2. Proof of, must be positive.-Adverse possession is not to be made out by inference, but by clear and positive proof. The possession must be such as to show clearly that the party claims the land as his own, openly and exclusively. Ib.

AMENDMENT.

1. Of complaint.-After an amended complaint has been held insufficient on demurrer, leave to amend a second time should not be granted, especially where the action is on a statute and the demurrer turned on the construction of the statute. Lowry v. Inman, 6 Abb. N. S.

2. Variance: Discretion.-The action of the court below in allowing the plaintiff to amend his petition while the second argument was being made to the jury by defendant's counsel, in order to conform the pleadings more definitely to the facts proved on the trial, will not be disturbed by the Supreme Court unless satisfied that there has been abuse of discretion or that the order made was not in furtherance of justice. Smith v. Howard, 27 Iowa.

3. Pleading.-The allowance of an amendment, after one trial has been had in which the jury disagreed, withdrawing the denial of the due execution and attestation of a will in a case in which its validity was contested on the ground of the mental weakness and undue influence of the testator, and thereupon giving the affirmative of the issue and the right of opening and closing the case to the contestants, was held not erroneous. Bates v. Bates et al, 27 Iowa.

4. Acceptance of terms estops appeal.- Where an order was granted allowing a defendant to amend his answer on payment of costs, and the costs were accepted by the plaintiff, held, that the acceptance of the costs estopped the plaintiff from appealing from the order. N. Y. Super. Ct. 1869, Howard v. Smith, N. R.

ARREST.

In action of claim and delivery.-In an action of claim and delivery to recover possession of property, an order of arrest on the ground that the defendant has concealed the property cannot be granted until after the sheriff has certified in the return to the writ that he has made demand of the property, but has been unable to recover it. N. Y. Super. Ct., 1869, Sherlock v. Sherlock. N. R.

ATTORNEY'S FEES.

BAR TO ACTION.

CIVIL RIGHTS BILL.

Validity of the Civil Rights Bill.-The provisions of the Ac of Congress commonly known as the "Civil Rights Bill" (14 U. S. Stats. at Large, p. 27), which provide that "all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be enizens of the United States, and such citizens of every race and color * shall have the same right in every State and Territory of the United States to full and equal benefit of al. laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding," were not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States as it read prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment thereto, and are valid. People v. Washington, 36 Cal.

串

COMMON CARRIERS.

Liability for Goods Burned-Delivery.-The defendants, the New Haven Steamboat Company, received merchandise at New Haven shipped for the west, brought it safely to New York, and landed it on their pier, where it was burned a short time after, with a large quantity of other merchandise. It appeared that it had been loaded on to the trucks of a firm of common carriers, ready to be carted away to a connecting line the next morning, had not the fire occurred. In an action to recover the value of the goods, the court held that the loading of the goods upon the trucks of the firm of common carriers was a delivery to them, and that by such delivery the liability of the defendants as insurers had ceased, though the goods still remained on their pier. Sup. Ct. Spe. T., 1869, Williams v. New Haven Steamboat Co., N. R.

CONDITIONAL SALE.

Conditional Sale of Personal Property-Title.-Where on sale of personal property "the right to receive payment before delivery is waived by the seller, and immediate possession is given to the purchaser, and yet by express agreement the title is to remain in the seller until the payment of the price upon a fixed day, such payment is strictly a condition precedent, and until performance the right of property is not vested in the purchaser." Putnam v. Lamphier, 36 Cal.

CONTRACTS.

1. Of insane persons. - Where a contract has been entered into under circumstances which would ordinarily make it binding, by a sane person with one who is insane, and such contract nas been adopted and is sought to be enforced by the representatives of the latter, it is no defense to the sane party to show that the other party was non compos mentis at the time the contract was made.

Arga. 1. Infants.-If an infant make a contract with one of
full age, it may be enforced by the infant against the
adult, though not by the adult against the infant.
Argu. 2. Surety: coverture.-While as a general rule the dis-
oharge of the principal disharges the surety, yet if a
person sui juris become surety for a married woman, a
minor, or other person incapable of contracting, the
Surety is bound, notwithstanding a successful plea of
disability on the part of the principal. Allen, by his
guardian, Stephens, v. Berryhill, 27 Iowa.

2. Contracts which are wholly executory, made by a person totally insane, are so far void as that they will not be specifically enforced, even at the suit of the lunatic or his representatives against the sane party. Per COLE, J., dissenting in same

case.

