"Shouldring a minstrell in a lane I broke His violl's case by an unlucky stroke; Who swore he would complaine, to vent his grudge. And what care I what any law will judge? For why I will maintaine it face to face, "T can be no more but th' action of the case."

In Causidicum:

"Causidicus wears patch'd cloathes, some bruit, And must do so, for he has nere a suite."

The Suit Ended:

"Ten pence recovered! ten pounds spent in cost! You say I've gained my suit; I say I've lost."

Two of a trade:

"How fitly joined, the lawyer and his wife!

He moves at bar, and she at home, the strife."

I translate the next epitaph from the French of Borde:

"Here lies a law solicitor profoundly wise,

Who seventy years to pillage others' goods descended. He mourns, if from the other world he recognize That you read free of charge these lines for him intended."

From the Greek of Lucillius:

"I lost a little pig, an ox, a goat,

For which you, Menecles, received a groat,
In small retainer-neither I nor these
Have ought in common with Orthryades;
My thieves I trace not to Thermophylæ;
Against Eutychides is this our plea:

Why Xerxes bring again on Grecian grounds?
And Lacedaemon with my loss confound?
The facts, the law, or else I raise loud cries-
So Menecles!-the rest my pig supplies."

The above reminds us of Martial. The next two are from the Greek of Agathias:

"Blind to law's use and wont. Fool! not to know
That we to men corrupt must judgment owe;
Thou boasted thy shrewd eloquence, whose fire
Knows in best words right issue to inspire.
Hope on! 1 pardon thee, but vain and strange,
Thy genius serves not Them is' course to change."

A judgment as profound as Captain Cuttle's:
"A poor man a learned sergeant sought and saw,
And questioned him upon this point of law:
'My slave-girl ran away; her some one found,
And knowing her another's chattel, bound
In marriage to his man, to whom she gave
Issue: of whom now is that issue slave?'
He ponder'd, and deep por'd in many a book.
Then, turning his arch'd brow, with solemn look:
To you or him who has the slave girl now,
Her issue here in case as slave must bow;
But seek out some wise judge: you'll quickly gain
His weightier voice, if true what you explain.""
Another version of the same:

"A plaintiff thus explained his cause
To counsel learned in the laws:
My bond-maid lately ran away,
And in her flight was met by A,
Who knowing she belonged to me,
Espoused her to his servant B.
The issue of this marriage, pray,
Do they belong to me or A?
The Lawyer, true to his vocation,
Gave signs of deepest cogitation,"

Look'd at a score of books, or near,

Then hemm'd, and said: Your case is clear;
Those children, so begot by B

Upon your bond-maid must, you see,
Be yours or A's. Now this I say,
They can't be yours if they to A
Belong-it follows then, of course,
That if they are not his, they're yours.
Therefore, by my advice, in short,
You'll take the opinion of the court.""

From the Greek of Nicardeus:

"Two persons deaf as posts invok'd the laws; A judge than either deafer tried the cause; One said the other owed him five months' rent, One that all night in mill-work he had spent. Wherefore contend ye?' frowning said the Court, 'Of both the mother, both must her support.'" This was translated into Latin by Sir Thomas More. Another version of the same:

"A thief once consulted a lawyer of note,
How best to ensure from the halter his throat.
Said the sage, as he pocketed gravely his fee,
'Run away if you can, and perhaps you'll be free.'"

On the Law of Custom, founded on fact. From an obscure Trojan poet:

"A western New York judge of sterling mental stuff,
Of shaven upper lip, of manners coarse and rough,
Disdaining all such foppery as clean apparel,
Once with a young attorney sought to pick a quarrel,
And with ill-timed severity in court did lash

Th' offending youth because he sported a moustache, -
Saying, 'Young man, that dirty hair about your mouth
You didn't wear till you from Buffalo went south,
And left plain folks like us for the metropolis.'

