Opinion of the Court. 249 U. S. part upon the measure of the rates they would be able to secure for this service in competition with the rail lines." It is clear that the changed conditions so found are something other than the "elimination of water competition" which Congress intended should not justify raising the reduced rates. Compare American Insulated Wire & Cable Co. v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 26 I. C. C. 415, 416. Fifth. The plaintiff attacks, however, the validity of the order of June 5, 1916 (amended July 13, 1916) also on the ground that it was not made upon application of the carrier-insisting that application by the carrier is not only a prerequisite to the original granting of relief under the fourth section, but also to the modification from time to time by the Commission of the relief afforded. This court expressed in the Sacramento Case, supra, at p. 187, its doubt whether such application was a prerequisite even to the original granting of relief. It is clear that application by the carrier is not a prerequisite to modification. As shown above, orders granting relief under the fourth section are not grants in perpetuity. Neither a carrier nor a favored community acquires thereby vested rights. Necessarily implied in each such order is the term, "until otherwise ordered by the Commission"; and the original application is always subject to be reopened, as it was here. The District Court did not err in dismissing the bill (and supplemental bill) on the merits; and its decree is Afirmed. Counsel for Parties. STANDARD COMPUTING SCALE COMPANY, LIMITED, v. FARRELL, AS STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 228. Argued March 14, 1919.-Decided May 5, 1919. A statement to the effect that all scales of a certain kind must be equipped with automatic devices, to compensate for changes of temperature, appearing as an item in a "bulletin of instruction and information to dealers, and weights and measures officials," issued by the New York Superintendent of Weights and Measures, was acted upon by certain county and city sealers of weights, with resulting injury to the business of the plaintiff, a manufacturer of scales of the kind specified but not equipped with such devices. Held, considering the Superintendent's functions and powers under the New York law, and the purpose of the statement, that it was educational and advisory merely, not binding on the city and county sealers and not a rule or regulation of a legislative character such as might impair the plaintiff's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or the commerce clause. P. 573. 242 Fed. Rep. 87, affirmed. THE case is stated in the opinion. Mr. Herbert C. Smyth, with whom Mr. Frederic C. Scofield and Mr. Frederick W. Bisgood were on the briefs, for appellant. Mr. Edward G. Griffin, Deputy Attorney General of the State of New York, with whom Mr. Charles D. Newton, Attorney General of the State of New York, was on the brief, for appellee. Opinion of the Court. 249 U.S. MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the court. By the statutes of New York a sealer of weights and measures is appointed in every county and every city by the local authorities with the duty, among other things, to keep safely the standards and to seal and mark such weights as correspond with the standards in his possession. The statutes provide also for a State Superintendent of weights and measures with, among other things, a like duty to keep the state standards, and "where not otherwise provided by law" to "have a general supervision of the weights, measures and measuring and weighing devices of the state, and in use in the state." General Business Law of New York, sections 11-15, Laws 1909, c. 25, amended 1910, Laws 1910, c. 187. Under a specific appropriation he publishes and distributes "bulletins of instruction and information to dealers, and weights and measures officials." Laws 1914, c. 521, p. 2093. In the bulletin for August, 1914, there appeared, among other matter, the following item: "Specifications. "Automatic Computing Scales. "All combination spring and lever computing scales must be equipped with a device which will automatically compensate for changes of temperature at zero balance and throughout the whole range of weight graduations." The Standard Company manufactures a combination spring and lever computing scale which was then being used and sold in New York. It is equipped with a compensating device which is not automatic. Because of these "specifications," some county and city sealers of weights neglected to seal scales of plaintiff's make and warned scale users to discontinue the use thereof. A state inspector, who was a subordinate of the State Superintend ent, also marked some of these scales "slow and faulty." As a result, the Standard Company's business in New York was injured; sales diminished and collections for scales theretofore sold became difficult. The Standard Company contends that its scales with a mechanical compensating device are at least as trustworthy as those of its competitor with the automatic device; and it presented these views to State Superintendent Farrell both before the "specifications" were issued and thereafter. Failing to secure a withdrawal of the "specifications," it brought, in February, 1915, this suit in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York against the State Superintendent, setting forth, in substance, the facts above stated and praying that the issuing of the "specifications," which it termed a "rule," be declared an invalid exercise of the police power of the State and their enforcement enjoined on the ground that the rule violates the Federal Constitution, in that it impairs the obligation of contracts, interferes with interstate commerce, abridges the privileges and immunities of a citizen, deprives the plaintiff of property without due process, and denies to it equal protection of the laws. An answer was filed; and upon full hearing on the evidence the bill was dismissed on the merits. 242 Fed. Rep. 87. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree; but, at appellant's request, the mandate was later withdrawn and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction; because it appeared that the jurisdiction of the District Court had been invoked solely under § 24, paragraph 14, of the Judicial Code, on the ground that the defendant's "rule" was unconstitutional. Carolina Glass Co. v. South Carolina, 240 U. S. 305, 318. Thereupon the case was brought here by direct appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code. No question is made as to the constitutionality of the statute creating the office of State Superintendent and defining his duties. The attack is upon the "specifica Opinion of the Court. 249 U. S. tions" in the bulletin which plaintiff assumes are a regulation, that is, a law. Its contention is that the so-called "rule" is not a proper exercise of the police power, and is void; because it is arbitrary and unreasonable, because it unjustifiably discriminates against plaintiff's product, and because it interferes with interstate commerce. The claim that it impairs the obligation of contracts is not now insisted upon. The "specifications" were not published as a regulation purporting to prescribe a course of action to be enforced by the power of the State. They embody, as the evidence shows, the result of prolonged investigation and extensive experimentation; and formulate the conclusion reached by the State Superintendent that every known automatic computing scale without an automatic compensating device is likely to mislead the customer who purchases at retail. In other words, the vice in this kind of scales was found by him to be generic; and as the objection was not one due to a defect of an individual machine, it was deemed useless to make individual tests. The "specifications" are a law only in the sense that every truth of general application may be spoken of as a law. If they may be termed a rule, it is only in the sense that they furnish a guide for the action of those interested. That is, the function of the "specifications" is educational and, at most, advisory. The item was one appropriate for a bulletin "of instruction and information to dealers, and weights and measures officials." That such was its purpose is shown also by the other items contained in the same issue of the Bulletin. In the pages preceding the "specifications" here in question, was one item giving elementary information as to how prosecutions for violation of the General Business Law may be conducted, and two recent opinions of the Attorney-General of New York addressed to the State Superintendent. The first concerned the power of |