of life which He gave to man; and, in the next place, He must do the same, if there be occasion, in administering and executing His Law. It is impossible, that either in the one or the other province, He should fail to express His estimate of the demerit or turpitude of sin; much more do, or omit to do, anything, which might imply, that His abhorrence of sin is less than it should be, or may be changed or abated. These things have their proof in themselves, and cannot be denied. But if they be true, how is the Divine Government, or God acting towards His creatures as Lord and Judge of all, to dispense with the punishment of sin? A penalty the law must have; and where it has been incurred by transgression, how may it consist with the holiness and moral rectitude of the Deity, not to execute the penalty? Is not punishment in this case necessary to the just revelation of the Divine displeasure? 7. But the fact lies before us, and is admitted by all, that punishment is forborne; that mercy in the Divine administration rejoices against judgment, and opens the gates of Heaven to those who have incurred condemnation to eternal death. There is remission of punishment for rebellious men. But how might this take place, without dishonor to Him, for whom are all things and by whom are all things? The primary and natural means of maintaining His honor being set aside, does a possibility remain of securing the end by any other means? Our doctrine gives this question an affirmative reply. It asserts there was one other means,-one only, namely, an atonement, by which the end could be and was secured. And because the end must be secured, and could be by no other means, an atonement in order to the forgiveness of mankind was as necessary, as that God do nothing incompatible with His essential excellency. 8. But how could even an atonement answer the purpose? The careful consideration of this question is necessary to our design. To see the truth distinctly here, is to understand the doctrine of the atonement. Let it be remembered, then, what the precise thing was that would have put the Divine conduct out of harmony, out of consistency, with the essential perfection of God, in case of an arbitrary remission of punishment. It was just this, that there would in that case have been no appropriate revelation of the displeasure of God against sin. Let there be then such a revelation, and does not the necessity for punishment disappear? Why is punishment necessary any longer, if its object is attained?. It was only in order to the manifestation of the Divine abhorrence of sin, that punishment was appointed. It was not appointed simply for its own sake. If it be possible, then, by any other means than punishment, to reveal in full measure and power the displeasure of God against sin; in other words, if there be any means by which the end of punishment is answered as perfectly as by punishment itself, and if these means are provided, is not the way now open, so far as the honor of God is concerned, for the setting aside of punishment? May not pardoning mercy here intervene, and grace abound in all its offices of kindness and love, without opposition from any one of the Divine perfections? May not God now act as it becomes Him to do, even while He pours upon the guilty and the condemned, if only they are prepared to receive it, all the fulness of His benevolence? In the language of inspiration, may we not say that God now may be just and yet the justifier of men? Or is there still something in the nature of God inconsistent with the remission of punishment? 9. To some it appears, so at least we understand them to say, that two things in the Divine Nature are still inconsistent; two essential perfections-the Divine Justice and the Divine Veracity. A necessity for punishing sin lies, it has been said, in the nature of sin itself, as deserving of punishment: punishment is due to sin; so that Justice has no place if punishment be set aside. But is this indeed so? Punishment is due to sin, if due and desert be the same? Sin deserves punishment; and if Justice is wanting wherever there is not treatment according to desert, forbearing to punish is being unjust; and there is truly a hindrance to the remission of punishment, still remaining in the nature of God. He would be the author of injustice if He should forbear to punish. The high and unchangeable necessity of which we have again and again spoken, would be against admitting any substitute for the punishment of sin. No atonement is admissible, not even though the atonement be itself punishment, i. e. the punishment of another: for the argument is, that there must be punishment where and because it is deserved; and the sinner's desert of punishment is one of the things which are eternal. 10. But let it be inquired into, whether that is the true idea of Justice which leads to this conclusion? Is it so, that Justice implies and necessitates treatment according to desert, so that where there is sin there must be punishment, or Justice is renounced and ceaseth for ever? The necessity of treatment according to desert-is this embraced in the nature of Justice? Is there, then, no such thing with God, as the remission of the punishment of sin, or veritable forgiveness? What means the preaching of the remission of sins among all nations in the name of Christ?1 Besides, how, after adopting this idea of Justice, can we give it a place among the virtues? If Justice be a virtue, a good thing, it can never be opposed to any other virtue, or oblige us 1Luke 24: 47. to anything evil, or be inconsistent with universal goodness. The virtues are homogeneal, sisters in the same family; they love and embrace one another. If I must renounce virtue,―be malignant or vindictive, for example, in order to retain what I choose to call Justice, either Justice is here an evil thing, or I have abused it, by giving its name to that which is evil. That cannot be in its own nature good which requires us to be, or to do, evil. But suppose a man to be brought into judgment and condemned as a criminal; and that, by some means, the ends to be answered by his punishment are already secured-that by virtue of a certain arrangement or provision, no injury will be sustained, and no good be lost-no ill consequences of any kind will follow, by forbearing to punish him-so that if his punishment should take place it would be for no end but simply for punishment's sake; and now suppose again, that something naming itself Justice should forbid his discharge on the ground that it would keep him from his desert, would this something, bear whatever name it may, be anything else than simple malignity-would it do in this case what might be regarded as a praiseworthy office, a thing worthy to be classed with the exercises and acts of that holy love, which is the fulfilling of the moral law? Surely it ought not to be called Justice. No, the quality of Justice is not such that it must inflict punishment, in all cases where it is merited, irrespectively of the ends of punishment, or merely