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Opinion of the Court.

EX PARTE TRACY, PETITIONER.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO RENEW APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.

No., Original. Motion submitted April 21, 1919.-Decided April 28, 1919.

Where this court denies leave to file a petition for habeas corpus, because of the competency of other courts to afford the relief sought, a motion for leave to apply for the writ to the District Court will be denied as superfluous.

Motion denied.

The case is stated in the opinion. (See also post, 588.)

Mr. C. M. Oneill for petitioner.

PER CURIAM:

For the purpose of redressing assumed violations of the Constitution and laws of the United States by means of habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of other competent courts to afford relief may not be passed by and the original jurisdiction of this court be invoked, in the absence of exceptional conditions justifying such course. Matters v. Ryan, ante, 375.

When leave to file the petition for habeas corpus was previously denied, without a suggestion as to the existence of any exceptional condition which would have justified a contrary view, such refusal presumably was based on the existence of the right to seek, if desired, other and appropriate sources of relief. From this it follows that although we pass the application of the doctrine, that the refusal of habeas corpus is not the thing adjudged precluding a subsequent granting of such writ

Opinion of the Court.

249 U. S.

upon the same facts, nevertheless there is here no reason to grant the order prayed, since the previous order rested upon the right and duty to petition for relief, if habeas corpus was desired, to other and appropriate sources of judicial power.

No reason, therefore, exists for granting the motion. and to avoid any implication of a necessity which does not obtain, the motion is

Denied.

RATON WATER WORKS COMPANY v. CITY OF

RATON.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

No. 348. Argued April 29, 30, 1919.-Decided May 5, 1919.

When diverse citizenship is absent and the jurisdiction of the District Court is based solely upon the ground that the suit arises under the Constitution of the United States, an appeal will not lie to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but only, and exclusively, to this court.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Abram J. Rose, with whom Mr. Jesse G. Northcutt and Mr. Henry W. Coil were on the brief, for Raton Water Works Co.

Mr. John Henry Fry, with whom Mr. George L. Nye was on the brief, for City of Raton.

Memorandum opinion by THE CHIEF JUSTICE.

The certificate states that in a cause pending before it on appeal from the district court, the jurisdiction of

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the court below to entertain the cause on appeal was questioned on the ground that the judgment of the district court was exclusively susceptible of being reviewed by direct appeal to this court. The certificate further states that the parties to the cause in the district court were both corporations of New Mexico and the jurisdiction of the district court to entertain the suit was based solely upon the ground that it was one arising under the Constitution of the United States.

Resulting from these conditions the question which the certificate propounds is this: "Has this court [the Circuit Court of Appeals] jurisdiction of the appeal?" The solution of the question is free from difficulty, since whatever at one time may have been the basis for hesitancy concerning the question the necessity for a negative answer is now conclusively manifest as the result of a line of decisions determining that, under the circumstances as stated, the Circuit Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction of the appeal, as the exclusive power to review was vested in this court. Judicial Code, §§ 128, 238; American Sugar Refining Co. v. New Orleans, 181 U. S. 277-281; Huguley Manufacturing Co. v. Galeton Cotton Mills, 184 U. S. 290, 295; Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189 U. S. 71, 73; Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 202 U. S. 453, 458; Carolina Glass Co. v. South Carolina, 240 U. S. 305, 318.

A negative answer to the question propounded is therefore directed. And it is so ordered.

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BEAUMONT, ASSIGNEE OF BORCK, v. PRIETO ET AL., ADMINISTRATORS OF LEGARDA, ET AL.

APPEAL FROM AND ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

No. 303. Argued April 17, 1919.—Decided May 5, 1919.

In the interest of justice the court may decline to dismiss a case upon the ground that the writ of error and citation were not made returnable in time, where the irregularity had color of authority from the court below and one of its judges. P. 555.

An offer to sell real property, in the form of an option allowing three months in which to buy at a certain price, is not accepted by an offer to purchase at that price, conditioned to be paid on a date specified (beyond the three months) or "before and with delivery" of clear title.

Id.

The opportunity to accept a continuing offer is lost by making a counter offer. P. 556.

The court will not disturb a decision of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines on a local question of contract, unless clearly wrong.
Id.
Affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Joseph D. Sullivan, with whom Mr. T. T. Ansberry and Mr. Thos. D. Aitken were on the brief, for appellant and plaintiff in error.

Mr. Alex. Britton, with whom Mr. Evans Browne, Mr. H. W. Van Dyke and Mr. Charles C. Cohn were on the briefs, for appellees and defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit for the specific performance of an alleged contract to sell land. The court of first instance made a

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decree for the plaintiff, but the decree was reversed by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and the defendants were absolved from the complaint. There is a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the writ of error and citation were not made returnable in time. But without going into particulars, as the appellant had color of authority from the court and a judge of that court, it appears to us that justice will be better served by dealing with the merits of the case. See Southern Pine Co. v. Ward, 208 U. S. 126, 137.

On the merits the only question is whether the alleged contract was made. The first material step was the following offer, dated December 4, 1911: "Mr. W. Borck, Real Estate Agent, Manila, P. I. Sir: In compliance with your request I herewith give you an option for three months to buy the property of Mr. Benito Legarda, known as the Nagtahan hacienda, situated in the district of Sampaloc, Manila, and consisting of about 1,993,000 square meters of land, for the price of its assessed government valuation. B. Valdes." There is no dispute that the assessed government valuation was 307,000 pesos, that Legarda owned the land and that Valdes had power to make the offer. On January 17, 1912, Borck wrote to Valdes: "In reference to our negotiations regarding" the property in question, "I offer to purchase said property for the sum of three hundred and seven thousand (307,000.00) pesos, Ph. C., cash, net to you, payable the first day of May, 1912, or before and with delivery of a torrens title free of all encumbrances as taxes and other debts." There was dispute about the admissibility of this letter and its being signed, but we see no occasion to disturb the opinion of the Supreme Court that it was a part of the transaction and was admissible. No answer was received, and on January 19 Borck wrote again, saying that he was ready to purchase the property at the price and that full payment would be made on or before

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