Opinion of the Court.

249 U. S.

of those that are reviewable in this court not by writ of error but by writ of certiorari.

By § 7 of the latter act it was provided that the right of review under existing laws in respect of judgments entered before the act took effect (October 6, 1916) should remain unaffected for the period of six months thereafter, but at the end of that time should cease. The present writ of error was applied for within the six-months periodDecember 19, 1916-and the question whether our jurisdiction is properly invoked by this form of writ depends upon whether the judgment sought to be reviewed was "entered before this act takes effect" within the meaning of § 7.

The action was brought against the railway company in a district court to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate, and a trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa, and that court on November 26, 1915, delivered an opinion for affirmance (178 Iowa, 998), and judgment was entered accordingly. A petition for a rehearing was filed, which, after consideration, was overruled April 7, 1916 (157 N. W. Rep. 192; 178 Iowa, 998), and a writ of procedendo was awarded. Thereafter a second petition for rehearing was filed, and, having been fully considered, was overruled on December 18, 1916, and judgment to that effect duly entered. The petition for allowance of a writ of error from this court, presented on the following day to the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Iowa, averred that the final order and judgment affirming the judgment of the district court was entered by the supreme court on the eighteenth day of December, 1916; and for review of this judgment a writ of error was prayed for and allowed.

We think this was a correct statement of the effective date of the judgment sought to be reviewed.

Section 237, Judicial Code, both before and since the

amendment of September 6, 1916, permits of the review by this court only of the final judgment or decree of the highest state court in which a decision in the suit could be had. It is only a judgment marking the conclusion of the course of litigation in the courts of the State that is subjected to our review. Hence, whatever its form of finality, if a judgment be in fact subject to reconsideration and review by the state court of last resort through the medium of a petition for rehearing, and such a petition is presented to and entertained and considered by that court, we must take it that by the practice prevailing in the State the litigation is not brought to a conclusion until this petition is disposed of, and until then the judgment previously rendered can not be regarded as a final judgment within the meaning of the act of Congress. We said recently in an analogous case: "If it were not so, a judgment of a state court susceptible of being reviewed by this court would, notwithstanding that duty, be open at the same time to the power of a state court to review and reverse." Andrews v. Virginian Ry. Co., 248 U. S. 272. It results that in the present case the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa did not become a "final judgment" until December 18, 1916, and by reason of the nature of the only federal questions raised in the record it then was reviewable in this court only by writ of certiorari, because of the above-cited provisions of the Act of 1916.

Writ of error dismissed.

NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, SUCCESSOR OF THE NEW YORK CENTRAL & HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY, v. PORTER, FOR HERSELF AND FOR HER FOUR MINOR CHILDREN, ETC., ET AL.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 134. Submitted January 10, 1919.-Decided March 3, 1919.

An employee of a railroad company killed by a train while removing snow on its premises from a space between a platform and a track used in interstate as well as intrastate commerce, held employed in interstate commerce; the resulting rights and liabilities were determinable by the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the State Workmen's Compensation Law was inapplicable.

172 App. Div. 918, reversed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Robert E. Whalen for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Merton E. Lewis, Attorney General of the State of New York, and Mr. E. Clarence Aiken for defendants in error. Mr. Albert T. Wilkinson, for defendants in error, in a separate brief.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

Lewis M. Porter, a section-man, was struck and instantly killed by plaintiff in error's engine attached to a passenger train and moving along the main track. The Appellate Division affirmed an award in behalf of his

widow and children under the New York Workmen's Compensation Law.

If the deceased was employed in interstate commerce when the accident occurred, consequent rights and liabilities arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the state statute did not apply. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147; Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170.

The evidence showed and the State Workmen's Compensation Commission found: "Lewis M. Porter resided at Camden, N. Y., and upon the date of the accident, December 17, 1914, was in the employ of The New York Central Railroad Company as a laborer. On said date, while engaged in shoveling snow upon the premises of The New York Central Railroad Company between the west bound track and a platform near the intersection of said tracks and Mexico Street in the Village of Camden, he was struck by the engine of a passenger train known as train No. 49, which was proceeding northerly on the west bound track, receiving injuries from which he died immediately. The tracks of The New York Central Railroad Company at the point where the deceased was working, were used for the purpose of transporting both interstate and intrastate cars and both interstate and intrastate commerce.'

Considered in connection with our opinions in Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 229 U. S. 146; Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, and cases there cited, we think the circumstances here presented make it quite clear that when killed Porter was employed in interstate commerce. Accordingly, the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.

MR. JUSTICE CLARKE dissents.

MISSOURI & ARKANSAS LUMBER & MINING COMPANY v. GREENWOOD DISTRICT OF SEBASTIAN COUNTY, ARKANSAS, ET AL.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.

No. 149. Submitted January 17, 1919.-Decided March 3, 1919.

A revivor to escape the statute of limitations adds no new efficacy to a judgment in respect of the power of the legislature to stop the further running of interest. P. 172.

A judgment of the United States Circuit Court, based on non-interestbearing county warrants, provided for interest at a specified rate on the amount of the judgment until paid. A later act of the legislature declared that thereafter judgments on such warrants should bear no interest. Held, consistent with the contract clause and due process. Id. Morley v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 146 U. S. 162. Interest on judgments allowed by statute merely is not contractual but a penalty or liquidated damages. P. 173.

Quare: Is this true of a judgment based on a contract stipulating for interest? Id.

Affirmed.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. John H. Vaughan and Mr. B. R. Davidson for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Thomas B. Pryor for defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the court.

Article XVI, § 1, Constitution of Arkansas (1874), declares: "Nor shall any county, city, town or other municipality ever issue any interest-bearing evidences of in