3. Mutuality: railroad subscriptions.-If one promise to pay another a sum of money if he will do a particular act, and he does the act, the contract is not void for want of mutuality, and the promissor is liable, though the promissee did not at the time of the promise engage to do the act; for upon the performance of the condition by the promissee, the contract becomes clothed with a valid consideration which relates back and renders the promise obligatory. Des Moines Valley R. R. Co. v. Graff et al., 27 Iowa.

4. It is accordingly held that if certain subscribers promise and undertake to pay a railroad company a certain sum or sums if it will build its road to a designated place, the subsequent completion of the road according to the terms of the promise,

furnishes in itself a consideration, removes the objection of want of mutuality, and renders the promise binding upon the subscribers. lb.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

1. In an action whose gravamen is negligence, it is the duty of the plaintiff to show a case clear of contributory negligence. There must be shown a prima facie case resulting exclusively from the wrong of the defendant, before he can be called to answer. Waters v. Wing, 59 Penn.

2. The plaintiff's horse was killed by the shaft of the defendant's carriage running into him, both being on a public highway. The defendant asked the court to charge: "That the defendant had a right to be on the public highway, and if the jury believe that at the time of the alleged accident he was traveling in an ordinary manner, he is not liable for an injury resulting from such use of the public thoroughfare." Held, that the point should have been affirmed. lb.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Circumstantial evidence; instruction.-In a prosecution for larceny the court instructed the jury that the evidence to establish the facts necessary to convict the defendant might be direct or circumstantial, or partly direct and partly circumstantial; direct, as by persons who saw the act, or circumstantial, as by evidence of facts from which the jury might fairly presume the guilt of defendant. Held, that the instruction was not erroneous. The State v. Brady, 27 Iowa.

2. Larceny: possession of stolen property.-Where a large portion of stolen goods were found soon after the theft in defendant's house, which was of a disreputable character and at which disreputable persons visited, and a part of the goods were found in a bed-room occupied by the defendant, this possession, together with some other circumstances tending to show defendant's participation in the commission of the offense, were held sufficient to warrant his conviction. lb.

3. Larceny: proof of owner's non-consent.-The rule requiring in a prosecution for larceny the introduction of the owner of the property stolen in order to prove his non-consent to the taking, does not apply in cases where the property is stolen from a bailee or another holding the possession thereof, or where it is impossible to produce the evidence of the owner as in case of death or the like. In such cases the evidence of the bailee or persons holding possession is sufficient, and in case the owner cannot be produced the fact of his non-consent may be shown by proper secondary evidence. The State v. Osborne, 27 Iowa.

4. Drunkenness no excuse for crime.-Insanity produced by intoxication does not destroy responsibility for the commission of a crime, when the party who committed the crime when sane voluntarily made himself intoxicated. People v. Lewis, 36 Cal.

5. Evidence of drunkenness as excuse for guilt.-Drunkenness is no defense to the fact of guilt. Evidence of drunkenness can only be received and considered by the jury for the purpose of determining the degree of guilt, and for this purpose it should be received with great caution. Ib.

ESTOPPEL.

Positive acts.-Positive acts tending to mislead one ignorant of the truth, which do mislead him to his injury, are good ground of estoppel, and ignorance of title on the part of him who is estopped will not excuse him. Chapman v. Chapman et al., 59 Penn.

EVIDENCE.

1. Declarations of agent: res gesta.-To render the declarations of an agent admissible in evidence to bind his principal, they must have been within the scope of the agency and made during the continuance of it in respect to the transaction then depending. Subsequent declarations are not part of the res gesta, and are not admissible. Sweatland v. Telegraph Co., 27 Iowa.

2. Testimony of attorney as to client's declarations.-The rule not permitting an attorney to testify to communications made to him by his client, as such, does not extend so far as to prohibit the attorney from stating by whom he was employed; neither does the rule prevent the attorney from testifying to communications made to him by his chent, unless they are confidential communications made by the client in the course and for the purposes of the employment of the attorney. 36 Cal.

8. Testimony of defendant in criminal case.-If the defendant in a criminal case does not avail himself of his right given by

the statute to testify in his own behalf, the District Attorney should not be allowed, in addressing the jury, to comment on his failure to testify as an evidence of guilt. People v. Tyler, 36 Cal.

4. Defendant need not testify in his own behalf.-A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to rest in silence and security upon his plea of not guilty, and no inference of guilt can properly be drawn against him from his failure to testify in his own behalf. Ib.

EXECUTOR.

