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schools which have always divided the world, viz. that which declares experience to be the source of all knowledge; and that which declares we have a great deal of our knowledge antecedent to and independent of experience. Both of these systems he pronounces to be composed of truth and error. He assumes this; for a little consideration might tell him that it is utterly impossible both should be correct: experience either is or is not the sole fountain of knowledge. The difference is as decided as that respecting the motion of the earth, or the motion of the sun. Ptolemy and Copernicus: choose between them; any compromise is impossible, unless you wish to side with the Sizar who, when the question was put, "Does the earth move round the sun, or the sun round the earth?" replied, "Sometimes one and sometimes the other." He was an eclectic apparently. us however for a moment grant that the two schools of Psychology are both partly right and partly wrong; we then ask, What criterium has the eclectic whereby to distinguish error from truth? He has none; the doctors are silent on the point.

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That men derive assistance from others, and that those who went before us discovered many truths, all admit. And there can be no doubt that a juxtaposition and comparison of various doctrines would be of service. Eclecticism, therefore, as a subsidiary process is valuable; and has always been practised. M. Cousin however converts this subsidiary process into a primary one, and dignifies it with the attributes of a Method. In the one sense it is simply that the inquirer consults the works of his predecessors, and selects from them all that he considers true : viz. such portions as confirm, extend, and illustrate his previous opinions; these opinions constituting his criterium. Let the reader reflect on the pertinacity with which men refuse to admit views which to others are self-evident, because those views are or seem to be opposed to religion, or the reigning doctrine, and he will clearly enough see the nature of this criterium. The history of opinion is crowded with instances of it. M. Cousin however does not so understand Eclecticism. He says we should admit all

systems as containing some truths; and these truths separate themselves from errors by the mere process of juxtaposition, somewhat in the manner, we presume, of chemical affinities.— A theory that needs, one would think, no further refutation than a simple statement of its principles.

Having dismissed Eclecticism as a Method, we need not waste time in examining M. Cousin's various and constantly shifting opinions. It is enough that he himself has relinquished them. It is enough that France and Europe reject them.

This final doctrine then fares no better than the doctrines which preceded it. Philosophy is still in search of its Method and its basis; and wearied out by so many fruitless efforts, it finally gives up the quest, and allows itself to be absorbed by Science. The dogmatic assertion of this position is to be found in Auguste Comte.

CHAPTER II.

AUGUSTE COMTE.

As I have devoted a whole volume to the exposition of Comte's philosophy, it will be unnecessary to enter into a detailed exposition here; and the small space at disposal may be occupied with a general indication of his historical position and the nature of his Method.

In the course of this History one fact has been gradually assuming more and more distinctness, as the various failures to establish any solid basis for Philosophy have been brought before us namely, that mankind has, from the origin of speculative inquiry, been pursuing a false Method. Gradually, as men became aware of this fact, they withdrew themselves more and more from Philosophy, and devoted their speculative energy to Science.

* Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences, 1853 (Bohn's Scientific Library, vol. 20).

Even those who, reluctant to relinquish the high aims of Philoso-
phy, tried by changes of direction to discover new and more pros-
perous issues, and hoped in reinvestigating the nature of human
knowledge to disclose some yet unsuspected path which might
lead them to the goal, found Psychology itself forced to range
beside the positive sciences, and to adopt the one Method which
hitherto had alone been fruitful in results. And while from all
directions a convergence towards Science was silently taking
place, there arose a powerful thinker who proclaimed the in-
herent necessity of this convergence, and the necessity under
which Philosophy now was of definitively relinquishing its
ancient claims in favor of the positive Method, which could lead
men to a general doctrine such as might once more establish har-
mony in their endeavors, and give to Europe an invigorating faith.
In the Cours de Philosophie Positive, 6 vols., 1830-42, Au-
guste Comte did for the nineteenth century what Bacon did for
the seventeenth: he resumed in one vast work the various re-
forming tendencies of preceding ages. Whoever casts his
glance at the present intellectual state of Europe, will perceive a
great want of unity, caused by the absence of any one doctrine,
general enough to embrace every variety of ideas, and positive
enough to carry with it irresistible conviction. Look at the state
of Religion:-
:- -Catholicism and Protestantism make one great
division; but within the sphere of each we see numerous subdi-
visions; the variety of sects is daily increasing. Each Religion
has remarkable men amongst its members; but each refuses to
admit the doctrines of the others. There is, in fact, no one gen-
eral doctrine capable of embracing Catholics, Protestants, Mo-
hammedans, and their subdivisions. Look also at the state of
Philosophy. There is no one system universally accepted; there
are as many philosophies as there are speculative nations, almost.
as many as there are professors. The dogmas of Germany are
held in England and Scotland as the dreams of alchemists; the
Psychology of Scotland is laughed at in Germany, and neglected
in England and France. Besides this general dissidence, we see,

