an interloper. They also showed that no difficulty had ever been experienced in procuring juries or obtaining convictions or judgments in anti-rent cases in that county. The motion was granted without any attempt to impanel a jury, and the case was sent to Saratoga county. We regard this decision as an important and novel one, as well as very flattering to the vanity of editors. The only reported cases in which a change of venue was granted before an attempt to impanel a jury, are The People v. Webb (1 Hill, 179), in which it was shown that the defendant, indicted for a libel on James Fennimore Cooper, had subsequently written and published in his own newspaper a letter calculated to prejudice the public mind against the prosecutor, and circulated the same among the jurors, three-fourths of whom confessed to having received it; and The People v. Long Island R. R. Co. (4 Parker, 602), in which it was shown that inflammatory and threatening hand-bills against the defendants had been circulated, excited and disorderly public meetings held, repeated indictments for nuisance found against the defendants, and hostile petitions circulated among the grand jury. Really, in Judge Peckham's view, newspapers are become a dangerous power for friend as well as foe. It behooves a prisoner to procure an injunction restraining all the newspapers from speaking a word in his favor. It used to be thought desirable to have a good character, but the time has now come, it seems, when the Scripture is fulfilled, "Woe unto to you when all men shall speak well of you."

CURRENT TOPICS.

The Legislature of California have before them, and will, it is said, pass, a bill allowing the husband and wife to testify in an action for divorce on the ground of adultery. We have never been able to discover any sound reason for excluding their evidence in such cases-as was done in this State, by the act of 1867. Under that act it is possible for a man to commit adultery in the very presence of his wife, and yet to be able to successfully defend a suit for divorce. The exception is an anomaly, and the Legislature of the State would do a wise thing in striking it out.

The present Revised Statutes are divided into parts, chapters, titles, articles, sections and subsections. As a matter of arrangement there is no objection to this, but for purposes of reference it is complicated and annoying, and frequently leads to mistakes in legislative enactments. It will do no harm to keep up the divisions in any revision that may hereafter be made, but the sections should be numbered consecutively after the manner of the Code of Procedure. This will not interfere with the plan of arrangement, while it will facilitate and render certain reference to the statutes, and afford assistance to the memory in retaining and recalling the precise location of any portion desired.

The Senate of the State of Iowa have passed a bill allowing women to act as lawyers, and it is said that the bill will meet with no opposition in the lower

house. Following fast on this news comes a despatch informing us that a female justice of the peace of the same State has just tried her first cause. We are in-formed that this female jurist "presided with much dignity," and "is thought to have shown great delicacy of feeling in her decision, whether technically correct or not." We have not the slightest objection to the fair ones practicing law and acting as justices to their heart's content, but to let "delicacy of feeling" take the place of the established rules of law, is an innovation for which our nerves are not prepared.

The New York Times gets into a sort of "frenzy in full mourning" whenever it speaks of the legal profession. Its most recent effusion was a disreputable and malicious personal attack upon the Hon. Charles O'Conor, because that gentleman had not denied the statement put forward that he had taken up Mr. Fullerton's case gratuitously. Here is a "specimen. brick" from the article: "When a lawyer talks of giving his professional services without compensation, we may be very sure that he is in pursuit of a fat quarry, and never means to leave it until he has tasted the last drop of its blood." The fact that the editor of the Times is an Englishman, and, we believe, an unsuccessful lawyer, is sufficient to account for the animus of all his flings at both the judiciary and the bar. When he confined himself to "glittering generalities," his words were about as important as thoseof a scolding housewife, but now that he has descended to attempts to blacken the characters of some of the most honorable members of the profession, it is a matter of some consequence, and deserves the outspoken denunciation of every lawyer. What thinks the Bar Association of the City of New York?

