The decision of the United States supreme court permitting the legal tender question to be argued in the Latham case, has led to the belief that the decision in the Hepburn-Griswold case may be reversed, consequently the Hon. J. B. Beck, member of congress from Kentucky, has moved the court for the reopening of that case. The court has the motion under advisement. It is said that no decided case will be reopened unless it be requested by one of the concurring justices, and it therefore depends upon that contingency whether the case will be reopened. Mr. Assemblyman Fields has introduced a bill, which provides as follows: Any attorney or counselor at law who heretofore acted, or may hereafter act, as attorney or counselor for any party to an action, suit, or proceeding, or who shall hereafter accept a retainer as counsel for any person, and who, in the course of such action, suit, or proceeding, or in any consultation with his client as counsel,has acquired or may acquire any information in confidence from such client, or has advised or hereafter shall advise any client that he may lawfully do any act or thing, and who shall hereafter use the information thus obtained in any action, suit, or proceeding, adverse to such client, or who shall appear as attorney or counsel in any action, suit, or proceeding brought against such client, or any of his or its agents or officers, for the purpose of obtaining any relief against him or them on the ground of the illegality of any action which such attorney or counsel shall have advised as aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding $1,000, or both." It is certainly humiliating to believe that there is any necessity for the enactment of such a law to regulate the conduct of members of an honorable profession. We have the consolation of knowing, however, that the evils aimed at have been confined chiefly, if not entirely, to "the wars of the railroad kings." We were in hopes, now that the United States supreme court has decided to hear arguments on the legal tender question, that the matter would be disposed of quickly, but the court seems to be as easy in the matter as a damsel of sixteen. It has three times in conference fixed the day for the hearing, and has as many times postponed it. The day is now fixed for Monday next. On the motion for the last postponement an interesting episode occurred in the court. The chief justice informed the attorney-general, that, according to his recollection, the case under consideration had been ordered to abide the decision in the case of Hepburn v. Griswold; and his recollection was backed by that of Justices CLIFFORD and NELSON, but it was stated by other justices that the recollection of the chief justice had not been deemed by the majority of the court sufficient ground to justify a refusal to hear the cases. It is now stated that Mr. Justice BRADLEY will not take part in the decision, inasmuch as he is interested in the issue, being a stockholder in the Camden and Amboy Railroad, and, until recently, counsel for that road. In that event, the decision of the case now before the court will probably stand four to four, and the Hepburn decision will escape the fate of being reversed. A matter has arisen in the second judicial district of this state of importance to the general public, and we believe, not without interest to the profession. Some months since the Postmaster-General saw fit to direct postmasters to refuse to deliver and to send to the dead letter office all letters that they believed to be addressed to fictitious persons or firms. In obedience to this order, the postmaster at Williamsburgh detained certain letters containing money directed to various persons and firms, but which were called for by one person. An injunction was issued by Judge Cardozo forbidding the postmaster from forwarding the letters to Washington. A motion was made in the United States court in Brooklyn to set aside the order of Judge Cardozo. The result we have not learned. Without reference to the jurisdiction, which is the principal point urged, and which, we suppose, must be decided in favor of the postmaster, it seems to us that the order of the Postmaster-General is not only an outrage upon the sanctity of private correspondence, but is in violation of the law. The postal department was instituted, as we understand, for the purpose of conveying letters and papers, and not as a censor of public morals. If a knave can defraud a fool or another knave by advertising that he will, upon the receipt of one dollar, send the value of five dollars, it is not the duty of the public authorities to stand between the parties. Much less is it the duty of those who, by law, oversee the transportation of the communications of the people, to determine what packages shall reach the parties to whom they may be directed. The mails should be sacred, and it rests with the government to determine whether our postal service shall be like that of France and Austria, uncertain and dangerous to those who employ it, or like that of England, so excellent and careful that an open envelop containing money may pass around the world safely. In New Hampshire, twenty years ago, "side judges" were in fashion. They were usually honest farmers of good common sense, but with an