things Civilly and Morally Good, being left alone * to their Contingent Educations and Complexions. But for Matter of Grace and Salvation, I confefs, to the Glory of God, that in us, being Dead in Sins and Trespasses, dwelleth no Good; That we cannot so much as think, much less do, any Good, unless the holy Ghost giveth us the Power both te Will and to Do it.

Adam before his Fall + was equally poised be. tween Perseverance and Defection; but he Falling by the Freedom of his Choice, lost those Perfections which made him Free: so that if his Posterity do any thing truly Good, it is from God, not from Themselves; whatsoever Bad they do, it is from Themselves not from God.

Here it may be Noted, that we may do many things Contingently in respect of God, which yet we do not Freely but Neceffarily in respect of our Selves; as our Sins are Contingent in respect of him, because he never imposed any Neceffity of Sinning upon us; yet they are Neceffary in respect of our Selves, seeing we being left to our Selves cannot but Sin. So many things which are Contingent in respect of our Nature, may be in some fort Neceffary in respect of our Persons; as those things which our Complexions, or Customs and Habits neceffitate us to: But this is an Impertinency.

They say moreover, that our Opinion contradi&eth both Scripture and Philosophy.

1. For Scripture, it is faid, that in him we Act. 14. Live, Move, and have our Being; by which Words we are taught, that all our Motions, of what kind soever, either Natural or Moral, Vital

* I do not reject the Opinion of Restringent Grace, if it be well expounded.

+ The opposite Tenet alloweth not Adam Free-will in his Innocency, as I could easily prove, and is partly affirmed already by the third Argument.

or Rational, are not only Guided, but also Caused by God himfelf.

2. Both in Logic and Metaphysics there are divers Rules confonant to this Scripture, as, Caufa caufe est etiam causa causati: causa secunda non agit nisi mota à prima, &c. Therefore Man doth no kind of thing but God is the first Caufe of it, and consequently whatsoever we do, we do Neceffarily in respect of him.

This is one of the Arguments which proveth more than our Adverfaries would have them, and by these Rules have I formerly in the second Argument proved, that they make God the Author of Sin; for if caufa cause be caufa causati, as doubtless it is, while they make God the Cause of all those Actions, which either are Sins, or the Causes of Sins, Questionless they make God, according to their own Argumentation, the Cause of Sins. But they have a limitation for this Rule, and say, thật it holdeth in caufis effentialiter fubordinatis, as they fay, that God is the Cause of all those things which are Effentially and Districtly done by our Wills; but Sins proceding from the depravation of our Wills, are Effects of a Cause, not directly fubordinate to God. The Limitation is found, but not applicable to their Instance; yea, the Limitation it self quite spoileth them: For 1. While Adam's Will was yet found, they teach, that God Decreed that Adam should eat the forbidden Fruit; now at that time they cannot say, but that Adam was a Cause effentially Subordinate to God. 2. They teach, that God is a Cause not only of our Actions, but alfo of our Volitions, as I may say; then these being the Causes of our Sins, are directly Subordinate to him.

3. Let us confider not only the Subordination between God and our Wills, but also between our Ations and their Moralites, and we shall perceive, thar

that according to the abuse of these Rules, they make God the Cause of our Sins. For that Rule, Causa causa est caufa caufati, is infallibly true expounded thus, The cause of any Effect, is the cause of all such Events as necessarily follow that Effect.

Now then, if as they say, God be a Neceffary Cause of all our particular Actions, feeing our Actions in reference to fuch and such Objects must needs be Sinful, it is manifest what followeth. For Example: Tho' to take Mony in General be no Sin, yet to take this or that Mony, being none of our own, is a Sin. Now then, if God be a Cause of this Action in reference to this Object, as he is if he be the Cause of this particular Action, it is impoffible their Doctrin should excuse God from Sin. Eating, in reference to the forbidden Fruit, was a Sin; but according to them, God was a principal Cause of Eating the forbidden fruit. Ergo.

