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had been sold. The advertisements put forward by the de fendant contained a most distinct statement that it was the same business as that which was carried on by the old firm. The plaintiffs were not estopped from obtaining relief by any misrepresentation, as they were entitled to retain the brass plates, &c. which were on the premises at the time of the purchase. Solicitors: Linklaters & Co.; Lewis, Munns, Nunn, & Longden. V.-C. J.


Motion to restrain the use of certain premises as a beerhouse for the sale of beer or other liquors, or otherwise, in contravention of the covenant entered into by the defendant with the plaintiff company in March, 1860.

By this covenant, which was contained in the deed by which certain building land was conveyed to the defendant by the company in fee simple, the defendant covenanted that the land to be conveyed, or the buildings to be erected thereon, should not be used "as a beerhouse, inn, or publichouse for the sale of spirituous liquors," and that no other trade or business should be carried on which should be a nuisance or annoyance to the company, or the owners or occupiers of the neighbouring premises. A house was erected on the land conveyed, and in August last defendant applied for a license for the sale of beer under 32 Vict. c. 27 (Beerhouse Act, 1869), and had commenced selling beer by retail.

The question was whether a house in which beer was sold by retail not to be drunk upon the premises was a beerhouse within the meaning of the covenant.

Speed and Ince, for the plaintiffs, in support of the motion. Jones-Bateman, for the defendant, referred to "Burn's Justice," where, in the editions of 1845 and 1867, a beerhouse was described as "a place where beer is sold by retail to be drunk upon the premises."

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR adopted the definition given in the edition of "Burn's Justice" current at the time when the cove nant was entered into, and held that there had been no breach of covenant by the defendant in selling beer by retail which was not consumed upon the premises.

Motion refused.

Solicitors: J. Blenkinsop; Eldred & Andrew.

V.-C. J.

Nov. 12.

LEATHER CLOTH COMPANY v. LORSONT. Covenant in Restraint of Trade-Public Policy. In May, 1857, an agreement was entered into by which the parties of the first part (of whom defendant Lorsont was one) agreed to sell to the plaintiff company, then in the course of formation, for 20,000l., all the letters patent obtained in France and England for the manufacture of American leather cloth, and then belonging to the parties of the first part (as representing an American company called the Crockett International Leather Cloth Company), and the full benefit and advantage thereof, and also the exclusive right of soliciting similar patents in Belgium and in all other countries of Europe, together with all the processes of manufacture used by them, or their agents or workmen, up to that day, and also the business premises and machinery at West Ham.

It was also agreed that the parties of the first part, or any of them, would not, "directly or indirectly, carry on, nor to the best of their power allow to be carried on by others, in any part of Europe, any company or manufactory having for its object the manufacture or sale of productions in any way similar to the productions which are the subject of the letters patent, and now manufactured in the business or manufactory carried on at West Ham, and will not communicate to any person or persons the means or processes of such manufacture so as in any way to interfere with the exclusive enjoyment of the intended company of the benefits hereby agreed to be purchased."

The defendant subscribed for 100 shares in the company, and was appointed general manager and superintendent of the factories of the company. In 1863 he was dismissed from his post of general manager, and was not re-elected a director at the expiration of his term of office.

In 1868 the defendant commenced manufacturing leather cloth on his own account at North Woolwich, with offices in Cannon Street (where also the offices of plaintiff company are), 66 Manuand issued circulars in which he described himself as facturer of Crockett's Leather Cloth," and stated that the goods supplied by him were "in every respect similar to those made by the Crockett International Leather Cloth Company (since known as the Leather Cloth Company) while their works were under my management."

The bill alleged that the defendant in his business had adopted and used trade-marks in imitation of those used by plaintiffs, and issued price-lists similar in form to those of plaintiffs, and with fac-similes of their trade-marks in the margin.

The bill was filed to restrain such proceedings, as being in breach of the covenant in the agreement of May, 1857, to which the defendant was a party.