entire absence of legal knowledge, and they sat one on each side of a bona fide judge. It was thought their practical everyday information might assist that portion of the court which knew any law; at any rate, there they were, with the name and dignity of "judge," if not with full judicial powers. "One hot afternoon, in the middle of a prosy case," said Judge, who never was enthusiastic over the old system, "I turned to the only other occupant of the bench who was awake, and remarked: "This is a pine bench we are sitting on, isn't it?' He said he rather thought it was, and that was the only opinion I ever heard him pronounce." Mr. Justice Maule would occasionally talk to the jury in a style that they could not well misunderstand. He once said: " Gentlemen, the learned counsel is perfectly right in his law; there is some evidence upon that point; but he's a lawyer, and you're not, and you do not know what he means by some evidence; so I'll tell you. Suppose there was an action on a bill of exchange, and six people swore they saw the defendant accept it; and six others swore they heard him say he should have to pay it, and six others knew him intimately and swore to his handwriting; and suppose on the other side they called a poor old man, who had been at school with the defendant forty years before, and had not seen him since, and he said he rather thought the acceptance was not his writing, why there'd be some evidence that it was not, and that's what Mr. means in this case." The following from a young lawyer in Cincinnati is not bad: An old darkey, very much in distress, came into my office the other day and wanted to hear "what de law told him on dat subjeck." It seems he had made a will, and given his house to a young and enterprising colored man. The latter, without waiting for the old gentle man's demise, sold the house. The sable patriarch was rather startled at that, but the chief burden of his complaint seemed to be, that it went at too low a figure. The purchaser agreed with the anticipating devisee to let him off from the bargain on payment of a handsome bonus. When the aged proprietor heard of it, he came to me and wanted to know whether he "war boun' to raise dat money." We thought, in view of the Fifteenth Amendment, we were safe in telling him he was n't." DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. 1. Rule under the statute.- Under the liberal provisions of our statute, to allow amendments, is the rule, to refuse them the exception. Pride v. Wormwood. 2. Rule exemplified. — In an action commenced on a contract not mature, the petition alleged that the defendant was about to dispose of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, and ask an attachment. There was no allegation that nothing but time was wanting to fix an absolute indebtedness. To this petition defendant answered without demurring or otherwise attacking its sufficiency. Subsequently, and after the contract under which the suit was brought had matured, the parties proceeded to trial upon the issues joined; and after the introduction of some testimony by the plaintiff, he offered an amendment to his petition, to the effect that, at the time of commencing his action, defendant was about to dispose of his property with intent to defraud his creditors; that nothing but time was then wanting to fix an absolute indebtedness; that since the commencement of the action the time for performance had expired, and that plaintiff had now a complete cause of action. Judgment was prayed as in the original petition. In asking this amendment plaintiff offered to submit to such terms as to costs or continuance as might be imposed. The court refused to allow the amendment, and instructed the jury to find for the defendant. Held, that the ruling was erroneous. Ib. APPEAL. - 1. From railroad right of way assessment. In the absence of any statutory direction as to the manner of taking an appeal from the assessment of damages for right of way, it seems that any act of the party usually required in cases of appeal from one tribunal to another is sufficient. Robertson v. The Eldorado R. R. & Coal Co. 2. It is accordingly held that notice of appeal to the opposite party is sufficient. And it seems that in case of appeal by the land owner no bond is necessary. But if one should be held necessary, the omission to file it would not operate to dismiss the appeal, as in such case the court could require one to be filed. Ib. 3. Failure to file papers. The failure of the officer to file papers until the first day of the next term after the appeal was taken, constitutes no sufficient ground for dismissing the appeal. Ib. 4. Failure to pay docket fee: rule of court. — A rule of the district court to which a cause was appealed, provided, that if the filing fee was not paid before noon on the first day of the term, the appellee might pay the same, and on motion have the appeal dismissed or judgment affirmed. Held, where the filing fee was not paid by the appellant until after noon of the first day of the term, but before the filing of a motion of the appellee to affirm, that the motion was properly overruled. Ib. 5. Notice: service on railroad director: appearance. - Semble, that service of notice of appeal upon a director of a railroad company is sufficient under section 2825 of the Revision. But if not, an appearance by the appellee to *From E. H. Stiles, Esq., Reporter. To appear in 27th Iowa. object to the service would operate as a general appearance, and cure the defect. Ib. -- 6. From general term. — The general term is an intermediate appellate tribunal provided by law for a substantial purpose, and causes taken on appeal thereto should be there argued, examined, and decided with appropriate and befitting care. An affirmance by consent with a view to an ultimate appeal to the supreme court ought not to be allowed by the general term. Roads v. Garman. 