At details, and that we should be on the alert for many possible contingencies. What is more, we can deal with more than one subject at a time. first the growing school boy may have to stop in his walk if he wishes to practise what is to him the new art of whistling; but he soon learns to do both things at the same time. So also in learning to play the piano, we can only conquer by dividing the task. It is, therefore, purely a practical question how many centres of thought or activity may be busy at a time. We can do thus much and no more; and within such limits, a number of subjects are possible. Engaged with both eyes and one hand, I trifle with the other hand, while re-producing some complex occurrence utterly foreign to the work and to the trifling According as the work or the reproduced occurrence draws more heavily on the fund of attention, so one or the other receives less attention. The quantity of subjects we can entertain is, therefore, not limited, except that with human beings any considerable difficulty absorbs nearly all the available attention. A race with a brain of a higher type could perhaps follow twenty or more serious subjects at once. [Test this section.] 96.-GENERAL METHODS IN THOUGHT. I asked myself whether I had ever before seen a certain face, and in a moment that face was re-produced. We wish at this stage to know if the connection between question and answer was direct or indirect. On closer inquiry the latter proves to be the fact. Times out of number I had put similar questions, and the demand hence became connected with the active tendency to recall along lines of similarity, identity, recency, etc.. We are, therefore, dealing with a secondary complication. The question. relates to an attempt to re-develop what is relevant, and thus the secondary process, instead of rushing to a conclusion or acting on its own initiative, reaches it in predetermined zigzag fashion. There is, of course, no need to imagine the active tendency to be elaborate, or connected with a sentence of so many words, since economisation is certain to curtail these luxuries. All that probably happens is that a brain area is readily sensitised, because it has been sensitised formerly. The very swiftness and matter-of-factness of the process is only what we should expect. We have an image, a connected active tendency and a resulting process. What is true of the above problem, is true generally. I may, for instance, be puzzled because there lies on the table a certain book which I do not remember to have taken from the shelves. [Experiment.] Suddenly I recollect that I have fetched the wrong volume. It is only apparently that the relevant answer stands in direct relation with the attitude of distraction. The fact is that the attitude of being puzzled is secondarily connected with the attitude of trying to re develop what is pertinent to the issue, i.e., what will explain the unexpected occurrence. We have here to do with a class of thought indirectly and not directly related. Secondary complications are naturally formed in conjunction with every line of activity which is at all common, and such lines constitute the streets and lanes of thought. Accordingly, whatever is important, striking, interesting, out of place, strange, obscure, useful, doubtful, subtle, pleasant, beautiful, witty, etc., etc.-all these representing needs or stimulating them -builds secondary complications of its own by which the trend of thought is in later life developed along well worn but unnoticed grooves. Let us consider an example, the only complete one which my note book offers. Some one says to me, jestingly, that my income amounts to £x 15s. per day, a figure which is considerably higher than the correct one. By a method of further exaggeration, secondary in character, I rejoin that the true sum is £x 195. 11 d., the figures developing while I am uttering them. I was saying £x 19s., and, seeking all the time organically for further exaggeration, I added 11d. Striving to exaggerate still further, I affixed another 3d. While each step was taken for secondary reasons, the content of every step was similarly decided, the sum 11 d., for instance, being a figure frequently quoted. Should something not quite relevant appear, it is silently suppressed, and our search is continued along known routes. Thus the general tendency as well as its expression is habitual. [Experiment.] Stout, in opposition to the above, argues that "of course each single pun requires attention; but the general trend of attention in this direction, rather than in other directions is a matter of habit" (Manual, 1898, p. 101). I have endeavoured to show that the distinction is not easily sustained. Again, consider the process by which I solve an intellectual problem. The problem presents itself. With its presentation is connected the recollection of what most favours my theory; with that an attempt to find material which tends to contradict that; with that, that which negatives it; with that, what proves it to be but partially true; with that, what shows that the argument proves too much; and so on. The progress of thought is, of course, not so easy of prediction as here suggested, since every class of thought is connected generally with several others rather than with one. But usually different individuals display different well marked secondary complications which oscillate only within trifling degrees. The inconsequence, the stupidity or the geniality of an intelligence is ever determined by the class of secondary complications which have developed. Take another illustration. I hastily read over a shop the words "Moral Decorations." 66 What," I mutter, "Moral Decorations ?" it must be "Floral Decorations." Now I might have recognised my mistake by a chance glance in the direction of the word, and there it might have ended; or I might have warned myself against mis-reading this particular word over this shop, in which case the warning would have formed a complication with that particular word in that particular place, and hence on re-reading, the warning would automatically develop, since we always try for connected thoughts when we are not absorbed.