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LETTER XLVIII.

To the Same.

Arran, Aug. 1848.

My dear Friend,

You will see that I have hitherto said nothing as to the two specific instances which you incidentally gave as specimens of what I call your incipient "Rationalism," and which led to the last two letters. I thought it much more important to argue against the general principle, or rather the want of any, which seems to me to lie at the basis of your doubts; an "ignis fatuus," which, if you take not the better heed, may lead you a pretty dance before it disappears, - or, more probably, will cause you to disappear, before itself vanishes, in some enormous boghole of the great quagmire of Rationalism over which it flickers.

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Of what I have hitherto said, this is the sum ;- Judge impartially of evidence, and do not weigh it in "a false balance.” If you doubt whether the same external evidence does apply to two facts, one of which you reject, and the other you accept, that is another thing; fight as long as you will that is, as long as you rationally can about that. The authority, for example, of a particular chapter may be disputed; but if, as you allow, the external evidence for the literal truth of Jonah's or Balaam's history, is as strong as that for Daniel's or Pharaoh's, I see not, I confess, any thing but caprice (which may and does assume a thousand different shapes in different minds) in accepting the one as historic truth, and rejecting the other as fabulous nonsense!

And now a word or two as to your two instances. First, you say the "Temptation," even putting out of sight the preternatural about the transaction, (the objection to that must depend on the validity of the general principle already considered,) seems to you

incomprehensible; that the "command," which was to constitute the probation of our first parents, was "trivial," "non-moral," and "arbitrary." As to its being "trivial," be pleased to observe that, if so, it was all the more easy to be obeyed; and that, therefore, it illustrates rather the moderation than the rigour of the Imposer. Would Adam have been better pleased if it had been harder? Would not his posterity then have said that the test of obedience was too difficult, as they now say it was too "trivial ?"

As to its being "non-moral," you must reflect that anything, though in its own nature indifferent, becomes moral in its obligation, if imposed by the rightful authority. Though not a duty in itself, an indifferent action becomes so, if the will of a legitimate Master impose its performance; yes though it were only a command to brush the dust off our shoes, never to shave the beard, or always wear a wig. Above all, the will of the Creator is "supreme law" to every rational creature; and such a creature will make no more objection to fulfil His arbitrary commands, when the idea of His authority is thus superinduced upon them, than those commands, the essential moral character of which is seen to be diffused through them.

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As to its being "arbitrary," I doubt whether you have ever sufficiently reflected on the real nature of the problem. I think you forget that, in Adam's condition, an "arbitrary" command (as you call it) was a more appropriate test of obedience than what you would call a "moral" command. This subject, if I mistake not, is judiciously touched in some part of Butler's Analogy." At all events, what we now ordinarily call a "moral" command would have insufficiently tested the absolute obedience of one whose whole original condition is represented as such, that no moral command could have involved any great temptation to disobey. Imagine a being, all whose faculties are as yet in harmony and equilibrium ;- who does not know what "evil" is ;-in blissful ignorance of the conflict of the Passions and the Reason, the Appetites and the Conscience;-whose out

ward condition is that of perfect health and exemption from all

pray, which of the commands of the Decalogue would

want;
seem very formidable to him? *

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The other instance of the presumed "legendary" style you gave, as a specimen of the narratives you feel disposed to reject, is the history of Balaam. I put out of view, as in the previous instance, the miraculous in the affair, inasmuch as I have dealt with that on general grounds; and because, in the abstract, you acknowledge you have no objection to miracle. All your difficulty seems to be about the degree and kind of the miraculous you deem worthy of reception.

Now whether it be more probable that an ass should speak than fire cease to burn, (as in the case of the Three Children,) or hungry lions practise fasting, (as in the case of Daniel,)- both which last you admit to be historic, is really a question I cannot enter into; the reception of the fact as miraculous must, as in other cases, be determined by this :-Is the external evidence for this miraculous narrative as unexceptionable as for other similar events which we scruple not to admit? In the present case you must reason in the same way.

