D

URING the Empire of Japan's association with the Entente Powers in the Great War, Japanese statesmen concluded approximately eighty treaties, agreements, arrangements, or accords with the Republic of China.

These diplomatic moves made the period from 1915 to 1919 one of continuous negotiation, constituting with its world implications the most critical years in the Orient since the days of Genghis Khan. In this time the status of China changed from that of a neutral protesting infringements by either side, so far as external events went, to that of a belligerent aligned with the United States, the Entente, and Japan; on the other hand, the inner circle of happenings showed the unfolding of purposes more fundamental than any connection Asia had with the disastrous breakdown of the balance of power in the West.

Both the Republic of China and the Japanese Empire are participants in the Peace Conference. But there is more than one distinction to be made. Not only is the Mikado's Land included in the Supreme Council as one of the Five-Power Group possessing general interests, while China found her place among the belligerents recognized as having but particular interests; in the minds of

European and American statesmen is the belief that Japan is a factor to be figured with in the great settlement-China, an element to be figured over.

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

Already the progress of the great settlement has revealed this diplomatic evaluation.

The Peace Conference has brought out the territorial intentions of Japan, both regarding the insular Pacific and the Asiatic mainland. The Japanese line of action has been in a direction which to-day vitally affects the League of Nations, for the decisions made at the conference on the Far Eastern issues will establish the effectiveness of the Covenant. There emanated from Washington on February 28th an inspired statement, which, we are assured, "reflects the attitude of the Japanese Government."

This Japanese elucidation of her position at the Peace Conference (1) charges China with attempting to tear up treaties; (2) maintains that the Japanese arrangements cannot be reviewed by the conference because it has "for one of its principal objects the consecration in the forthcoming peace treaty of the inviolability of international contracts"; and (3) threatens China with the fate of

the Bolsheviki who "excommunicated themselves from the rest of the world by an impudent breach of international morality." It was Japan among the Great Powers who boldly formulated the doctrine that the secret diplomatic undertakings arranged during the European War should be made the foundations of the settlement and thus become an integral part of the League of Nations.

Thus the January sessions of the Peace Conference brought up two problems. First, considering that the Peace Conference has been convened to establish an equitable international settlement in all parts of the world, would the appeal for a decision on treaties binding 400 million people against their will bring

about their excommunication because their government asks a hearing on the merits of the case? Second, it raises the unescapable question of whether or not the League of Nations is a forum based on equity and a new international morality.

The position of China, advanced by Minister of Foreign Affairs Liu Cheng-hsiang, Minister Koo, Delegate C. T. Wang and the Chinese representatives, is her wish to establish her territorial integrity and freedom of action in the reconstructed world with the full recognition of her adhesion to the League of Nations. As China's President put it on the eve of the Paris Conference: "The proposal of President Wilson for making the league one of the terms of peace and for the cancellation of the doctrines of spheres

of influence and balance of power in Europe and elsewhere naturally receives the whole-hearted endorsement of China. If the proposed league becomes a fact, the nations of the world should stand on an equal plane, and secret diplomacy will then naturally be deprived of its sanction."

CLASSIFICATION OF TREATIES

The attempt of China to carry open diplomacy into Oriental relations uncovered a portion of the arrangements made by Japanese statecraft between 1915-1919.

The Paris Conference now has before it the task of considering three kinds of diplomatic transactions: treaties whose contents have been (1) There are the Sino-Japanese known from the time of signature. (2) The most numerous are the politico-economic agreements arranged to forward Japan's diplomatic purposes under the cover of business undertakings, partly published and partly an open secret so far as their main purport goes. (3) Most insidious is the group of "accords" essentially political in character, still hidden to the world by a Japanese diplomacy negotiating them with a ring of Chinese officials outside the Foreign Ministry and without the knowledge of the President of China.

Examined accordingly, there are two treaties and thirteen exchanges of notes now laid before the Peace Conference textually and drawn from the first and second classes of arrangements. The bulk of the second grouping, however, has not

been published officially; yet the policy of Japan has centered about this form of modus vivendi for the achievement of her ends-probably as many as forty-seven economic pacts being only known in a general way. Finally, there are probably not more than half a dozen understandings in the group of "accords," but these are built about the allimportant Sino-Japanese Military Convention whose missing text is expected to be forthcoming, furnishing the connection between the Military Party in Peking and Tokyo..

It is contended that China's entrance into the Great War has given the Powers the right to review these pacts, even going so far as to require the revision of the treaties in these three groups. The following is a transcript of the record: the arrangements laid before the Peace Conference are in ordinary type; those not yet published are italicized; and leading events fitting into the diplomatic chronicles are indicated in parenthesis.

(Aug., 1914-European War: Japan declares war on Germany, resulting in the reduction of Kiaochow by Anglo-Japanese action.)

May, 1915-Treaties resulting from 1915 Demands signed:

I. Shantung Treaty: China assents to Japan securing reversion of German rights, interests, and concessions in Shantung Province.

II. Notes relating to Shantung: (a) non-alienation of Shantung coastal territory; (b) Japanese penetration of interior through China being obliged to open treaty ports; (c) restoration of Kiaochow to China if Japan left the free disposal of the territory as the outcome of the war, made non-effective by four stipulations.