1. Liability of, to the estate.-The common law rule that a debtor who is made the executor of his creditor is thereby released from the debt, it not appearing that the assets of the estate are insufficient to meet the testator's debts, is not in force in this country, and the debt in the executor's hands is regarded as general assets of the estate for the benefit not only of creditors, but of legatees and all others interested. Castor v. Pierson, 27 Iowa.

2. Judgment against executor.-In an action by a receiver appointed to sue for and collect the choses in action belonging to an estate, against the exccutor upon a promissory note exe cuted by him to the testator, judgment should be rendered against him in his individual capacity, and not as executor. lb.

HUSBAND. AND WIFE.

Parties to action.-In an action for trespass committed by the cattle of a married woman, the husband need not be joined. Rowe v. Smith, 38 How.

INJUNCTION.

In actions to recover real property.-Where an action presents grounds for the equitable interference of the court, a preliminary injunction will be granted and a receiver appointed, if the condition of the subject of the controversy requires the aid of these provisional remedies. Thus, in an action to recover the possession of real property, on the ground that the proceedings to foreclose a lien under which the plaintiff was divested of title were fraudulent, and the court in which the proceedings were had without jurisdiction, and where it appeared that the de fendants were irresponsible, that they were collecting rents, which they were unable to refund, and that the premises were supposed to go to ruin, an injunction and receiver were granted Rogers v. Marshall, 38 How.

JUDGMENT.

Correction of: Practice.-Judgment in an action on a note was ordered, and the clerk directed to assess the amount due thereon, which, by mistake, he made a much smaller amount than was actually due, and judgment was entered accordingly. The mis. take was not discovered until after the period allowed by the statute to correct such errors on motion had expired, and until after the case had been appealed to the Supreme Court, where it was affirmed on motion of the plaintiff, the defendant having failed to perfect his appeal, and judgment rendered for the same amount as the judgment in the District Court. Held, notwithstanding the affirmance of the judgment in the Supreme Court, that the plaintiff, being without fault or negligence and without any remedy at law, was entitled by an equitable proceeding in the District Court to have the error in the amount of the judg ment corrected, the correction being in respect to a matter not passed upon by the Supreme Court. Partridge & Co. v. Harrow et al., 27 Iowa.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

Probable cause.- In an action for malicious prosecution the jury may infer malice from want of probable cause, but they are not bound to make this inference. And if malice is deduced from want of probable cause it is as much malice in fact, within the meaning of the law, as though shown or deduced from any other fact or facts. Smith v. Howard, 27 Iowa.

MANDAMUS.

When allowed.-When the statute prescribes no remedy for the refusal to perform a duty made imperative thereby, or in case of doubt, whether there be another effectual remedy, the writ will be allowed. People v. Ottawa, 48 Ill.

NEW TRIAL.

1. Jury. There is no error in the action of the court in refus ing a new trial on the ground that one of the jurors set in a pre. vious trial of the case, when it is not shown that the attorneys

of the applicant, as well as the applicant himself were ignorant of the fact until after the return of the verdict and the discharge of the jury; especially where it does not appear that any inquiries were made of the juror before he was empaneled and sworn. Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa.

2. Newly discovered evidence. Evidence discovered after the close of the evidence but before the completion of the trial and the submission of the case to the jury, is not newly discovered evidence, for which a new trial will be granted, where it appears that such evidence was at the time of discovery within reach of the party. In such a case the party should move before the termination of the trial for permission to introduce such evidence. Dodge v. N. Y. & Washington Steamship Co., 6 Abb., N. S.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. Joint owners.-Where two farmers buy in common a threshing machine, which they use and operate together, and for which they execute to the vendor a note signed by both individually, they are to be treated as joint owners and not as partners. Iliff v. Brazill, 27 Iowa.

2. Liability of partners for fraud.-In case of a debt fraudu lently contracted by a partnership firm by one member alone, the others being ignorant of the fraud, while all the members will be bound in an action brought on the contract or to recover the property so fraudulently obtained, yet the liability to an action for the fraud, which is essentially different and involves moral turpitude, is limited to the partner committing the same, unless the others assented to the fraud or ratified it by adopting "the act of the fraudulent partner, or retaining its fruits with knowledge of the fraud. 36 Cal.

