It is fit that, in the last place, we consider him as a speaker-a speaker for business, not show-a debater. In this capacity he stands very high indeed. We cannot deny that Julius Cæsar was, in the common acceptation of the term, a greater orator-he of whom it was said, that, had he devoted himself to the Forum, as he intended probably at one time (for he studied under a professional rhetorician at Rhodes), "no one else could have been named with Cicero." But he was, in all likelihood, not equal as a debater; and there seems reason to think that Cæsar's eloquence was, in a great degree, artificial and rhetorical, notwithstanding the force ascribed to it.* One observation made upon it by Quinctilian (imitating, by the way, if not parodying, a passage of Livy) seems equally applicable, in part at least, to the Duke, that he made speeches with the same genius with which he made war-the same vigour and the same acumen. We might not add the same vehemence; but, on the other hand, the Roman orator, we may safely affirm, argued less closely, expounded more diffusely, and had not always before his eyes in speaking that elementary proposition, which the Duke never for an instant lost sight of, whether in speech or in action-that the shortest line between two points is a straight line. It would be difficult to find any one in any assembly who more clearly and concisely brought before It is hardly necessary to remark, that we have no remains of his speeches; for the notes he gives of his addresses (conciones) to the soldiers, in his Commentaries, are only the heads, and were written long after; the speech in Sallust, like that of Cato, is plainly the historian's own composition. Sallust's diligence in collecting information upon that famous debate, must have been confined to the topics merely, though Cicero had laid the foundation of reporting, and even of short-hand reporting, on that occasion, by causing the debates on the conspiracy to be thus preserved, as we learn from Plutarch (Cato, c. 23.) But even as to the topics, the Fourth Catalinarian shows how unfaithful Sallust's account of the debate is. Indeed, nothing can be more unfair than his whole treatment of Cicero.-Of Cæsar's letters two or three remain, and they are truly admirable. his audience the whole of his subject, the whole which it was important to unfold,-who left so distinct an impression of the opinions he meant to declare, or gave more cogent reasons in support of them-reasons, if not sufficient to convince others, yet quite sufficient, not only to show the grounds of his own conviction, but that he logically deduced it from his premises. Accordingly he was, (experto crede) of all the debaters in our day, with perhaps the exception of Lord Plunket, the most difficult to grapple with, the hardest to answer. Nor did it seem to make any difference that the subject happened to be one with which he was little conversant in detail. His speeches on commercial and financial questions were really as admirable as on subjects of foreign and military policy. Nay, I shall not easily forget the remark of one of the greatest orators of our times (Lord Ellenborough) when we left the House of Lords together, in equal admiration of the Duke's extraordinary speech upon Subscription, as connected with the Universities, a question with which he must be supposed little familiar: "Did you observe that the whole hour he spoke, not one topic but the best chosen, nor one word for which another equally fitting could have been substituted?" It is to be remembered that he greatly improved as a speaker after he became Prime Minister in 1828. The perfect modesty of his nature, with his unfailing good sense (if indeed the two things can be separated), made him incapable of harbouring any notion that it was beneath him to take pains: and as it had been once or twice thrown out in debate that he had a habit of begging the question (the pleasantry coming from a friendly quarter, that there were different kinds of beggars, the sturdy as well as the gentle and dexterous), it might be seen that latterly he carefully avoided falling into an error extremely natural to an unpractised orator. As for his undeviating candour and fairness, his constant love of justice, his perpetual desire to securc their due to all, his instinctive hatred of oppression and contempt of fraud,-these are moral qualities, not rhetorical, and qualities which, if the most eloquent of all men, the unprincipled Greek orators, could have been made to comprehend, they certainly would not have much respected. Lord Denman once made a remark, strikingly true in itself, and which came with peculiar grace from the greatest judge of the day. It was when he saw the eagerness with which the Duke rushed forward, as it were, to defend some officer unfairly attacked, or to obtain for him the share of commendation that he thought had been inadequately awarded. "Of all that man's great and good qualities, the one which stands first, is his anxious desire ever to see justice done, and the pain he manifestly feels from the sight of injustice." 366 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE BAR AND BENCH. - As the alterations in our judicial system, which they are gravely pleased to call reform of the law, have now reached the Principality, we, its regular judges, are abolished, with its peculiar courts, and the judges of England are let in upon the Celtic countrymen of Howel-dha and King Arthur. It may be all very well for the state at large; for the individuals concerned, it is not quite so well. They give us some of us, at least retiring pensions; but we had much rather continue to work for our bread; and though the morsel was not very large, neither was the labour great. I used to reckon it child's play, compared to the Northern Circuit, which I quitted for it: and though the Courts were more dull than can easily be described, from the excessive stupidity of the people, both witnesses and jurors, the difficulty of getting anything like English out of them, or putting anything like sense into them,-the trifling nature of their endless disputes, the inextricable entanglement of their endless pedigrees, yet the assizes lasted but a couple of days at each place, for the most part; and there was great pleasure in their clear air and fine scenery, especially after the House of Commons and Westminster Hall had fatigued one, and made London intolerable: their streams were pure and refreshing, to say nothing of their fish; and their hills were wild and sunny, without taking into account the good mutton they fed. The place of a Welsh Judge, therefore, compatible with practice at the bar, and a seat in Parliament, was much prized in our profession, at least by all who either wished to retire from part of their fatigue, or who had less work than they could wish. It was a preferment, too, which sometimes led to higher place. But I freely admit that my judgment respecting the important change which assimilated the jurisdiction, is not an impartial one. I lost my place, and, except in my pension, had no compensation; for I am no great law reformer; nor, indeed, judging from what I have known of the tribe either at the bar or in society, am I disposed to be a reformer in any sense of the word. It has occurred to me that I may employ the addition thus made to my leisure, not unpleasantly to myself, and not unprofitably to those who come after me, by setting down without much pretension to order, and with no affectation of history, still less of system, such Recollections as from time to time occur to me, of the Bar and the Bench, since I have known them. There are not many of our body who have lived longer in it, or more associated with my brethren; and I believe there is no one who esteems both that "renowned profession" (as Erskine used to call it) and its members more affectionately than I have ever done. They have little therefore to apprehend from my pen, if I had any gall in my nature to distil through it. Moreover, as I really have no bias on my mind, and am writing only to amuse myself with these reminiscences, without any other object to gain, what I say will at least have the recommendation of being only said because it is true-a recommendation not very generally belonging to anecdotes, which are related with the design of either raising or lowering some persons, or with the more excusable, but not very respectable, desire of setting the table in a roar, by fancy dressed up in the cloak of memory. history, far be it from me to make any pretence to deal in any such wares. Whoever has led causes as As for |