The Minor I prove thus; They say he was the

Eat

Neceffitating Cause of this particular Action: ing was a natural Action, the Individuation of this Eating by an unlawful Object was a moral Obliquity: But God was the Cause of this Individual. Ergo.

The like may be faid of all our finful Actions. When I have drunk fufficiently, both for the necessity and comfort of nature, to drink a cup more, is Sin. But our Opposites teach, that I cannot take up this superfluous Cup without God's Special Determination: Ergo.

This Doctrin is enough to make ones Hair stand an end, making God, whatsoever they say, the Cause not only of our Actions, but also of our Obliquities: for what are the Obliquities of our AStions, but the placing of them upon wrong Objects? If therefore they make God the principal Cause of all our Particular Actions, most of which are partiçularized by bad Objects, what do these Men make

of God? But Recrimination is no answer,

Hitherto I have shewed, tho perhaps without Method, yet I hope not without profit, how our Oppofites are wounded with their own Weapons. Now I will take their Weapons out of their hands, and teach them the right use of them, shewing how God is the Cause of all things, only not the Cause of Sin: a Cause of all good things, yet so as that many good things are Contingent also.

We have shewed in the third Argument how God hath ordained, that all forts of Inferior or second Causes should work according to their proper kinds; that voluntary Agents should work Voluntarily, &c. God then is the first Cause that all things do work, and that they do work in certain kinds: If fo, then God is the Cause that many things are done Contingently, one of the chiefeft forts of second Causes by this appointment working Voluntarily, and therefore Contingently, which Connexion we have formerly justifyed. This being well understood, will instruct us not only that it may be so, but also that it must be so. That God being the Neceffary Cause of all good things, yet all such things are not Necessary Effects of him. For Example, it is impossible that Man should do any thing without God, therefore God is a Caufe Neceffary to the Being of all things Effected by him; yet because many things done by the Free choice of Man, might as well have been omitted, God no ways constraining him to them, these are not Necessary Effects of God. The Reason of this is, because God hath Decreed that Man should work Voluntarily, having liberty to do as well one thing as another, yet so that God giveth him the Strength to do whatsoever he Chooseth to do, and Ability to Choose what he Will without limitation of his Choice; for this were else, to take it away, and to make Man an involuntary Agent. For example, God hath given Thee ftrength of Body

dy; he hath given Thee also Ability to choose in what Exercise thou wilt employ it; thou choosest to Ring, or Dance; God then the Author of thy strength is the chief Cause of these Exercises, yet so, as they are Contingent in respect of him, because thou mightest have omitted them hadst thou pleased. By this we may plainly fee, how God is the principal Cause of all things of which he is capable to be a Cause; and yet many things are Contingent in respecta of him. This being cleared, we may with more facility conceive, how and in what sense God is the Cause of all we do, and yet we only the Cause of Sin.

God sustains us when we are about our Sins; even then, in him we live, and move, and have our being, as well as when we are better bufied. God giveth that strength by which we commit any Sin, yet because he doth not neceffitate or incline unto it, but we of our selves abuse it to Wickedness, God hath still the part of a Creator, we only are Sinful. An example will make this clear, suppose a King delivereth to his Subjects Men, Weapons, Mony, and Warlike Provision, that he may fight for his Honor against his Enemies; his Subject proves a Traitor, and useth all his Sovereign's strength against himself. His Sovereign here is a Cause that he hath the Command, and doth the Office of a Captain, but he is no Cause of his Treachery, the Offence is only the Captain's, and the wrong is only the Sovereign's. This is just the cafe between God and Us; God hath given us many excellent Faculties both of Body and Soul, which he intended we should use to his Glory, in Obedience to his Commandments, and resist his and our Enemy the Devil; we most Traiterously siding with Satan, have abused his gifts to his Dishonor; God did the part of a Creator, we of Rebels. A Man lives Intemperatly, God gave him not strength to this purpose, he Neceffitated not the Man to this