3. Rights of Partners: When Lien from State Court Supersedes Proceedings in Bankruptcy.—After one of two partners had procured the appointment of a receiver of the partnership property the other partner attempted to defeat the proceedings by inducing an alleged creditor to apply under the bankruptcy law to have the firm declared bankrupt, and the U. S. Marshal had endeavored to take possession of the property, the court held, on an application to preserve the property, as follows: "Where a lien has been acquired by proceedings in a State Court, that lien is not divested nor the jurisdiction of the State Court superseded and ousted by subsequent proceedings in the Court of Bankruptcy. (Lowry v. Morrison, 11 Paige, 327; Matter of Allen, Law Rep. 362; Storm v. Waddell, 2 Sand. ch. 494; Stewart v. Isidore, 5 Abb., N. S. 70, and numerous authorities cited in 2 Sandford and 5 Abb.) In terms, the present bankrupt law preserves all existing liens on the debtor's property. The appointment of a receiver in an action in this Court operates as a lien on all the partnership property for the benefit of the plaintiff's partner and of the social creditors; and that lien cannot be disturbed or destroyed by the subsequent fiat of a Bankruptcy Court in afterinstituted proceedings. N. Y. Super. Ct. Sp. T. Clark v. Bininger, N. R.

4. Bankruptcy.-One partner cannot throw the firm into bankruptcy where it appears that the assets are greater than the liabilities. Ib.

SLANDER.

1. Words spoken while a witness.-A person is not liable for slander on account of words spoken by him as a witness, if in response to questions asked him, he spoke the words alleged without malice. The rule in such case is, that what was said pertinent to the matter in controversy, being privileged, the legal idea of malice is excluded; but if not pertinent and not uttered bona fide, but for the purpose of defaming plaintiff, protection cannot be claimed and the witness would be liable. Smith v. Howard, 27 Iowa.

2. Eridence.-Where the only witness for the plaintiff in an action for slander to prove the slanderous words was a German unacquainted with the English language, the court refused to disturb a judgment for the plaintiff, upon the ground that it was not shown but that the words were spoken in English, which the witness did not understand, when it did not appear that the words were spoken in his presence alone, and he distinctly testified that he understood them himself. Hurtert v. Weines, 27 Iowa.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

1. Printed restrictions: statute.—It seems that it is competent for a telegraph company, notwithstanding section 1353 of the Revision which provides that a telegraph company is liable for

all mistakes in transmitting messages made by any person in its employment, as well as for all damages resulting from a failure to perform any other duty required by law, to adopt reasonable rules, conditions, and regulations governing the transmission of messages, restricting its liability in cases where the message is not repeated. Sweatland v. Telegraph Company, 27 Iowa.

2. Extent of liability: negligence.-While a telegraph company may in the absence of any statutory regulation to the contrary, restrict by printed stipulations and conditions attached to the message, its liability in cases where the message is not repeated, it will notwithstanding such special printed conditions be liable for mistakes happening in consequence of its own fault, such as want of proper skill or ordinary care on the part of its operators or the use of defective instruments; but not for mistakes occasioned by uncontrollable causes, such as atmospheric electricity, provided these mistakes could not have been guarded against or prevented by the exercise of ordinary care and skill on the part of the operating agents of the company. lb.

3. Can not exonerate from all liability.-Telegraph companies it would seem by general printed conditions can not relieve themselves from liability for the improper or negligent conduct of their servants. lb.

4. These companies, like railroad companies, owe important duties to the public. They must act in good faith towards it, and can not by general printed conditions demand unreasonable concessions from those proposing to send messages. Ib.

5. Ordinary care: gross negligence: onus probandi.-While they are liable for want of ordinary care and skill as weil as for gross negligence notwithstanding the condition restricting their liability in cases where the message is not repeated, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show this want of ordinary care or fault on the part of the company; and where this condition as to repeating messages exists and is known to the party sending the message, or where he is bound to take notice of it, and a mistake occurs in an unrepeated message, the mere proof of such mistake without some other evidence of carlessness or negligence on the part of the company would not render them liable. Ib.

6. Rule applied.-It was held in the present case, that the plaintiff, in order to recover, must prove something more than the mistake in the message, and the damage resulting therefrom. He must show that this mistake was caused by the fault of the company, and that it might have been avoided if the company's instruments had been good ones and if its agents had possessed the requisite skill and exercised proper care and diligence in respect to the transmission and receipt of the message in question. lb.

Connecting lines.-Under a statute requiring connecting telegraph companies to receive and forward messages on cach other's lines, a company which receives a message to be forwarded in part over such a connecting line is to be regarded as authorized to make contract respecting its transmission for such other line, and the receipt by it of an entire price is a sufficient consideration for the obligation of such connecting company. Baldwin v. U. S. Telegraph Co., 6 Abb. N. S.