If the statutes of the State shall be again revised we trust that the duty may be intrusted to a body of men numerous enough to perform the work in a satisfactory manner. It will be impossible for a commission of three or even of five men to give that attention to details that is required for the successful codification of the statute law. We believe provision should be made for the appointment of a commission of not less than sixteen competent lawyers, two to be taken from each judicial district. Thus might be assembled a body of experienced persons familiar with the existing statutes, their practical working throughout the State, their defects and the proper remedies therefor. Besides, each portion of the State would be represented and its local wants made known, and a sufficient number would be secured to do their work thoroughly and well. If, however, in accordance with recent custom, the labors of revision are intrusted to a few, we fear that the result will be a crude and imperfect compilation, acceptable neither to the legal profession nor to the people. The extra expense of the more numerous commission will not be great, and, in view of the advantages probably resulting therefrom, not to be thought of. It is with the present legislature to decide whether the coming revision shall be a mere makeshift, or a collocation of law that will be an honor to our own and a model to every other State.

In a recent number of the LAW JOURNAL we suggested that in all cases of indictment for seduction under promise of marriage, the only competent evidence of the promise should be a written contract, executed with the same formula as other contracts. A case has just occurred in Lake county, Illinois, that leads us to believe that even in civil actions for breach of promise to marry, parol evidence of the promise should not be received. In that case the parties were the only witnesses as to the promise, the plaintiff swearing positively that a promise had been made, and the defendant swearing equally positively that he had never made any promise whatever. The defendant was proved to be a man of character, reputation, wealth and social position, while it was proved that the woman had deserted her husband and four children; that she had been a strolling fortune teller, clairvoyant, mesmerist and medium, and with as many aliases as a New York thief; that she had been wice convicted of misdemeanors and sent to jail; that she had been the inmate of a house of ill-fame, and had been guilty of the most shocking indecency and lewdness, and that she had followed the army as a common prostitute. Yet in the face of all this undisputed evidence, and a strong charge in favor of the .defendant, the jury, after being out five days, failed to agree. That a jury should fail to agree with such evidence before them, is either a strong argument in favor of doing away with trial by jury, or of requiring stronger evidence to sustain a like case.

Women with voting propensities probably look upon the Territory of Wyoming as their "Paradise Regained," and were we at all maliciously inclined we should wish for a general hegira of all that ilk thitherward, and that it might prove to them the "country from whose bourne no traveler returns." At least one man must look upon it as "Paradise Lost." It is heralded that a jury was recently impaneled, in that romantic region, composed of eleven women and one man. The condition of this "lone, Horn" man, shut up in a jury-room with eleven women just elevated to so lofty an altitude, cannot be described, but may be imagined. Compelled to listen to their desultory and stormy discussion of points of law and points of dress, of facts and of fashions, unable to drink or smoke or decide the case by a game of "seven up," how he must have writhed, how his soul must have been harrowed up! Let us pity the sorrows of this poor juryman. The telegram does not inform us whether or not this jury "agreed;" but we infer that it did not, since it would be paradoxical for eleven women to agree on any one thing under the sun. If the law-makers of Wyoming have any regard for their fellow men, they will provide that there shall be no recurrence of this melancholy spectacle. We do not object to female jurors, but eleven to one is too much for human nature to endure. It is simply "cruelty to animals." Let them provide that in all future juries there shall be at least two men, for aid and comfort!— or, better still, that there shall be "six and six." Thus the good men of Wyoming shall be relieved from the terror that now hangs heavily over them.

