in excess of the unpaid balance due on his judgment after deducting said five hundred dollars, to M. and S., who brought action therefor, setting up said facts, and recovered judgment. The only defense was by way of demurrer to the complaint, which was overruled. Held, that said last named judgment was properly rendered. Ib.

PRACTICE.

1. Defective complaint. — If a complaint improperly unites two causes of action, or is ambiguous and uncertain, the defect must be taken advantage of by demurrer, or it is waived. Lawrence v. Montgomery.

2. Party plaintiff in action for deceit. An action for deceit in the sale of land to which the grantor had no title, should be brought by all the grantees jointly, unless there has been a conveyance of the cause of action to the plaintiff. A conveyance by one of the grantees to the others, of his interest in the land, does not assign the cause of action for deceit, so as to enable the assignees to sue for the deceit in their names. lb.

5. Plaintiffs in suit upon covenants in a deed. All the grantees should join as plaintiffs in an action upon either a direct or implied covenant in a deed that the grantor has not sold or incumbered the land, or that he is seized of and has a right to convey the same. A deed of the land by one of the grantees to another does not convey to him the cause of action upon such covenant. Ib.

6. Defective pleading. — Although the allegations of a pleading are defective, yet, if there is not an entire want of allegations constituting a cause of action, and no demurrer is filed, or objection made in the court below, the judgment will not be disturbed. Lee v. Figg.

7. Conveyance to defraud creditors.—A conveyance made by a debtor, without consideration, for the purpose of de

frauding his creditors, can be set aside by the creditors on the ground of fraud, even if the grantee was ignorant of the fraudulent purpose for which it was given. Ib.

8. Attack on judgment by confession. — A judgment for money, by confession, upon a statement which does not sufficiently state the facts out of which the indebtedness arose, nor that the amount confessed is justly due, is not a nullity on its face. Such judgment cannot be collaterally attacked. It can only be called in question by the creditors of the defendant on the ground of fraud, and in a direct proceeding for that purpose. Ib.

9. Admissions in pleading. — If the complaint avers a judgment, and the issuing of an execution thereon, and a sale thereunder of land, and the answer denies the validity of the judgment, and avers that it was void for want of jurisdiction, and denies that the plaintiff acquired any title by the pretended sale by the sheriff, the execution and sale thereunder are not sufficiently denied to require the execution to be put in evidence. Ib.

10. Defendants whose names are unknown. Where parties whose names are unknown are sued by fictitious names, the record should show these facts. Ford v. Doyle.

12. Execution of writ of possession against strangers to the record. In an action against - Doyle, John Doe, and Richard Roe, to recover land, wherein there was no service of summons, but John Doyle answered, and a judgment was subsequently entered against James Doyle. Held, that the district court properly refused to direct the sheriff to execute the writ of possession, by turning out James Doyle, Jr., James Doyle, Sr., and Catharine Doyle, who were in possession at the time of the commencement of the action, but who had not been made parties to the suit. Ib.

13. Service of writ of possession. A person in possession of the demanded premises at the time of commencement of the action to recover possession cannot be removed under a writ issued on a judgment in the case, unless he is made defendant, and judgment is rendered against him after the court acquires jurisdiction of his person. Ib.

14. Review of orders entered by consent. - Although the supreme court will not review judgments and orders entered by consent, yet, if it appear by a fair construction of a stipulation consenting to an order denying a new trial, that the stipulation was only intended to facilitate an appeal, and not as an abandonment of the right to contest the correctness of the order, this court will review the order. Mecham v. McKay.

15. Admission of pleading in evidence. — If an answer has been superseded by an amended answer, the answer thus superseded is not admissible in evidence as an admission on the trial. Ib.

16. What pleadings party bound by. — Although a party is bound by the admissions contained in his pleadings, yet it is only the admissions in the pleadings upon which he goes to trial. Ib.

17. Possession of tenant that of landlord. — If A enters under a lease from and as a tenant of B, and C then recovers a judgment of eviction against A, after which A attorns to and pays rent to C, from this last period the possession of A becomes that of C. Ib.

PROBATE JUDGE.

1. Interested in an estate. —A probate judge who has a power of attorney from any of the persons claiming to be heirs of the deceased, authorizing him to receive for them any money or property to which they might be entitled from the estate, and also letters offering him a percentage upon said proceeds coming to said alleged heir, is interested in the estate, and cannot act as judge in any

2. Payment of salary of office. A salary of an office which is fixed at a monthly rate becomes due and payable monthly. Ib.