The bashful but deserving youth blushed deep at this,
But held his tongue, and bowing low to the rebuke,
Waited till summing up, when thus revenge he took:
The point is, gentlemen, whether a custom's proved,
With reference to which these parties are supposed
T' have contracted, one, 'tis said, to Buffalo,
Peculiar and unknown as further south you go.
Such case may easily be, for from his honor's talk
You learn what's strange to you is common in New York.
With us they let the beard grow on the upper lip,
But this subjects one here to a judicial nip;
No custom 's universal, but customs vary
With each degree of latitude in which you tarry;

A New York judge takes pride in keeping free from dirt—
Not so with judges here-look at his honor's shirt!'
The bar with loud applause greeting this pithy one,
Acknowledged G―r met his match in Fn."

The next seven are from "Recreation for Ingenious Head-Pieces, or a Pleasant Grove for their Wits to Walk in," etc. London, 1667:

"Loquax, to hold thy tongue would do thee wrong, For thou wouldst be no man but for thy tongue.'

"If Lawyers had for Term a tearm of war,
Souldiers would be as rich as Lawyers are;
But here's the difference 'tween Guns and Gowns,
These take good Angels, th' other take crackt Crowns."
"Our Civil Law doth seem a Royal thing,

It hath more titles than the Spanish king;
But yet the Common Law quite puts it down,
In getting, like the Pope, so many a Crown."
"A lusty old gown-grave, gray-headed Sire,
Stole to a wench to quench his lust's desire;
She ask'd him what profession he might be?
I am a Civil Lawyer, girle (quoth he).
A Civil Lawyer, Sir! you make me muse,
Your talk's too broad for civil men to use;
If Civil Lawyers are such bawdy men,

O what (quoth she) are other Lawyers then ?"
"Law serves to keep disordered men in aw,
But Aw preserves orders and keeps the Law,
Were Aw away L (aw) yers would lyers be
For Lucre, which they have and hold in fee."

"To go to Law I have no maw,
Although my suite be sure,

For I shall lack suits to my back,
Ere I my suit procure."

Upon Anne's marriage with a Lawyer : "Anne is an Angel-what if so she be? What is an Angel but a Lawyer's fee?" The next twenty-six are from Owen's Latin Epigrams:

"If happy's he who knows of things ine cause,
How happy thou Cause-Pleader with Applause.”
"Lawyers are prudent, provident beside,
For prudently they for Themselves provide."
"Physicians and Lawyers in their Trade
Are like, their gain of others' loss is made;
To Patients these, to Clients those apply
Their helping hand, and help themselves thereby.'

"A man lies with a Wife, which is his own
Whom he supposed Another's, till 't was known;
Whether the Child by such mistake begot,
Be spurious, legitimate, or not?"

"No Terms determine, no Vacations vain, Thou wholly Vacant art, by Strifes to gain."

"Rome had one God, called Terminus of old;

But Westminster more Terms than one doth hold."

To the Lord Chancellor:

Lest Force the greatest Enemy to Law,
Should violate it, Law keeps Force in awe:

But thou the Law's Extreams hast pow'r t' abate,
And in the Chancery to moderate.'

"Thou pleadest for thyself, not Client; he

Not for himself, but brings his Gold for thee:
The certain Laws uncertain Causes cross:
Thou sure of gain, thy Client's sure of loss."

"Pontilian, thee Christ'pher sues at Law;

Not thee, but money 'tis from thee to draw."

To a Lawyer:

"Part of thy Life thou to thy Wife dost give,

Part to thy Client: When to thyself wilt live?" "Thou shalt not steal, this Law's for Lawyer's writ: Thou shalt not kill, this for Physician's fit." "Though Cicero call Law the sum of Reason, And that Law's best which thence proceeds in season: Few Lawyers are Logicians; use Example, The Laws and Statutes are of either Temple."

The Four Terms at Law:

"The first Term's from St. Michael declar'd;

For now the Arch-Angel* doth the Lawyer guard:
The next is Hilary, this Term doth cause
The Lawyers hilarity by the Laws.
The third from Easter feast its title took,

The Lawyer's Dockets are like the Easter Book.t The fourth Term's called Trinity; but why? Because each cause hath a Triplicity."? "Wert not cause-maker, thou, thy need to serve, Thou, no cause-pleader, might'st for hunger starve." "Kings, Shepherds; People, Sheep; Laws, Fodder, are: For sick Sheep, Doctors, Kings, Law's cure prepare."

