tion. This theory is to be taken with Herbert Spencer's modification, or rather extension, of the entire association theory: namely, that every mental tendency accumulates by hereditary transmission; so that mental tendencies which have been formed by habitual association in the parent may become congenital in the offspring; and, as a case of this law, such moral sentiments as the love of truth and the hatred of falsehood, though originally formed by the habitual association due to experience, may have become congenital in the most highly cultivated races of men.

tion.

It may assist in understanding this theory to be re- Origin of minded that such is, beyond all doubt, the way in which the love of money by the love of money has come into being. The love of associamoney, unlike the love of food, cannot be a primary feeling, because money, unlike food, is not a desirable thing in itself; it is desirable only on account of the desirable things that may be obtained by its means. The love of money is a secondary feeling, produced by association with the thought of the desirable things which it is able to purchase. But when the love of money has once been formed, it is exactly like a primary feeling; and it may not improbably have become hereditary in some classes of society among the civilized races of men.

test of

In criticising the attempt to account for the origin of the moral sense by this theory, it is obvious that there is no possibility of applying the method either of demonstration or of experiment. The only available method in such The only an inquiry is first to ascertain whether the alleged causes such a exist; and then, if they exist, whether they are adequate theory is to produce the effect. This method however is by no means the alleged confined to psychological questions; it is the only one cau which is applicable to a vast variety of questions in are adequate. physical science, including most geological ones, and nearly all those concerning the origin of species.

whether

causes

exist and

the causes exist, but

In the present case there is no doubt that the alleged In this case causes exist; there is no doubt whatever of the law of the habitual association of ideas, nor of the law of the heredi- it is not tary transmission of mental tendencies. But it is not so that they

certain

are adequate.

Of

certain that these causes are adequate to account for the origin of so peculiar a mental fact as the moral sense. course it is not denied that the laws of habitual association, and the law of the hereditary transmission of tendencies, act in every mental function and in all formation of character. But it does not follow that those laws alone will suffice to explain every mental function and all formation Analogy to of character. The question is an analogous one to that of the tion of the nature of the vegetative life. It is certain that the vegetanature of tive or formative life acts in conjunction with, and through,

life.

the chemical forces; but it does not follow that this life is in any sense a mere resultant from the chemical forces.1 Just so, it is certain that intelligence, and the moral sense, which is a particular manifestation of intelligence, are developed under the laws of habitual association and hereditary transmission; but it does not follow that intelligence and the moral sense are mere resultants from those laws. This analogy, however, is not itself an argument, though it may assist us in understanding the arguments. The theory which refers all the complex facts of the moral sense to association with pleasure and pain, is that which theories. is usually called the Utilitarian theory. The theory which, on the contrary, maintains the existence of an element in morals not derived from the sense of pleasure and pain may be called the Ethical theory.

Utilita

rian and Ethical

Ethics treats

of character, Deontology of actions.

It is to be observed that what any theory of the moral sense has to give an account of, is not only our judgments and our feelings respecting actions, but also our judgments and our feelings respecting character. The moral aspects of character constitute the subject-matter of the science of Ethics, as the moral aspects of action constitute the subjectmatter of the science of Deontology. These are merely the definitions of the subject, and do not prejudge any of its conclusions.

The question under discussion may now be stated with The ques- more definiteness than hitherto :-Is the sense of happiness or pleasure, with the correlative sense of pain, acting

tion stated.

1 See "Habit and Intelligence," Chapter 8 (The Chemistry of Life). See also the Appendix to the same work.

through the habitual association of ideas, adequate to account for our moral judgments and feelings respecting actions and character? Or, in other words: Does the moral sense present the characteristics that it would present, if it had been formed out of no other materials than the sense of pleasure and pain, and by no other process than the association of ideas? If it can be shown that the moral sense is in some important respects quite unlike any thing that could possibly be produced by association with the ideas of pleasure and pain, it follows that the utilitarian theory is, not indeed totally false, but altogether inadequate; and that some form of the ethical theory must be true.

of selfish

utilitarian

Before going any further, it is right to admit that the The charge oft-repeated charge of selfish tendency against the utili- ness tarian theory of the moral sense is unfounded and unjust. against the If the utilitarian theory is true, all right and wrong are theory is ultimately resolvable into tendency to produce happiness unjust; or pain; if the ethical theory is true, the ideas of right and wrong contain an element which is not so resolvable; -one or the other of these rival theories must be true;but whichever opinion we adopt, the truths are not only obvious but fundamental, that selfishness and cruelty are vices, and their opposites, unselfishness and kindness, are virtues. On the ethical theory, we believe this because the conscience of mankind declares it; on the utilitarian theory, it follows from the very definitions of the theory, according to which that which consciously and of purpose tends to promote happiness is virtue. This definition of virtue, and the utilitarian theory founded thereon, are quite adequate as a basis for benevolence; but it may be but it is maintained, and as I think truly, that they are unfavour- able to able to moral elevation.