3. The occupation of an office by an intruder does not have the effect of deferring the time of payment of the salary until the intruder is ousted. Ib.

4. Claim against county. The board of supervisors of a county have no authority to allow an unaudited claim against a county, except it be done within one year after he claim shall accrue and become due. Ib.

STAMPS.

The waiver, by an indorser of a promissory note, of presentation, demand, notice of non-payment, and protest, written upon the back of the note, need not be stamped in order to be valid. Pacific Bank v. De Po.

TAXATION.

1. Possessory claim to public land taxable. A possession of and claim to public land of the United States is property, and as such is taxable to the claimant, without violating the act of congress by which this state was admitted into the Union. People v. Black Diamond Mining Co.

2. Revenue act. - -So much of the general revenue act as exempts possessory claims and improvements upon the public lands from taxation is unconstitutional and void. (People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 433, and People v. Gerke, 35 Cal. 677, affirmed.) Ib.

TRUST DEED.

1. Absolute deed as security for debt. — A deed or an assignment of an interest in land, absolute on its face, may be shown by parol testimony to have been intended as a security for the payment of a debt. Raynor v. Lyons.

2. Money held in trust. If A makes an absolute deed of his land to B, with the understanding between him and B and C that B is to sell the land and use the proceeds to pay the debt of A to C, C can compel B to account to him and pay over the proceeds. Ib.

WAGERS.

1. At common law, wagers made in respect to matters not affecting feelings, interest or character of third persons, or the public peace or good morals, or public policy, are legal contracts, which may be enforced by action. Johnston v. Russell.

2. Wagers upon elections. —Wagers upon the result of elections are against public policy, and are therefore void; and, hence, money put up in the hands of a stakeholder may be recovered, if the wager be repudiated and a return of the money be demanded at any time before the election has taken place and the result has become generally known, but not thereafter. Ib.

3. J. made a wager with F. that Seymour would receive a majority of the votes cast in this state at the presidential election in 1868, and F. made a wager with J. that Grant would receive a majority of said votes. The money was put in the hands of R. as stakeholder. After the election had taken place and the result had become known, J.,

having lost his wager, notified R. that he repudiated the wager, and demanded his money, but R., notwithstanding, paid the money to F., according to the terms of the wager. In an action by J. against R. to recover his stake, it was held that a recovery could not be had. Ib.

NEW YORK STATE DECISIONS.*
CONTRACT.

1. Evidence: trial: witness, -Under a contract for the sale of wood subject to the measurement and inspection of a third person, the buyer is entitled to actual measurement by such person, or something equivalent thereto. Supreme Court, General Term, 7th District, 1869. Mc Andrews v. Lantee.

2. In an action on such contract, the inspector having testified that he measured the dimensions of height and width by his eye, as was his custom; Held, that it was proper to charge the jury that they were to determine his capacity to measure correctly in that way, and that the plaintiff would not be bound by any estimate of the inspector, unless they were of opinion that his eye was, on a question of measurement, as reliable as a measuring rod. Ib.

8. On the second trial on a contract, the defendant and his witness testified to the terms of the contract, and stated that it was on a certain condition, and on crossexamination each stated that he had testified to that condition, on the former trial. Held, that the condition being material to the merits of the controversy, it was proper to permit the plaintiff to prove that on the former trial defendant and his witness, in testifying to the contract, omitted to state such a condition. Ib.

4. Such evidence is admissible, as in the nature of an admission as against the party, and of impeaching evidence against the witness. Ib.

COSTS.

1. Satisfaction of part of plaintiff's claim: offer to allow judgment: recovery. After defendant had made an offer to allow plaintiff to take judgment for a sum less than sued for, which offer plaintiff did not accept, he answered, setting up a counter-claim, and plaintiff, on motion under section 244 of the Code of Procedure, compelled satisfaction of the balance of his claim, as admitted by the answer; and on the trial as to the counter-claim, defendant had a verdict. Held, that upon the entry of judgment, plaintiff was not entitled to costs after the time of the answer. The case of Hoe v. Sanborn (24 How. Pr., 26 and 36 N. Y., 93), explained. Supreme Court, General Term, 5th District, 1868. Scoville v. Kent.