"I many Penal statutes, Fronto, saw,

But not one Premial in all your Law;
Laws Penal, Premial, support a state;

This age hath lost the last; the first's in date."

Hast care to cure, and to secure thy cause?
Incline, then, Client, to thy Lawyer's Laws."

"God t' Adam gave a Law before his Sin;

Ill manners, therefore, all Laws brought not in."
"A Judge, who to be Just, on bribes doth look,
Is like a Fish, which while it takes, is took."
"We have one Advocate in Heav'n, saith Paul;
Are no more Advocates within that Hall?"
"We many Laws have made, almost not any;
For if not any kept, what's good so many?
That Laws be kept, this one more Law ordain,
Which if soon marr'd, will soon be made again.'
"Wonder'st the Judges' Ears are shut to thee,
When unto them thine hands not open be?"
"If Judge to thee be deaf, thy cause is lost;
Thy gain is vain Experience with cost:
"Tis better Judges please than plead the Laws;
Those before them indulge unto thy Cause."

"If mortals would as nature dictates live,
They need not Fees to the Physicians give:
If men were wise, they need not have their Cause
Pleaded, prolong'd by th' ambiguous Laws.
So Bartolus might (Feeless) go to bed,
And Mice corrode Hippocrates unread."
"The way to Law than Justice more we trace,
Though this the shorter, that's the longer Race."
"To take a thing without the Lord's consent
Is theft. What if the lady be content?"

This is from Thomas Pecke's "Heroick Epigrams," London, 1659:

"The study of the Laws did Galba please
Better than other charming Sciences.

When Princes want the Knowledge of the Law,
"Tis Tyranny, not Reason, keeps in Awe."

The gold coin. †The Parson's Easter Book. Client, Lawyer, Judge.

By the same:

"Law is a Well,

Men are the thirsty buckets which receive
More or less Water, as Reason gives Leave.
There's an Eternal Spring."

"Certain set Forms, fixt in the Memory,
Almost accomplish for the chancery."

From Sir Walter Raleigh's "Pilgrimage:"
"From thence to Heaven's bribeless Hall,
Where no corrupted voices brawl;
No Conscience molten into Gold,
No forg'd Accuser bought or sold,
No cause deferr'd, no vain-spent journey,
For there Christ is the King's attorney;
Who pleads for all without degrees,
And he hath Angels, but no Fees:
And when the grand twelve million Jury
Of our sins, with direfull fury,

'Gainst our Souls black verdicts give,
Christ pleads his Death, and then we live.
Be thou my Speaker, taintless Pleader,
Unblotted Lawyer, true Proceeder!

Thou giv'st Salvation even for Alms,-
Not with a bribed Lawyer's Palms."

On seeing a law book, bound in uncolored calf and white edges:

"With unstain'd edges and in spotless calf,
A Law book bound must make a stoic laugh;
For in that striking emblem you may see
Not what the Law is, but what the Law should be,
A Law book thus in the Law Livery drest,
Is like a Jesuit in a Layman's vest;
'Tis like a strumpet cloath'd in spotless white;
"Tis like a bitter apple, fair to sight:
"Tis like a simple Quaker, plain and neat,
That with his yeas and noes is sure to cheat;
"Tis like a pirate that false colours shows,
Or Hecla's flames concealed in virgin snows;
"Tis like, in short, 'tis like Dan Milton's sin,
All fair without, but monstrous foul within."

66

"A Justice, walking o'er the frozen Thames,
The ice about him round began to crack:
He said to's man, 'Here is some danger, James;
I pr'ythee, help me over on thy back."

On a counselor having his hat stolen in Westminster Hall:

"Should'st thou to Justice, honest thief, be led, Swear that you stole his hat who had no head, That plea alone all danger shall remove, Nor judge nor jury can the damage prove." By Mrs. Madan in her brother's Coke upon Lyttle

ton:

"O thou, who labour'st in this rugged mine,
May'st thou to gold th' unpolished ore refine!
May each dark page unfold its haggard brow!
Doubt not to reap, if thou canst bear to plough.
To tempt thy care, may each revolving night
Maces and purses swim before thy sight!
From hence, in times to come, adventurous deed!
May'st thou essay to look and speak like Mead!
When the black bag and rose no more shall shade!
With martial air the honours of thy head;
When the full wig thy visage shall enclose,
And only leave to view thy learned nose;
Safely may'st thou defy wits, beaux, and scoffers,
While tenants, in fee simple, stuff thy coffers!'