7. As to who appeals. Where the supersedeas bond in an appeal to the supreme court from a judgment against two defendants, recited that one of the defendants, naming him, had appealed, without referring to the other defendant, and the notice of the appeal was headed as that of the plaintiff against the defendant alone who was men tioned in the supersedeas, but the body of the notice used the plural-defendants- it was held, that the defendants mentioned in the supersedeas and in the heading of the notice, alone appealed. Webster v. The Cedar Rapids and St. Paul R. R. Co. 8. Correction of excessive judgment: defective petition. - The objection that a judgment is excessive will not be considered by the supreme court on appeal, until a motion has been made to correct the error in the court below, and there overruled. Ib. 9. So, too, of the objection that the petition in an action where defendants made default was so defective that it failed to show any cause of action, and that the judgment thereon was, therefore, erroneous. Ib. BANKRUPTCY. 1. Foreign state insolvent laws: discharge under. - A discharge under a state insolvent law will not discharge a debt due a citizen of another state, unless the latter appears and voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court, by becoming a party to the proceeding or claiming a dividend thereunder; and this is the case irrespective of the form of the debt, or where the contract was entered into, or where it was to be performed. Hawley v. Hunt. 2. The place of making or place of performance is wholly immaterial in all cases where the creditor is not a citizen of the state granting the discharge. Citizenship of the parties, and not the place of the making or the place fixed for the performance of the contract, is the controlling element. Ib. 3. Application of principles. - Where judgments were rendered against a debtor in the state of New York, and these judgments were afterward assigned to a citizen of this state, it was held that a subsequent discharge of the debtor, under the insolvent laws of New York, constituted no bar to a suit on the judgments. Ib. 4. Validity of state insolvent laws. The doctrine recognized that state insolvent laws are invalid as respects subsequent contracts. The course of decision upon the principles herein announced shown, and the authorities collated, by DILLON, Ch. J. Ib. BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. 1. Certification of evidence. The supreme court will not review the finding of the court below on the facts, under a bill of exceptions which states that the evidence is given in substance, and that no other material evidence was heard by the court. It should be stated that all of the evidence is certified. McKenzie, adm'x, v. Killer. BOND. 1. Requisites of. A bond for the delivery or return of property is not invalid because it fails to recite the time, terms or conditions upon which the delivery or return is to be made. Huntington v. Fisher. 2. For security of persons not named: privity. - Where a bond, given for the primary security of one person, also contains a clause intended for the security of another, suit may be brought by the latter, though not named in the bond, if he sustains an injury in consequence of a breach thereof. Rev. 2787, 2757. Ib. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 1. Repeal of banking acts. - Section 5, article 8, of the new constitution, which declares that no act of the general assembly, authorizing or creating corporations or associations with banking powers, nor amendments thereto, shall take effect until the same shall have been submitted to, and received a majority vote of, the people, does not apply to, nor operate as a limitation upon, the repealing power of the legislature. Morseman v. Younkin et al. 2. It was accordingly held, that the 4th section of chapter 153, laws of 1868, repealing section 1598 of the Revision, which was a part of the general banking law, and which authorized the taxation of the capital instead of the shares of banks organized under the State law, was authorized and valid, it having received the two-thirds vote of the legislature, required in such cases by section 12, article 8, of the new constitution. Ib. 2. Law of forum. It is accordingly held, in an action upon a sealed instrument executed in another state, where the common-law rule as to sealed instruments prevailed, and where the consideration, if the action had there been brought, would not have been inquirable into, that our law would govern as that of the forum, and that the defense of want of consideration might be made. Ib. 3. Remedy: constitutional law. Our statute allowing such defects to sealed instruments is one relating to the remedy, and does not impair the obligation of the contract. Ib. CRIMINAL LAW. 1. False pretense; promise.