Sir R. Palmer, Q.C., Kay, Q. C., and Murten, for the plaintiffs. Eddis, Q.C., Fischer, and Cohen, for the defendant, contended, 1st, that the plaintiffs had no right to be protected in the use of their trade-marks, as the decision of the House of Lords was conclusive as to two of three trade-marks (Leather Cloth Company v. American Leather Cloth Company (11 H. L. C. 523), while the other one, not within that decision, contained manifestly false representations; 2ndly, that the defendant had not, in fact, infringed the trade-marks, or acted in contravention of the agreement; and, 3rdly, that the covenant being in restraint of trade generally, without limit of time or space, was void as against public policy, and could not be enforced. Kay in reply.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR held that the plaintiffs' case as to the three trade-marks failed, the judgment of the House of Lords being conclusive as to the first and third, while the second contained an untrue representation. There was nothing in the agreement that violated the rules of public policy or the decided cases. A man was not to be compelled to deprive himself of the means of earning his living; but, again, where he had obtained or invented any secret or process by his labour and skill, he was entitled to sell it to the best advantage. When that advantage required him to enter into stipulations, even so as to bind himself, he was entitled to do so, provided such stipulations were not unreasonable, having regard to the subject-matter of the contract. Looking at the subject-matter of the contract in this case, there was nothing unreasonable in the stipulations that the defendant would not carry on the process so as to interfere with the exclusive enjoyment by the plaintiffs of the benefits purchased by them. The covenant, therefore, was capable of being enforced; and, as there had been a clear violation of it by the defendant, he must be restrained from carrying on any manufacture or sale of Crockett's leather cloth, or from being engaged in any company for the sale of Crockett's leather cloth, or any production similar thereto, and from holding himself out as the manufacturer of such leather cloth, or any production similar thereto. Solicitors: Thomas & Hollams; Combe & Wainwright.

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Woodroffe, for the application, said that the accounts would be inspected by Mr. Lindsay for nothing, and that the estate ought not to be saddled with the costs of a professional accountant. Bedwell opposed :—

The application was always a very special one. No complication of accounts had been shewn; and Lindsay was, in fact, a witness in the cause.

THE VICE-CHANCELLOR observed that, although it was not said that the accounts were complicated, it appeared they were very extensive and voluminous. The assignee was entitled to the assistance of an accountant, and if he chose to avail himself of the services of Lindsay, His Honour saw no reason why he should not be permitted to do so. He could not allow the plaintiff Brooke to take in both Lindsay and an accountant; but there would be an order that the plaintiff Brooke was to have the same liberty of inspection as was given to the plaintiff Lindsay by the order of November, 1868, with power to employ Lindsay as his accountant in such inspection.

Solicitors: Allen, Colley, & Edwards; Oliverson & Co.

Q. B.

Common Law.


Nov. 13. Factory Acts Extension Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 103), s. 5, subs. 7 -Factory-Quarry.

An information was laid against the respondent, charging him with an offence under the Factory Acts, for that he did in his factory employ a young person requiring a surgical certificate of age without the certificate of age required by the said Acts. The respondent is the owner of a slate quarry which extends over an area of 400 acres, and is situate on the side of one of the Welsh mountains in the parish of Llanberis. The quarry is worked on the open system, and has no underground workings, and the whole of the business is transacted in the open air. It is not enclosed by a fence of any kind, and there is nothing to define the area, which is gradually being extended in every direction. Upwards of 2600 men and boys are employed.

The young person in question was employed at an open shed in splitting and squaring blocks of slate into roofing slates.


The justices dismissed the complaint, on the ground that slate quarry was not a factory within the meaning of the Factory Acts.

The question for the Court was whether the quarry and premises are within the operation of the Factory Acts. Sir J. D. Coleridge, S. G. (Archibald with him), for the appellant.

