the payment of debt, the court must be satisfied by the pleadings, by an agreement of the parties, by affidavits filed, or by a report of a commissioner or commissioners, whether or not the property can be divided without materially impairing its value, and may cause it to be divided, with suitable avenues, streets, lanes or alleys, or without any of them.

(2) If it is necessary to sell for the payment of debt, a parcel of real property which cannot be divided without materially impairing its value, the officer shall sell the whole of it, though it bring more than the sum to be raised, and the court shall make proper orders for the distribution of the proceeds.

(3) The plaintiff in an action to enforce a lien on real property shall state in his petition the liens, if any, which are held thereon by others, and make the holders defendants; and no sale of the property shall be ordered by the court prejudicial to the rights of the holders of any of the liens, and when it appears from the petition or otherwise, that several debts are secured by one lien, or by liens of equal rank, and they are all due at the commencement of the action, or become so before judgment, the court shall order the sale for the pro rata satisfaction of all of them, but if, in such case, the debts be owned by different persons and be not all due, the court shall not order a sale of the property until they all mature. If all such liens be held by the same party, the court may order a sale of enough of the property to pay the debts then due, unless it appear that it is not susceptible of advantageous division, or that, for some other reason, the sale would cause a sacrifice thereof, or seriously prejudice the interests of the defendants, but the holder of a prior lien may enforce the same when the debt thereby secured is due, notwithstanding the existence of inferior liens,

whether the debts secured thereby are due or not; and the holder of an inferior lien, when the debt thereby secured is due, may enforce the same by a sale of the land subject to a prior lien or liens thereon, where the debt or debts secured thereby are not yet due. Provided that the provisions of this act shall not apply to any liens now of record.

(Neither approved nor disapproved by the Governor.)

CHAPTER 106.

AN ACT authorizing J. W. Ray to sue the State of Kentucky. Whereas, in the year 1898 the Adams and American Express Companies by their presidents brought suits in the United States Circuit Court at Frankfort against Samuel H. Stone then Auditor of the State seeking to enjoin him and the State from collecting franchise taxes assessed against said two companies for past years since 1892, which said suits were delayed and in 1900 were revived against Gus G. Coulter, then Auditor and including therein subsequent years' taxes assessed pending liti gation and in such suits so revived John W. Ray attorney, was employed to defend for the Auditor and the State of Kentucky, by the Auditor Gus G. Coulter and with the consent of the then acting Attorney General Robert J. Breckinridge, and under such employment said Attorney Ray did present such defenses as could be made and after having been defeated in the Circuit Court on proof taken in New York and the records, successfully prosecuted an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals at Cincinnati and there succeeded in obtaining a dismissal of such suits, as to some years for want of jurisdiction to sue the State, and as to some years dismissal because prematurely brought. For the year where dismissed for want of jurisdiction Ray has been fully paid for his services and claims nothing; and whereas subsequent suits were at once instituted by the same plaintiffs in the same court against the State Board of Valuation and Assessment, then composed of S. W. Hager, Auditor; H. M. Bosworth, Treasurer and H. V. McChesney Secretary of State, for the years included in the former suits wherein the court had held to have been prematurely instituted, and also included in the latter suits subsequent years of taxes accruing since the former suit had been filed, all such cases seeking to defeat the

State of Kentucky in its effort to collect taxes on the intangible property of such express companies and especially attacking the validity of the law as well as the method of the assessment as provided by the law; and whereas in these latter suits John W. Ray was employed by the then Auditor S. W. Hager, acting for the Board and with the consent of the other members thereof as well as with the consent and on the recommendation of the then Attorney General Napoleon B. Hays; and whereas under such authority it appears from the record of the United States Court in Frankfort, that said John W. Ray did represent said Board of Valuation in that litigation and was the sole representative of the State therein and filed all pleas and motions and so represented the interests of the State therein that in 1907 a judgment was rendered directing the amount ascertained to be due by said express companies for taxes for the several years to be paid into the State Treasury; and whereas it appears that the said express companies have long since paid into the treasury the sums so adjudged to be due in those suits in the United States Circuit Court in Frankfort and whereas it appears that said attorney John W. Ray has never been paid anything for his services in that litigation save his personal expenses of a trip to Maysville and one to Covington Ky., in the defense of such cases; Therefore, in order to do justice to said attorney in the matter of his services:

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:

That John W. Ray is hereby permitted to sue the Commonwealth of Kentucky, in the Franklin Circuit Court under the style of John W. Ray plaintiff against Robert L. Greene Auditor, defendant, in order to determine and allow after hearing the proof as to the value of the services rendered in the above cases against the State Board of Valuation and Assessment as above set out, a reasonable fee to said Ray, not exceeding thirty per centum of the amount of taxes paid into the Treasury by said express companies for the years in litigation and fixed by the judgment of the United States Circuit Court in those cases, for his services in representing the said board

and the State of Kentucky in the above litigation and when said judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court becomes final the Auditor is directed to issue to said Ray his warrant upon the Treasurer of the State of Kentucky for the amount of said judgment. and the Treasurer is directed to pay said warrant out of any funds in his hands not otherwise appropriated.

(Neither approved nor disapproved by the Governor.)

CHAPTER 107.

AN ACT designating the twelfth day of February of each year a legal holiday, to be known as "Lincoln Day."

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:

That the twelfth day of February of the year 1917, and the twelfth day of February of each year thereafter is hereby declared a legal holiday, to be known as "Lincoln Day" and the same shall be recognized, classed and treated as other legal holidays under the laws of this Commonwealth.

(Neither approved nor disapproved by the Governor.)

CHAPTER 108.

AN ACT to amend Section 3 of an Act entitled "An Act relating to consolidated corporations organized under general laws for the purposes of constructing, maintaining and operating bridges across rivers forming boundary lines of this Commonwealth and declaring an emergency." Said Act became a law February 15, 1893, without the approval of the Governor, and being Chapter 21 of the Acts of the General Assem. bly of 1893; and said section being Section 845, Kentucky Statutes, Carroll's edition.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:

That Section 3 of an Act entitled "An Act relating to consolidated corporations organized under general laws for the purposes of constructing, maintaining and operating bridges across rivers forming boundary lines of this Commonwealth and declaring an emergency," said Act became a law February 15, 1893, without the approval of the Governor, and said Act being Chapter 21 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1893, and said Section being Section 845 Kentucky Statutes, Carroll's Edition, be and the same is hereby amended so that said section as amended shall read as follows, to-wit:

Section 3. Such corporation may take reasonable tolls for crossing such bridge, but it shall be unlawful to demand, charge, exact or receive for passage over such bridge any toll, fare, compensation, reward, or thing of value whatever greater than or in excess of, the following rates, to-wit: For persons passing over such bridge on foot, two cents for a single crossing, twenty-five crossings for twenty-five cents; ten crossings for ten cents; five crossings for five cents; for vehicles drawn by one horse, ten cents for a single crossing, or eleven crossings for one dollar; for vehicles drawn by two horses, fifteen cents for a single crossing, or seven crossings for one dollar; for vehicles drawn by three horses, twenty cents for a single crossing or five crossings for one dollar; for vehicles drawn by more than three horses, five cents for every horse more than three; for horse with rider, five cents; for timber wheels drawn by two horses, thirty cents; for timber wheels drawn by three or four horses, fifty cents; for timber wheels drawn