boat and loss of cargo, in consequence of the alleged negligence of the tug which was towing her. The court below found as matter of fact that both were in fault, and divided the damages. This court affirmed that decree, Mr. Justice DAVIS delivering the opinion.

The City of Chicago v. Green. - Error to the district court for the northern district of Illinois. - In this case the city accepted the bid of Green to manufacture certain hose for its fire department, but afterward the hose were rejected on the ground that they did not stand the test required by the contract. Green demanded a public test of the hose, which the city refused; he thereupon had them tested by scientific persons, and they were found equal to the requirements of the bid. The court below gave him judgment, which was affirmed here. Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion.

Mahoney v. The United States. - Appeal from the court of claims. The claimant was a consul of the United States at Algiers, from 1854 to 1859, and returning to the United States, in 1865, he brought this suit to recover his salary which the state department had declined to pay, claiming that since Algiers became a province of France the statute of 1800, giving a fixed salary to consuls there, did not apply. The court of claims found for the government, holding that the changed condition of Algiers rendered the act of congress fixing the salary inoperative for want of a proper subject. The same question was presented to this court and the judgment of the court of claims was affirmed. Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion.

Wise, Jr., v. Allis. - Certificate of division from the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin. -- In this case the court held, that notice to the plaintiff in a patent case that the defendant would prove a prior invention and use of the improvement in different cities, was sufficiently specific and definite without naming the different mills or manufactories in those cities where the improvement claimed had been used, and that under such notice the defendant was entitled to give evidence of the invention by others prior to the date of the patent in suit. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion.

Hancox v. Steamer Syracuse. - Appeal from the circuit court for the southern district of New York. - This was a case of collision on the Hudson river, near Percy's Beach, between a tow of the Syracuse and the steamboat Rip Van Winkle, owned by the appellant. The questions were of fact, the case turning on the position and maneuvers of the boats, as proven. The decision of the district court was in favor of the Rip Van Winkle, which was reversed by the circuit, and the decree of the circuit was now affirmed. Mr. Justice SWAYNE delivered the opinion.

The Ship Maggie Hammond v. Moreland et al.- Appeal from the circuit court for the district of Maryland. - In August, 1866, the Hammond took on board a cargo of iron to be transported from Androssan, Scotland, to Montreal, Canada, and sailed, but subsequently, in consequence of stress of weather, returned to England and discharged cargo for repairs at Cardiff, the captain protesting that the repairs could not be made in time to complete the voyage. The decision is, that the Hammond should either have released the iron in November, after repairs, or proceeded on her voyage with the chance of completing it before the close of navigation in the St. Lawrence river, or if, when it became necessary to unload, it was apparent the repairs could not be made in time to justify her proceeding on the voyage, the cargo should have been transferred to some other vessel for transportation. Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion.

or whether they were properly decided by the court. The court held, that there should have been a submission of the facts to the jury, and reversed the judgment below, remanding the case to be tried accordingly. Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. Mr. Justice CLIFFORD dissented.

United States ex rel. Bourn v. Goodyear, executor. - Appeal from the circuit court for the southern district of New York. This suit was commenced in the name of the United States, for the purpose of setting aside the Goodyear patent, on the ground of fraud in the procurement of its extension; and the question was whether the alleged fraud in the procurement of the extension can be investigated in the name of the United States on the relation of a private party. The decision is that it cannot. The chief justice delivered the opinion.

The Propeller Allegany v. Wolverton et al. — Appeal from the circuit court for the district of Wisconsin. This was a case of collision between the schooner H. C. Winslow and the propeller at the mouth of the Milwaukee river. The schooner was bound out, in tow of a tug, and the propeller was bound in, under a high rate of speed. Both the district and the circuit courts below held that the propeller was in fault, and the decrees were for the owner of the Winslow. Those decrees are affirmed by this court. Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion.

Pierce v. Dox, trustee. - Appeal from the supreme court for the District of Columbia. - This appeal was dismissed, as the amount involved does not bring the case within the jurisdiction of the court. Decision announced by the chief justice.

