to collect as much as others. The whole of this teaching is education. You will see at once, that in this is included the operation of laws and the customs of society. Man is essentially the creature of circumstances, this you seem to admit; but you say men are differently affected, this must be admitted; but you account for it by making the difference to accord with some fanciful arrangement (organization) as some part of each is supposed to differ. It is intellect which forms the base of our argument, and this according to you must be more or less as the organization is more or less perfect, so that a perfectly well organized man must necessarily be a Solomon, let him be born wherever he may. This inference is, I think, unavoidable; but this is contrary to experience. In New Holland the people had in many hundreds of years made no progress at all in intellectual attainment. It is impossible to conceive how even the very small number of people in New Holland could have lived at all with even a shade of knowledge less than they possessed, and the conclusion we are driven to is, that they must have been as intellectual many hundreds of years ago, perhaps many thousands of years ago, as they were when we made the settlement among them. Now how did it happen that these people were so equally organized that no one ever made a discovery; an improvement. The truth is, I suspect this, that circumstances did not occur to teach them, did not occur to produce the intellect necessary for improvement; the soil was there, but the seed was wanting, and the culture was wanting. I am of opinion, that intellect is as much a result of certain modes of manufacturing as any piece of machinery is. A man is brought up (let us suppose) a Welsh shepherd, spends his boyhood and his manhood in lounging about, and is as stupid as any one of his flock; now suppose this shepherd to have been placed when young under the care of persons well qualified, and very desirous to make him a correct reasoner on every useful and important subject, would he be the same man? You will say no, certainly not; but, you will add, take two such boys and do your best with them and there will still be a material difference between them, and this difference will be as the difference of their organizations. Try this notion of yours another way, thus, after all possible pains have been taken, the two boys will have received a very different education, different impulses will have been given to them, and many of these too from causes not noticed, or unknown to their preceptors and even to themselves, each may therefore be as wise as his fellow and yet their modes of shewing their wisdom may be very different, or they may differ considerably in the quantity of wisdom each may possess; and this would be the case if the two boys were organized exactly alike, or if the same boy were placed under the one or the other set of circumstances. Take an example; one boy stays at home and his attention is drawn towards a clock, he examines it, becomes strongly excited, and all his other studies are neglected in some degree in consequence of the thirst of knowledge which the machinery of the clock has excited. This circumstance might, and probably would, No. 3, Vol. VIII.

influence his whole future life. Now suppose that the other boy I went out, or suppose the former boy did not remain at home but went out, in either case the circumstances respecting the clock could not have occurred at that time, and might never have occurred at any time, and thus this piece of education would not have operated, but other circumstances might have occurred to give a very different direction to the boy, and might cause his intellectual powers to be of a higher or of a lower order, just as he happened to be influenced by those circumstances. In either case, if a powerful stimulus was given, although the direction were as opposite as it is possible to imagine, the consequence might be a much lower intellectual power than the preceptors had calculated upon as probable, or it might be the means of stimulating the pupil in the way they wished and produce a higher intellectual power than they had calculated upon, and yet they might be wholly ignorant of the cause, and consequently unable to controul the pupil in respect to it. But would it not be absurd to say that the cause of the actual difference was to be sought in the imaginary difference of organization, in the one case between the two boys, in the other case in the same boy.

The best conclusion that I have been able to come to, after much observation, is, that by a judicious adaptation of such means as the child may require for the purpose, a pretty equal quantity of intellect may be produced in all those children whose physical difference does not amount to deformity; and that deformity, such as to make the child a defective animal, and I am of opinion, that ninety-nine out of every hundred are capable of intellectual culture to a pretty equal extent.

This subject might be elucidated in many ways, and numberless examples might be adduced, but it is perhaps best to treat of it generally, and to invite every one to reason on the matter for himself.

Those who are of my opinion will be found to be by far the most likely to improve mankind, for having no occult cause to serve them as an excuse for idleness or ignorance, they are the least likely to give up any case as hopeless, and by far the most likely to succeed to a much greater extent than those, who avail themselves of the excuse organization furnishes to neglect their duty. If the preceptor were profoundly wise himself, it could hardly fail, that he should be able to give such clear demonstrations as should command the assent of his pupil. If he taught him to reason correctly, and to take care to have all the circumstances of the case before him, or present to him, it would be impossible for the pupil to come to a wrong conclusion, and it is impossible to shew that the generality of mankind if so instructed would not be capable of understanding the reasonings and drawing the same conclusions. But inasmuch as preceptors are deficient and careless, so in proportion must be the intellectual powers of those they teach or neglect, and so must also be the quantity of folly or wisdom in all its different shades and gradations among mankind."