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Milward, Q.C. (Hance with him), for the respondent. THE COURT (Cockburn, C. J., Mellor and Hannen, JJ.) held that the Factory Acts were not intended to apply to the carrying on of a business in the open air, and that the quarry and premises were not a within 30 & 31 Vict. c. 103, s. 5, factory subs. 7, which defines "factory" as any premises in the same occupation, situate in the same parish, &c., and constituting one trade establishment in, on, or within the precincts of which fifty or more persons are employed in any manufacturing process;" and dismissed the appeal.

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Attorney for appellant: Solicitor to the Treasury.

Attorney for respondent: Fluker, for Dewes & Burgess, Nuneaton.


Nov. 15.

OAKE AND ANOTHER v. MOORECROFT. Practice-Appearance to Writ by Defendant in Person-Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 76), ss. 29-31. of Exchange Act (18 & 19 Vict. c. 67). The defendant obtained A writ was taken out in this action and served, under the Bills leave to appear, the last day for appearing being Saturday, the

6th of November.

On Monday, the 8th of November, at the opening of the office, one Edward Perry handed in the memorandum of the appearance of the defendant in person, with the defendant's address, as required by the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852 (15 & 16 that the defendant had obtained leave to appear, or that he had Vict. c. 76), ss. 29-31. The plaintiffs not having any notice entered an appearance, signed judgment a little later on the same morning, and execution was immediately taken out, and the defendant was arrested on the same day.

Application was made on behalf of the defendant to Lush, J., at chambers, but he refused to interfere, being of opinion that the appearance entered by a third person was not a good appearance in person.

A rule was then obtained calling on the plaintiffs to shew cause why the judgment should not be set aside, and the defendant discharged out of custody, on the ground that the judgment was signed after appearance entered. Day shewed cause.

Lumley Smith, in support of the rule.

THE COURT (Cockburn, C.J., Blackburn, Hannen, and Hayes, JJ.) were of opinion that the appearance of the defendant in person need not be by the own proper person of the defendant, but might be entered on his behalf by a third person. The judgment was therefore irregular, and the Court made the rule absolute without costs; no action to be brought.

Attorneys for plaintiffs: Tucker, New, & Langdale.
Attorney for defendant: W. T. Boydell


Nov. 10.

C. P.
Acknowledgment by Married Woman under 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 74—
One Commissioner only Acting.

One of the two commissioners for taking an acknowledgment being interested as the solicitor in the transaction, the examination of the lady took place before the other only, and he died before he could make the affidavit required by the rules of Hilary Term, 1834. The deed was acknowledged before both commissioners. The registrar having declined to receive and file the certificate of acknowledgment with an affidavit by the surviving commissioner stating that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the requirements of the statute and of the rules had been duly complied with by the deceased commissionerapplication was made to the Court for an order authorizing the reception and filing of the documents.

L'er curiam. There is nothing in the Act or in the rules to authorize the taking of the acknowledgment and the examination of the married woman by one commissioner only. Whatever the practice may heretofore have been, it is desirable that it should be known that the acknowledgment should be taken before both commissioners; and that one who is interested as solicitor in the transaction should not be a commissioner. The 17 & 18 Vict. c. 75 amounts to a legislative declaration that both commissioners must be acting together.

Rule refused.

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Rep. 1 Ex. 91), that the deed was binding on the plaintiff, and
was a bar to his right of action against the defendant for the
money he had paid as his surety.
Attorney for plaintiff: J. Craven.
Attorneys for defendant: Phillips & Willicombe.

Nov. 15.