* The warning might, * In dream life we, therefore, take for granted what would cause grave doubts in waking life. Hence, in our dreams, those who are dead or at a distance may greet us unchallenged, and hence nonsense of every sort easily passes. again, have been attached to the re-reading of those words generally, or to reading-matter as a whole or to life generally. Perhaps with the notion of the mistake has been combined the notion of preventing the recurrence of such blunders. In that case, the recognition of my mistake in this particular instance would develop into the warning not to permit the occurrence of similar mistakes. Such general rules, embodied in secondary complications, are common; they constitute a man's intellectual character. The quality of the secondary complications is of supreme importance in practice. Shallow persons employ shallow rules, while wise men are guided by maxims of deep import. Accordingly, for the seeker after truths, such rules as "observe closely," "test the statement repeatedly," "show that the contention is partly true, that the contrary holds, that it proves too much or too little," are bracing; and so with the rule always to generalise daringly yet guardedly, in an order which gradually extends in every direction from what is most related to what is least related. It is methods such as these that make intellectual progress possible, rather than the syllogism which is cumbersome and presupposes them, or Mill's Canons of Induction which are dangerous without them. (Secs. 65a and 136.) tomes. No one who is not both cynical and perverse, would demand a moral justification of mathematics, since innumerable and sweeping truths have been deduced by their means. Their simple axioms have been indisputably useful. Not so with Logic. While boasting of certainty and infallibility, it has no fruits to show, only leaves bound up in ponderous In mathematics the simple law of identity is elaborated into a vast but graded system. In Logic we begin and end with certain so-called ultimate truths. While, again, mathematics have been actively applied in science, logic has remained in the hands of "philosophers," its rules being ignored by practical men. At the same time, the attacks on the syllogism have not abated since Locke gave the signal. To me it appears that a false psychology must mean a false logic, and that the barrenness of the methods of logic are the direct result of its disputable basis. Who would ever think in syllogisms? Those who, like Archbishop Whately (Logic, 1844, Appendix III.) apply them to obtain new truths, fail deplorably, and naturally the man who helps in doing the world's work, smiles when any one proves to him what no one calls into question. The shortcomings of the syllogistic method are evident. To begin with, the truths obtainable in ordinary life are derived from the judgment and not from demonstration. We are sure of very little, and we make sure of less because of the difficulties in the way. This indeterminateness alone would prove fatal to the use of the syllogism. However, its defects lie deeper. Let us choose a syllogism for illustration. All towns with a high-rate of mortality have a bad system of drainage; Therefore, Blank town has a bad system of drainage. Now many a person will agree with the reasoning of this syllogism, and yet, in a strict sense, our syllogism, by its straight form, has probably strengthened error. To begin with, the plausible major premise is incorrect, for the cause of a town's mortality rate is not to be settled in so off-hand a manner; and when we come to the minor premise it is quite likely that the mortality figures are hear-say or unreliable, and that the mortality is the reverse of that suggested. Hence we obtain a faultless conclusion of no value. Indeed, if we had ascertained that the facts were as we had stated them to be, a formal syllogism would be a pure luxury. What we need is a scientific catechism which shall allow for probability and which shall suggest methods of finding truths. We ought to be ready to ask as to the major premise: on what is the statement based? Does it contain official expert reports stretching over many countries and years, and are there no exceptions ? What are the verified reasons for this strict relationship? If, after that, the answer comes that it is reasonable to connect the two, we must say that the conclusion may be regarded as fair, but not as proven, and that the facts may even bear evidence to the contrary. So also must we proceed with the minor premise, and judiciously examine the statement by a number of queries as to its precise basis, and whether there is not a flaw somewhere. A catechism of such a nature might put even the splendid results of mathematics to shame, stimulating and guiding inquiry in the humblest as in the highest departments of life. They Ordinary reasoners well illustrate the absence as well as the need of method. readily assume that, say, the relation of the figures prove Board Schools to have reduced the number of criminals; they forget to question the correctness of the figures; and they do not ask whether legal or social influences have produced any changes. To this must be added the general presence of strong bias which accentuates the error. Hence only a deliberately elaborated system of education which takes account of these weaknesses and makes them impossible, will prove of service against the tendencies generally prevailing, especially where matters of “opinion" are concerned. (For criticisms on the syllogism, see Mill, Logic, 1875, bk. 2, chs. 2 and 3; Locke, Human Understanding, bk. 4, ch. 17, secs. 4-8; Sigwart, Logic, 1895, trs., pp. 359-62; Spencer, Psychology, 1890, ii, pp. 6-116; Lachelier, Théorie du Syllogisme, 1875; and Jevons, Principles of Science, 1877, who holds a modified theory which almost equally deserves the reproach of being mechanical and unsatisfactory for the advancement of