unfavour

moral

elevation.

insuffi

Of course no one says that it is false to define virtue as It is not that which purposely tends to promote happiness; but those false but who maintain the ethical theory of morals think it insuffi- cient. cient. It is now time to give the grounds of this opinion.

utilitarian

If the utilitarian theory is true, happiness is the only thing On the which is an absolute end, or in other words an end in itself; theory,

also.

happiness moral goodness is good only because it is a means to the is the only absolute end of happiness. If, on the contrary, the ethical theory end; on is true, happiness is no doubt an end in itself-all sentient the Ethical, good beings, from insects upwards, are agreed on this; but it ness is one is not the only end; right deeds ought to be done and the formation of noble character ought to be aimed at, not only because they tend to promote happiness, though they' do tend to promote happiness, but also, and chiefly, because they are good in themselves independently of consequences. These are not merely logical inferences from the rival theories; they are statements of the theories, in different language from that used before. Now, which is true? Is moral goodness good in itself, or good only on account of the happiness it produces or tends to produce? The ques- This question can be decided only by an appeal to the combe decided mon sense, the real belief of mankind; in other words, by by the an appeal to the moral sense itself when properly analysed.

tion is to

moral

sense

itself.

On the utilitarian theory,

moral ad

miration ought to resemble the admi

ration of useful things;

What, then, is the moral sense like? If the utilitarian' theory were true, and if moral good were good only because of the happiness which it produces, we should regard good actions and noble characters with feelings similar to those with which we regard other agents and agencies which tend to produce happiness. Now it is not to be denied that a very large amount of real happiness, though not of at high kind, is due to such agencies as those of productive gardens, convenient houses, good roads and railways, and efficient tools and appliances of all kinds. These things are good because they minister to happiness; or, if happiness is too high a word, at least to comfort and enjoyment. Let us call these, generically, useful things. If then worthy actions and noble characters are good only because they minister to happiness, they are good only for the same reason that useful things are good: namely, because both minister to happiness alike; and the emotions excited

1 Ascetics may have maintained that happiness ought not to be sought, because it can never be sought without injury to what is of more importance than happiness. This is intelligible though wrong. But it is not possible for any sentient being to doubt that happiness is desirable in itself. As Coleridge somewhere says, "It is not possible for us to deny our nature as sentient beings."

resemble

by worthy actions and noble characters ought to be similar to those excited by useful things. But this is but it does not the case; on the contrary, the emotions excited the admiby moral worth have nothing in common with those ration of beautiful excited by useful things; while they have very much things. in common with the emotions excited by the sight of beauty. This is a familiar fact of consciousness, and is witnessed to by our habitual language; in which we apply such words as beautiful, which primarily belongs to visual objects, to the moral nature of characters and of actions; and apply to visual objects such words as noble and lovely, which primarily belong to characters. This, however,

must not be over-stated, as if the moral sense were nothing more than the sense of a higher kind of beauty than any which can be seen with the eyes. The moral sense is this, but it is also much more. It might be nothing more than this, to beings who should look on actions and on character as mere spectators; but such an attitude is impossible to us; we have to act as well as to criticise; and to us, as beings capable of action, the moral sense is more than merely a power to discern excellence; it is a law of obligation, an imperative command.

In reply to the argument drawn from the un-utilitarian nature of the sense of beauty, it may be urged that the sense of beauty itself is capable of explanation on utilitarian principles; or, in more familiar language, that the sense of beauty is itself capable of being resolved into the sense of enjoyment. If this means that the beautiful is the useful (and this has been maintained), the assertion is

1

tiful is not

a mere absurdity; were it so, spades and millstones would The beaube among the most beautiful of all objects, and there the useful. would be more beauty in a kitchen-garden than in a flower-garden. But when it is said that the sense of beauty may be explained on merely utilitarian principles, it is more probably meant that beauty gives pleasure in the beholding; and that the definition of beauty is that it is what gives pleasure in the beholding. This is true so far as it goes, but it does not exhaust the subject;

1 This remark is made in Ruskin's "Modern Painters,” vol. ii.