The nomination of Judge Strong to the Supreme Bench of the United States has been confirmed by Congress, but that of Judge Bradley still "hangs fire." While we entertain little doubt that both of these men are competent to honorably fill the position, it is a disagreeable fact to reflect upon that their political proclivities, and their preconceived notions on the legal tender question, have been about the only basis for their confirmation considered by the Senate. Their abilities as lawyers and jurists seem to have been entirely overlooked in the race after partisan judges. Very few outside of the Senate will question the propriety of the proposition that judicial ability should be about the only test as to a nominee's fitness for a seat on the Bench of the highest tribunal in the country; and yet this test is about the only one that is ignored. The evil of this is not confined to the endangering of popular privileges; the dignity of the bench is lowered in the eyes of the public, and popular confidence in the law is weakened. The conduct of several railroad and other corporations relative to the recent legal tender decision, is a striking illustration of this fact. They decline to pay their bonds, bearing date prior to 1862, in gold, though the highest court in the country has decided that they were so payable. It is generally, and no doubt correctly, understood that the Senate has made opposition to that decision a condition of affirmance of nominees to that court, and these corporations very naturally say the decision will be overruled. It is a matter of history that so long as the courts of a country maintain their integrity and independence, the rights of the people are safe, but when judges become political partisans and mere sycophants of the dominant power, anarchy is imminent and popular rights in peril.

The Constitution of the recently formed Bar Association of the city of New York, and the address of the Executive Committee, published elsewhere, are worthy of the attention of the profession of the State. The object of this organization is declared to be, "to maintain the honor and dignity of the profession of the law, to cultivate social intercourse among its members, and to increase its usefulness in promoting the due administration of justice." It is an undoubted fact that during the last quarter of a century the profession has deteriorated sadly from the high and honorable position which it before occupied. This deterioration had its origin mainly in the Constitutional changes of 1846, which, by removing nearly all barriers to admission to the bar, have made it possible for a class of men to take on the name and character of members of the learned and honorable calling, without having themselves either learning or honor, and with no care to preserve the dignity, integrity or traditions of the profession, nor any ambition above the almighty dollar. Though as yet this class is small in comparison with the better portion of the profession, yet it is constantly on the increase, and its tendency is to drag the reputation of the whole profession down to its miserable level. The only hope of rescue from this degradation is in the profession itself, and the only method is by organization, -"to come together as a body; to look the question fairly in the

face, and if we find that we have been tainted by the influence of the times, to undertake ourselves the work of purification; to revive a past renown and give new life to traditions which we believe to be only dormant but not extinct." Such the Committee declare to be their purpose, and such should be the purpose of the profession at large. If any general or permanent good is to be wrought it must be through the combined effort of the bar of the State, and to this end the profession in every city and county should associate. Thence will naturally and speedily arise "an Association of the Bar of the State of New York, worthy of the past history of the bar, powerful by its intelligence and learning, and influential by its integrity and patriotism." When such an association shall have been formed, the day of the regeneration of the bar will be at hand.

GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.

FIRST DISTRICT. — FEBRUARY TERM. Irregularities in the jury-room. - In this case, after the jury had retired, they sent in to the judge for an annuity table, and the judge sent them the Code opened at the little annuity table contained in it. The jury gave a verdict of $5,000 for plaintiff; and defendants, on their appeal, raised the point, among others, that this sending in of an annuity table was irregular and vitiated the verdict, being done without the defendants' consent. Judge BRADY, reviewing at great length the decisions as to communicating to the jury matters after they had retired, from them draws the conclusion that where the document communicated could plainly have had no effect on their decision, and verdict is sustained by the evidence properly before them, the court will not interfere on account of such trifling irregularity. Shaffner v. Second Ave. R. R. Co. Hearsay evidence. According to the decision of the court below, the plaintiff's wife was raped by the defendant, and she died from the injuries received therefrom. The main testimony in the case was the statement made by her to her husband partly immediately after and partly one or two days later, but there was some confirmatory testimony. Judge INGRAHAM, giving the opinion of the court, grants a new trial, on the ground that the statements of the wife not made immediately after the occurrence, were improperly admitted. Judge BRADY, however, dissented, holding that such statements came within the exception of the law made in cases where the sufferer is the only possible witness and has died. Spatz v. Lyon. Notice of protest through the post-office: civil war. - The defendant in this suit was the indorser of a note, and resided in Greenville, South Carolina. The plaintiff sought to give him notice of protest after the civil war had broken out, and after the President's proclamation that the Southern States were in a state of insurrection, and that all communication between the citizens of the two sections was unlawful, by depositing the notice in the post-office directed to the defendant at his place of residence. The court below held this notice good, but the General Term held that at that time a complete interruption of communication had taken place by the acts of our own Government, of which the plaintiff was bound to take notice; that the Government was not bound to preserve the letters and forward them at the earliest opportunity, but the defendant himself was bound, at the earliest opportunity, to renew his notice, and in default of proof of his having done so the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. Harden v. Boyce. Opinion by BRADY, J.