The contract made with the sender by the company receiving such message and within their apparent authority, is binding on the connecting company, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary between the two companies, unknown to the sender. 16.

66

For WAIT'S DIGEST, separately, $7.50 a Volume,

LAW BOOKSELLERS AND PUBLISHERS,

No. 68 STATE ST., ALBANY, N. Y.

TH

OTICES

No

ES BY THE PRESS.- From the many notices which the LAW JOURNAL has received from the press of the country, we take the following:

"It seems likely to supply a want of which the lawyers of the State have long been sensible."-Brooklyn Daily Eagle.

"This weekly journal will contain, in each number, twentyfour royal octavo double column pages, with legal information, and discussions of kindred topics, which will interest the lawyer and the intelligent reader. The literary tone of the journal will Indeed secure favor for it beyond the pale of the Bar."-Philadel phia Age.

"It begins well.”—Springfield Republican.

"If the comprehensive purposes of the Journal are carried out-and the first number gives proof of ample resources and ability-it cannot fail to secure a wide circulation. Its editor, Isaac Grant Thompson, is a gentleman of established literary as well as legal ability, while its publishers, Weed, Parsons & Co., possess every facility needful to insure regularity in its issue and beauty in its typography."-Albany Evening Journal.

"The general purpose of the Journal is admirably carried out in this initial number, and we have no doubt the publication will be warmly sustained by the profession at large."-Troy Daily Times,

"The contents of this number are varied and interesting, having the brand of literary lore no less than of legal research. Irving Browne, of this city, contributes an article on Law and Lawyers in Literature, which will do to read on a rainy day. The contents generally will be found of great interest to members of the legal profession."-Troy Northern Budget.

"Its managing editor is Isaac Grant Thompson, and, judging from this specimen, he is not only competent to making it a reliable compendium of legal intelligence and important decisions, but is determined to have it something more, and, consequently, in addition to the lore and items of the bar, it contains a quantity of other matter, not wholly disconnected with that learned profession, but of sufficient general interest to be attractive to any one. We have seldom seen the initial number of any periodical so thoroughly equal to all that it claims."-Rochester Chronicle.

"The general purpose of the Journal is admirably carried out in this initial number, and we have no doubt the publication will be warmly sustained by the profession at large."-Ballston Journal.

THE EVENING JOURNAL ALMANAC---1870.

S. C. HUTCHINS, Compiler.
CONTENTS:

ASTRONOMICAL PHENOMENA, ECLIPSES, etc.

CALENDAR for 1870-Terms of the Supreme Court of New York; Christian and Jewish Calendar days and interesting statistical items.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT-President, Vice-President and Cabinet Officers, with their duties.

UNITED STATES JUDICIARY -- Supreme Court, Judges, their residences and salaries; Circuits of; Terms of the Second Circuit and Districts Courts of New York, and Officers of the same, with their residences and salaries.

XLIST CONGRESS-Names, residences, districts, politics, etc., of Senators and Representatives; popular vote of Members and their opponents.

STATE GOVERNMENTS-Governors, their terms, politics and salaries; Legislatures, political complexion, place and time of meeting.

ELECTION RETURNS BY STATES-1868-1869, inclusive. ELECTION RETURNS BY TOWNS-Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Delaware, Rhode Island. CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION RETURNS BY COUNTIES - compared with 1866.

GOVERNMENT OF NEW YORK-Executive and Department Officers, their politics, residences, etc.

JUDICIARY OF NEW YORK-Judges of Court of Appeals and Supreme Court, with terms, residences, politics and districts. LEGISLATURE OF NEW YORK-Senate and Assembly districts, their population; names, residences, politics and biographies of Members, and popular vote of candidates compared with preceding elections.

SHERIFFS, COUNTY CLERKS AND COUNTY TOWNS of the State of New York

COUNTY JUDGES AND SURROGATES of the State of New York, with their residences.

DISTRICT ATTORNEYS AND TREASURERS of the State of New York with their residences.

All communications intended for publication in the LAW JOURNAL should be addressed "Editor Law Journal, Albany, N. Y.:" and the name of the writer should be given, though not necessarily for publication. Communications on business subjects should be addressed "WEED, PARSONS & Co., Albany, N. Y."

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JANUARY 15, 1870.

LAW AND LAWYERS IN LITERATURE.

II.

MASSINGER.