- While a false promise will not sustain the charge of obtaining property, etc., under false pretenses, yet the fact that a promise is combined with the false pretense, does not destroy the criminality of the act; and if both blend together and jointly act upon the mind of the defrauded person, it is sufficient. The State v. Dowe. 2. Rule applied. — In a prosecution for obtaining the signature of the prosecutor to a receipt, which under our statute is the subject of forgery, by false pretense, the indictment charged that the defendant went to the prosecutor and pretended that he had come to pay a debt due from him to the prosecutor, and that by reason of such false pretense the prosecutor was induced to execute a receipt to the defendant for the amount of his debt, which the defendant took into his possession and carried away, without paying him any part of the debt. The indictment further alleged that defendant had not come to pay the prosecutor as pretended. Held, that the indictment was sufficient. Ib. 3. Indictment; perjury. - An indictment for perjury is sufficient under section 4659 of the Revision, when the act charged as to the offense is stated with such a degree of certainty and in such manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment. The State v. Schill. 4. Perjury; indictment. — In an indictment for perjury for false swearing in a criminal investigation before a grand jury, it is not necessary to allege that the party charged with the offense that was under investigation before the grand jury, was or was not guilty thereof, nor the facts constituting such offense. Ib. 5. Perjury before grand jury.-Perjury may be committed by wilfully giving false testimony of a material character before a grand jury. Ib. 6. Change of venue. -An application for a change of venue in a criminal cause is intrusted by the statute to the district court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, and the supreme court will not interfere with its action unless it is shown that such discretion has been improperly exercised. It was accordingly held, that the action of the court below in refusing an application for a change, based upon the uncorroborated affidavit of the defendant of the prejudice of the judge, was not erroneous. State v. Freeman. The 7. Appeal; reduction of fine. -The power given to the supreme court, section 4295 of the Revision, to reduce the punishment in a criminal cause, should be exercised only in cases where the court below has manifestly visited too severe a penalty, one disproportioned to the degree of guilt, as shown by the proof. Ib. - DAMAGES. 1. Interest on. The general rule that interest cannot be recovered on unliquidated damages, has been much modified by modern decisions; and it seems that under the rule as now understood, and the provisions of our statute, Revision, 1787, interest is recoverable on the value of property lost by a bailee, from the date of such loss. Mole v. The Chicago and N. W. R. R. Co. 2. Seduction. A verdict of $2,500 damages for the seduction of an unmarried woman was held not excessive in the present case. Gray v. Bean. EASEMENT. 1. Extent of; construction. While the rule is, that an easement appurtenant to an estate is so to every part thereof, whatever the subdivision at the time or subsequently: Yet the servient estate is not to be burdened to a greater extent than was contemplated or intended at the creation of the easement. And this intention is to be derived from the natural construction of the language used in the instrument, construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Brassart v. Corbett. 2. Right of way.— A right of way through certain premises, reserved to the grantor of a portion of them, cannot be enlarged as against the first grantee by a reference, contained in a subsequent deed of a another portion, to the effect that the right extends to a certain point, which is, in fact, beyond that fixed in the reservation. Ib. 3. A right of way was reserved through the servient estate to a certain boundary line. Held, under the circumstances of the present case, that the way should not be extended along such line after reaching it. lb. EQUITY. Mistake in written contract.—To establish a mistake in a written contract, it should be made out by the testimony beyond fair and reasonable controvery, and if the proofs are doubtful and unsatisfactory, or if the mistake is not clearly shown, equity will not interfere. Tafts & Colly v. Larned. ESTOPPEL. 1. In pais; failure to disclose liens.—An agent of the owner of real estate met a person holding liens and incumbrances thereon, for the purpose of paying and discharging the same. The agent asked for an exhibit of all liens and claims held by the creditor against the land, and was informed by the latter that he had none other than those exhibited. These were paid by the agent, who again inquired if all liens were settled, and received an answer in the affirmative. The creditor at the time of this settlement held a certificate of tax sale which he did not exhibit, and upon which he subsequently obtained a tax deed for the land. Held, that he was estopped by the facts connected with the settlement from asserting title under this deed. Davidson v. Follett. 