Mr. Aspinwall, and on it he sued his co-stockholders for contribution, and obtained judgments against them. The defendants in those suits appealed, claiming, that under the act of incorporation the stockholders were only "severally" liable, and therefore, could not sue each other for contribution. Held, that though the cases in which contribution has been ordered have been usually cases of joint liability, yet the reason rests on the equitable principle, that common advantage is to be met by common loss. Aspinwall v. Ramsay et al. Opinion by INGRAHAM, J.

Partnership property. - Matthews, an employee of Rawdon, Wright, Hatch & Edson, bank-note engravers, discovered the green ink which has since become so well known in the greenbacks. Edson procured from him an assignment of his patent. At that time there was but little call for the green tint. Edson offered it to his firm, and they, after three months' consideration, declined to purchase it of him, preferring to stand in regard to it on the same basis as other companies-that of paying so much per thousand impressions. Subsequently the firm, with the other chief note engraving firms, united in the American Bank Note Company, each throwing in all its machinery, and which was named in a schedule which each partnership submitted. The final agreement bound each partner to surrender all the means, machinery, etc., which was owned by each establishment to the new com. pany. The new company continued to pay a royalty to Edson till about 1860, when an effort was made to buy him out. The payment of the royalty was then continued to 1863. After that the company refused to pay more, and commenced an action to get back the money they had already paid, and Mr. Edson commenced a suit for his royalty.

On the trial before the referee of the two suits, he held that Mr. Edson's relations to his partners made his purchase of any of the means by which their business could be carried on, a purchase for their benefit, and the purchase therefor inured to the benefit of the company. He therefore gave judgment in both cases against Mr. Edson, and Mr. Edson appealed. Held, that the purchase by a member of the firm of matters pertaining to the business of the firm is not absolutely void in favor of the purchaser, but to be considered as only exposing the member of the firm who makes them to a liability to the firm to render them an account of the profits. That in this case it appeared distinctly that the firm had waived their rights, and the right remained in Edson with their consent. It was never, therefore, transferred by the partners to the company. With regard to the transfer by Edson to the new company, held that it merely conveyed his interest in the property belonging to the company. American Bank Note Company v. Edson. Opinion by INGRAHAM, J.

EIGHTH DISTRICT FEBRUARY TERM. The relator was incorporated for the purpose of constructing and operating a horse railroad between certain points in the villages of Dunkirk and Fredonia. It acquired the right from the adjacent owners to lay its track and maintain and operate its road upon the public highways; and afterward laid and maintained its railroad track in such highways. The respondents assessed the relator for so much of the railroad as was laid and maintained upon the highways in the town of Dunkirk, as real estate. And a writ of certiorari was issued for the purpose of reviewing that decision. It was held, in affirmance of the proceedings, that the interest acquired by the relator in the land, and the superstructure affixed to and upon it in constructing the railroad, were properly assessed as real estate. The People ex. rel. The Dunkirk and Fredonia Street Railroad Co. v. John Cassity and others, Assessors of the town of Dunkirk. Opinion by DANIELS, J. The plaintiff brought this action in a justice's court for the recovery of the possession of personal property alleged to be wrongfully detained from nim by the defendant.