The United States, claimants of 600 bales of cotton, v. Doug las.-Appeal from the circuit court for the southern district of New York.-In a passage from Savannah to New York the schooner Ann & Susan, owned by Douglas, fell in with the schooner Davis, loaded with government cotton and bound also for New York. The condition of the Davis at this time was hopeless; her masts were gone, and her boats were gone. The schooner Ann & Susan towed her to a place of safety, and subsequently, before the cotton was delivered to the United States, filed a libel against both the Davis and her cargo, for salvage service. The district court allowed $19,750 for the service against ship and cargo, the former valued at $8,000, and the latter at $150,000, and fixed the amount against the vessel at $1,000. But the cotton having subsequently passed into the possession of the government, and it intervening and claiming that no lien for salvage service could exist against the property in its possession, so much of the decree as affected the cotton was dismissed. Appeal was taken to the circuit court, when Mr. Justice NELSON affirmed the decree in all respects, except as to the cotton, and as to that, the decree of the district court was reversed, and a decree passed charging the cotton with contribution and costs. In his opinion Mr. Justice NELSON said: "The mere fact of ownership of the cotton by the United States, in the act of its conveyance to the port of destination, for the purpose of a market as merchandise, we think did not exempt it from the lien in case of salvage service. We shall not enter into an argument in support of the position, as the subject is a kindred one. The liability of the government for general average, and the present questions, incidentally, have been most elaborately examined by Mr. Justice STORY. We are inclined also to the opinion it is the decision in admiralty in England, and of the most approved modern elementary writers on the subject in the country. The question in this court, therefore, is whether cotton, the property of the United States, saved from peril when in course of being transported on the high seas to its port of destination, to be delivered to an agent of the United States there, is liable to be proceeded against in a district court by a libel in admiralty for salvage contribution, without the consent of any officer of the United States having been obtained to such proceedings. The government insists upon the negative of this proposition."

Allow me to explain that the commendation expressed is due to John Townshend, Esq., an esteemed brother author, whose edition is doubtless the one to which Mr. O'Conor intended to refer. The mistake into which he fell is not perhaps surprising, that edition having been published anonymously, and the name of myself and brother having been so long connected with the law and the new procedure, in New York, both in practice and in the authorship of the New York Digest, Practice Reports, and kindred works.

While I am writing allow me to say a few words as to the code itself.

What is the New York Code?

The essential principle which the "Code" has introduced is, allowing, so far as seems practicable, uniformity of procedure in all classes of actions.

All actions, whether common law or equitable, are now commenced by summons; judgment on a money demand on contract may be had, of course, if no defense be interposed; plaintiff's pleading must be a plain statement of the facts constituting his cause of action, instead of the former mixed allegations of law and fact, and the setting forth of evidence; the defendant's answer must deny the plaintiff's averments, or state the facts constituting his defense; and he may set up, against a legal demand, an equitable defense such as formerly he could only avail himself of by bringing a cross suit in chancery; plaintiff can only reply when new facts are stated in the answer; the court now has power to order discovery, grant injunctions, appoint receivers, etc., without putting the party to a new suit in chancery. It has also power to adapt the mode of trial, whether by a judge, by a jury, or by a referee, to the requirement of each case; a judgment creditor may summarily examine his debtor, as to property, without being put to a second suit on the judgment; and judgments of all kinds are reviewed in one way, by appeal.

This is the gist of the new practice. To compare it with the former procedure we must describe ten or twelve different forms of suit, each of which imperatively required a method of its own, and which together constituted two great classes of suits, the principal object of one of which was to correct the deficiencies of the other.

Mr. O'Conor forcibly presents the objections that have been urged against the new system, by some of those lawyers who were trained exclusively under the old. These objections may be summed up in two propositions: 1. That the codifiers are entitled to no credit, for there was a general desire for reform, and their work was not original.

2. That the system of procedure adopted confounds necessary distinctions, and confuses the administration of justice.

On the first point nothing better could be said in favor of any reform. The merit of a reform lies rather in the general need of it, than in its originality; and the success of a reformer consists in his getting the community to adopt it.

The utility of the change is the only question. The most

recent, and, I think, the ablest presentation of the merits of old modes of proceeding, as compared with the code, is a pamphlet by Wm. H. Greene, Esq., of Buffalo, published at the office of the Commercial Advertiser. It is entitled "The Code of Procedure: or the New and the Old Modes of Proceeding compared; showing the necessity of restoring the forms of actions and pleadings in cases at common law."

