But the maintenance of fo numerous a Dependance, was not perhaps the Moyety of his Expences; he had long entertain❜d an Ambition to be Pope. And he was too wife to attempt any thing in the Conclave, or Court of Rome, by means of which he cou'd have no hopes of Succefs. Money has always been the only Argument which has prevail'd in the Papal Elections, or in the particular Interests that the Princes in Obedience of that See form for themfelves or Favourites. The Cardinal therefore must be at an expence proportionable to the vehemence of his Defires: Which having no Bounds; his Largeffes, to obtain that End, cou'd be bounded by nothing but the Abilities of the King and Kingdom, the Treasure of which was wholly at his Command. This was the Reason, that prevail'd with him to engage the King, his Mafter, to lend Sums of Money to the Emperor, whofe Poverty was fo well known that he cou'd have no Prospect of ever having them Repay'd. 'Tis true, the Emperor and the Court of Rome were not fair Chapmen, but received his Money, and, at the fame time, inftead of promoting, obftructed all his Aims at the TrippleCrown. These incident Charges, join'd with the conftant Expences of fo numerous a Retinue, occafion'd perpetual and large Difbursements; and these put him on extraordinary Ways and Means of providing a Fund for their Continuance. To this end he grants Commiffions, under the Great Seal of England, which oblig'd every Man, on Oath, to deliver the true Value and Eftimate of his Eftate, and to pay Four Shillings in the Pound for every Fifty Pounds and upwards. This was fo heavy and fevere a Tax, that it's being Authoriz'd by Parliament wou'd not have freed it from the Imputation of an Oppreffion of the Subject: But to be done by the private Authority of a Subject, is what wants a Name. And that it was so, notwithstanding the Great Seal was affix'd to the Commiffions, is plain, from his Majefty's difowning the Matter, as fuch a Violation of the Fundamental Rights of the People, and a total diffolution of Magna Charta, that no wife King of England cou'd be guilty of. A just consideration of this, made the King declare, That, tho' his Neceffities were great, yet he bou'd never think them great enough to make him attempt the raising Money by any but the Legal way, of the People's consent in Parliament. Tho' the King had made this Declaration, and the Cardinal found his firft illegal Projec defeated; yet, fince Money was to be had, or his Defigns fall to the Ground, he once more trys one as little agreeable to Lawas the former, tho' not fo odieus and unproper. He therefore puts the King on defiring a Benevolence of the People without an Act of Parliament. And the Commiffioners, (who were the Cardinal's Creatures, and employ'd by him) exacted this Money, not as a free Gift, but as if due by Law. But in this he was exactly disappointed, tho' at the Expence of bis Mafter's Reputation; for the People, pleaded, a Statute of Richard III. and obftinately refused to pay it. But, Madam, I must remember to whom it is that I am fpeaking; to one of the Wifeft and Beft of Princes, as being entirely free from all vicious Inclinations; and of too good Judgment to be inpos'd-on, by the fairest Appearances of Virtue, fo far as to lofe the jufter Confiderations of Publick good in the fhining Qualities of any particular: Under you, Madam, we find that Saying true, How happy iş the Kingdom [that is] guvern'd by a Philofopher! We feel the Bleffing, and every Day experience the Manna of your Reign. And, bow indulgent foever your Majefty may be thought to the eminent Excellencies of fome, yet I have no manner of Fear, that they will ever be able to expel your Majesty's Majesty's Affections from all your other Subjects, or make you ever deviate to a Particularity in their Favour, against the Good and univerfal Cries of your People. This Noble Temper in your Majefty it is that fecures me against all Fears from this Freedom, which I have taken; fince you will eafily fee a Publick Spirit, void of all private Aims, shine through the whole. I have therefore only to add my ardent Wishes for the profperous and long Reign of your Majesty over a People that are fenfible of the Blefing which Providence has bestowed on them in their gracious Queen. [This memorial is re-printed from pages 99, 100,--111, of a very small volume of political tracts, called The Cabala, or Mysteries of State, published at London in the year 1715.] THE STATE OF A SECRETARIES PLACE, AND THE DANGERS INCIDENT TO IT. Written by ROBERT CECIL, Earl of Salisbury. Reprinted from the Cabala, pages 115, 116,-120. ALL Cfficers of State and Counsellors of Princes, have a prescribed Authority, either by Patent, by Oath, or by Cuftom; the Secretaries Place only excepted: but to them there is allowed a Liberty to Negotiate at Discretion, both at Home and Abroad, with Friends and with Enemies, in all Matters of Enquiry to gain Intelligence. All the Servants of Princes deal upon ftrange and cautious Authority and Warrants for it: as in Disbursements and Receiving of Money by Treasurers, Receivers, &c. Which is done by fufficient Warrant; and in Conference with Enemies, as Generals by Commiffions; in executing of all Offices, as Officers by their Patents; and fo in whatever elfe: Only a Secretary hath no Warrant or Commiffion, in matters of his own greatest Danger, but muft rely upon the Word and Integrity of his Sovereign. For fuch is the Multiplicity of Occafions, and the variable Motions and Intentions of Foreign Princes, and their daily Practices in fo many parts and places, that Secretaries can never have any Commiffion fo Large and Univerfal as to affure them. So that a Secretary muft either conceive, or dive into, the Thoughts of a King (which is only the Prerogative of God Almighty) or elfe a King muft muft either exercise the Painful Office of a Secretary himfelf (which is contrary to Majefty and Liberty) or chufe fuch a Secretary that he may repofe his confidence in; and the Secretary's Life must be in Truft with the Prince : for he cannot deal with Princes tanquam Inimicum futurum; and therefore all the Security he has is that his Sovereign will be Semper Idem. All foreign Princes hate another Prince's Secretary, as well as all Ambitious Afpirers and Confpirators; because for the most part they either Kill thofe Monsters* in their Cradles, or track them to a discovery, where no other Perfon could find the Print of their Feet. - Military Perfons alfo hate them; unless they ferve them on all occafions, tho' never fo prejudicial to the Interests of their Mafters. All Perfons in Offices and Places of Truft malign them, unless they wink at their Frauds and Cheating the King: All their fellow-Counsellors envy them, becaufe they fee and do moft: have freeft accefs to their Sovereign, and on all Occafions that the Prince has to enquire into offences, to Deny, Prefer, or Punish, none are so much employ'd, or bear the Burden fo much, as the Secretaries. Kings are advised to obferve Three things efpecially in a Secretary. 1. That he be created by himfelf, and be of his own Raifing and Preferring. 2. That he match not in a Family that is accounted Factious. 3. That he has a reasonable Capacity, and convenient Ability both of Friends and Eftate; that, by the firft, he may be able to go to the depth of what is committed to his Charge, being brought-up, as it were, in his own Condition: That, by the second, he might not be led-away with any vain or idle conceit, to wrong his prince, or abuse the Truft com mitted to him: And by the laft, That he may be able That is, ambitious aspirers and conspiraters. to |