It will be seen from this statement that although the relator was definitely removed from office as of June 30, 1913, and was forcibly ejected from the Government office building on July 20, 1913, he did not file his petition until more than twenty months later, April 30, 1915. His only explanation for this delay is the allegation, which was denied, that he had made every reasonable effort to have his rights in the premises accorded him and to be restored to office, but without avail.

Without discussion of the authority of the Secretary of the Interior to remove the relator without filing charges against him and giving him an opportunity to answer, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia on the ground of laches, and the case is here on writ of error.

In this conclusion we fully concur.

This court has lately said that while mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, it is a remedial process which is awarded, not as a matter of right, but in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion and upon equitable principles, Duncan Townsite Co. v. Lane, 245 U. S. 308. It is an extraordinary remedy, which will not be allowed in cases of doubtful right, Life & Fire Insurance Co., v. Wilson, 8 Pet. 291, 302, and it is generally regarded as not embraced within statutes of limitation applicable to ordinary actions, but as subject to the equitable doctrine of laches. Chapman v. County of Douglas, 107 U. S. 348, 355; Duke v. Turner, 204 U. S. 623, 628.

The remedy is provided for in a separate chapter (c. 42) of the Code for the District of Columbia with detailed requirements which differ so greatly from the pleading and practice prescribed for ordinary actions that we cannot doubt that Congress intended to continue the special character which has been given the proceeding from our early judicial history, United States v. Lawrence, 3 Dall. 42; Life & Fire Insurance Co. v. Wilson, supra;

and we cannot discover any intention to include it within the general provisions for the limitation of actions. (§ 1265.)

When a public official is unlawfully removed from office, whether from disregard of the law by his superior or from mistake as to the facts of his case, obvious considerations of public policy make it of first importance that he should promptly take the action requisite to effectively assert his rights, to the end that if his contention be justified the Government service may be disturbed as little as possible and that two salaries shall not be paid for a single service.

Under circumstances which rendered his return to the service impossible, except under the order of a court, the relator did nothing to effectively assert his claim for reinstatement to office for almost two years. Such a long delay must necessarily result in changes in the branch of the service to which he was attached and in such an accumulation of unearned salary that, when unexplained, the manifest inequity which would result from reinstating him renders the application of the doctrine of laches to his case peculiarly appropriate in the interests of justice and sound public policy.

In this conclusion we are in full agreement with many state courts in dealing with similar problems. McCabe v. Police Board, 107 Louisiana, 162; Stone v. Board of Prison Commissioners, 164 Kentucky, 640; Connolly v. Board of Education, 99 N. Y. Supp. 737, and cases cited; Clark v. City of Chicago, 233 Illinois, 113.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that it is entirely unnecessary to consider whether the removal of the relator from office was technically justified or not, since by his own conduct he has forfeited the right to have the action of the Secretary of the Interior reviewed, and the judgment of that court is therefore

Affirmed.

Opinion of the Court.

UNITED STATES v. GUDGER.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA.

No. 408. Argued December 11, 1918.-Decided April 14, 1919.

The Reed Amendment, prohibiting the transporting of liquor in interstate commerce "into" any State the laws of which prohibit its manufacture, etc., does not preclude its transportation through such a State to another.

Affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Frierson for the United States.

Mr. Joseph S. Graydon, with whom Mr. Lawrence Maxwell was on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

Virginia being a State which prohibits the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, the defendant in error was indicted for having transported into that State an enumerated quantity of whisky in violation of the provision in § 5 of the Post Office Appropriation Act of March 3, 1917, known as the Reed Amendment. (39 Stat. 1058, 1069). For the purposes of a motion to quash, the United States Attorney furnished a bill of particulars of the evidence which the Government intended to offer to sustain the indictment, and the defendant also made admissions which were recited in such bill. The motion to quash, as elucidated

Opinion of the Court.

249 U. S.

by the bill of particulars, was granted on the ground that the statute, when rightly construed, did not embrace the acts charged. The United States prosecutes error.

The case stated by the court below is this:

"That the defendant was a passenger on a railroad train from Baltimore, Maryland, to Asheville, North Carolina, and that while the train was temporarily stopped at the station at Lynchburg, Virginia, he was arrested, his baggage examined, and it was found that he had in his valise some seven quarts or more of whisky. The particulars show clearly that the evidence will be that he had no intention of leaving the train at Lynchburg or at any other point in Virginia and that his sole intention was to carry the liquor with him into the State of North Carolina to be there used as a beverage."

In addition to these facts we observe that the bill of particulars contained this recital:

"The charge in the indictment that the defendant caused to be transported liquor to Lynchburg, in the State of Virginia, has no other foundation than the fact that he was arrested while the train was stopped at the railroad station in Lynchburg, Virginia, and while he was en route to Asheville, North Carolina."

The bill stated besides, that the accused was traveling on a through ticket from Baltimore to Asheville and return.

Under this state of facts we think the court was clearly right in quashing the indictment, as we are of opinion that there is no ground for holding that the prohibition of the statute against transporting liquor in interstate commerce "into any State or Territory the laws of which State or Territory prohibit the manufacture," etc., includes the movement in interstate commerce through such a State to another. No elucidation of the text is needed to add cogency to this plain meaning, which would however be reinforced by the context if there were need

to resort to it, since the context makes clear that the word "into," as used in the statute, refers to the State of destination, and not to the means by which that end is reached, the movement through one State as a mere incident of transportation to the State into which it is shipped.

The suggestion made in argument that although the personal carriage of liquor through one State as a means of carrying it beyond into another State violates the statute, it does not necessarily follow that transportation by common carrier through a State for a like purpose would be such violation, because of the more facile opportunity in the one case than in the other for violating the law of the State through which the liquor is carried, is without merit. In last analysis it but invites, not a construction of the statute as enacted, but an enactment by construction of a new and different statute.

Affirmed.

MATTERS v. RYAN.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.

No. 141. Submitted January 16, 1919.-Decided April 14, 1919.

The District Court has no jurisdiction in habeas corpus to determine and award the custody of an infant at the suit of an alien against a citizen of the State of forum, when the only substantial question is which of the parties is the mother. P. 377.

The claim that such a case arises under a law of the United States because the infant was imported by the respondent in violation of the Immigration Laws is frivolous. Id.

Quare: Whether diversity of citizenship with an averment of pecuniary interest could confer jurisdiction on a federal court in habeas corpus. P. 378.

Reversed.