learning.) The Mill's canons of induction (Logic, 1875, bk. 3, ch. 8) help us somewhat along the road; but they are still critical rather than constructive. Suppose I wish to shorten a string, how am I to do it by Mill's method? If the canons are of no assistance to me in that, they fail in what is the normal business of thought, i.e., to meet contingencies. moment my inquiry suggests a solution, the canons become of some value; but even here, how am I to apply the principles of agreement, difference, concomitant variation or residue? How am I to judge instances where the truths to be obtained are imperfect ones? Without, therefore, ignoring the canons, we must persist in our contention that their object, like that of the syllogism, is final criticism rather than the active discovery of truth. I wish to solve the problem of the relation between crime and Board Schools, and consult Mill's canons. Now if, apart from Mill, I do not know how to proceed, I shall never make a beginning. Suppose I do proceed, how am I to sift the figures? I ask my informant, Are you quite sure about your facts?" What if he answers "Yes; I am quite sure"? In that case, the solution of the problem, if it depended on the canons, would remain in a mournful condition. I may think that I have arranged every detail, when I have but dreamily skimmed the surface, or I fancy that I am triumphantly applying the rules, when, in fact, I am wasting my time. A stray hint thus appears a complete induction. Mill's chapters on the moral sciences are, in this manner, built up in a somewhat fanciful fashion, statements which are not even half-truths being paraded as thoroughbred inductions. His canons, therefore, we conclude, presuppose that we are carefully trained observers; that we have garnered a large stock of useful information; that we are disciplined in recognising hidden resemblances and differences; that we are inventive, methodical, and the like. In other words, his laws, valuable in their way, form but a trifling portion of a true scientific canon. The nature of a general unit or idea must now be fairly clear. We read the words "Moral Decorations." That being a not previously known complex, it necessarily appears strange. With the fact of strangeness has been systematically combined the process of doubt and re-examination, and hence in every case of strangeness the thorough student doubts and reexamines. [Examine cases of strangeness.] Similarly we may resolve that, subject to tests, whatever seems useful, should be applied not only once, but always; not only in the given direction, but also in related ones. When, accordingly, I chance to recognise that deliberateness of speech has been useful on a certain occasion, that recognition develops into the tentative recognition that deliberateness of speech, action and thought is always desirable for every one. We must not, however, strain the significance of language. The recognised slowness in deliberation, in connection with its effectiveness, may of itself impress us, so that we dwell on both aim and slowness with the result that the re-collection of an aim suggests the slowness. Hence when a new notion occurs to me, that fact alone sets me generalising without the interference of language and without reference to the fact. Generally speaking, economisation will eliminate complex imagery and language. [Observe such instances.] It seems somewhat strained to assume that the process of orderly development which I have sketched, quite accounts for the somewhat erratic course of thought. One wonders whether old ideas or those which are interesting have not some secret manner of entrance. The suspicion is legitimate; but a satisfactory answer is forthcoming. The organised notion of exploring out-of-the-way ideas and combinations of ideas is persistent, and results in keeping us in touch with much that would otherwise be wholly forgotten. So also such phrases as "old times, boyhood," etc., are organically attended to with fruitful consequences. Thus again the very pause in thought when it occurs, the very lack of action, is often organically connected with particular interests and lines of memories, and these latter are hence easily developed. In this manner I re-member connecting without deliberation the word "psychology" with any pause, thus ensuring persistent recurrence to the topic. It is in this fashion, by a multitude of organised arrangements, that breadth of thought and continuity of interest are maintained. We see here again that the flow of thought, as we know it in any case, is not determined by the particles forming the stream; and that for aught we can conjecture in any instance the flow may stop at any moment. Continuity of thought is due to the presence of highly developed needs, and if these needs are to be explained in terms of the secondary series, then it will be states of feeling and not states of imagery, as is popularly held, which will form the connecting link or force. 97.—KNOWLEDGE IS MOSTLY A SOCIAL PRODUCT. Human beings are part and parcel of a natural and social order to which on pain of punishment they are bound to conform. Hence their reactions will be of a type which is both need-determined and secondarily social, and hence a huge accumulation of somewhat loosely connected secondary complications will be evolved which characterise man and men. If the individual possessed great natural sagacity he would quickly manufacture rational secondary complications. As it is, the contrary is true. The individual laboriously makes his own what mankind has already laboriously elaborated. Where he is much left to his own devices, the complications are of the crudest and most unsatisfactory type, the interconnecting or reasoning being reckless, sporadic and devoid of far-reaching relations. This doctrine of the slow growth and the social nature of secondary complications will solve many questions in animal psychology. For example, a human being is shut in a room, which he leaves, when he wishes, by opening the door. A cat, on the contrary, can only open the |