Without here discussing the question, a few facts as to the cause of public and professional opinion on this subject may surprise some of those unacquainted with what has taken place.

The New York Code, the pioneer in this reform, was prepared in 1847-1850. As reported complete to the legislature, in 1885 sections, it is an entire system of regulations for uniform procedure in civil remedies, including rules of evidence, etc. Considered as a scheme, proposed for a trial, it had the disadvantage of being but partly adopted. Those provisions (473 sections), which regulated civil actions only, and without the rules of evidence, etc., were adopted, and constitute what is known as "the New York Code."

The reform thus initiated has spread by its own force, until now codes of practice, embracing substantially the uniform system I have above described, have been adopted in the following states and territories:

New York, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, California, Oregon, Nevada, South Carolina, North Carolina, Washington, Montana, Idaho, Dacota, Wyoming, Arizona. I think I might add several others if their recent statutes were accessible to me at the moment.

A code of criminal procedure, a penal code and a civil code, the former prepared by the same commissioners, and the latter by Mr. Field, in connection with the late Wm. Curtis Noyes and Surrogate Bradford, have not been adopted in New York, but have been substantially, or in part, adopted in several of the states or territories above named.

The tendency of jurisprudence toward the uniform procedure in civil cases is not confined to this country. It is becoming general, like the tendency to adopt steam instead of wind and water powers, and telegraphs instead of mail-bags. The steps in this direction taken in England in respect to the common law procedure, some years ago, proved so satisfactory, that a judicature commission, appointed by the British government, have recently unanimously reported in favor of the adoption of what we may call the American system. This commission consists of eminent lord chancellors, common law, equity, civil law and admiralty judges, attorneys and solicitorsgeneral, barristers, solicitors, etc. In their report, made in March 1869, and now before parliament, they propose the merging of their respective courts in one supreme court, having a consolidated jurisdiction of all cases now cognizable in law, equity, probate, divorce and admiralty. Although this goes beyond our reform, but one of the commission (Phillimore) dissents, and only as to merging admiralty jurisdiction. They propose that all suits of whatever class shall be "commenced by a document to be called a writ of summons." As to pleadings they say: "The systems of pleading now in use, both at common law and in equity, appear to us to be open to serious objections. Common law pleadings are apt to be mixed averments of law and fact, varied and multiplied in form, and leading to a great number of useless issues, while the facts which lie behind them are seldom clearly discoverable. Equity pleadings, on the other hand, commonly take the form of a prolix narrative of the facts relied upon by the party, with copies or extracts of deeds, correspondence, and other documents, and other particulars of evidence, set forth at needless length. The best system would be one which combined the comparative brevity of the simpler forms of common law pleading with the principle of stating, intelligibly and not technically, the substance of the facts relied upon as constituting the

plaintiff's or the defendant's case, as distinguished from his evidence. It is upon this principle that most modern improvements of pleading have been founded, both in the United States and in our own colonies and Indian possessions, and in the practice recently settled for the courts of probate and divorce.

"We recommend that a short statement constructed on this principle of the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of complaint, not on oath, to be called the declaration, should be delivered to the defendant. Thereupon the defendant should deliver to the plaintiff a short statement, not on oath, of the facts constituting the defense, to be called the answer. When new facts are alleged in the answer, the plaintiff should be at liberty to reply. The pleadings should not go beyond the reply, save by special permission of a judge; but the judge should, at any stage of the proceedings, permit such amendment in or addition to the pleadings as he may think necessary for determining the real question or controversy between the parties, upon such terms, as to costs and otherwise, as he may think fit." *部*

"With regard to the trial and determination of disputed questions of fact, the mode of trial varies according to the court in which the litigation happens to be pending, without any sufficient power of adaptation to the requirements of particular cases.

"We therefore recommend that great discretion should be given to the supreme court, as to the mode of trial, and that any questions to be tried should be capable of being tried in any division of the court-1. By a judge; 2. By a jury; 3. By a referee.

"The plaintiff should be at liberty to give notice of trial by any one of these modes which he may prefer, subject to the right of the defendant to move the judge to appoint any other mode."