2. Actions of which justices of the peace have jurisdiction: allowance. The right of a plaintiff to costs of course, upon succeeding in an action in a court of record for recovery of money, is limited to cases where he recovers fifty dollars or more, notwithstanding the amount claimed in the complaint may have been too great to allow a court of a justice of the peace to take cognizance of the action. General Term, Supreme Court, 2d District, 1868. Pinder v. Stoothoff.

3. Jurisdiction of the action, and not of the claim of damages made in it, determines the plaintiff's right to costs, if the recovery in the court of record be for less than fifty dollars. Ib.

4. Where the plaintiff recovers a verdict, however small, the defendant is not entitled to an allowance, on recovering costs under the statute, because the verdict was for less than fifty dollars. The recovery of judgment entitling the defendant to the allowance of a commission on the plaintiff's claim, is a recovery on the issue tried, not a recovery of costs, merely, because of plaintiff's failure to recover enough to carry costs. Ib.

DIVORCE.

Foreign divorce: service of process: jurisdiction. - It is not essential to the validity of a foreign divorce, as against

From Austin Abbott, Esq., to appear in 8 Abb.'s Practice Reports. (N. S.)

the plaintiff who obtained it, that both parties should have resided in the state where it was granted, if process was personally served upon the defendant without the state. Supreme Court, Sixth District, Sp. T., 1870. Holmes v. Holmes.

MARRIAGE.

1. What testimony is admissible: competency of party as to transactions with deceased person against heirs, etc.: effect of verdict of jury on trial of special issues. — A valid marriage is established by proof of an actual contract per verba de præsenti between persons of opposite sexes capable of contracting, to take each other from thenceforth for husband and wife, especially where the contract is followed by cohabitation. No solemnization, or other formality, apart from the agreement itself, is necessary, unless agreed on. Supreme Court, Sp. T. 2d Dis. 1869. Van Tuyl v. Van Tuyl. 2. Nor is it essential that the contract should be made before a witness. Under the code, the wife is a competent witness to prove the contract, in an action for partition. Ib.

3. In an action for the partition of real estate, in which the legitimacy of the children of such marriage is put in issue by other heirs of the husband, the widow, even though she be a party to the suit, is a competent witness on behalf of such children, to prove the contract and declarations and transactions of the deceased husband. Ib. 4. The fair construction of section 399 of the code is, that when adverse rights by succession are involved, one litigant shall not testify to a transaction with the deceased predecessor in title, invalidating or impairing the right or title of the other. Ib.

5. The declarations of the husband that he was not a married man, made in promiscuous conversations having no reference to his relations to his wife, are inadmissible as evidence. Ib.

6. The verdict of a jury upon the trial of special issues should not be disturbed, unless it appear that a fair trial has not been had, or that errors have been committed by the court or jury, affording a reasonable doubt as to the Justice of the result. Ib.

PRACTICE."

1. Appellate order: contempt, and proceedings to punish as for.-An order punishing a party to an action as for contempt, by imposing a fine for the indemnity of the adverse party injured by his refusal to obey the order of the court, and by imprisonment to compel obedience, is appealable to the court of appeals. Court of appeals, June term, 1869. Sudlow v. Knox.

2. Such an order is not a proceeding in the action, within the meaning of subdivision two of section eleven of the code of procedure, which allows appeals from "an order affecting a substantial right made in an action, when such order in effect determines to action, and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken," etc., but is "a final order affecting a substantial right, made in a special proceeding," within the meaning of subdivision three. Ib.

3. Upon appeal to the court of appeals from such an order, it will not be reversed merely because it does not affirmatively appear from the appeal papers that proof of the misconduct was made by affidavit, and due notice given.

4. It is not a contempt for a party, required to produce his books before a referee, to refuse to leave the books with the referee, if the order under which the referee acts only requires the production of the books. Ib.

5. Whether it is competent for the court to order the books of a party to be left with the referee for the purposes of an accounting-query? Ib.

6. It is a contempt for such party to refuse to obey the referee's order that he allows a witness, while testifying, to examine the books, to enable the adverse party to question him thereon. 16.

7. In proceedings as for contempts to enforce civil remedies, under 2 Rev. Stat., 534-538, section 21 of which

authorizes the court to impose a fine to indemnify a party for actual loss and injury, and to satisfy his costs and expenses, the costs and expenses must be ascertained by the rate of compensation fixed by statute for the services performed. Ib.

8. The amount of the fine to indemnify for the other loss and injury must be fixed upon proof of the damages sustained, according to the rules of law which would apply in an action for such damages. Ib.