Epitaph on a magistrate who had formerly been a barber:

"Here lies Justice; be this his truest praise;
He wore the wig which once he made
And learnt to shave both ways."

From Herrick:

"Dead falls the cause, if once the hand be mute But let that speak, the client gets the suit."

By the Earl of Orrery:

"For that is made a righteous law by time, Which law at first did judge the highest crime." "Tua Cæsar Etas" was Justice Aston's motto on the rings which he distributed on being made a judge of the king's bench; this epigram was thereupon made:

"All, all is Caesar's, new-rob'd Aston cries,
All, all is Caesar's, the King's Bench replies.
Poor people, you have nothing left, we see,
Since all is Caesar's which belong'd to me.'

Epitaph from the Latin of Theodore Beza:

"O fickle Fortune, cruel, heartless jade,

This brawler who his voice his fortuné made, Summoned to plead in Rhadamanthus' court, Finds what he sold before must now be bought." By Swift:

"Here lies Judge Boate within a coffin;

Pray, gentlefolks, forbear your scoffing.
A Boat a judge! yes, where's the blunder?
A wooden judge is no such wonder.
And in his robes, you must agree,
No boat was better deckt than he.
'Tis needless to describe him fuller;
In short, he was an able skuller."

Anonymous:

"Here lies Lawyer Lag, in a woeful condition, Who once was a law-man, now turn'd politician; Alive, he a Templar was, keeping his terms, And dead, he makes one in the Diet of Worms." "He practiced virtue, pleaded for the right,

And ran the race that all men try to win; He lightened many an over-burdened wight, And if a stranger came, he took him in."

By Ben Jonson:

"No cause, nor client fat, will Cheveril leese,
But as they come, on both sides he takes fees,
And pleaseth both; for while he melts his grease
For this, that wins for whom he holds his peace."

By Lindsay (a friend of Dean Swift; a judge, and an elegant scholar):

'A slave to crowds, scorch'd with the summer's heats,
In courts the wretched lawyer toils and sweats;
While smiling Nature, in her best attire,
Regales each sense, and vernal joys inspire.
Can he who knows that real good should please,
Barter for gold his liberty and ease?'

Thus Paulus preach'd:-When, entering at the door,
Upon his board his clients pour the ore;

He grasps the shining gifts, pores o'er the cause,
Forgets the sun, and dozes o'er the laws."

As the LAW JOURNAL goes to press on Wednesday,

an analogous case-Mayer and Wife v. Mordecai et el.-holding that where a trustee is not limited or directed by the instrument under which he acts, as to investment of the trust fund, his discretion must be exercised with the same diligence that a prudent man would bestow on his own concerns; but that this, however, would not sanction such investments as are never favored or sanctioned by the court, although men of prudence, dealing with their own means, might make them-as loans on mere personal security - or stocks of railroad companies, or other private corporations. The trustee is bound to manage the property for the benefit of the cestui que trust, with the care and diligence of a prudent man. The English rule is that trustees holding funds for investment must invest in the government securities. We fail to discover any valid objection to a rule requiring them here to invest either in government or real estate securities. This would seem to be the only safe way to guard the property of orphans.

The New York World has been endeavoring to convince its readers that state courts are not bound by a decision of the United States supreme court. The arguments advanced result in the proposition that the decision of a court, in any given case, is only binding upon the parties directly interested, and that the law laid down by the decision is only applicable to the particular case in question; and Kent is cited as an authority to this effect. The citation, however, comes very far short of sustaining any such proposition. On the contrary the chancellor declares in his Commentaries that "a solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case, becomes an authority in a

CURRENT TOPICS.

