copyright; provided, that the Court of Appeals shall certify that the question involved is of sufficient importance to render it proper that a final decision thereof should be made by the Supreme Court.

The provision that the decision of the Court of Appeals upon a question of fact shall be final, except as already stated, Judge Davis regards as wise and salutary, and in support of it recalls the facts in reference to comparatively recent legislation concerning the duties of the Supreme Court in admiralty cases, which, by relieving that court from finding the facts, as it formerly did, has greatly assisted the court in disposing of that class of controversies. In this respect the new bill assimilates the duties of the Supreme Court concerning questions of fact in all cases (except as already stated) to the practice already prevailing on writs of error, where the facts have been found by a jury or by the court by consent of the parties. In other words, it proposes to relieve the Supreme Court from perhaps the most perplexing and difficult labor hitherto imposed upon it, namely, the consideration of conflicting evidence and determination of disputed questions of fact, by following in all cases, so far as the Supreme Court is concerned (except as already stated) the practice hitherto pursued in actions at law.

This general scheme admirably meets, as the majority of your committee believe, all the conditions which, as I have ventured to suggest in beginning these remarks, must be met by any plan which shall propose an adequate remedy for the delays in question. It leaves the one Supreme Court untouched,-leaves it one body, to sit as one body, every member of which shall be responsible for its decisions, and shall personally take part therein. It provides, in effect, that the Supreme Court and its justices shall not be tempted, much less authorized, to adopt the practice which, as I have

pointed out, seems to be impliedly censured in the minority report, namely, of delegating to a part only of the judges the consideration, and practically the decision, of any cause. This plan therefore obeys strictly the mandate of the Constitution, and its provisions fully meet what Mr. Justice Story says was the distinct and important purpose of the constitutional provision establishing one Supreme Court, namely, uniformity in the decisions of the court of last

resort.

We think also that this scheme provides for.such uniformity, in another and very important way, far more effectually than the present plan or than any other which has been proposed, because it in fact enlarges the right of appeal now existing, and which is now limited to cases of $5,000 and upwards, so as to embrace every case really involving legal questions of general importance, even though the amount in controversy therein is the minimum amount for which suit can be brought in a federal court. It thus affords, I repeat, an opportunity of appeal, not now enjoyed, by suitors of every class and degree, provided only it shall appear that the question or questions of law upon which their right depends are questions of such nature or importance that the decision of the particular case would have some bearing upon the uniform administration of justice throughout the country.

I am quite sure that every lawyer who hears me will agree that the true functions of the Supreme Court of the United States is not simply or chiefly to give to any suitor, as such, a right to be heard a second time. That court does not sit to give litigants "another chance." Its great and august function is, above all, the one of which Mr. Justice Story speaks, namely, to secure that uniformity in the final interpretation of the laws daily administered by the inferior courts which is so important and necessary an

element of justice itself. I venture to affirm that, so far as that great need is reached, the highest function of the Supreme Court is fulfilled.

As to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court there is of course nothing to be said. That is established by the Constitution, and there is no question of modifying or changing that in any respect.

Another important consideration with reference to the Supreme Court is this, that by preserving its unity, in spirit and in fact as well as nominally, and by enlarging the right of appeal, as the scheme supported by the majority report proposes to do, the most effective provision is made not only for maintaining, but for enhancing, the dignity of that august tribunal, and for increasing the confidence and satisfaction with which suitors throughout the land shall receive its decrees. And any plan which, by reasonable anticipation, should imperil that result, would, for that reason alone, as it seems to us, be a plan which should be condemned.

The scheme advocated by the majority report also affords effective and complete relief to the Circuit Courts. It provides, as its advocates are convinced, judicial force enough to perform promptly and satisfactorily all the work of the Circuit Courts, and also the business likely to come before the new appellate tribunal. The addition of two circuit judges in each of the circuits, it is believed, will accomplish this end. If more should be needed, experience will demonstrate that fact, and will point out to Congress such necessity. If these considerations are further supported by a reasonable prospect that the plan which we advocate will accomplish the desired result, based upon actual experience of a similar plan which has been experimentally successful in the case of other courts suffering from similar embarrassments, it seems to us that they furnish an unanswerable argument in favor of the general scheme set forth in the " Davis bill," so called.

I have already adverted to the somewhat peculiar position which this Association occupies,-a body without legislative or other authority, in any sense, and whose recommendations must derive all their weight from the character of the men who compose it, and from the reasonable supposition that their declarations are the result of professional experience and skill, and of disinterested and careful consideration of the subject.

It is certainly desirable that the opinion expressed by the members of this Association here present should coincide, as far as possible, with those views, if we can ascertain them, which are held by our fellow-members, in whose name we act and speak. If, then, it should appear that, as the result of a careful and patient consideration of this plan, it has met with general acceptance and approbation,—still more, if it should be true that an experiment of the same general character, tried under circumstances so analogous as to furnish a real and valuable test of its merits, has been found to realize, to the full, the expectations of those who proposed it, should not these facts have great weight in determining what action we shall take here to-day?

But the fact is well known, Mr. President, that a plan, substantially identical with that supported by the majority report, was several years ago adopted in the state of Illinois for the purpose of relieving the Supreme Court of that State from precisely such embarrassments as we are now considering in respect of the United States Supreme Court. The fact is also well known, not only to the bar in Illinois, but to those of us who have occasion to know from time to time of the working of their judicial system, that this experiment has proved a complete success,-so complete, that those who strongly opposed its adoption are now not only satisfied with it, but advocate its application to the Supreme Court of the United States. I am glad to know that one of our members

from that state, present this evening, who is himself familiar with the workings of this system in Illinois, and who had much to do with its original advocacy and adoption there, will give us the benefit of his observations and experience as a member of the Illinois bar.

Surely, Mr. President, if the question before us is, in fact, a choice between two or more plans, and one of those plans is not only theoretically approved by large numbers of those whose opinions are weighty arguments, but has also been verified, so to speak, by experience such as that just mentioned, surely these are weighty facts in support of such a scheme. And, conversely, the absence of such experimental verification by any other plan, if not an argument against it, is at least a serious counterweight to any theoretical argument in its favor.

I have thus endeavored, Mr. President, as briefly and clearly as I could, to present the principal considerations of a general nature which have induced a majority of your committee to present the report signed by them. Doubtless in the course of the discussion there will be opportunity to answer questions and meet possible objections which may have presented themselves to the minds of others. Both reports are before the Association, and I presume that all, or nearly all, who hear me have carefully read them both. I have not deemed it necessary, or even appropriate, that at this time I should. undertake to anticipate what will doubtless be urged, and urged I am sure with great ability, in behalf of the scheme presented by the minority report, by our friends who have adopted the conclusions which it sets forth.

E. J. Phelps, of Vermont:

It is with extreme regret, Mr. President, that I have found myself constrained to differ in opinion upon this question, with those of my distinguished associates on the committee who have signed the majority report.