III. South Manchurian and Eastern Inner Mongolian Treaty: China extends Japanese leasehold of Kwantung and control of railways to 99 years, agrees to make

provisions facilitating Japanese colonization and development.

IV. Notes accompanying (III): (a) extends lease of Japan in Kwantung Territory to 1997; (b) of the railroads to 2002-2007; (c) commercial ports in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to be opened by China after consultation with minister of Japan; (d) Japanese to to be allowed to preempt mining rights in 7 coal, 2 iron and 1 gold area of the two Manchurian Provinces in the Japanese sphere; (e) Japanese capital given prior rights for railways in South Manchuria and Inner Eastern Mongolia; (f) Japanese to have right of prior appointment as advisors "on police, financial, military, and political matters" in this part of China; (g) defines "lease by negotiation" to admit virtual Japanese ownership of land; (h) Japanese subjects put under special arrangement for police laws, ordinances, and taxation in this region; (i) threemonth postponement of treaty articles.

V. Notes relative Japanese interests in the Yangtsze: Japanese political control extended to back financial domination of Hanyehping steel enterprise.

VI. Exchange relative to Fukhien Province: non-alienation of coasts or borrowing of money for military bases, etc., "from foreign nations."

May, 1915-Politico-financial loan agreements, arrangements or accords begun, negotiations extending to date. (July, 1916 Russo-Japanese signed with secret clauses affecting China.)

Alliance

(Nov., 1916-Terauchi Ministry commences acceleration of Japanese financial diplomacy.)

(Jan., 1917-Chengchiatun Agreement re Japan in Eastern Inner Mongolia, being an attempt to revive regionally part of the deferred Group V Demands of 1915.) (Feb., 1917-China ruptures relations with Germany.)

(July, 1917-China declares war on Germany.)

(Nov., 1917-Lansing - Ishii signed relative to China.)

Agreement

( 1917- Japan signs similar agreements with Britain, Italy, and France.) Jan., May, 1918-Sino-Japanese Military Convention, amplified by accords in June and September presumably, and subordinating China to Japanese military direction, nominally because of the Siberian intervention. (Infra, Feb., 1919.) Sept., 1918-Exchange of Notes providing for Japanese construction of three railways in South Manchuria, Inner Eastern Mongolia, and Chihli Province.

Sept., 1918-Exchange of Notes providing for Japanese construction of two railways in Shantung and Chihli. Sept., 1918-Exchange of Notes providing for joint operation of ex-German railway in Shantung, withdrawal of Japanese garrisons to Tsingtao excepting that of Tsinan, supervision of Chinese police force, and the withdrawal of Japanese civil administrations.

(Oct., 1918-Hara Ministry announces new loan policy outwardly affecting reorganization of Japanese political financing in China.)

Feb., 1919-Sino-Japanese Military Convention extended until Allies withdraw from Siberia.

1919-Politico-financial diplomacy of Japan leaves her possessor of various concessions, including 15 railway and communications rights; 6 mining regions; 20 industrial and monopolistic rights; and 9 essentially political.

JAPANESE POSITION

During this stage of the Peace Conference, Japan's position was commented on by statesmen at Paris as "puzzling."

was

However, the Japanese leaders were by no means idle. Following the beginning of the Chinese disclosures, the Mikado's land busily engaged in fortifying its diplomatic position. Of importance was the arrival of Marquis Saionji to head the Japanese delegation: Japan's premier in 1906 and again in 1911; associate of the late Prince Yamagata, who controlled Japan from behind the screen; and himself a member of that star-chamber group in the politics of Nippon known as the Elder Statesmen. Again, the Peace Conference began to hear more about Japan's Asiatic Monroe Doctrine and race equality, diplomatic hints calculated to dampen the ardor of those supporting China. Nearer home, Japanese statecraft of its sort has moved with

effective obliqueness; Japan is work

ing in Peking with her Chinese militarist coterie cooperating with Nipponese leaders without reference to China's administration as a whole, while the Mikado's land in the south is contributing materially to the efforts to wreck any compromise between the two factions in China at loggerheads.

Yet in spite of these efforts, China presents a united front externally. In controversy with Japan, the Chinese interests in the south are supporting the Peking Government; and China's delegation at the Peace Conference represents both wings in Chinese politics.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

Summarily, the situation comes down to this: First, does a neutral's entry into war cancel undertakings with a common enemy which an ally seeks by force to secure for herself? Second, are treaties signed under duress which affect allies and friendly countries voidable? Third, can the League of Nations review such war diplomacy? Fourth, if there is not concerted action through the League, will not the Powers move in the old way to destroy infringements on their interests?

China contends this reviewing of SinoJapanese relations by the Peace Conference would do more than show the hegemony Japan has attempted to establish over her by direct action. It would block efforts of Japanese statesmen to play a distorted Monroe Doctrine against the United States and Europe Japan's application of it to East Asia to prevent western exploitation of the Orient without denying to herself the stakes of aggrandizement.

On the 5th of March the Chinese delegation endorsed the League of Nations without qualification, saying: "We have known no little greatness. Maybe much that was lost will be regained under the international order in which we will be free to live our life untrammelled and unthreatened by the type of state whose material greatness is based on war."