This report, which approves the code system and proposes to extend it still further, is signed by the following names: Cairns, lord chancellor, judge of court of appeals in chancery, etc.; Hatherly, lord chancellor and formerly as Sir Wm. Page Wood, vice-chancellor; Sir Wm. Erle; Sir James P. Wilde, judge of probate, divorce, etc.; Justice Blachburn, of the queen's bench; Justice Montague E. Smith, of the common pleas; Sir John B. Karslake, queen's counsel; Sir Roundell Palmer; Sir Wm. M. James, vice-chancellor; Henry C. Rothery, registrar in admiralty, and a number of other names eminent in jurisprudence, both for experience and sound opinion. These facts show that the reform is demanded by the age, and that its progress is irresistible. They suggest the importance, both to the bar and to the bench, of a candid examination of the merits of the system, and a fair, unprejudiced trial of it where it is actually adopted. Those who enter most fully into the spirit in which it was conceived, find an advantage in the ease if not in the success of practice under it.

I am, respectfully, yours,

AUSTIN ABBOTT.

TERMS OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR MAY.

2d Tuesday, General Term, Poughkeepsie.

2d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Ballston Spa, James.

2d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Oswego, Morgan.

2d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Ontario, Johnson.

2d Tuesday, General Term, Broome.

3d Monday, Special Terms (Issues), Kings, Barnard. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Albany, Hogeboom.

d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Chemung, Boardman.

S Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Delaware, Balcom.

3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Chautauqua, Talcott.

3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Orleans, Daniels.

3d Tuesday, Special Term, Lewis.

LEGAL NEWS.

Chief Justice Appleton, of Maine, refuses to naturalize liquor sellers.

Senator Ira Harris has been engaged as counsel for the Anneke Jans Heirs v. Trinity Church.

The death penalty has been abolished in Yucatan and imprisoninent for a term of years substituted.

A New Hampshire paper suggests that "justifiable insanity" is the form in which verdicts in many cases should be rendered nowadays.

A Dansville (Ind.) lawyer, who had a large practice of ten years' standing, has left the bar and gone to preaching in the Methodist church.

Charles Reed, a Boston barkeeper, has been arrested for marrying a couple last week who thought he was qualified to perform the ceremony.

A San Franciscan who sued the city for $100,000 on account of the death of his daughter, who was run over by a fire-engine, has recovered $5,000.

Some feeling has been caused in Portland, Me, by the action of a judge in committing a witness, in the midst of a trial of a case, for "probable perjury."

Judge Paine, of Cleveland, Ohio, recently decided that a debt made for intoxicating liquors sold, to be resold at retail, cannot be collected by the law of Ohio.

Judge Humphreys, of Alabama, is to be associate justice of the supreme court of the District of Columbia, in place of Judge Fisher, who has been nominated for United States district attorney for the district.

According to the Providence Press they prosecute children only eight years old in that city for theft and assaults. A little girl eight years of age was recently brought before the court of magistrates and bound over in $300 to appear for trial on a charge of theft!

NEW YORK STATUTES AT LARGE.*
CHAP. 408.

AN ACT relating to the supreme court and to the election of a judge of the court of common pleas in and for the city and county of New York.

PASSED April 27, 1870; three-fifths being present. The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. The general terms of the supreme court, as organized under existing laws, are abrogated from and after the first day of May next; and thereafter all causes and matters then pending in such general terms, or which according to law might be brought before them, shall be cognizable before the general terms organized under this act. Provided, nevertheless that the said general terms of the supreme court, as now organized, shall meet on some day to be designated by the justices composing the same, for the purpose of deciding all matters pending before them on the said first day of May, and that appeals may be taken from the judgments and orders entered on such decisions, in the same manner as in like cases from the judgments and orders of the general terms organized under this act.

