who, without stirring from their libraries, attempt to discourse concerning the works of nature, may indeed tell us what sort of world they would have made, if God had committed that task to their ingenuity; but, without a wisdom truly divine, it is impossible for them to form an idea of the universe, at all approaching to that in the mind of its Creator. And, although your method promises every thing that can be expected from human genius, it does not, therefore, lay any claim to the art of divination; but only boasts of deducing from the assumed data, all the truths which follow from them as legitimate consequences; which data can, in physics, be nothing else but principles previously established by experiment." * In Gassendi's controversies with Descartes, the name of Bacon seems to be studiously introduced on various occasions, in a manner still better calculated to excite the curiosity of his antagonist; and in his historical review of logical systems, the heroical attempt which gave birth to the Novum Organon is made the subject of a separate chapter, immediately preceding that which relates to the Metaphysical Meditations of Descartes.

The partiality of Gassendi for the Epicurean physics, if not originally imbibed from Bacon, must have been powerfully encouraged by the favorable terms in which he always mentions the Atomic or Corpuscular theory. In its conformity to that luminous simplicity which everywhere characterizes the operations of nature, this theory certainly possesses a decided superiority over all the other conjectures of the ancient philosophers concerning the material universe; and it reflects no small honor on the sagacity both of Bacon and of Gassendi, to have perceived so clearly the strong analogical presumption which this conformity afforded in its favor, prior to the unexpected lustre thrown upon it by the researches of the Newtonian school. With all his admiration however, of the Epicurean physics, Bacon nowhere shows the slightest leaning towards the metaphysical or ethical doctrines of the same sect; but, on the contrary, considered (and,

See the first Epistle to Descartes, prefixed to his Treatise on the Passions. Amstel. 1664.

I apprehend, rightly considered) the atomic theory as incomparably more hostile to atheism, than the hypothesis of four mutable elements, and of one immutable fifth essence. In this last opinion, there is every reason to believe that Gassendi fully concurred; more especially, as he was a zealous advocate for the investigation of final causes, even in inquiries strictly physical. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that, on many questions, both of Metaphysics and of Ethics, this very learned theologian (one of the most orthodox, professedly, of whom the Catholic church has to boast,) carried his veneration for the authority of Epicurus to a degree bordering on weakness and servility; and although, on such occasions, he is at the utmost pains to guard his readers against the dangerous conclusions commonly ascribed to his master, he has nevertheless retained more than enough of his system to give a plausible color to a very general suspicion, that he secretly adopted more of it than he chose to avow.

As Gassendi's attachment to the physical doctrines of Epicurus, predisposed him to give an easier reception than he might otherwise have done to his opinions in Metaphysics and in Ethics, so his unqualified contempt for the hypothesis of the Vortices, seems to have created in his mind an undue prejudice against the speculations of Descartes on all other subjects. His objections to the argument by which Descartes has so triumphantly established the distinction between Mind and Matter, as separate and heterogeneous objects of human knowledge, must now appear, to every person capable of forming a judgment upon the question, altogether frivolous and puerile; amounting to nothing more than this, that all our knowledge is received by the channel of the external senses,-insomuch, that there is not a single object of the understanding which may not be ultimately analyzed into sensible images; and of consequence, that when Descartes proposed to abstract from these images in studying the mind, he rejected the only materials out of which it is possible for our faculties to rear any superstructure. The sum of the whole matter is (to use his own language,) that "there is no real distinction between imagination and intellection;" meaning, by the former

of these words, the power which the mind possesses of representing to itself the material objects and qualities it has previously perceived. It is evident, that this conclusion coincides exactly with the tenets inculcated in England at the same period by his friend Hobbes,* as well as with those revived at a latter period by Diderot, Horne Tooke, and many other writers, both French and English, who, while they were only repeating the exploded dogmas of Epicurus, fancied they were pursuing, with miraculous success, the new path struck out by the genius of Locke.

It is worthy of remark, that the argument employed by Gassendi against Descartes is copied almost verbatim from his own version of the account given by Diogenes Laërtius of the sources of our knowledge, according to the principles of the Epicurean philosophy; †-so very little is there of novelty in the consequences deduced by modern materialists from the scholastic proposition, Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu. The same

doctrine is very concisely and explicitly stated in a maxim formerly quoted from Montaigne, that "the senses are the beginning and end of all our knowledge; "—a maxim which Montaigne learned from his oracle Raymond de Sebonde ;-which, by the present race of French philosophers, is almost universally supposed to be sanctioned by the authority of Locke ;-and which, if true, would at once cut up by the roots, not only all metaphysics, but all ethics, and all religion, both natural and revealed. is accordingly with this very maxim that Madame du Deffand (in a letter which rivals anything that the fancy of Molière has conceived in his Femmes Savantes) assails Voltaire for his imbecility in attempting a reply to an atheistical book then recently published. In justice to this celebrated lady, I shall transcribe part of it in her own words, as a precious and authentic document of the

It

* The affection of Gassendi far Hobbes, and his esteem for his writings, are mentioned in very strong terms by Sorbière. Thomas Hobbius Gassendo charissimus, cujus libellum De Corpore paucis ante obitum mensibus accipiens, osculatus est, subjungens, Mole quidem parvus est iste liber, verùm totus, ut opinor, medullá scatet!" (Sorberii Pref.) Gassendi's admiration of Hobbes's Treatise De Cive, was equally warm; as we learn from a letter of his to Sorbière, prefixed to that work.