remove, and take away any wrecks of vessels, and any vessels that shall be sunk in any dock or elsewhere within the port of Liverpool, or any of the sea channels leading thereto, and be in their judgment an obstruction to the safe and convenient navigaticn or use thereof, and may also remove any stone, timbers, anchors, or other obstructions or impediments to such navigation that may be found or arise therein; and in case the master or owner of such vessel or other obstruction shall refuse or neglect C. P. LONDON AND SOUTH WESTERN RAILWAY to pay the charge of removing the same for the space of three COMPANY, APPS.; MYERS, RESP. days after demand, or in case any such master or owner cannot Carriers-Interpretation of Statute-Rate per Mile. be found, then the board may sell the same, and out of the proAppeal from the County Court judge for Hampshire. ceeds of such sale retain the expenses incurred in raising, The appellants carried some goods of the respondent from destroying, and removing such wrecks or other obstructions, Southampton to Luton, and in the course of the journey carried and the charges of detainer and sale, rendering the overplus to the goods past the Clapham Junction to Nine Elms Station, and the person entitled to the same: and if from such proceeds suf-then back again, thus making the journey six miles longer than ficient to pay all the aforesaid charges shall not be recovered, it need have been. This course was, however, usual and reasonthen the deficiency shall be recoverable from the master or owner able, there being a Goods Station at Nine Elms. By 9 & 10 Vict. of such vessel or articles so raised, destroyed, or removed, in like c. cxxxi. s. 13 it is provided that the London and South Western manner as penalties are by this Act authorized to be re- Railway Company shall not charge more than 3d. per ton per mile for goods. The company having charged 3d. a mile per ton for the whole distance, including the distance from Clapham Junction to Nine Elms and back, the respondent brought this action to recover back the amount charged in respect of these six miles.


A vessel was sunk in the Mersey, having goods on board belonging to the plaintiffs and to other persons.

THE COURT held, upon the construction of s. 59 of the Act of 1858, that the defendants were not justified in detaining and selling the plaintiffs' goods raised by them from the wreck to satisfy the expenses incurred in removing or destroying the hull of the vessel.

Sir G. Honyman, Q.C. (Mathew with him), for the plaintiffs.
Quain, Q.C. (Maclachlan with him), for the defendants.
Attorneys for plaintiffs: Waltons, Bubb, & Walton.
Attorneys for defendants: Gregory, Rowcliffes, & Rawle.

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Upon motion for an attachment against the sheriff of Essex for not returning a writ, the affidavit alleged service of a rule to return the writ to have been made "on Messrs. H. & Co., of, &c., who then were, and now are, the agents for the deputy for the sheriff of the county of Essex, appointed under the Act of Parliament in that behalf for, amongst other things, accepting service of all rules and orders made on or touching the execution of any process or writ directed to such sheriff."

THE COURT required the affidavit to be amended by stating Messrs. H. & Co. to be (as the fact was) deputies for the sheriff. Thesiger, for the plaintiff.

Attorney for plaintiff: H. Montagu.

C. P.
Nov. 15.
Composition Deed-Surety-Right of Action against Principal.
Action on a bill of exchange by the drawer against the ac-

Plea of a composition deed, containing a release of all the defendant's debts, with the usual reservation of the rights of the creditors against sureties.

Replication: that at the time the deed was made the bill was outstanding in the hands of third parties, whom the plaintiff had been since compelled to pay.

Demurrer to the replication.

W. T. Barnard, in support of the demurrer.

Raymond, in support of the replication, contended-1, that the plaintiff was not a creditor at the time of the making of the deed within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Acts; 2, that the deed must be interpreted in the same way as a Common Law deed would be, and contained therefore an implied exception of the rights of the sureties against the defendant, since that was implied by the Common Law from a reservation of the rights of creditors against the sureties.

THE COURT held, on the authority of Wood v. De Mattos (Law

The County Court judge having decided in the plaintiff's
favour, and granted leave to the appellants to appeal:
Hon. G. Denman, Q. C., and Mangles, appeared for the appellants.
Montague Bere, Q.C., for the respondent.

THE COURT held that the appellants were entitled to charge
per ton for every mile which they carried the goods, if carried
by a usual and reasonable route.


Attorney for appellants: L. Crombie.
Attorney for respondent: J. Vincent.

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County Court Appeal-Costs-Notice to Produce. This was an appeal from the decision of Mr. Commissioner Kerr, upon the question whether a notice to produce "all letters relating to your tenancy of a room" included a letter which, with the plaintiff's reply, constituted the tenancy. One letter was specified in the notice, which was written during the tenancy, and it was contended that this limited the generality of the


The learned commissioner held that the notice was insufficient, and nonsuited the plaintiff, who appealed.