9. The court cannot, for either purpose, summarily fix a gross sum in its discretion. Ib.

REFORMATION OF CONTRACT.

1. Mistake: relief consistent with the case: redemption. Το make a case for the reformation of a written contract, it must be shown that the written instrument does not express the real contract. N. Y. Superior Court, Special Term, 1869. Boardman v. Davidson.

2. This must be shown by clear and entirely satisfactory proof, and the relief will not be granted whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory, or is in its texture open to doubt or to opposing presumptions. Ib.

3. As an element in the proof to establish that the written instrument does not express the true contract, it is necessary to show that by mutual mistake, accident, or fraud on the part of the defendant, the writings have failed to express the true agreement; if no such element is shown to exist, the conclusion is irresistible that whatever may have been the original propositions made and accepted, they were altered before the final completion of the contract, and that the agreement concluded on is that which is expressed in the written instrument. Ib. 4. The rule that where the complaint is answered, the court may grant plaintiff any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue, does not justify the court in granting relief upon a contract set up in the answer, which is materially different from that alleged in the complaint, unless the plaintiff accepts the contract as alleged in the answer, so as to waive his own version of it. Ib.

5. The rule laid down in the cases that where a plaintiff files a bill to compel a specific performance, and the agreement as alleged is admitted by the answer, with some modifications or variations, or is substantially proved, though the plaintiff has failed to establish the precise terms by him alleged, the court will look into the answer and proofs, and establish the terms of the agreement is not to be extended, so as to allow a plaintiff, who fails to establish the case as made by his pleading, to have relief according to the allegations of the answer, without adopting them at the hearing as constituting his case. Ib.

6. After the forfeiture of a lease for non-payment of rent, and eviction of lessee, the landlord granted a new lease on payment of the arrears of rent, and, simultaneously with the execution of the new lease, the old lessee and the new lessee made an agreement by which both were interested therein, the nature of the old lessee's interest being the matter of dispute in this action. The plaintiff, the former lessee, alleged in his complaint that defendant, the new lessee, agreed with him to hold the lease as security for the advances; but by misrepresentations procured him to sign an instrument which provided that defendant should convey to him an interest in the lease, on payment of certain sums. Held, 1. That this was not the case of an admitted agreement, with a dispute only as to certain of its terms, but the two claims were totally inconsistent, and plaintiff must waive his claim to have the instrument reformed, if he would recover on defendant's version of the transaction. 2. That as between the lessor and the new defendant, the payment of arrears could not be deemed a redemption of the lease, because, upon the evidence, it appeared that it was not so intended by either of them; and that, as to the plaintiff, it could not be regarded as a redemption, in the absence of fraud on the part of the lessor. Ib.

ADVICE TO YOUNG LAWYERS.

The following is from the address delivered by Prof. H. A. Morrill to the graduates of the Ohio Law School: Having reached the conclusion of our course, before our final separation it would seem proper for me to address a few words of a general character to the class, and more particularly to those of it whose steps along the devious pathway of the law, hitherto taken under the guidance of others, are now to be pursued singly and alone. Thus, perchance, a word may fall which shall add to the courage and brighten the hopes of such, and give to them a higher appreciation of the dignity and importance of the life-work upon which they are about to enter.

It seems to me that one of the earliest lessons for you to learn is, that our profession, generally speaking, is not a lucrative one, and that your highest reward is not likely to consist in the attainment of wealth; at least, it should not be your first and highest aim. If you have no other aim than this, it may prove better for you to have remained on the farm, in the workshop, or at the countingroom. And I count it one of your chief dangers that you enter upon your profession at the time of ebbing tide in the course of private and public works, and of unwonted adulation over every marked example of success in pecuniary acquisition and gain. Every age and every nation has its prominent characteristics.

Rome, as I have already intimated, in her best days, rendered her highest homage to law as a science she well-nigh defiled. The whole commonwealth bowed in blind adoration to its behests, as if founded in abstract truth, while its chief magnates applied its precepts with an iron hand and an inflexible purpose.

Greece, on the other hand, when at the acme of her power, worshipped at the shrine of beauty. Her golden age was the fruitage period of whatever man delights in as beautiful in art and architecture. It-the love of the beautiful-entered into and permeated her whole social and political organism, and we of to-day build upon and fashion and chisel after the exquisite models she has handed down to us, vainly essaying to compass the excellence she achieved therein. England and our fathers have reared on these foundations a superstructure tempered by the more humane and juster principles of a later age. Even the models of ancient art and architecture have by them been utilized to meet the wants and taste of a more practical era, and happy would it be for us did we walk more closely in their footsteps.

