found in the Paris press of December and January. Every paper, on its front page, carried daily despatches from Washington informing the French people that Wilson was not the spokesman of the United States, but only a repudiated politician. On December 18th Senator Knox made a bitter attack upon the League of Nations, declaring that the whole question should wait "until the Allies had imposed their terms," and on December 20th Senator Lodge delivered a lengthy address along the same lines. Both of these speeches were "played up" in the French and English press, and other regular features were the assaults of Roosevelt. Also on December 21st Senator Lodge made a speech in favor of Clemenceau's appeal for "secret sessions," and this was reprinted with keen delight. As early as January 1st such papers as L'Echo de Paris and the London Post were carrying editorials stating that the attitude of the Republican Senate majority "placed full power in the hands of the Allies," but that this power must be used wisely, as any open humiliation of Mr. Wilson might be resented.

Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, attached to the American Peace Commission at the time, has given proof of the extent to which the campaign was organized and directed:

A secret document showing how the French pressa large part of which is notoriously controlled by the government-was being marshaled against the influence of the President and in support of French interests actually came into the possession of one of the American commissioners. It was in the form of official suggestions of

policy of French newspaper editors, and it contained three items:

First, they were advised to emphasize the opposition to Mr. Wilson in America, by giving all the news possible regarding the speeches of Republican Senators and other American critics.

Second, to emphasize the disorder and anarchy in Russia, thereby stimulating the movement toward Allied military intervention.

Third, to publish articles showing the ability of Germany to pay a large indemnity.

At all times there was plain evidence of this secret relation between the French government and the French press. The President, induced to regard private discussions as sacredly confidential, kept his pledge to the point of an absurd reticence. No American newspaper man could win a word from him with reference to any controversial matter until decisions were reached and duly announced. On the other hand, the French contentions, the French points of view, were communicated secretly but regularly to the French press, a pleasant practice that continued until the President served warning that he would not submit to it a day longer.

Repudiated and assailed by the Republican majority, every attack being reprinted with joyousness by a French and English press, meeting at every turn the stubborn antagonism of cynical statesmen bent upon a policy of delay until they were ready to stab, and faced by the patent fact that the "power of the people" was confined to the presentation of flowers and city keys, it was only the driving force of the President's faith that compelled the meeting of the

Supreme Council of January 12th and secured the selection of the League of Nations as a first order of business. And with this faith as his sole support he turned now to the first meeting of the Peace Conference, where the real battle was to be fought.

council-chamber ever witnessed the meeting of four more widely dissimilar personalities than those that faced in Paris for the purpose of restoring peace and order to a distracted, war-torn world. In character, temperament, training, culture, ideas, and ideals the President, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Sonnino stood out as studies in contrast, and these differences were rendered more acute by a conflict in aims that was as instant as it was fundamental. England, France, and Italy were gathered as victors to impose terms upon a defeated enemy, their whole intent embittered by the wretchedness and desolation at their backs. The settlement with Germany accomplished, and accomplished according to the Mosaic formula, they were willing to talk of world peace and international concert, but not until then. Only the mind of the President was unclouded by any passion of anger or self-interest.

The Allied point of view found a vigorous and complete expression in Clemenceau, better known as "The Tiger." Mr. Keynes, more concerned with striking phrase than true characterization, may call Clemenceau "dry in soul and empty

the Jugoslavs. The Italians seemed to acquiesce, but the surrender was more apparent than real.

On the journey to Rome Ambassador Page boarded the President's train at Modane, and in his party was a messenger from Mr. Hearley, the Commissioner for Italy of the Committee on Public Information. He told me that the program for the President, as arranged by Orlando and Sonnino, had excited wide-spread discontent by its exclusion of the people themselves. I looked over the sheet brought by the ambassador and saw for myself that the plan of entertainment considered only the royal and official circles. Mr. Hearley's suggestion was that the President had an empty hour after his luncheon with the Queen Mother, and that as he drove back to the Quirinal the citizens of Rome were eager to have him stop at the Piazza Venezia for a meeting that would be the people's own. I took the matter up with the President at once, and after consultation with the ambassador, who saw no impropriety in the arrangement, I was given permission to telegraph the President's consent to Mr. Hearley.

At twelve o'clock of the day Admiral Grayson brought word that the "official entertainers" had entered a very vigorous protest against the plan and that the President thought it wise to cancel the engagement. I explained to the admiral that this was impossible, as thousands were already gathered at the Piazza Venezia and nothing but misunderstanding and bitter disappointment could result from the announcement