2. The state is hereby divided into four departments. The first department shall consist of the first judicial district; the second department of the second judicial district; the third department of the third, fourth and sixth judicial districts; and the fourth department of the fifth, seventh and eighth judicial districts. The general terms shall be held in each year in the first department at the court-house in the city of New York on the first Tuesdays in January, February, April, June, September and November; in the second department at the courthouse in the city of Brooklyn on the second Tuesdays in January, April, September and December; and at the court-house in the city of Poughkeepsie on the second Tuesday in June; in the third department at the capitol in the city of Albany on the first Tuesdays in February and October; at the court-house in the village of Platts

*These laws have been carefully compared with the originals, and may be relied upon as accurate. We have not thought it necessary to take up space by attaching to each the certificate of the secretary of state which is attached to the copy from which we print. ED. L. J.

burgh, in the county of Clinton, on the first Tuesday in July; at the court-house in the city of Elmira on the first Tuesdays in April and September; at the courthouse in the city of Binghamton on the first Tuesdays in June and December; and at the court-house in the city of Ogdensburgh on the first Tuesday of November; in the fourth department at the court-house in the city of Syracuse on the first Monday in May and the second Monday in November; at the court-house in the city of Oswego on the first Monday in October; at the courthouse in the city of Rochester on the first Mondays in January, March and September; and at the court-house in the city of Buffalo on the first Mondays in February and June.

§3. The governor, by a writing to be filed in the office of the secretary of state, shall, immediately after the passage of this act, designate from the whole bench of justices of the supreme court a presiding justice and two associate justices for each of said departments to compose the general term therein. After such first designation of presiding and associate justices, the judicial force herein provided for the holding of such general terms shall be maintained and supplied from time to time, as may be necessary, and for that purpose, other presiding and associate justices shall from time to time be designated. and such other and further designations shall be made by the governor in manner aforesaid. In all cases any person designated as presiding justice shall act as such during his official term; and any person designated as associate justice shall act as such for five years from the thirty-first of December next after the time of his designation, or until the earlier close of his official term. The governor shall in like manner, as aforesaid, designate presiding and associate justices to sit in such general terms as often as vacancies therein shall occur for the unexpired terms.

4. In case no presiding justice shall be present at the time and place appointed for holding a general term, the associate justice present having the shortest time to serve shall act as presiding justice until the presiding justice shall attend, and in case one or both of the associate justices shall not be present at the time and place appointed for holding a general term, the presiding justice present may select any justice or justices of the supreme court to hold with him such general term until such associate justice or justices shall attend.

25. The general terms shall have all the powers and jurisdiction which under existing laws now belong to the general terms of the supreme court; and all laws relating to general terms, as now organized within the judicial districts, and to the hearing of appeals from judgments pronounced and orders made within such districts, if not inconsistent with the constitution or this act, shall apply, so far as the same are applicable, to judgments pronounced and orders made within the judicial departments, and to the general terms instituted by this act.

§6. Causes and matters pending in any general term instituted by this act may be entitled in the supreme court. The concurrence of two justices shall be necessary to pronounce a decision. If two shall not concur a re-argument may be ordered. In case of such disagreement, when any one of the three justices shall not be qualified to sit, the cause may be directed to be heard in another department. The associate justices, designated to any department, shall be competent to sit in the general term of any other department, in place of any justice in such other department.

$7. To prevent the failure of circuit courts, special terms, and courts of oyer and terminer, as the same have been heretofore appointed for the years eighteen hundred and seventy and eighteen hundred and seventy-one, in consequence of the designation to be made of justices for service in the general terms, as provided by this act, it shall be the duty of the governor, on the request of a justice in any judicial district, to assign justices to hold such circuit courts, special terms and courts of oyer and terminer within such district; provided, however, that the justices in any district may themselves make provision for the holding of such courts. At least one month before the expiration of the year eighteen hundred and seventy-one, the justices of the supreme court resident in each judicial department mentioned in this act shall appoint the times and places of holding special terms, circuit courts and courts of oyer and terminer within their department, for two years, commencing on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and seventy-two, and the like appointment shall be made for every two succeeding years thereafter.

8. Pursuant to the twelfth section of the said sixth article of the constitution, it shall be the duty of the governor, whenever the public interest shall require, to designate one or more judges of the superior court, or court of common pleas of the city and county of New York, to hold circuits and special terms of the supreme court in that city; such designation shall be in writing, and shall specify the time and place of holding any such circuit or special term. When a case or bill of exceptions shall be made in any cause tried at such circuit or special term, the same shall be settled before the judge holding the same, and the review shall be had at a special or general term of the supreme court in the same manner, and with the same effect, as if such circuit or special term had been held by a justice of the supreme court.