because punishment has been incurred and is deserved. The ends of punishment must be regarded; they are the justification and defence of its infliction-what Justice points to, it may be with tears of pity, as the necessitating cause of her punitive procedures. If these can be secured without punishment, it is not Justice, or any form of goodness, but arbitrary cruelty, that will proceed, in these circumstances, to inflict a pang, though death itself be deserved. Justice is in this case satisfied; she does not and cannot object to the remission of punishment: Justice is no enemy to Love. 11. It may be well to note the office and place of Justice in a virtuous character. It is essential, but it does not hold the highest seat among the attributes of goodness. The supremacy belongs to Love-the highest, brightest adornment and glory of every good being. Wisdom is subservient to Love; so is Power; so is Justice. The work of Justice is to secure to all their rights, and protect the interests of all. This done, Justice is content; she seeks nothing more. If by any proceeding of Wisdom,any means whatever not unlawful in themselves,—the interests of all are placed in perfect security, nothing would be more unjust and absurd than to forbid, in the name of Justice, the manifestations of mercy. 12. Distinctions have been made in Justice, as if it were of different kinds, Distributive, Commutative, and Public; but Justice in each of these varieties is of the same nature; in neither of them does it ever fulfil the part of simple, despotic power, or renounce the rule of Love and Goodness. Distributive Justice deals out to every one the portion of good which falleth to him; allots to each one his claims, suffers no one to be injured; but it hinders no one from relinquishing his rights at the suggestion of benevolence or compassion, much less does it oblige any one to be malignant or unforgiving. Commutative Justice -faithfulness to contracts, honesty between man and man, -is not against indulgence to an unfortunate debtor, nor will it imprison an honest debtor who has no means of payment; such a measure never proceeds from any modification of Justice; it is the doing of pure malevolence. Public Justice is of the same character: it demands the punishment of crimes, as a means of securing the public good, but it is not against the pardon of an offender whose punishment may be remitted with prudence; or, as the case sometimes is, must be remitted, unless the public good be disregarded. To return to our former statement, it is never of the nature or spirit of Justice to give pain to any one where no ulterior end is to be answered, where there is no object to be reached beyond the giving of pain, or where the infliction terminates in itself. Work of this kind proceeds not from Justice, but gratuitous cruelty. Justice, then, is not in the way. 13. The other supposed obstacle is the Divine veracity. Punishment, we are reminded, is not only deserved, it is threatened and denounced. It is expressed in the Law itself, as the consequence of transgression, and is not the Law the voice of truth? Or is it consistent with the principle and end of Divine legislation, to allow the idea that what the Law names as the penalty of transgression, may be incurred and yet not endured? If this be so, is not the discouragement of trangression, the majesty of the Law-the strength of the Divine government, less than it might be? It must be confessed that there is, on this supposition, less of one kind of strength than in the opposite view there would be. If the Divine government proceeded on the principle, adopted, it is said, by an ancient tyrant, that no remission or mitigation of the punishment prescribed in the law would, under any circumstances, be admitted, there would, indeed, be in it more of that formidable, terrible strength which is displayed in the stern exercise of authority; more, in other words, of despotic power. But it is in the nature of things impossible that God, a being of perfect and unchangeable goodness, should administer such a goverment. He would not be God if He should assume the throne of an arbitrary despot. Any plan of government, not consistent with the supreme rule of Love or Goodness, is such as would mis become the Most High. God could govern on no such plan. If the remission of punishment may be made compatible with Justice, it is reproachful to God to suppose that He would, by institutes of law and government, have foreclosed against Himself the exercise of the pardoning prerogative; or disabled Himself from appearing in His administration true to His own nature as the God of Love, whose goodness is His glory. 1 The fact is, that mere legislation, unless it be itself unlawful, never binds the hands of love, or forbids mercy under all possible or supposable circumstances. The veracity of a lawgiver is not pledged by the simple fact that he has annexed a penalty to his law, for the execution of the penalty in all cases of transgression. Let Justice be satisfied, and Truth itself would lose the quality of a virtue, if it should now be a barrier to the free exercise of benevolence. Just legislation, like Justice itself, implies no necessity for punishment, except as the ends of punishment may require. The penalty of a law is "not to be taken for a prediction, expressive of a certain event, or what shall be; but a commination, expressing what is deserved, or most justly may be the true meaning or design of a commination being, that it may never be executed." They who think otherwise, "labor under a delusion as to the meaning of threatenings, which, though they affirm simply, nevertheless contain in them a tacit condition, depending on the result." Such universally is the groundwork, the law, of all true legislation, human and divine. Where law under the Divine government is broken, the penalty is incurred, the transgressor is amenable to punishment; but God has not, by the mere fact of having given the law, pronounced a priori against the exercise of mercy. He holds, and from the first meant to hold, the pardoning prerogative in His hand. Although, according to the letter of the law, the offender is exposed to death, yet God, except as justice demands satisfaction, has left Himself free to do with him as He pleases-to have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and show compassion to whom He will show compassion. So 14. These Divine perfections, then, are not in the way. far as Justice and Truth are concerned, the way is open and clear. Is there any other obstruction? If an amende, an atonement, may be supplied, is there anything remaining, in or out of the Divine nature, to restrain the exercise and manifestation of the Divine benevolence to mankind? According to the evangelical faith, such a measure has become a reality. An atonement has been made, by means of which all the perfections of God harmonize and interblend their glories in favor of men; his Justice, Truth, Holiness, Wisdom, commingling with his Mercy, and all perfectly consenting toge |