But, if I mistake not, the predominant motive power in the American mind, of this last half of the nineteenth century, is neither the love of abstract truth, as supposed to be embraced in any one or any number of sciences, nor devotion to any representative form of beauty, nor any high conception of justice or moral excellence, but rather a supreme devotion to, and a hot relentless pursuit after, those things which tend to increase one's worldly estate. And no where, I apprehend, is this tendency exerting a more baneful influence than among our own profession. I fear from this the profession stands in danger of becoming a business of "mere paltry traffic and barter," to a daily want of appliances, and maneuver to defeat rather than subserve justice, to encourage public and private rapacity and extortion rather than protect rights and promote honesty and fair dealing.

I am sometimes constrained to fear that the American lawyer never before stood in such peril of becoming what Cicero, in the days of Roman decline, was provoked to style the degenerate representatives of the profession in that day, to wit: "Sharp and cunning pettifoggers, retailers of law suits, canterers upon forms, and cavilers upon words." Certainly the influences calculated to seduce the lawyer from the path of rectitude, and to lower the standard of intellectual attainment, were never stronger with us than now. Let me say to you, in all earnestness, guard well against every temptation to sac

rifice your manhood or your integrity, or to desert that high intellectual seal of thought and study to which the law introduces you, for the sake of slaking that greedy thirst for gain which is eating up the intellect of the American mind, and consuming the virtue of the American heart.

Another danger which you will encounter is the allurements which politics holds out to the young lawyer. Very justly the American lawyer wields a large influence in the domain of politics. His habits of thought, his fields of professional investigation, his relations with and extensive knowledge of men, eminently qualify him for its duties. And when the lawyer, at middle age, with habits firmly fixed, and a mind richly stored with useful information, accepts political honors which have sought him by reason of his fitness to become their recipient, and performs the duties connected therewith faithfully, he certainly subserves a high and noble purpose.

But that mania for office and political preferment which seizes so many novices in the profession, breaking up their habits of study, casting them upon the fickle waves of popular applauses and contumely, is a fruitful source of professional failure, and blasts and utterly destroys much of the best talent which has been consecrated to this high calling. Guard well, then, against this danger also. Cleave closely to this main lifework of your choice in these early years; and thus, should your country call you to its service at mature age, you will rise to a higher place of honor to yourselves, and usefulness to the commonwealth by reason of your early devotion to the profession.

In closing Mr. Morrel warned against skepticism and unbelief, and gave much good advice as to general behavior in practice and improvement.

BOOK NOTICES.

Reports of Cases Determined in the Supreme Court of the Territory of Kansas: together with an important case determined in the district court of the first judicial district of said territory before one of the judges of the supreme court, and several important cases determined in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, with preface, table of cases, notes and index. By James McCahon, attorney at law. Chicago: Callaghan & Cockroft. 1870.

In 1860 the Hon. Thomas Weans, since deceased, undertook the publication of the decisions of the supreme court of the territory of Kansas, and printed some forty-eight pages of the work, when it was abandoned. The object of the present book is to rescue "the decisions contained in it from oblivion," and to put "them in shape to be of some use to the profession." Mr. McCahon and the publishers, together, have accomplished this object in a very acceptable manner. We have seldom seen a report so admirably gotten up, so far as relates to its mechanical execution, while the labor of the reporter has been done in a very creditable manner. The index is especially worthy of mention as a model of completeness. Although purporting to be a report of the decisions of the territorial courts, a considerable portion of the work is taken up with decisions of the United States court rendered since Kansas was admitted as a state. We shall have occasion hereafter to give an abstract of those cases of general importance, of which the book contains several.

Bench and Bar.

The April number of this enterprising quarterly contains Chancellor Kent's Introductory Lecture before the Columbia College Law School; a very well written and sensible article on The Usury Law; several Decisions of the United States supreme court; Digest of recent Decisions; Book Reviews and Miscellany. The Bench and Bar is published by Messrs. Callaghan & Cockroft, law publishers of Chicago, and is furnished free of charge to members of the profession sending their names. It is edited with decided ability, and is a very entertaining and valuable periodical.