29. The justices of the supreme court shall receive na annual compensation of six thousand dollars each, payable quarterly, in lieu of all other compensation, except that they shall receive, in addition to such stated salaries, a per diem allowance of five dollars per day for their reasonable expenses when absent from their homes and engaged in holding any general or special term, circuit court or court of oyer and terminer, or in attending any convention, as hereinafter provided, to revise the rules of said court, and no greater sum shall be paid to the chief judge or any associate judge of the court of appeals, or to any commissioner of appeals, than five dollars per day for their reasonable expenses, when absent from their homes and actually engaged in holding any court of appeals, or commission of appeals, and all provisions of law inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed. But this section shall not be construed to diminish the compensation now received by the justices of the supreme court of the first and second judicial districts.

10. All appeals and other matters proper to be brought before any general term shall be heard and determined in the department in which the judgment or order appealed from shall be entered, or in which the matter brought up arose, unless two of the general term justices in such department shall be incapable of sitting on the appeal or acting in the matter, in which case the appeal or other matter shall be ordered to be heard in some other department; and in that case such appeal or other matter shall be heard and determined in the department to which the same shall have been ordered as aforesaid.

11. Each general term shall be attended by the sheriff of the county in which any session shall be held, or one of his deputies, and by two constables or police officers, to be summoned by the sheriff; and by a crier for courts within the county, and by the county clerk or his deputy, all of whom shall act under the direction of the court or of the presiding justice; and the sheriff of the county shall see that the room in which the general term shall be held is properly heated, ventilated, lighted, and kept comfortable, clean, and in order; and he shall provide the court with necessary stationery during its sittings. 12. The fees of criers, sheriffs, constables and police officers for attending general terms, and all expenses incurred by sheriffs under and pursuant to the preceding section of this act, shall be audited by the comptroller and be paid out of the treasury of the state. All fees and proper charges of clerks for services rendered at or preparatory to any general term, not legally chargeable to attorneys or parties in cases or matters brought before the general term, shall be a counter charge.

§ 13. All rules of the supreme court now in force not inconsistent with the constitution or any statute of the state shall remain in force until abolished or altered by the general term justices, the chief judges of the superior courts of cities, the chief judge of the court of common pleas of the city of New York and of the city court of Brooklyn, in convention assembled, at the capitol in the city of Albany. A convention of such justices and chief judges shall be held at the place aforesaid, on the first Wednesday in August, eighteen hundred and seventy, and every two years thereafter; and such convention shall revise, alter, abolish and make rules, which shall be binding upon all courts of record so far as they may be applicable to the practice thereof. A majority of said justices shall constitute a quorum to do business in the premises, whether said chief judges shall be present or absent; but each justice and chief judge shall be entitled to vote on all matters which shall come before the conventions.

§14. The governor may, whenever in his judgment the public good shall require it, appoint extraordinary general terms, circuit courts, and special terms of the supreme court and courts of oyer and terminer, and he shall designate the time and place the same shall be held, and name the justice who shall hold the extraordinary circuit or special term, or preside in such court of oyer and terminer, and he shall give notice of such appointment in such manner as he may believe the public good requires.

15. In any action which was referred to a justice of the supreme court, and was pending and undetermined on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and seventy, and in which testimony had been taken, the supreme court, at a special term thereof, may in its discretion order the evidence so taken, and the proceedings had in such action, to stand, and have the same force and effect in the further prosecution of said action, or the defense thereof before the court, as if such evidence had been taken or proceedings had before the court.

16. At the election directed to be held on the third Tuesday of May, eighteen hundred and seventy, under the provisions of chapter eighty-six of the laws of eighteen hundred and seventy, there shall be chosen, by the electors of the city and county of New York, a judge of the court of common pleas of said city and county, in the place of John R. Brady, who has resigned his office, and the said judge, so to be elected pursuant to this act, shall enter upon his official duties on the first day of January next, at which time the term of office of the present incumbent, holding by appointment from the governor, will by law expire.

§ 17. This act shall take effect immediately.'

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, MAY 14, 1870.

CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH LAW.