THE COURT being of opinion that the notice was sufficient, and that there must be a new trial:

Bowen asked for the costs of the appeal, relying on Schroeder v. Ward (13 C. B. N.S. 410), where the Court of Common Pleas laid down an opposite rule to that laid down in this Court in Gee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company (6 H. & N. 221), and held that, on appeals from the County Court, the successful appellant was, in all cases, entitled to costs, although a new trial was directed on the ground of misdirection.

Kemp, contrà.

THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Channell, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB.) gave costs to the appellant, but declined to lay down a general rule; and held that it was a matter of discretion in each case. Attorney for plaintiff: Pain. Attorney for defendant: Jones.

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to the person using the same, and to have been carefully and | with S. Ritson to grant to him a lease of a part of the land; and
skilfully compounded by him, the defendant; and thereupon the deed then professed to demise to S. Ritson a large and the
the plaintiff Joseph George bought of the defendant a bottle of most valuable part of the land for 999 years from the 25th of
the said compound, to be used by the plaintiff Emma for washing March, 1868. The deed contained no notice of any title, legal or
her hair, as the defendant then knew, and on the terms that the equitable, of the prosecutor, and contained the covenants usual
compound was fit and proper to be so used without personal between a lessor and lessee. It was executed by both W. and
injury, and that it had been skilfully and properly compounded; S. Ritson.
yet the defendant so unskilfully, &c. conducted himself in making
and selling the said compound that the same was not fit to be used
for washing hair, nor could it be so used without personal injury;
by which premises, and by reason of the defendant's unskilfulness
and improper conduct, the plaintiff Emma, who used the said
compound for washing her hair, suffered pain, and was injured
in her health.

Demurrer, and joinder in demurrer.

Nov. 10, 15. Lord, in support of the demurrer, contended that,
in the absence of an allegation that the defendant knew the com-
pound he sold was deleterious, there was no breach of duty on his
part towards the female plaintiff shewn on the declaration, such
as would make the action maintainable. He cited Langridge v.
Levy (2 M. & W. 519; 4 M. & W. 337) and Longmeid v. Holliday
(6 Ex. 761).

Ingham, in support of the declaration, was not called on.
THE COURT held that the circumstances disclosed by the decla-
ration constituted a good cause of action by the husband and
wife, according to the principle of Langridge v. Levy (2 M. & W.
519; 4 M. & W. 337).


Judgment for the plaintiffs.

Attorney for plaintiffs: J. M. Dobson.
Attorneys for defendant: Hore & Sons.

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Corrupt Practices at Elections-Power of Commissioners to hold
Sittings without Adjournment—15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, s. 4.
In this matter a rule for a habeas corpus was obtained by Sir
J. B. Karslake, Q.C., in this Court on the 8th of November, after
the discharge of a similar rule in the Queen's Bench on the 5th
of November (ante, p. 223).

Nov. 16. Sir R. P. Collier, Q.C. (A.G.), Sir J. D. Coleridge,
Q.C. (S.G.), and Archibald, shewed cause on behalf of the com-

Sir J. B. Karslake, Q.C., Sleigh, Serjt., and M. Howard, supported the rule.

THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Channell, Pigott, and Cleasby, BB.)
discharged the rule on the same grounds as those relied on by
the Court of Queen's Bench.

Attorney for prisoner: H. W. Blake, for A. W. Bainton, Beverley.
Attorney for commissioners: Solicitor to the Treasury.

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Forgery-Antedated Deed.
Indictment under 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 20, for forging a deed.
W. Ritson was the father of S. Ritson, and was the owner in
fee of certain land. W. Ritson gave an equitable mortgage of
the land to the prosecutor as security for money advanced to him
by the prosecutor. Subsequently, on the 5th of May, 1868, W.
Ritson executed a deed of assignment under the Bankruptcy Act,
1861, conveying all his real and personal estate to a trustee for
the benefit of his creditors.

