Moral Philosophy Of MooreTemple University Press, 2009 - 256 páginas A close examination of Moore's the early essays show that MooreOCOs famous naturalistic fallacy argument has been widely misunderstood" |
Contenido
| 3 | |
Intuition I A First Look | 35 |
Intuition II A Second Look | 59 |
Value Judgment The General Theory | 87 |
Judgments in Particular Contexts | 111 |
Ontology and Nonnatural Qualities | 131 |
Fact and Value The Logic of Moral Discourse | 157 |
Choice Consciousness and Freedom The Moral Self | 185 |
Notes | 219 |
Index | 225 |
Términos y frases comunes
action actual aesthetic analysis argues Aristotelian Society awareness beauty Bloomsbury's Prophet C. D. Broad called causal cognition complex concept Conception of Intrinsic consciousness consequences context criticism defined definist fallacy discussion distinction doctrine duty E-statements entities essay existence experience fact Frankena G. E. Moore good's grasp grounds Ibid ideal indefinable independent intrinsic value intuition intuitionism intuitionist irreducibility judge logical means ment metaphysical mind Moore holds Moore says Moore tells Moore's ethics Moore's ontology Moore's view moral agent moral choice moral philosophy natural properties naturalistic fallacy naturalistic fallacy argument Nature of Judgment non-natural properties notion object of thought obligation ontological organic unities person pleasure possible practical ethical predicate Principia Ethica proposition qualities question Ray Perkins reference Regan Rohatyn rules Russell Schilpp volume seems self-evident sense Sidgwick's simple concept simple particulars situation supervenience Sylvester Sylvester's thesis tion Tom Regan true truth unanalyzable utilitarianism wrong
Pasajes populares
Página 25 - What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?
Página 88 - In order to arrive at a correct decision on the first part of this question, it is necessary to consider what things are such that, if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation, we should yet judge their existence to be good...
Página 145 - By far the most valuable things, which we know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful objects.
Página 100 - Imagine these all combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason, and the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming feature.
Página 100 - Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admire — mountains, rivers, the sea ; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine these all combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that no one thing jars against another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth, containing everything that is most...
Página 92 - ... good' has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined.
Página 158 - And it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not 'other,' but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the 'naturalistic fallacy' and of it I shall now endeavour to dispose.
Página 5 - I am right in thinking that it is so used. My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about this I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement. But, if we understand the question in this sense, my answer to it may seem a very disappointing one. /If I am asked 'What is good?
Página 4 - It appears to me that in Ethics, as in all other philosophical studies, the difficulties and disagreements of which its history is full are mainly due to a very simple cause; namely, to the attempt to answer questions without first discovering what question it is that you desire to answer.
Página 25 - To readers who are familiar with philosophic terminology, I can express their importance by saying that they amount to this: That propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic; and that is plainly no trivial matter. And the same thing may be expressed more popularly, by saying that, if I am right, then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom as that "Pleasure is the only good" or that "The good is the desired" on the pretence that this is "the very meaning of the word.
Referencias a este libro
G. E. Moore's Ethical Theory: Resistance and Reconciliation Brian Hutchinson Vista previa limitada - 2001 |