the source of weakness than the parent of misfortune. Bitter experience has demonstrated it to be the worst species of economy that ever found advocates. Very little reflection would suffice to convince the people of this country, that they ought to place themselves in a position that should make them feel as conscious of their strength as they are proud of their freedom. Let us glance, for a moment, then, at the importance and necessity of enhancing our national strength. ་ With all the physical means required to produce the masculine proportions and strength of a giant, we seem indeed to exhibit but the shapeless stature and impotence of a dwarf. The public arm is completely unnerved, and our empty show of force has become the theme of jest and ridicule. It is a settled maxim, sanctified by truth and confirmed by history, that no nation can either maintain its rights or command the respect of others, whose weakness is such as to provoke insult, or invite aggression. There is a rank due to the United States,' says WASHINGTON, which will be withheld from the imputation of weakness.' It is not in the nature of things, that a people can preserve their independence and just rank, unless their means are not only adequate to their own protection, but sufficient to enforce an observance of those laws which are based on the principles of eternal justice. Hence the necessity of investing the supreme authority with that degree of vigor that shall operate as a continual shield, as well against the perpetration of wrong, as for the protection of right. The only mode in which these things are to be accomplished, is by increasing the military and naval force to an extent proportioned to the public exigencies and requirements. As a people, we ought to bear in mind that we are now the second commercial power on the globe, and that in all probability, before the lapse of another generation, we shall be the first. The importance, therefore, of materially augmenting the means of naval warfare, would seem to be a self-evident position. A rich and expanding commerce calls for naval protection, not only as regards individual rights and property, but with a view to the safety of the revenue. And this duty becomes the more obvious and binding, when we take into consideration a line of sea-coast little short of two thousand miles in extent, with bays, harbors, and rivers, almost without number, and of the easiest imaginable access. And moreover, the long train of misfortunes, and the consequent anguish occasioned by hordes of pirates and freebooters, who but recently infested the West India seas, and were continually hovering on our coast, committing murders and depredations of a most revolting nature, ought to admonish us how we again open the door to similar outrages. the destruction of nearly the whole of our naval strength, and in the introduction of the ridiculous gun-boat system, that memento of folly and stupidity, we behold the vivid picture of our shame and humiliation. We should learn wisdom, not less from the example of older nations, than from the effects of our own sore experience. From an early period, even until the present day, we have felt the evils which spring from an exposed and unguarded condition of our most valuable interests. With the exception of a few intervals, which were as fleeting as the causes that led to them, we have beheld a succession of fluctuations, pernicious, in the highest degree, to In the character, dignity, and prosperity of the country. Millions have been expended to no useful purpose. The noblest specimens of naval architecture ever produced by human ingenuity and skill, have been held up to the gaze of the nation, as if intended merely to flatter their pride and tickle their vanity. This seems to be a fair inference from the fact, that these same splendid models, instead of being fitted out and sent abroad to ride in proud majesty on their destined element, displaying our brilliant banner, and guarding our commerce in distant seas, were seen imperfectly housed under a loose covering, and partially imbedded in the mud, where they rested for a long series of years, until decay had nearly completed their ruin. But leaving the theatre on which our resolute and hardy seamen have won unfading laurels, and turning our eye to those countless towns and cities which reflect their brilliancy over a boundless domain, teeming with golden harvests, and abounding in riches, what heart can refrain from exulting in the consciousness that we possess so fair an inheritance? Yet with means most abundant, and with irresistible energies, if but wisely directed, we have recently had our soil polluted by a band of foreign mercenaries; nay, our very capitol, the pride of our heart, and bearing the name of our august political father, was sacked, blown up, and destroyed by a mere handful of these same wretched mercenaries! And where shall we seek for the origin of this stinging reproach, this humiliating stain upon our bright escutcheon? I aver, without fear of contradiction, that by far the largest portion of the wrongs submitted to by the nation, both by sea and land, and they have been infinitely great, was occasioned by a want of seasonable precaution, arising from the dread of incurring a moderate degree of expense, which in the end would have proved to be the most prudent economy that could have been adopted. A retrospect of public transactions for forty years past, will abundantly illustrate the correctness of my position. Individuals may find it to their account, and may insure durable respect, by listening to the dictates of sound philosophy and pure morals. Nations must be governed, in a marked degree, by different motives. They must assume commanding attitudes; for they will insure respect and confidence, only in proportion to the measure of their strength. From the dread of investing the national arm with the necessary vigor to maintain indisputable prerogatives, the government has placed its reliance on such restricted and diminished means, as almost to defeat the great end in view. Our standing force has been so limited in numbers as to be little more than an idle pageant. Had we possessed the requisite power, before the late resort to hostilities against Great Britain, who will not admit that it would have been attended with the most beneficial consequences? Who can doubt that it would have prevented the wasteful expenditure of an immense amount of blood and treasure? Who will deny, that it would have been the means of saving the lives of many thousands of valuable men, who were enticed from their families and private pursuits, to be sacrificed to very little purpose in the