2. It was further held, that whether the owner or his agent in fact knew that the taxes were unpaid for the year for which the land was sold, was immaterial, as under the circumstances the creditor was bound to disclose this lien, and if he did not he would be concluded from afterwards setting it up. Ib. EVIDENCE. 1. Error without prejudice. - The admission of irrelevant and unimportant testimony which could not have had the effect of prejudicing the right of the party objecting, will not be regarded as sufficient to justify a reversal. McKenzie, admx. v. Kitler. 2. Admissions of administrator; statute construed. —Section 2393 of the Revision which provides that an administrator shall not admit claims until the claimants have sworn to their correctness, and that the same rule shall apply to payments or set-offs, was not intended to abrogate the general rule admitting in evidence the declarations and admissions of parties to the record. It is accordingly held, that the admissions of an administrator as to the amount of payments that had been made on a note held by the estate, were admissible in an action wherein he was a party. Ib. 3. Parol to vary written instrument; pleading.-Evidence of a contemporaneous verbal agreement that the maker of a promissory note should, at his option, have time for payment beyond that fixed in the note itself, is not admissible; and an answer setting up such agreement as a defense is demurrable. Stucksleger v. Smith. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. Delivery for record by grantor. -The fact that the grantor in a deed delivered the same to the recorder for the purpose of having it recorded, may be a circumstance tending to show fraud in the transaction; but that fact alone would not, as a matter of law, render the deed fraudulent; nor would it sustain a verdict of a jury to that effect. Ward v. Wehman et al. GARNISHMENT. Of payee of promissory note; pleading.—The pendency of a garnishment proceeding against the maker of a promissory note does not constitute matter for a plea in bar to a recovery on the note in a suit by an assignee thereof who received it after due and after garnishment of the maker. But such a defense may be pleaded in abatement; and the issue thereon should be submitted to the jury, that their verdict thereon may be distinguished from one upon matter pleaded in bar. Rev., sec. 3124. Chise v. Freeborn. (Concluded next week.) TERMS OF THE SUPREME COURT FOR APRIL. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Newburgh, Gilbert. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Ulster, Peckham. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Schoharie, Miller. 3d Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Cortland, Boardman. 3d Tuesday, Special Term, Onondaga, Morgan. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Suffolk, Gilbert. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Johnstown, Bockes. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Livingston, Johnson. 4th Monday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Wayne, Dwight. 4th Tuesday, Circuit and Oyer and Terminer, Lewis, Morgan. Last Monday, Special Term, Ontario, J. C. Smith. COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT. Freeman et al. v. Charter Fire and Marine Ins. Co. The defendants demurred to a complaint on the ground that it did not make out a cause of action in behalf of the plaintiffs. The complaint alleged a valid contract by the defendants with the plaintiffs, insuring them by name, on account of whom it might concern, against loss or damage by fire, on a certain vessel; the loss of the vessel and the furnishing of proofs of loss, and a full compliance with all the conditions of the policy. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs, having no interest in the vessel, could not maintain an action, as they were not the parties in interest. Held, that the action was well brought and the complaint sufficient; that such was the law before the code, and that the code had in no respect changed the common-law rule, and that the plaintiffs were trustees of an express trust within the meaning of section 113 of the code, and could sustain the action as such. Opinion by MASON, J. Quinn, Adm'r, etc., v. Lloyd. Held, that, if an adverse party desires to object to evidence of transactions with a party's intestate, he must do so in season, and not wait till he learns what they are, and then, if they bear unfavorably on his case, move to strike them out. Opinion by Woodruff, J. Wolf v. Goodline Fire Ins. Co. Where the supreme court had reversed an order for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was the result of a compromise, and was rendered because the jury thought it better for the litigants and for the public that the controversy should be terminated by the verdict which they rendered than that it should be prolonged by a disagreement, and that, for this reason, while some of the jurors were convinced that fraud was established, and others thought it was not, they agreed to find a verdict which was consistent with the views of neither, and that the verdict could be sustained, WOODRUFF, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, used