The bill reviving the act of 1866 for consolidating the statutes of the United States reminds of the colossal scheme of codification in progress in England. That nation has now two great legal reforms on hand. Indeed, the present period is a sort of jural revival in the old country. During the reign of William the Fourth great and beneficial changes were made in the law of British conveyancing. The first year of Queen Victoria's reign prolonged the beneficial era of law reform, and gave to the British world the Wills act, 1 Vict. c. 26, and the Judgment act, 1 and 2 Vict. c. 110 (the latter now unhappily repealed). But, except the Short act, 8 and 9 Vict. c. 106, no other important conveyancing act, nor indeed any other great measure of legal reform, has been passed in the reign of her present majesty. Now, however, British ex-chancellors, life peers, and aspirants to the bench, are engaged in a mutual contest as to which shall excel in the vigorous and radical nature of his suggestions. Even the question, Where should the new law courts be built? has led to an amount of debate and partisanship that indicates the high temperature to which the British legal world is at present excited.

The want of a code, or digest of English law, has been long felt in that country. British law, like the British empire, is scattered over vast regions, having hardly any mutual intercourse. Nay, even a statute will often contain a jumble of provisions, some of the most important nature, and others almost ludicrous, from the paltry matters for which they provide. Upon cases, however, the success of a suit usually depends; and, therefore, though an English lawyer had mastered all the statutes passed since magna charta, all such knowledge profiteth him nothing unless he is acquainted with the latest judicial decision, or possibly even dictum, upon the point in question. To remedy this want of arrangement in the British legal system, a law digest commission are now preparing a consolidation of the whole law of England, upon the following plan:

The commissioners do not propose to make any change in the existing law. "Whatever is is right," so far as their present labors are concerned. They will merely separate the chaotic elements into distinct classes, and make the waters and the dry land assume definite boundaries. They intend placing under each title, as in a law dictionary, every rule of common law, every statute, or part of a statute, and every judicial decision or dictum illustrating the point. To use a common example, they will sort the cards, placing all of each species together, with minor varieties of detail in equally felicitous apposition.

This is not a code, which consists only of general propositions; nor is it a digest, which treats only of particular points; but it will enunciate general rules where the cases will warrant them, and it will also

give particular cases in somewhat of detail, wherever the point appears to be sui generis.

Consolidation then, and not a code or digest pur et simple, appears to be the aim of the law digest commission. Their work, complete, will be, like our civil code, a large, handy book or law dictionary, of use as well to the student as the practitioner. We doubt whether law can be made easy to the layman, or that any consolidation will preclude the necessity for resort to professional advice in every case of difficulty.

The English plan is, as we have shown, to a great extent, founded upon our own method of codification. It seems, however, to have been prematurely adopted in England, until the proposed abolition of the distinction between law and equity had been carried into effect. As the judicature bill now before parliament will revolutionize practice in general, we presume that department will be left untouched by the digest commission. We wish the commissioners, at all events, every success in their praiseworthy attempts to reduce the present disjecta membra of British jurisprudence to something like "law and order."

COL. EDWARD D. BAKER.*

The work of the soldier may be more brilliant, but that of the legislator is more enduring. The one will, at the most, affect the condition of a few generations and a limited number of individuals, while the other is liable to spread its influences beyond the people among whom and the age in which it was performed, to survive and control the actions of men, not only when the labors of the legislator are finished, but when his people and their civilization have passed away; nay, when even the monuments of that civilization and that people have been destroyed and their history become a myth. Gibbon, in the opening of his well known chapter on the civil law, draws a beautiful comparison between the military triumphs of the Roman emperor and the peaceful triumph of the code which bears that emperor's name. And the result indicated by the historian must ever be peculiarly gratifying to the members of the legal profession. The great empire, whose power and riches were infinite, the material wealth of a generation which had succeeded to the accumulations of upward of a thousand years of national prosperity, the vast and well-disciplined army, the productions of art, the conveniencies and customs which had resulted from long continued civilized social intercourse, the language, almost the literature of that age, have been destroyed. The pomp of successful warfare, the long procession, the magnificent music, the enthusiastic multitude have become as nothing. But the silent, unnoticed labors of Trebonian and his associates exert an influence upon, aye, form and control, the judicial legislation of to-day. We live under another civilization, between which and that of Rome the law is the only connecting link.

So, too, with the Hebrew law. What care we to

*Sketch of the "Life and public services of Edward D. Baker, United States senator from Oregon, and formerly representative in Congress from Illinois, who died in battle, near Leesburg, Va., October 21, A. D. 1861." By Jos. Wallace, Springfield, Ill; 1870.