in dispelling cold and fatigue, though nature provides both means of rest and animal heat without them. The true gentleman in like manner carefully avoids whatever may cause a jar or a jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast; - all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make every one at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender towards the bashful, gentle towards the distant, and merciful towards the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate; he is seldom prominent in conversation, and never wearisome. He makes light of favors while he does them, and seems to be receiving when he is conferring. He never speaks of himself except when compelled, never defends himself by a mere retort, he has no ears for slander or gossip, is scrupulous in imputing motives to those who interfere with him, and interprets everything for the best. He is never mean or little in his disputes, never takes unfair advantage, never mistakes personalities or sharp sayings for arguments, or insinuates evil which he dare not say out. From a longsighted prudence, he observes the maxim of the ancient sage, that we should ever conduct ourselves toward our enemy as if he were one day to be our friend. He has too much good sense to be affronted at insults, he is too well employed to remember injuries, and too indolent to bear malice. He is patient, forbearing, and resigned, on philosophical principles; he submits to pain, because it is inevitable, to bereavement, because it is irreparable, and to death, because it is his destiny." If he engages in controversy of any kind, his disciplined intellect preserves him from the blundering discourtesy of better, perhaps, but less educated minds; who, like blunt weapons, tear and hack instead of cutting clean, who mistake the point in argument, waste their strength on trifles, misconceive their adversary, and leave the question more involved

than they find it. He may be right or wrong in his opinion, but he is too clear-headed to be unjust; he is as simple as he is forcible, and as brief as he is decisive. Nowhere shall we find greater candor, consideration, indulgence! he throws himself into the minds of his opponents, he accounts for their mistakes. He knows the weakness of human reason as well

as its strength, its province and its limits. If he be an unbeliever, he will be too profound and large-minded to ridicule religion or to act against it; he is too wise to be a dogmatist or fanatic in his infidelity. He respects piety and devotion; he even supports institutions as venerable, beautiful, or useful, to which he does not assent; he honors the ministers of religion and it contents him to decline its mysteries without assailing or denouncing them. He is a friend of religious toleration, and that, not only because his philosophy has taught him to look on all forms of faith with an impartial eye, but also from the gentleness and effeminacy of feeling, which is the attendant on civilization.

Not that he may not hold a religion too, in his own way, even when he is not a Christian. In that case his religion is one of imagination and sentiment; it is the embodiment of those ideas of the sublime, majestic, and beautiful, without which there can be no large philosophy. Sometimes he acknowledges the being of God, sometimes he invests an unknown principle or quality with the attributes of perfection. And this deduction of his reason, or creation of his fancy, he makes the occasion of such excellent thoughts, and the starting-point of so varied and systematic a teaching, that he even seems like a disciple of Christianity itself. From the very accuracy and steadiness of his logical powers, he is able to see what sentiments are consistent in those who hold any religious doctrine at all, and he appears to others to feel and to hold a whole circle of theological truths, which exists in his mind no otherwise than as a number of deductions.'

1 From The Idea of a University.

The nucleus of an exposition of the kind just cited is the ordinary definition. Such an exposition may be regarded, indeed, simply as an extended or enlarged definition. The importance of the definition in expository composition is therefore obvious. Good definitions are exceedingly rare, and the value of a good definition is not easily over-estimated. The ability to make clear and accurate definitions lies, in fact, at the very root of clear thinking, and is indispensable to the lucid presentation of thought which deals with general notions.

89. Kinds of definitions. Two kinds of definitions may be distinguished: (a) that which we ordinarily find in the dictionaries, and which we may call the loose definition; and (b) the more formal and exact kind known as the logical definition.

(a) The loose definition. The loose definition, so-called, is the simplest kind of a definition. Ordinarily, it consists merely of a word or phrase synonymous, or nearly so, with the term to be defined. A king, for example, may be defined as "a chief ruler, a reigning sovereign or monarch." Such a definition does not pretend to be a full and exact account of the content of the idea for which the term stands. It marks out approximately, rather than exactly, the boundaries of the idea. Nevertheless, the loose definition is an exceedingly useful kind of definition, in spite of its inexactness. It is usually very concise, and that makes it convenient for practical

use.

(b) The logical definition. - The logical definition differs from the loose definition merely in being more formal and exact. It does not, any more than the loose definition, pretend to be a full and detailed account of the content of an idea. On the contrary, it gives in detail, usually, but one or two characteristics of the thing to be defined, supplying the place of those omitted by means of another general term. That is, it takes the term to be defined, regards it as representing a species, refers that species to a genus, or higher class, and indicates the characteristic or characteristics which differentiate the species from the

genus.

The essential parts of a logical definition are, thus, the genus and the differentia. The following examples will illustrate the form in which it usually

90. Requisites of a good definition. In the first place, a definition, to be valid, must avoid the use of any term containing the term to be defined or any term derived from the same root. Trying to define a term by means of virtually the same term would be like traveling in a circle; no advance would be made. Thus, to define "freedom" as "the ability to act freely," would be inadmissible.

In the next place, a definition should be accurate. Its value, in fact, depends upon its accuracy, upon the distinctness with which the thing defined is separated from all other things. In the case of the loose definition, as we have seen, accuracy can be attained only approximately. In the logical definition, however, we can have almost as great a degree of precision as we please. It is mainly a question of differentia. This must always be a characteristic possessed by the thing defined but by no other things included in the genus. Thus the definition of a bird as "an animal capable of flying" would be worthless because, in the first place, not all birds are capable of flying, and, in the second place, other animals than birds-bats, for instance - are capable of flying. The differentia here is not an unfailing mark of distinction, and is therefore valueless. A logical definition admits of no exceptions; it must be true universally, or it is worthless.

It should be noted that accuracy of definition does not necessarily imply that the differentia must be full and precise as to the characteristics which distinguish