the following language: "This view of the duty of jurors, and of their right to find a verdict which their own consciences tell them is not according to the evidence, seems to me mischievous in the highest degree. If the rule entitling the parties to the unanimous concurrence of twelve jurors in the verdict is a bad rule, let it be abrogated, but while it remains the rule, approved by the experience of centuries, and maintained in its integrity still as the just and reasonable protection of the citizen, whether charged with crime or pursued for alleged claims upon his property, it should not be practically abrogated, and that by judicial approval. "It is saying that the juror who has sworn to find a verdict according to the evidence, and whose conscience is satisfied by the evidence that a fraud has been committed, may concur in a verdict contrary to the evidence and against his oath, and he may do so because he thinks it better for the litigants that the controversy be terminated by an unjust verdict than that it be longer protracted. With this consideration the jury have nothing to do, and in this form I am sure the learned judge, by whom the opinion was pronounced, would not approve it; and yet it seems to me the plain meaning of the language he employed. Its danger, and its clear withdrawal of the protection furnished by a jury trial, is most manifest if it be supposed to form part of the instruction of the judge to a jury on the trial of an indictment, to wit: That, though the evidence did not satisfy all of them of the guilt of the prisoner of any crime, they might compromise the matter with such jurors as deemed the evidence to establish the grossest offense by consenting to a verdict of guilty of one less atrocious. "The opinion below intimates that such a compromise may be proper where damages are unliquidated. I know of no ground on which a juror may be relieved from his oath to find a verdict according to the evidence in one case rather than another. And if, where vindictive or exemplary damages are proper, and rest to some extent in the discretion of a jury, there is large room for the jury to defer to the views of each other, and conscientiously yield their first impressions to the influence of discussion, this is not such a case. Here the rule of damages was single and certain, to wit: the amount of the loss. "In any case there is room, and very often there is a necessity, that jurors should confer without pride of opinion, with a disposition to yield first impressions to the influence of mutual comparison of views and just and proper discussion of the proofs; and on such conference unanimity often results and accords with the conscientious convictions of each. If it do not, then the jurors ought to disagree. If the language of the opinion of the court below was found in an instruction to the jury, it should be pronounced erroneous, and a verdict rendered in pursuance of such an instruction should be set aside; and yet if the observations are just, and are a true and legal exposition of the duty or the privilege of jurors, it would be quite proper so to instruct them, and practically receive a verdict in favor of six, or even two, jurors, in the form of a verdict of the whole; for under such an instruction polling the jury would be of no avail, since, in accordance with the instruction, each Juror could say it his verdict, though rendered against the evidence." BANKRUPTCY ABSTRACT. ARREST. Property which had been conveyed by a bankrupt in fraud of creditors prior to the passage of the bankrupt law, is to be regarded as vested in the assignee in bankruptcy, by force of that act, and by virtue of the proceedings thereunder. The bankrupt, therefore, cannot be arrested in proceedings under the act of 1831, of this state, known as the "Stilwell act," by a creditor seeking to reach the property of the bankrupt. The primary object of civil proceedings under the Stilwell act, is not the punishment of the debtor, but the collection of the creditor's judgment; and therefore such proceedings are in direct conflict with the bankrupt law, as respects all property which passed to the assignee in bankruptcy. N. Y. Com. Pleas, Goodwin v. Sharkey, 3 Bankrupt Reg. 138. BURDEN OF PROOF. Where assignees in bankruptcy impeached a transaction involving a transfer by the bankrupts of a mortgage and promissory notes to holders of their check, if it be shown to have been made out of the ordinary course of business, it is prima facie evidence of fraud, and the burden of proof is cast upon the defendant to show the validity of the transaction. U. S. Dis. Ct., S. D. of N. Y., Collins and another, assignees, &c., v. Bell et al., 3 Bankrupt Reg. 146. DISTRIBUTION. In the distribution of the assets of the bankrupt, derived from the collection of a promissory note, a creditor whose claim is in judgment has no priority, and will share pro rata with the other creditors. U. S. Dis. Ct., S. D. of Georgia. In re Erwin and another, 3 Bankrupt Reg. 142. FAILURE TO FILE SCHEDULE. Where a member of a bankrupt firm had failed to file schedule of his personal property, Held, The other members would not, on that account, be refused a discharge. U. S. Dis. Ct., S. D. of N. Y. In re Scofield et al., 2 Bankrupt Reg. 137. |