Fortunately the apprehensions which have been entertained that the United States supreme court would reverse its own decision in the legal tender question are not likely at present to be fulfilled. The cases of Latham, and of Deming v. The United States, which involved the question, have been withdrawn by the plaintiffs; and the motion recently made to reopen the Hepburn-Griswold case has been denied. The causes which led to the withdrawal of the former two cases have not transpired. In denying the motion in the latter case the chief justice said that the reason why the rehearing was denied was that none of the four judges now on the bench who concurred in the opinion in that case desired to have the case reheard, and, under the rule of the court, without the consent of some one of the judges who concurred in the decision of a case, it could not be reheard.

In the case of King v. Talbot, 1 Hand, 76, the duties of trustees holding trust funds for investment for the benefit of minor children were very fully discussed, but the court stood divided on the very important question, as to whether such trustees were bound to invest in government or real estate securities. The supreme court of South Carolina has just decided

can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unreversed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or misapplied in that particular case." That the state courts are bound to receive as authoritative precedents all decisions made by the federal courts in cases over which they have either appellate or original jurisdiction, is a proposition which can be most abundantly sustained by authorities, but which is too evident to every lawyer to need sustaining.

We published in a recent number an article from the Pall Mall Gazette upon "A Ministry of Justice," whose duty it should be to overlook the passage of public statutes by parliament. We understand that a bill establishing a "bureau of justice," having similar duties intrusted to it, has been introduced in congress.

Certainty in the law is a necessity among civilized men. We do not mean to be understood that the law should never be changed, but that all changes should be made with such care and deliberation that the object thereof may be attained without injury to any one. A jurisprudence which is the result of the | accumulated wisdom of generations is far more likely to be correct than one produced under the influence of the passions and prejudices of any particular time. Statute laws must nevertheless be made to meet the wants of a progressive age, and these statutes must

more or less infringe upon and alter the great body of the law which existed before them. When made in haste and by men ignorant of legal science, they are liable not only to confuse and render doubtful the meaning of the law, but in many instances to fail in accomplishing the purpose for which they were created. To prevent these evils, and also to secure stability and a uniform character to our legislation, a body of learned and practical men, having advisory and supervisory power as to the enactment of general statutes, is felt to be a need in England. Would not such an institution be of advantage in this state, where it has become not unusual, in order to accomplish private ends, to vary and to overturn the fundamental principles of the law?

The New York Tribune recently contained a lengthy editorial on "The. Limitations of Defense," which opened with the following assertions:

"It will be remembered, at least by all our readers who are interested in celebrated cases, that some years ago Lord William Russell, an aged nobleman, was barbarously murdered in his own London house by a Swiss valet, who, upon his trial, was defended by Mr. Charles Phillips. The line of defense adopted by the distinguished advocate was that the murder was committed by the female servants of the house, and he also argued that bloody articles found in the prisoner's box were placed there by policemen with a view to the reward offered for his discovery and conviction. Suddenly in the very middle of the trial, Mr. Phillips was astonished by receiving from his client a full confession of guilt. But he did not swerve a hair's breadth from the line of defense which he had adopted. He lifted his eyes to Heaven, and fervently declared to the jury that God alone knew who had committed this murder! He continued his insinuations against the housemaid especially, the result of which was that the poor girl was carried to an insane asylum. Mr. Phillips did his client no good, however, for he was convicted, and in due time executed." The Tribune thereupon proceeds from this text to lecture the legal profession soundly for their moral depravity, and to lay down a code of ethics for their future guidance. Now, the only objection we have to the discourse is, that it is based on a text false in every essential particular.

The case alluded to by the Tribune is known as "Courvoisier's case," and has been made famous by the bitter discussions that took place in the papers of the day, of the conduct of Mr. Phillips, the prisoner's counsel. He was charged with having retained Courvoisier's brief after having heard the confession; with having appealed to Heaven as to his belief in Courvoisier's innocence after the confession, and with having endeavored to cast upon the female servants the guilt which he knew was attributable to Courvoisier. The last two charges were at once proved, by the most undoubted and reliable authority, to be utterly false and groundless. It was most clearly established that Mr. Phillips had conducted himself, under the trying circumstances in which he was placed, in a most honorable and conscientious manner. Mr. Baron Parke, who sat with the chief justice at the trial, and who knew of the confession himself, declared that for reasons of his own he had most carefully watched every word that Phillips uttered, and that the address was perfectly unexceptionable, and that he made no such statements as were subsequently attributed to him. Other prominent gentlemen who