The property was of the alleged value of about twelve dollars; and damages were claimed by the complaint for its detention exceeding the sum of fifty dollars. This claim, it was held, entitled the defendant to a new trial on appeal in the County Court, although the value of the property as assessed, and the damages recovered before the justice, did not together amount to the sum of fifty dollars. William R. Merrill, Respondent, v. Samuel Patterson, Appellant. Opinion by DANIELS, J

The plaintiff joined in the same complaint against the defendant, as executor, two causes of action for professional services as an attorney and counselor at law. The first accrued against the testator in his life-time. The second against the testator after his appointment as executor, and while he was acting in that capacity. The defendant, by his answer, took issue upon the entire complaint. That was held to be a waiver of the objection, that the two causes of action could not be properly united in the same complaint; and to render it the duty of the referee to whom the action was referred for trial, to try and dispose of the issues upon both causes of action; but that the judgment should have been against the defendant as executor on the first cause of action, and against him personally on the one accruing upon his own retainer for services performed for him after his appointment. John G. Record, Respondent, v. Anson W. Keith, Executor, etc., Appellant. Opinion by DANIELS, J.

DIGEST OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.*

ASSIGNMENT.

A due bill as follows: "Due Mr. Harvey Groot two hundred and ninety-five dollars in part payment for a piano forte, said piano to be selected by Mr. Groot," dated and signed, is assignable, and the assignee or his agent would have the same right to select a piano that the assignor had. Groot v. Story.

BAILMENT.

1. A rode with B from Barton to Newport, knowing that B had hired the team to go only to Barton, but exercised no control over it. Held, that A was not liable as a trespasser to the bailor of the team. Hubbard v. Hunt.

2. If a pledgee or pawnee of a chattel, or one having it in his right only, sell it as if he were the absolute owner before he has a right to, the general owner may maintain trover, and in that action recover according to the value of his interest in the property. Kidney v. Persons.

BASTARDY.

Evidence on the part of the defense, in a prosecution for bastardy, tending to show sexual intercourse by the plaintiff with others than the defendant, and acts of indecent familiarity with them tending to show such intercourse, outside of the time within which, according to the course of nature, the child in question could have been begotten, is inadmissible. Nor is this evidence rendered admissible by inquiries as to such acts, being first made of the plaintiff on the stand, and her denial of them. Nor does her answering without objection give the defendant the right to introduce evidence to contradict her answers, even for the purpose of impeaching or discrediting her testimony. Sterling v. Sterling.

CONTEMPT.

1. A writ of injunction issued to restrain the defendants from removing certain machinery which was in their possession. Held, that they would be guilty of a contempt if they stood by and quietly suffered it to be removed, even though they did not themselves actively participate in the removal. Stimpson et al v. Putnam et al.

2. The fact, if true, that an injunction was improperly granted, is a reason for its dissolution; but, until dis-solved, it must be obeyed, no matter how unreasonable in its terms or unjust in its operation. Ib.

* From 41 Vermont Reports.

CONTRACT.

1. A court of law will not set aside a contract for inadequacy of consideration alone. The inadequacy may be such as to furnish evidence of fraud. Kidder v. Chamberlin. 2. Where a laborer leaves his employer before his term of service has expired and without his employer's consent, and the employer, although insisting that he does not admit his liability, offers to pay him for his labor at the rate he would have received if he had labored until the end of the time agreed upon, or makes a tender of the amount due at that rate, he (the employer), both by his offer of payment and by his tender, waives the forfeiture of the wages for the services performed. But the laborer is not entitled to recover more than the contract price, in any view of the case, unless he had good cause for leaving. Patnote v. Sanders.

EJECTMENT.

1. To maintain an ejectment, it must appear that there has been a disseizin of the plaintiff, as well as a wrongful possession by the defendant. Chamberlin v. Donahue.