The only reply that can be given to the foregoing extract is to point the fact; that there is an actual difference in the temperament of all kinds of animals, arising from their variance in organization, state of health, and other physical conditions and relations: which, though education may controul to a great extent, can never equalize in similitude. It is upon a confined scale, what the difference between different species of animals is upon a larger scale, and if we contend that education is all the difference, we may as safely say, that education would make the lion a lamb, or the sheep a goat. I also use the word education in the larger sense, or as embracing whatever instruction or discipline a man subjects himself to or is subjected to by others, throughout his life. Education is wholly a moral power: I speak of physical power. And I can only admit the correctness of my friends argument as applicable to the matter in ques-tion, when I am taught, that there is no difference nor distinction in moral and physical power. Nor can I admit that to be an occult quality which is so prominent and visible, not only in every species of animal; but, in all the animals of the same species. I am of opinion, that we shall never reason rightly about man, until we view him in comparison and conjunction with other animals, or as a part of the animated whole

RICHARD CARLILE.

Dorchester Goal, July 1, 1823.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE HAMPSHIRE COUNTY NEWSPAPER.

SIR

Dorchester Gaol, June 21, 1823. As my name has lately found its way into your paper; first in the form of a challenge to the clergy, to meet and refute my opinions, instead of persecuting the publishers, and again, in the shape of an answer to that challenge; I feel myself called upon to notice the last communication.

The writer, under the signature of "A Lover of Truth," says: "There is not an argument that has ever been opposed to it (Christianity) that has not been answered, and folios upon folios now lie which infidelity dares not touch, and from the examination of which it shrinks with an invincible fear."

As far as this assertion applies to me it is not "Veritas." I have anxiously sought after every thing that can be considered an evidence in favour of Christianity; and, though it is possible, that many works written in defence of that religion have been beyond my reach, I feel so far convinced, that I have met with all the essential arguments, that I call upon your correspondent to point my attention to one that I fear to encounter.

In most controversies on a large scale, it is a misfortune, that people will content themselves with ranging on one side, and with reading the arguments of that side alone. This is a common evil; and, in this particular case, applies to the unbeliever as well as to the believer of the validity of Christianity. In a question affecting the interests of all mankind so extensively, as is the soundness or unsoundness. of Christianity, it becomes criminal to restrain the discussion, or to be content with looking at only one side of it: and, fancying that "A Lover of Truth" is a teacher of Christianity, I beg leave to ask him, whether the following questions or objections can be cleared up.

First: What evidence, out of the New Testament, can be found, that the name of Jesus Christ, or the sect of Christians, was known in Jerusalem, before the destruction of that city by Titus?

Second: What evidence, that any one book, gospel, or epistle, contained in the New Testament was written before that period?

And third: What evidence does the New Testament itself afford of the ascension of Jesus Christ, since those who are stated to have been eye witnesses of that scene: to wit: Matthew, John, Peter, James, and Jude have not left even an allusion to such a circumstance in the writings ascribed to them?

On the ground of personal testimony, this last is the most striking objection that has yet been made to the divinity of the Christian religion, as it is founded entirely upon the contents of the New Testament. The two first questions are purely a matter of history, depending upon corroborative evidence; the third, a matter of narrative resting upon its own internal credibility. If "A Lover of Truth" can refer me to the folio which has answered these objectious, he may be assured that he will do no small service to the cause of Christianity.

Upon the other point which "A Lover of Truth" touches, I would observe: that all theological disputes are now

nearly brought to one point: whether the Almighty Power (for such a power is not questioned, cannot be rationally questioned) be wholly material, or wholly immateral; whether it be or be not intelligent. We have been hitherto quarrelling more about words than things: we never quarrel about colours, or about any thing we can define or understand; but always about words which we cannot define; and which are generally without any physical relations, consequently, beyond our powers to communicate to each other in the shape of ideas.

Those who argue for immateriality and intelligence introduce the apparent evidence of design pervading all matter, as what appears to them, a proof of a Designer, or an intelligent Creator. They say, that, every thing in existence proclaims itself to be the design of the Creator.

The Materialist starts this difficulty: Throughout the animated word, where sensation is alone supposed to exist, there is evidently a pervading mixture of two opposite principles, or those which cause pleasure and pain. In a physical sense, we term these qualities good and evil: in a moral sense, we use the same terms; but recognize them also under the distinctions of virtue and vice, humanity and inhumanity, morality and immorality, honesty and dishonesty, truth and falsehood, right and wrong. The first, or the last of these designations, expresses the sense of all the others, and the whole may therefore be reduced to the words good and evil, as they affect the animal sensations and generate pleasure or pain.

To ascribe the creation of these two opposite principles to two opposite powers, is a manifest impeachment of Omnipotence, which cannot be tolerated for a moment; though, the idea is very ancient, as ancient as any kind of existing bistory. To ascribe them to one power is as manifest an impeachment of the good design of intelligent omnipotence; therefore, the Materialist, rather than attribute evil design to an omnipotent power, surmounts the difficulty by holding, that, beyond the animal powers, intelligence does not exist: as there is not, in fact, a shadow of proof, that it does, or that it can possibly exist, distinct from a nervous organization. and its consequent sensations.

The reverse of the proposition, or the tenets of the Immaterialist, can need no further elucidation, than the reflection the contrast conveys.

The inference which I shall draw from this statement of the argument is, that the first and greatest duty of every hu