*The editor has omitted a passage in this Letter, which has given some offence to a few "weak in the faith," but to many more of no faith at all. A few remarks on the subject will be found in the preface to the present edition.

to the talk of Balaam himself;

I

As for the matter of what Balaam's ass says, am sure you will concede that to have been most excellent sense, and very superior so superior, indeed, that it is hard to say, on this occasion, which was the ass, the ass or the ass's master; or rather it is easy, - for it is very certain that Balaam was far the greater ass of the two.

And, indeed, this is one of your à priori grounds for believing this history of Balaam to be no history at all. You cannot, you say, imagine a man so illuminated - so preternaturally privileged with spiritual knowledge-acting so like a dolt.

Pardon me, my dear friend; but this is the weakest reasoning of all. Depend on it, the pictures of human nature in the Old Testament even the most Rembrandt-like are all true to the life, - exact types of what is every day quite as unaccountable in human character and conduct. Nay, if you will but go with sufficient metaphysical depth into the phenomena of a depraved will acting against the clear light of reason and conscience, you will find every act of deliberate sin equally- that is, perfectly— inexplicable! That man-that any man should, with his eyes perfectly open, do what he knows, what he feels, reason and conscience both condemn, and of which he himself will often even tell you he will bitterly repent, is an intractable paradox; and every man who so acts and who has not so acted? - only repeats the "mad prophet's" story.

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Do we not see, every day, instances enough in which the largest, clearest knowledge of duty, the divinest endowments of genius, the highest intellectual illumination, are not at all inconsistent with the commission of the coolest, the most enormous wickedness? Is not history, is not common life, full of illustrations of this mournful truth? Do we not see men, whose prevailing and habitual propensities carry the day against convictions which no revelation could make clearer ?. against experience which no miracles could make more conclusive?

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But as to this question, whether Balaam's character and conduct be psychologically possible or probable,—read Butler's wonderful sermon upon it. I think you will doubt no more that

176 FIVE LETTERS TO AN INCIPIENT NEOLOGIST. LET. XLIX.

66

the portrait is true to human nature and human nature's power of juggling with itself; and that your philosophy, not that of the Bible, is superficial. Neither knowledge nor endowments of any kind or degree are any absolute security against any amount of moral absurdity or obliquity. "But miracles!" you say,-"immediate consciousness of preternatural communications!"—No, nor even these. The question of "natural" or preternatural has nothing to do with the matter. The thing that constitutes the mystery is the breach of a law which, at the very moment we break it, we confess to be absolutely authoritative; and whether that conviction comes to us "naturally" or "preternaturally" makes no difference. Now of this practical paradox all men, as well as Balaam, show themselves capable enough in every act of deliberate violation of conscience! As to miracles, I will show you in a moment that belief in them as little involves any incredibility in Balaam's conduct.

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You will acknowledge, I suppose, that it is the belief that miracles are really wrought, whether really wrought or not,that can alone be supposed to have any moral bearing, or give the conception of them any moral force. Well, among the ancient Jews, among the ancient heathens, — through the middle ages, was not that belief universal and sincere? Did that belief that "miracles" were often wrought, that direct communications were still maintained between the natural and supernatural, that the door of the unseen world was, as it were, left ajar, -act in any appreciable degree as a deterrent from crime on man? Was there any lack of crimes in consequence? Were there not as deliberate and flagrant sins committed then as in our more sceptical age? Were they not wrought in spite of man's being haunted by this very conviction that he lived amidst “miracles, which might at any moment disclose or avenge his guilt, and though he was often miserable in proportion to that belief? Miracles, no doubt, have an important function, a valid intellectual bearing; they are of use, as evidence in given cases, to confirm the message of God to man; but the most sincere-the most vivid belief in them has, of itself, no power to operate a moral

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