2. If the defendant is in possession with the plaintiff's permission and acquiescence, without claim of ownership or refusal to yield the possession, a demand of possession, or a request to quit in a reasonable time, is necessary in order to render the defendant's occupancy wrongful, and as constituting an ouster of the plaintiff. Ib.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

The orator having commenced a suit in equity against the defendant before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in which he sought relief and decree upon the same claim, and upon the same grounds that he is seeking rellef by his present bill, the defendant having appeared in said suit in Massachusetts and made defense therein, and said cause having been heard, and a decree passed dismissing the bill by that court, which is conceded to have had jurisdiction, it was held, that the matter in dispute had passed in rem judicatam, and the decree is conclusive. Low v. Mussey.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Where a verbal contract is to be performed within a year by one party, but not by the other, the question whether the statute of frauds applies or not depends on whether the suit is brought against the party who was to perform his part within the year. If it is so brought, the statute would not apply; but if brought against the party whose agreement was not to be performed within the year, then the statute would be a bar. Sheehy v. Adarene.

HIGHWAYS AND BRIDGES.

1. Towns are not liable for injuries to travelers by coasting on sleds in highways. This is not an insufficiency of a highway, within the meaning of statute which renders towns liable for injuries by reason of insufficiencies, though the selectmen neglected to forbid coasting. Hutchinson v. Concord.

2. The town and public having for more than forty years treated as a highway a space without the limits of the highway as originally surveyed and laid out, the same as if it had been within such limits, the town is bound to keep the same in repair, and is liable for injuries by reason of its insufficiency, the same as if it was embraced within the original survey. Bagley v. Ludlow.

3. Towns owe a statutory duty to travelers, for the breach of which the party injured may maintain an action to remove from the margins of their highways objects unlawfully deposited there, which, by their frightful appearance, make it unsafe to travel the road with ordinary horses. Morse and Wife v. Richmond.

4. The duty of the town to remove the obstruction from the highway does not attach until they know of it, or ought to know of it, nor while it is upon the highway a reasonable time for the purpose of transportation over it. Ib.

5. Though a town is not bound to work the whole width of the road where the travel does not require it, yet they

have a right to control the whole width, and have a corresponding duty. If they suffer objects to remain deposited on the margin which, by their frightful appearance, make the whole road unsafe, they will be liable for such accidents by fright as are the natural result of their neglect. Ib.

6. Towns are liable for injuries from insufficiencies of highways caused by sudden freshets, if the highway surveyor of the district had time after notice of the defect to repair it before the accident with the means in his control, considering as well his means by virtue of his official statute authority as the means in his hands individually. Clark v. Corinth.

7. No lack of diligence could be charged upon the town until notice to the proper officers of the insufficiency, in a case where it is not claimed that the freshet was itself so extraordinary as to amount to a notice that the road would need repairs, or that the dangerous condition of the road had existed long enough to charge the town officers with fault in not having discovered its condition without notice. Ib.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. It is only where a decree of nullity by the Supreme Court is necessary to secure the proper descent or distribution of the estate, that a petition for that purpose, after the death of one of the parties to the marriage, would seem to be necessary or proper. Pingree, administrator, v. Goodrich.

2. A petition to annul a marriage cannot be sustained after the death of one of the parties to the marriage, where the cause alleged renders the marriage null and void from the beginning, without any such proceeding. Ib.

3. In no instance does the statute give any right to the administrator to bring a petition to annul a marriage. He is not the representative of the deceased for any such purpose. Only relatives of the deceased interested in contesting the validity of the marriage, are authorized by statute to petition that it may be annulled. Ib.

4. One-third of the personal estate of an intestate husband vests in his widow immediately upon his decease, and in case of the decease of the widow, before assignment by the probate court, the same passes to her legal representative. Estate of Johnson v. Estate of Johnson.

5. This was the common law rule prior to the statute (Gen. Sts. 384, § 1), and that statute, providing that the widow shall have such part of the personal estate of her intestate husband "as the probate court may assign to her according to her circumstances and the degree and estate of her husband, which shall not be less in any case than onethird, after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration," does not alter or prejudice the right she already had, or any of its incidents. Ib.