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in France and Germany at least, great opposition between Religion and Philosophy openly pronounced. This opposition is inevitable it lies in the very nature of Philosophy; and although, now as heretofore, many professors eagerly argue that the two are perfectly compatible and accordant, the discordance is, and always must be, apparent.

With respect to general doctrines, then, we find the state of Europe to be this: religions opposed to religions; philosophies opposed to philosophies; and Religion and Philosophy at war with each other. Such is the anarchy in the higher regions.

In the positive sciences there is less dissidence, but there is the same absence of any general doctrine; each science is on a firm basis, and rapidly improves; but a Philosophy of Science is nowhere to be found except in the work of M. Auguste Comte, which comes forward with the express purpose of supplying the deficiency. The speciality of most scientific men, and their incapacity of either producing or accepting general ideas, has long been a matter of complaint; and this has been one great cause of the continuance of Philosophy: for men of speculative ability saw clearly enough that however exact each science. might be in itself, it could only form a part of Philosophy. Moreover, the evil of speciality is not confined to neglecting the whole for the sake of the parts; it affects the very highest condition of Science, namely, its capability of instructing and directing society.

In the early ages of speculation, general views were eagerly sought and easily obtained. As Science became rich and complex in materials, various divisions took place; and one man cultivated one science, another man another. Even then general views were not absent. But as the tide rolled on, discovery succeeding discovery, and new tracts of inquiry leading to vast wildernesses of undiscovered truth, it became necessary for one man to devote himself only to a small fraction of a science, which he pursued, leaving to others the task of bringing his researches under their general head. Such a minute division of labor was

necessary for the successful prosecution of minute and laborious researches; but it ended in making men of science regard only the individual parts of science; the construction of general doctrines was left to philosophers. A fatal error; for such doctrines could only be truly constructed out of the materials of Science and upon the Method of Science; whereas the philosophers were ignorant of Science-or only superficially acquainted with it— and despised the Method. The Natur-Philosophie of Schelling and Hegel is a sufficiently striking example of the results of such a procedure.

We come then to this conclusion: in the present state of things the speculative domain is composed of two very different portions, general ideas and positive sciences. The general ideas are powerless because they are not positive; the positive sciences are powerless because they are not general. The new Philosophy which, under the title of Positive, M. Comte proposes to create -and the basis of which he has himself laid-is destined to put an end to this anarchy, by presenting a doctrine which is positive, because elaborated from the sciences, and yet possessing all the desired generality of metaphysical doctrines, without possessing their vagueness, instability, and inapplicability.

Besides this general aim of the new "Great Instauration,” we have to notice three initial conceptions which Comte advances, two of which relate to Method, and one to History.

The first is the conception of Philosophy, which, in its widest sense, is identical with Science; consequently one Method must be followed in all investigations, whether the investigations relate to Physics, to Psychology, to Ethics, or to Politics. Every special science, no matter what its subject-matter, is but a branch of the one Positive Philosophy.

The second conception is that of Classification, whereby all the special sciences will assume their proper place in the hierarchy of Science, the simpler being studied first, and thus becoming instruments for the better prosecution of those which succeed. Thus Mathematics becomes the instrument of Astronomy

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