Massinger's drama, "The Old Law," derives its title from the edict "that every man living to fourscore years, and woman to three score, shall then be cut off as fruitless to the republic, and law shall finish what nature lingers at." The justice of this enactment is gravely discussed by the lawyers in the piece, described as first and second. Cleanthes insists that the law is unjust, because it kills innocents. Number one replies that he understands conscience, but not law; and when asked if there is any "main difference," answers that the inquirer "will never be good lawyer if he understands not that." Besides, he argues that it does not take the lives of the innocent, because people cannot live to such an age and be innocent. Cleanthes evidently was a woman's rights advocate, for he comments on the unjust discrimination between the sexes, and infers that "there was no woman in this senate, certain." Cleanthes then fees number one for advice as to some plan to evade the law, and the counsellor is delivered of this sage opinion:

"We say, man is not at age,

Till he be one and twenty; before it's infancy,
And adolescency; now, by that addition,
Fourscore he cannot be till a hundred and one."

The client, not regarding the jest as a good one, demands the fee, but is told "there is no law for the restitution of fees."

Through the enforcement of this law arise many touching scenes of filial affection and many horrible instances of filial ingratitude and marital infidelity. But it turns out that the law was only a trick to test the morals of the young people of the realm; nobody was put to death, and the supposed victims are produced at the close to confront their putative unkind survivors. The bad sons are deprived of their inheritance, and the incontinent women are forbidden to marry for ten years. The faithful are suitably rewarded. There seems no defect of strict poetic justice save some punishment on the counsellors for their bad law. Perhaps the poet considered the sarcasm of making them defend such an unjust enactment a sufficient retribution. The piece winds up with: "The good needs fear no law,

It is his safety, and the bad man's awe."

JONSON.

In Jonson's best drama, "The Fox," Voltore, an advocate, is made a most unenviable character. Volpone, the Fox, is a sensual old miser, who has accu

mulated a large fortune by presents from persons whom he promises to make his heirs, and among whom is the advocate. Voltore also serves the Fox in a disgraceful legal proceeding, instituted by Volpone against a woman who refuses to gratify his lust. The advocate's character is aptly described by one who says of him, "his soul moves in his fee;" "this fellow, for six sols more, would plead against his Maker." The advocate's argument in court is described by the Fox's factotum, Mosca, to his master:

"Had you heard him first

Draw it to certain heads, then aggravate,
Then use his vehement figures. I look'd still
When he would shift a shirt: and doing this
Out of pure love-no hope of gain."

The Fox feigns death, and wills all his property to Mosca, who says when the plan is suggested, "Your advocate will turn stark dull upon it;" and the Fox replies, "It will take off his oratory's edge." When the lawyer reads the pretended will there is a scene. Mosca, in a passage of exquisite irony, says:

"Marry, my joy is that you need it not;
You have a gift, sir, (thank your education,)
Will never let you want, while there are men,
And malice, to breed causes. Would I had
But half the like for all my fortune, sir!
If I have any suits, as I do hope,

Things being so easy and direct, I shall not,
I will make bold with your obstreperous aid,
Conceive me,- for your fee, sir. In meantime,
You that have so much law, I know have the conscience
Not to be covetous of what is mine."

Afterward the lawyer meeting Mosca in the street, rails at him, and the latter expostulates:

"Good advocate,

Pray thee not rail nor threaten out of place thus."

But the lawyer turns the tables on the Fox by exposing to the court the false accusation against Celia : "It is not passion in me, reverend fathers, But only conscience, conscience my good sires, That makes me now tell truth."

However, at the last pinch, the Fox, in disguise and unknown to the lawyer, whispers him that Mosca, "the parasite,

Will'd me to tell you that his master lives;
That you are still the man; your hope the same;
And this was only a jest."

Whereupon the lawyer falls down in court, and goes through various affected spasms to appear bewitched, and on recovering takes back all he had said against ford, "that he lets slip no opportunity of showing his Volpone. "It is to the praise of Jonson," says Gifcontempt for the popular opinions on this head"— of witchcraft. Some other complications ensue which it is not necessary in this connection to unravel, but in the end Volpone's possessions are confiscated, and he is sent to prison; Mosca is condemned to the galleys; and

"Thou Voltore, to take away the scandal

Thou hast given all worthy men of thy profession, Art banished from their fellowship, and our state." Jonson's treatment of the subject of witchcraft is shown in "The Devil is an Ass," in which Sir Paul Eitherside, a superstitious and unfeeling lawyer and justice, explains the dumb show of certain pretended demoniacs brought before him. Among other qualities that Sir Paul attributes to the devil, is that of being "the master of players and poets too." The justice is solemn, sententious and uninteresting, but as to his belief in witchcraft, no more credulous than Bacon and Matthew Hale.