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beating soul, to the deep, green valley of her love, he shall in anguish cry unto the mountains to fall upon him, and hide him from her piercing glance. Christ crucified, the Lord of life and glory-Christ, the Way, the Truth, and the Life, is the theme of the Christian orator-and around Him, the Lord, should all nature bow, "sun and moon, the stars of light, the heaven of heavens, and the waters that be above the heavens, dragons and all deeps, fire and hail, snow and vapor, stormy wind fulfilling his word; mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars, beasts and all cattle, creeping things and flying fowl"-all should pay their tributes to His praise; and as His ambassador should the preacher, furnishing himself with all knowledge, strive to bestow upon his theme all of beauty, of gracefulness, of forcefulness, of power, that man may have, or man may learn, by studying alike the human soul, the harp of many strings, or the great world, that hand of God which strikes continually upon that harp, or the laws of grace which strings and tunes that harp for heavenly
3. Our subject, while it thus clearly exhibits the importance of Pulpit Eloquence, and sets forth the province of a teacher of Sacred Rhetoric, also with unwavering grasp holds up the great Evangelical principle which should guide in the teachings and the study of this department.
All is to be done in humble dependence on God, and for His sake. We are to strive to become orators that we may better serve God. We are bound to make the best use of our powers, to cultivate them to the highest degree for this end. The honor conferred on those who are called to the work of the ministry, requires, that on their part they should strive in the most complete manner to fit themselves for the discharge of that ministry. Gratitude demands this. Reverence alike demands it. True devotion demands it. "Neither will I offer burnt offerings unto the Lord my God, of that which doth cost me nothing." The best that we can present is the least that we should present. The Holy Spirit, who condescends to use our instrumentality, ought to have that instrumentality in its most perfect form. At the same time, self is to be kept ever veiled by the thought of God's supremacy. Not for self-gratification, not for applause, not for mere personal power-for nothing short of God's honor in the prosperity of Zion-is Eloquence to be studied, or to be taught. And we can hope for final eminent success only so far as we recognize this principle and are controlled by it. Without it there may be the show of Eloquence and temporary popularity, but not the approbation of God and real success. These will come only as the result of a sincere dependence upon Him, and humble asking of His blessing. The heart of piety will thus be found to be the
1 II Sam. 24: 24.
proper fountain of Eloquence-and true Eloquence, rich in the unction of the Holy One, will put to flight all idle declamation, and by the lips of him who speaks will God glorify His grace. Knowledge sanctified by piety thus becomes power-power employed for God's honor and man's good.
4. Our subject impresses us with the importance of cultivating a most devout sense of our dependence on the Holy Spirit.
This is not only a dictate of religion, and an essential of true piety, but also contributes largely to give to the pulpit performances of the minister their highest power and excellence of character. The preacher of the gospel, therefore, should preeminently be a man of piety, "praying always with all prayer and supplication in the spirit." By constant communion with the fountain of all good, should he at the same time keep alive in his soul a sense of his dependence on that blessed Spirit, and secure the flowing into his soul of the needed grace, and upon his efforts the Divine blessing. By reading of the holy word, by devout meditation, by retirement and prayer is he to be made to realize more and more this great truth, and as he realizes it more fully its influence will pervade his whole character, both intellectual and spiritual, and shine forth in all his utterance.
THE JUSTICE OF GOD.
By Rev. ENOCH POND, D.D, Prof. Theology, Bangor Theo. Seminary.
THE word justice, from the Latin jus, is but another name for the due, the right. It supposes two or more persons, or one person sustaining different relations, and signifies what is right between them, or what is due from the one to the other.
Justice, though of the same general nature, may be regarded under two different forms or species, commercial and governmental. Commercial justice supposes two parties or persons to sustain to each other the relation of debtor and creditor, and marks the amount due from the one to the other. It, moreover, exacts that the due be rendered, or that the amount be paid. An individual performs for me some act of service, or I purchase of him some article of convenience, on account of which I owe him a sum of money. Commercial justice, in the abstract, is the precise mea
sure of what I owe. It also demands that the debt be cancelled. If I have promised to pay the debt, then faithfulness, as well as justice, requires its payment. Still, faithfulness and justice are different things. Justice would have exacted the payment, if I had made no promise. The promise brings me under an additional inducement, viz: that of fidelity to my word.
From the nature of the relation subsisting between God and His creatures, He can never be commercially either their debtor or creditor. Hence, strict commercial justice can have no place between Him and them. There may be that which, in some of its aspects, resembles it, and expressions may be found in the Bible which seem to imply it; as when the Jews are charged with robbing God, in withholding their tithes and offerings, and when they are exhorted to pay unto him their vows. But these, and the like expressions, are used, obviously, in a somewhat figurative sense. God is the absolute proprietor of His creatures. Themselves, and all that they possess, are in the strictest sense His own. How then can He be their debtor or creditor, in the sense of strict commercial justice? The thing is manifestly impossible; and hence, justice, as subsisting between God and men, must necessarily be of the other kind, viz.: governmental.
This, too, implies two or more persons, or one person sustaining different relations, and is, abstractedly, the precise measure of what is due from the one to the other. But the due here is of a moral, a governmental nature, and not one in dollars and cents.
The relation on which this form of justice rests is prominently that of ruler and ruled, the sovereign and the subject, and we here use these terms in their widest signification, extending from the ruler and head of a family, up to the ruler of a state, and the Sovereign of the universe.