On the 7th of May, 1868, W. Ritson and the trustee executed
a deed conveying the land in fee to the prosecutor.
Subsequently S. Ritson claimed the land, and produced as his

title the deed charged as a forged deed.

This deed was dated the 12th of March, 1868, which was prior to the two before-mentioned deeds, and purported to be made between W. Ritson and S. Ritson. It recited the original conveyance in fee to W. Ritson, and that W. Ritson had agreed

The jury were told that, if the deed of the 12th of March, 1868, was executed after the conveyance to the prosecutor, and was antedated with the purpose of defrauding the prosecutor, the deed would be a forgery. The jury found the prisoners Guilty. The question was whether the prisoners were properly convicted of forgery, inasmuch as the deed was really executed by the parties between whom it purported to be made. Torr, for the prisoners.

Addison, for the prosecution.

THE COURT (Kelly, C.B., Martin, B., Blackburn, Lush, and Brett, JJ.) held that the prisoners were properly convicted, as it is forgery to fraudulently make a deed which purports to be something quite different from that which it really is, even although it is executed by the parties between whom it is expressed to be made.

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This was a cause of damage.

The action was entered in the sum of 1000%. The damage actually sustained by the plaintiff's vessel amounted to 800!. After the institution of the suit the defendants availed themselves of the provisions contained in section 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63), and filed an affidavit, which stated the facts necessary to entitle them to have their liability limited to 87. per ton. After the affidavit was filed the sum of 2521. 2s., which was the value of the defendants' vessel calculated at 81. per ton, was tendered by the plaintiffs, and accepted by the defendants in satisfaction; the question of costs being reserved.

Clarkson, on behalf of the plaintiffs, moved the Court to condemn the defendants in costs.

Gibson opposed the application, on the ground that the suit might, without agreement, have been brought in a County Court, and that the plaintiffs had not recovered a sum exceeding 3001.

THE COURT held that the suit was not a proceeding which might, without agreement, have been taken in the County Court, and condemned the defendants in costs.

Proctors for plaintiffs: Shephard & Skipwith.
Proctor for defendants: Coote.

A. & E.


Nov. 17.

County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (31 & 32 Vict. c. 71), s. 9
-Örder to take Proceedings in the High Court of Admiralty.
Clarkson applied, in pursuance of the 9th section of the
County Courts Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1868, for an order to
institute a suit in the High Court of Admiralty. The application
was made on behalf of the owners of two steam tugs, who claimed
to have rendered salvage services to the Bengal, a vessel of 1300
tons burden. The application was supported by an affidavit, from
which it appeared that agreements had been made between the
masters of the tugs and the master of the Bengal to tow the
Bengal into port for a specific sum; that after the making of the
agreement the difficulty of the enterprise had increased; and that
a question of law was likely to arise whether, under the circum-
stances of the case, the towage contract was
superseded by the
right to salvage.

THE COURT made the order.
Proctors for plaintiffs: Lowless & Nelson.



BRITNELL v. WALTON (Will-Construction -"Then living")

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V.-C. M. 238
CADBURY v. SMITH (Legacy-Lapse of Time-Statute of Limita-
M. R. 235
tions-Admission of Assets-Trust)
up-Contributory-Past Member-Forfeiture of Shares)
L. J. Giffard 234
DUKE OF NEWCASTLE, In re. Ex parte MORRIS (Bankruptcy-
Privilege of Parliament)
L. J. Giffard 231
DUNN v. FERRIOR (Production of Documents-Suit between adverse
V.-C. M. 238
Claimants of Legal Title)
FAMILY ENDOWMENT SOCIETY, In re (Contract-Evidence of Nova-
tion-Unregistered Company-Jurisdiction to Wind up-Legal
V.-C. J. 239
Purchase-money paid into Court-Insolvent Company-Peti-
tion for Payment of Costs).
up-Contributory-Past Member-Debts of Company-Pay-
ment in Debentures).
L. J. Giffard 234
HOOD v. HOOD (Will-Construction-Gift over on Death referred
to Death in Testator's Lifetime-Legacy payable within Six
Months after Death of Tenant for Life-Interest) V.-C. M.
Shares issued by way of Security or Indemnity)