INNKEEPER.

1. The plaintiff, who was a minor, went with his father, with a horse and wagon, to the inn kept by the defendant, to attend the trial of a suit which the innkeeper had brought against the father. When they arrived, the horse and wagon were delivered to the servant of the defendant, to be put up and taken care of; and the plaintiff and his father entered the inn where the defendant was in charge, and laid aside their overcoats in the room where they entered, and in presence of the defendant. In due time the father called for dinner for himself and the plaintiff, which they had; and they remained in the inn till evening, when the bill was paid and they left. Held, that the relation of innkeeper and guest was thereby created between the plaintiff and the defendant. Read v. Amidon.

2. A guest is not relieved from all responsibility in respect to his goods on entering an inn. He is bound to use reasonable care and prudence in respect to their safety, so as not to expose them to unnecessary danger of loss. Ib.

3. A guest having laid his gloves down under his overcoat on a bench, in the presence of the innkeeper, it was a question of fact to be determined upon by the jury, in view of all the circumstances, whether he was so careless with respect to his gloves as to exonerate the innkeeper from liability for their loss. Ib.

INTOXICATING LIQUOR.

If a seller of intoxicating liquor in New York, to a party in Vermont, intentionally aid the purchaser in evading the prohibitory law of Vermont in respect to the traffic in intoxicating liquors, by forwarding the liquor to the purchaser in a concealed or disguised form, calculated to accomplish that object, the seller cannot recover for the liquor in this State, even though it was not agreed between the parties, prior to, or at the time or on the occasion of the sale, that the seller would thus aid the purchaser. Aiken v. Blaisdell.

JUROR.

1. The fact that a juror is not sworn is an irregularity which the parties may waive. The court certainly should not set aside a verdict for this cause unless the party asking it, as well as his counsel, was ignorant of the fact during the trial. Failing to show that they were thus ignorant, the court would be justified in the inference that they were not, and if not, the irregularity should be treated as waived. Scott et al. v. Moore et al.

2. An application to the court after announcing their decision, to receive affidavits showing the fact of such ignorance, is addressed to the discretion of the court. The refusal to receive them is a point not subject to exception. Ib.

MEMORANDUM.

1. A witness having referred to a pocket memorandum to refresh his memory during his examination in chief, the opposite party is entitled to take and examine the same for the purpose of cross-examination. And the witness cannot refuse its production and examination on the ground that it contained private memoranda of his acts as a detective, and that to do so would be a breach of confidence and a personal injury; certainly not, unless it appears to the court that he has reasonable ground of belief that he would thereby subject himself to personal injury. State v. Bacon.

2. A paper containing dates, figures and amounts, recently made, partly from recollection, and partly from original entries, bills and receipts, concerning matters that transpired long before, may be referred to by a witness, not for the purpose of refreshing his recollection as to the correctness of the entries, but to enable him to state with accuracy the details of things of which he had from recollection made a memorandum, but could not carry them in his mind so as to be able to repeat them without the aid of the paper. Pinney v. Andrus.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. A sale by one member of a partnership, consisting of two partners, of his half of the partnership property, except the accounts, and suddenly leaving the State, operates as a dissolution of the partnership. Ayer et al. v. Ayer.

2. Each partner has equal legal right to collect the debts due the partnership, but in making such collections he acts for the partnership, and not in his sole, exclusive right, and is accountable as partner, for whatever he collects. lb. 3. An attorney employed by one of the partners to make such collection, is the attorney of the firm, and accountable as well to one partner as the other, and equally subject to the direction and control of one as the other of the partners. Ib.

4. The plaintiffs A and B were partners; A suddenly disposed of all his property, and sold his interest in the firm, except the accounts, to G, and absconded from the State, leaving the partnership book of accounts, embracing the account in suit, in the hands of G, with directions