Governmental justice may be considered in a general or a restricted sense. In a general sense it is nearly synonymous with duty, or duty when coupled with desert. In this sense, the child is unjust to his parent, and the scholar to his master, and the subject to his rightful sovereign, when he refuses obedience. In this sense, a sovereign, by suffering his law to be violated, and his authority to be trampled on, may be unjust to himself.
In a stricter sense, governmental justice is retributive. It regards the sovereign's treatment of the subject, and requires that this be strictly according to desert. It requires that judgment be laid to the line, and righteousness to the plummet, and that favors and frowns, rewards and punishments, be meted out with an even hand.
In the more general sense of the term justice, every sovereign may be said to owe to his subjects wise regulations, good and wholesome laws, to be sanctioned by suitable rewards and penalties. He owes also to the loyal faithful subject his protection THIRD SERIES, VOL. IV. NO. 4.
and care. On the other hand, the subject owes to his rightful sovereign a cheerful obedience, a devoted service. We use the word owe here, not, of course, in the commercial sense, but in the moral sense. And we are sanctioned in this use of it by the continual recurrence, in like connections, of the good English word ought, which is but the preterite of owe. Thus we say, that the sovereign ought to establish good laws, and that the subject ought to obey them.
We have said that the subject owes obedience. If this is rendered, he is the proper subject of reward. In the moral, governmental, retributive sense, his sovereign may be said to owe him a reward. Strict justice fixes the measure of this reward, and requires that it be bestowed.
If, however, obedience be not rendered; but, in place of it, there be positive disobedience, then a debt is contracted in the other direction. The sovereign has a demand against the subject, which can be legally cancelled only by the infliction of a penalty. Strict justice notes the measure of this penalty, and (as in the former case) demands its execution. It must be executed, if the full strength and perfection of the government are to be sustained. To remit the penalty without an equivalent, to remit it on slight and insufficient grounds, is morally to defraud and weaken the government. It is to introduce a principle which, if pursued, will work its overthrow. As well might a bankinghouse be sustained, which should proceed on the principle of relinquishing, without an equivalent, all its debts, as a government could be sustained, which should proceed on the principle of relinquishing, without an equivalent, all its penalties. Commercial and governmental justice differ, indeed, as to their subjects, or objects, but the demands of the one are as imperative as those of the other and the consequences of trifling with them, in both cases, are alike ruinous.
I have said that the demands neither of commercial nor governmental justice can be safely relinquished without an equivalent. It may be necessary that something should be added here, as to the nature of the equivalent, in either case. A commercial equivalent is a mere quid pro quo; a sum of money equal to the debt, or other property of like value. This, therefore, is a simple matter. A governmental equivalent for the infliction of a penalty must be something which will answer all the ends and purposes of government as fully as the infliction itself. It may, or may not, be the endurance, by a substitute, of the same kind and amount of suffering; but it must be an infliction, an endurance, which, in the circumstances of the case, shall as fully sustain the government, as perfectly meet its righteous demands, as would the infliction of the literal penalty. The difficulty in remitting a just penalty is, that the government is thereby weakened, its
authority is impaired, its righteous claims are not cancelled. Now if a substitute can be provided, which shall fully answer all these ends of government, then justice is satisfied, an equivalent is rendered, and a remission of the penalty may safely, follow. But unless an equivalent of this kind is rendered, the penalty must be inflicted, or justice is sacrificed, and the government is weakened, if not prostrated.
And here we see the error of those who hold that repentance satisfies for sin, and furnishes a sufficient ground of pardon. How would such a principle operate, in reference to commercial justice? Suppose creditors universally were expected and required to relinquish their claims, just as soon as their debtors were sorry that they had contracted them. Would not such a principle be fatal to commercial justice, destroying all confidence between debtor and creditor, and putting an end to the orderly transaction of business? But no less fatal would it be to governments to regard repentance alone as making satisfaction for crimes, and furnishing a sufficient ground for their forgiveness. Repentance is necessary in order to prepare the transgressor to receive a pardon, and to profit by it; and hence it is made, under the Divine government, the indispensable condition of pardon. But repentance, of itself, constitutes no equivalent for the transgression of the law, or the infliction of its penalty, and no proper ground for the remission of sins.
Thus far we have spoken of justice in the abstract; of its intrinsic nature, its different forms, and its demands. It will be understood that this is a very different thing from justice considered as a moral attribute; the attribute of a free, intelligent being. Justice, in the abstract, is a fixed principle. It is the due from one being to another. But justice, considered as a moral attribute, belongs to the character. It is a disposition to do what is just. It is a fixed purpose, a determination, to meet and fulfil its high demands.
The question has been asked, whether justice is a form of benevolence; or whether it partakes of the nature of that love which is "the fulfilling of the law." To this, we answer, that justice, in the abstract, is not a form of benevolence, more than truth or right, in the abstract, is a form of benevolence. But justice, considered as a moral attribute, in other words, the disposition to be just, is a form of benevolence. It is as really so as mercy or grace. God, we are repeatedly told, is love. Love enters into and comprises His whole moral character. But the justice of God, considered as an attribute, is an important part of His moral character, and, of course, must be but a modified form of love. It is benevolence in God which prompts him to do justly, as well as to love mercy. His benevolence is as