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M. R. 235


V.-C. J. 239 MILLINGTON v. HOLLAND (Partnership Account-Statute of Limitations). V.-C. J. 238 POTTERIES RAILWAY COMPANY, In re (Scheme under Railway Act, 1867-Debenture-holders-Judgment—Execution) V.-C. M. 237

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POUPARD V. FARDELL (Validity of Patent-Specification-Practice
-Time for closing Evidence-15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, 88. 38, 39)

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V.-C. M. 236
PREES v. COKE (Sale set aside-Misrepresentation and Want of
Professional Advice)
V.-C. J. 238
(Shareholders-Motion to rectify the Register-Companies Act)
V.-C. M. 236
WALTERS v. WEBB (Copyholds-Seizure quousque-Demurrer-
Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 Wm. 4, c. 27)
V.-C. M. 236
WORKS COMPANY (Company-Winding-up-Double Proof-
Principal and Interest-Secured Debt-Practice--Appeal from
Judge in Chambers).
L. J.
Giffard 234
way Company, Agreement between-Apportionment of Rent
between Lessor and Lessee-Lands Clauses Act, 1845, s. 119)


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ANGEL v. RITCH (Statute of Frauds-Sale of Goods-Acceptance)
BARBER v. FLEMING (Ship and Shipping-Marine Insurance-
Policy on Freight-When Interest in Freight commences) Q. B. 239
BECKETT v. HOWE AND OTHERS (Will-Execution-Signature of
Testator not seen by Witnesses-Acknowledgment) . P. & M. 243
BREMER, APP.; MCGOWEN, RESP. (Representation of the People
Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 102), s. 3-Occupier letting
C. P. 240
BRISTOW AND ANOTHER v. BOOTH (Copyhold-Fine on Admission
of a substituted Trustee under 13 & 14 Vict. c. 60, s. 32, and
15 & 16 Vict. c. 55, s. 9)
C. P. 241
COCKER, APP.; CARDWELL, RESP. (Nuisances Removal Act, 1855
(18 & 19 Vict. c. 121), s. 12-Nuisances Removal Act, 1860
(23 & 24 Vict. c. 77), s. 13-The Sanitary Act, 1866 (29 & 30
Vict. c. 90), 88. 14 & 21-Complaint of Nuisance by Inhabitant
Q. B. 240
COLES v. PACK (Construction of Guarantee-Consideration and
C. P. 241
FEARON V. FLINN (Award-Excess of Authority-Uncertainty) C. P. 242
GILL, IN THE GOODS OF (Will-"Written Directions affixed hereto "
P. & M. 243
-None affixed-Insufficient Reference)
Consignment Note-Demurrage of Trucks).
C. P. 240
A. & E. 244

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HICKMAN, THE (Practice-Form of Tender-Costs)
HORSEY V. GRAHAM (Statute of Frauds-Contract or Sale of an
Interest in Land-Memorandum in Writing)
C. P. 241
JONES v. BEWICKE (Libel-General Plea of the Truth of the
C. P. 242
MEMPHIS, THE (Practice-Inspection of Documents-Costs) A. & E. 244
MERCER, APP.; WOODGATE, RESP. (Highway-Limited Dedica-
tion-Right of Owner of Soil to plough up Footpath) Q. B. 240
NORTHUMBRIA, THE (Limitation of Liability under Merchant Ship-
ping Act Amendment Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63), 8. 54-
A. & E. 214
REGINA v. HODGKISS (Perjury — Affidavit under Bills of Sale Act
(17 & 18 Vict. c. 36)-Making false Oath-Common Law

REGINA v. MACGRATH (Larceny - Mock Auction

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