were present, including the chief justice, Tindal, bore evidence to the same fact. In the reports of the case published in the London Times, Chronicle, Herald and other prominent papers, it appears that Mr. Phillips not only did not attempt to cast the guilt on the female servants, but expressly stated to the jury that they must not for a moment suppose that he meant or intended to cast any suspicion upon either of the female servants. As to the charge of having retained the brief after the confession, we believe that there is no difference of opinion in the profession that, under the circumstances, this course was right. Indeed, directly after the confession, Phillips informed the judges of it, and of his desire to throw up his brief, but was informed by them that if the prisoner wished to be defended he was bound to defend him, and to use "all fair arguments arising on the evidence." We should not have referred to the matter at such length had not the Tribune reiterated charges proved beyond per adventure to have been false, and thereupon attempted to show the moral depravity of the legal profession.

OBITER DICTA.

We learn that Mr. Justice Daly, of the Court of Common Pleas of the city of New York, is engaged in writing a life of the late Chancellor Kent.

We once knew a young limb of the law, more conceited than wise, who, on being applied to by a landlord to know if he could get a tenant out of his house, answered, "why certainly we can replevy the house."

"Suppose, Mr. K.," said an examiner catechizing an applicant for admission to the bar, "suppose a tenant for life should hold over after the termination of his estate, how would you proceed to evict him?" "I think I should proceed under the statute of mortmain," was the reply.

A young lawyer was once engaged in trying his first case before the late Judge Pearce of the Supreme Court of Ohio, and was indulging in some lofty flights of eloquence. Just as he was preparing for his loftiest soar, the judge interrupted him by rapping on the desk several times, and said: "Hold on, hold on, my dear sir. Don't go any higher, for you are already out of the jurisdiction of the court."

Few witticisms of the bar more deserve to be perpetuated than the following of Wirt: One day in court, when Mr. Wickham and Mr. Hay were opposed to each other in the trial of a cause, the former got the latter into a dilemma; observing and enjoying which, Mr. Warden whispered to Mr. Wirt, who was sitting near him, "Habet fenum in cornu" (he has Hay on his horns). Wirt instantly extemporized the following neat epigram:

"Wickham, one day, in open court,
Was tossing Hay about for sport;
Jack, rich in wit and Latin too,
Cried 'Habet fenum in cornu!'"

The Austin (Texas) Journal relates the following: In 1837 or 1838, the county of had just been organized, and the first district court was held in a small room that had been used for a grocery. It was the fall term, a severe norther was blowing, and there was no fire-place or stove in the room. A desperado was on trial for one out of many murders he had committed, and the judge and jury were impatient to end the case. The county was sparsely settled, and consequently too poor to make adequate arrangements for the comfort of prisoners; so, when the jury brought in a verdict of guilty, the judge

in pronouncing sentence upon the culprit, said: "Bob Jones, you have had a fair trial; you have been found guilty, and the court adjudges that you be hanged by the neck until you be dead; but as the county is just organized and affords no conveniences to lodge a prisoner with any degree of comfort-there being no suitable building nor bedding, not even blankets, the court do hereby, in consideration of his personal comfort, order that the prisoner be taken to the nearest tree and there hanged until he be dead, and may the Lord have mercy on his soul." The sheriff then borrowed a lariat from a bystander, put it over the culprit's neck, and led him out to a tree a few feet from the court-house, threw it over a limb, and suspended the prisoner until life was extinct.

Construction thereof. A contractor, who had engaged to construct a piece of work, employed another, at certain stipulated wages, to superintend the construction, having previously requested the latter to make the plans and devise the best means by which certain difficult parts of the work could be accomplished. After his employment, the superintendent, at the request of his employer, applied these plans in the execution of the work, which was successfully done. Held, in an action against the contractor by his employee, to recover for the skill and labor bestowed in the making of those plans, that they were not embraced in the original contract of employment, nor in the duties thereby imposed, and he might recover additional compensation therefor. Dull et al. v. Bramhall.