† Compare Gassendi Opera, tom. III. pp. 300, 301; and tom. V. p. 12.

philosophical tone affected by the higher orders in France, during the reign of Louis the Fifteenth.

"J'entends parler d'une réfutation d'un certain livre, (Systême de la Nature.) Je voudrois l'avoir. Je m'en tiens à connoître ce livre par vous.. Toutes réfutations de systême doivent être bonnes, surtout quand c'est vous qui les faites. Mais, mon cher Voltaire, ne vous ennuyezvous pas de tous les raisonnemens métaphysiques sur les matières inintelligibles. Peut-on donner des idées, ou peut-on en admettre d'autres que celles que nous recevons par nos sens?"-If the Senses be the beginning and end of all our knowledge, the inference here pointed at is quite irresistible.*

A learned and profound writer has lately complained of the injustice done by the present age to Gassendi; in whose works, he asserts, may be found the whole of the doctrine commonly ascribed to Locke concerning the origin of our knowledge. The remark is certainly just, if restricted to Locke's doctrine as interpreted by the greater part of philosophers on the Continent; but it is very wide of the truth, if applied to it as now explained and modified by the most intelligent of his disciples in this country. The main scope, indeed, of Gassendi's argument against Descartes, is to materialize that class of our ideas which the Lockists as well as the Cartesians consider as the exclusive objects of the power of reflection; and to show that these ideas are all ultimately resolvable into images or conceptions borrowed from things external. It is not, therefore, what is sound and valuable in this part of Locke's system, but the errors grafted on it in the comments of some of his followers, that can justly be said

*Notwithstanding the evidence (according to my judgment) of this conclusion, I trust it will not be supposed that I impute the slightest bias in its favor to the generality of those who have adopted the premises. If an author is to be held chargeable with all the consequences logically deducible from his opinions, who can hope to escape censure? And, in the present instance, how few are there among Montaigne's disciples, who have ever reflected for a moment on the real meaning and import of the proverbial maxim in question!

"Gassendi fut le premier auteur de la nouvelle philosophie de l'esprit humain ; car il est tems de lui rendre, à cet égard, une justice qu'il n'a presque jamais obtenue de ses propres compatriotes. Il est très singulier en effet, qu'en parlant de la nouvelle philosophie de l'esprit humain, nous disions toujours, la philosophie de Locke. D'Alembert et Condillac ont autorisé cette expression, en rapportant l'un et l'autre à Locke exclusivement, la gloire de cette invention," &c. &c. De Gérando, Hist. Comp. des Systêmes, Tome I. p. 301.

to have been borrowed from Gassendi. Nor has Gassendi the merit of originality, even in these errors; for scarcely a remark on the subject occurs in his works, but what is copied from the accounts transmitted to us of the Epicurean metaphysics.

Unfortunately for Descartes, while he so clearly perceived that the origin of those ideas which are the most interesting to human happiness, could not be traced to our external senses, he had the weakness, instead of stating this fundamental proposition in plain and precise terms, to attempt an explanation of it by the extravagant hypothesis of innate ideas. This hypothesis gave Gassendi great advantages over him, in the management of their controversy; while the subsequent adoption of Gassendi's reasonings against it by Locke, has led to a very general but ill founded belief, that the latter, as well as the former, rejected, along with the doctrine of innate ideas, the various important and well ascertained truths combined with it in the Cartesian system.

The hypothetical language afterwards introduced by Leibnitz concerning the human soul (which he sometimes calls a living mirror of the universe, and sometimes supposes to contain within itself the seeds of that knowledge which is gradually unfolded in the progressive exercise of its faculties,) is another impotent attempt to explain a mystery unfathomable by human reason. The same remark may be extended to some of Plato's reveries on this question, more particularly to his supposition, that those ideas which cannot be traced to any of our external senses, were acquired by the soul in its state of preexistence. In all of these theories, as well as in that of Descartes, the cardinal truth is assumed as indisputable, that the Senses are not the only sources of human knowledge; nor is any thing wanting to render them correctly logical, but the statement of this truth as an ultimate fact (or at least as a fact hitherto unexplained) in our intellectual frame.

It is very justly observed by Mr. Hume, with respect to Sir Isaac Newton, that "while he seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he showed, at the same time, the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy, and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that