field? The painful fact must be fresh in the recollection of the great body of the people. Not only should we have been exempt from these losses and privations, by a timely application of efficient means, but the conclusion necessarily follows, that signal advantages, with an honorable reputation attendant on our arms, would have been the sure consequence. There was no want of fortitude and bravery, for these qualities could not be exceeded; but there was great deficiency in unity of action and skill. The whole transactions of the country, as shown in the history of the revolutionary struggle, as well as in the late one, furnish undeniable evidence of the fallacy of relying on militia, until they are well disciplined and inured to the dangers and habits of the field. But there is a wanton cruelty in calling from the bosom of society the most useful citizens, and exposing them to sudden destruction in open warfare. Nothing is more thoroughly confirmed by experience, than that troops can only become effective by means of long practice. War is an art that can only be learned, like any other business, by unremitting study and faithful drilling. But in all countries there are men enough who are willing to resort to it for support, and who give it a preference over every other calling. And let it be borne in mind, that they are generally of that class who are habitually idle, and not unfrequently vicious. By taking such men from the sounder ranks of society, we withdraw from it those whose example is often bad, and whose industry contributes very little to the health and increase of the body politic. And beside, do not such men always expect maintenance and protection, whether at home or abroad? Is it less expensive to the community to maintain them in private families, than it would be in the field? These are considerations which address themselves to every reflecting mind, and yet they are too generally overlooked. But without special reference to the conflicts with Great Britain, in which our losses and sufferings on land were most severe, arising wholly from the want of a competent and well prepared force, let us direct our attention to the contests with the fearless and wily sons of the forest. Here we find repeated and overwhelming proofs of our utter inefficiency. The frontier settlements, in many instances, have been frightfully ravaged, and subjected to murders and desolations of a most appalling character. Not only were helpless adventurers the victims of savage fury, and their improvements laid waste, but multitudes of noble hearted militia, who generously volunteered their aid from distant districts, have fallen martyrs in fierce conflicts with desperate savages, leaving hosts of sorrowing widows and fatherless children, the surviving witnesses of a most pernicious system. Among many cases that might be cited, to sustain my position, I will instance only two. One is of recent date; the other, with all its grim and forbidding aspects of slaughter and rapine, has long been, and still continues to be, the cause of inexpressible anguish to thousands, and of deep regret and mortification to the whole nation. My first allusion is to the war with Black Hawk, and the other, of course, to that of Florida. In the history of Indian warfare, it is perhaps difficult to point to an instance which has been the source of so many and such sore afflictions as this. And what adds poignancy to the reflection, is the notorious fact, that very little of military glory attaches to any of the operations, in any single campaign; nothing beyond the assurances of a manly spirit of patriotism and determined bravery. Little, indeed, has been gained; but the sacrifice of several thousand lives, at an expense of many millions, betrays very glaring defects in the incipient stages, as well as in the prosecution of the war. Military officers of acknowledged merit, and statesmen of distinguished abilities, have admitted, that a single regiment of regular troops, with the requisite equipments, stationed either at Galena, or at any other advantageous position, would have awed the savage tribes into subjection, and prevented all the calamitous effects of the war with Black Hawk. But our weakness was so manifest, and effectual resistance so improbable, that the bloody savage was prompted to mount the deadly rifle and tomahawk, and accordingly bounded forth with a fierce spirit, and a fixed determination to deck himself with those trophies which are obtained by the reeking scalp of the white man, and to load himself with plunder. The result of the contest was the overthrow of the savages; but not without prodigious loss and destruction on both sides. It has been a very general belief, by those who are deemed competent judges, that if fifteen hundred good troops had been seasonably divided between Tallahassee and St. Augustine, the Florida Indians would never have presumed on a resort to hostilities. But they were encouraged in settled and confirmed resistance, when they found how feeble and contemptible were the detachments sent against them, both in point of numbers and means. This is a melancholy subject on which to dwell; and when we review its distressing consequences, and call to recollection the noble spirits whose blood has been profusely poured out, and whose bones are left to whiten on the desert sands, the thoughtful mind becomes deeply agitated, and the susceptible heart smitten with sorrow. Before quitting the subject, let me again advert to that object of terror, a standing army. If, under the first pure and enlightened administration, when our numbers were few, and with most inadequate means, an army of five or six thousand men was deemed small, then surely no reasonable man could suppose that twenty-five thousand would be too strong a force to meet the present requirements. Our position may be somewhat illustrated, by referring to Great Britain. Her standing force, as I am advised, consists of not less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of this number, fifteen or twenty thousand only are retained at home; the rest are disposed of in distant possessions. Now I would ask, notwithstanding this formidable array of military power, do the inhabitants of Great Britain feel the slightest dread of a standing army? Are any people on earth more free or better protected? Does the light of heaven shine on a country where man is more safe, more exempt from danger and insult, or where wrongs are more promptly redressed? The inference, then, seems fair, that those who are for ever striking this ungracious chord, have no chord in their own breast that vibrates to the touch of honor, sympathy, or justice. |