COSTS IN CHANCERY.

1. At what stage of the cause they may be awarded. Where, in a suit in chancery to foreclose a mortgage, a decree is rendered which settles the rights of the parties and directs a sale of the premises, but leaves the question of costs undisposed of, and the whole case stands over to await the report of the master, the parties being retained in court in view of further probable action in the case, it is competent for the court to require the costs to be taxed at the term subsequent to that at which such decree is rendered. The Northern Illinois Railroad Company et al. v. The Racine and Mississippi Railroad Company.

2. Award of costs in chancery: discretionary. - The awarding of costs in chancery cases is a matter of discretion with the court, which this court will rarely interfere with. Frisby v. Balance, 4 Scam. 300, and Blue v. Blue, 38 Ill. 19. Ib.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Accessory equally guilty: distinction between accessories before the fact and principals abolished: not after the fact. Under our statute, the distinction between accessories before the fact and principals is abolished, but this is not true as to accessories after the fact. Yoe v. State.

2. Accessory after the fact: may be convicted: though indicted as a principal. - Under our criminal code a party may be

From Hon N. L. Freeman, State Reporter. To appear in 49 Illinois Reports.

convicted as an accessory after the fact, and punished accordingly, though indicted as a principal. Ib.

3. Rights of accused. — In cases of this character, where the proof showed that, if accused was guilty at all, she could only have been so as an accessory after the fact, it is proper and right for the court, in its instructions to the jury, to inform them that if the prisoner had given any explanation of the circumstances proved against her, showing them to be consistent with innocence of the charge, they should favorably consider them. Ib.

DEEDS.

1. Containing condition against a conveyance within a limited period: construction thereof. - Where the grantor, in a deed, annexed to the grant a condition that the grantee should not convey the property, except by lease for a term of years, prior to a certain day named therein, and the grantee afterward, and within the limited period, executed to a party a lease of the premises for ninety-nine years, and also at the same time gave to him a bond for the conveyance of the property in fee, after the expiration of the limitation, and received from the purchaser the purchase price therefor: Held, that these acts of the grantee were not prohibited by the condition, and hence worked no forfeiture of the estate. Samuel Voris et al. v. William Renshaw, Jr.

2. Condition to avoid an estate: construed strictly.—A condition to avoid an estate must be taken strictly. It cannot be extended before its express terms. And, when a party insists upon the forfeiture of an estate under a condition, he must bring himself clearly within its terms. Ib.

EVIDENCE.

1. In criminal cases: of the right to show the character of a witness: in a capital case. — - Where, upon the trial of a capital case, a witness, who had acted as a detective, was asked the question by the prisoner's counsel, upon crossexamination, "What is the character of your associates in your business as a detective?" Held, that the inquiry was objectionable, as tending to degenerate into investigations wholly foreign to the matters in question. Yoe, impleaded, etc., v. People of the State of Illinois.

2. Medical books: extracts read therefrom: not evidence. And in such case, where the state's attorney, in his argument to the jury, read from medical books not in evidence or proved to be authority upon the subject, it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury that such book is not evidence, but theories simply, of medical men. Ib.

3. Testimony given in another case: and in another state: inadmissible. It was error for the court to permit to be used in evidence against the prisoner the testimony of a professor of chemistry, given in another case and in another state, and reported in the criminal reports, no opportunity having been had either to cross-examine such witness or to meet his testimony by other evidence. Ib.

FORFEITURES.

Not favored. The law does not favor forfeitures, but refuses to enforce them, whenever wrong or injustice will result therefrom; and before a forfeiture will be enforced, a clear case, appealing to the principles of justice, must be established. Voris v. Renshaw, Jr.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.

1. Abandonment.-B. and wife executed to C. a conveyance of their homestead, but the deed did not operate to release the homestead right. B. continued in the occupancy of the premises after the execution of the deed, under a lease from C., and paid rent therefor. Subsequently B. died, leaving a wife and one child, who remained in possession for a time, when the widow intermarried with one M. and removed to another town, taking the child with her, and leased the premises to A, appropriating the rents to the education of the child. Held, in an action of ejectment brought by C. against A,