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addition to those excepted in the trust deed were excepted and were designated in accordance with the second plat, and at the foreclosure sale the land in this subdivision was offered by lots and blocks by reference to the second plat. Nowhere by its conduct or by any act did the dock company or its privies attempt to revoke the offer of dedication. or to vacate the second plat. The offer of dedication being still open at the time of the incorporation of the village, its acceptance thereafter of the streets and alleys designated in the plat completed the dedication. It is conceded that since the year 1904 property in the second subdivision has been taxed as lots and blocks as described in that plat. Appellants contend that by the default of the village in the foreclosure proceedings and the decree of the court finding that the bill was taken as confessed by the village and that its rights were subject and subordinate to the lien of the complainant in that suit, the public was deprived of its rights in the streets and alleys. Under the circumstances shown and the various steps taken in the foreclosure proceedings it will not be necessary to consider the effect of the default. As has been stated, the trust deed, the bill for foreclosure and the decree of sale all recognized the second plat and described certain portions of the property involved by reference thereto. At the master's sale the lands included in the tract designated as lot 6 by the first plat were first offered for sale as the lots and blocks specified in the second plat, and a number of lots were so sold to Mrs. Roth and Schrumpf. It would create a very anomalous situation to hold that the master sold certain lots to Mrs. Roth and Schrumpf according to the second plat, and then sold the remainder of the lands in the second subdivision in a lump, together with the other lands involved, to Mrs. Roth according to the first plat and without any reference whatever to the second plat. No exceptions were filed to the master's report of sale by any party interested, and the master's deeds were finally executed and the vari

ous tracts conveyed by the same descriptions under which they were sold. Having failed to object to the action of the master in selling the lands included in the second plat by reference thereto, the parties to the foreclosure suit, and all those claiming under or through them, are bound by the act of the master in recognizing the second plat, and are now estopped to assert that the rights of the public in these streets and alleys have been lost by reason of the default of the city in that suit.

The title to the streets in question is in the village of Winthrop Harbor, and the judgment of the county court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.


Opinion filed February 20, 1913-Rehearing denied April 2, 1913.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-extent to which jurisdiction of a park board over boulevard is exclusive. So far as relates to the laying out, improvement and maintenance of parks, boulevards and driveways within a park district the jurisdiction of the park commissioners is exclusive; but that jurisdiction does not include the power of exclusive control of the intersections of public streets with boulevards and pleasure driveways.

2. SAME-jurisdiction of city and park board over intersection of street with boulevard is concurrent. The jurisdiction of a city and the park commissioners over the intersection of a public street with a boulevard is concurrent, in the sense that each has jurisdiction of the same territory; but the jurisdiction is for different purposes, that of the park board being for the improvement and maintenance of the intersection and that of the city being for the use of the intersection as a public street.

3. SAME-city has sole power to authorize a street railroad in street crossing a boulevard. The city has the sole power to authorize the construction of a street railway in a public street crossing boulevards or driveways under the jurisdiction of the park commissioners, but such commissioners, while they have no power to absolutely prohibit the construction of the street railway at the intersection of the street with the boulevard or driveway, have power

to impose such reasonable restrictions as will tend to preserve the use of the intersection for boulevard and driveway purposes.

4. SAME reasonableness of park board's restriction is for the court. Where a city has authorized the construction of a street railway in a public street which crosses a boulevard or pleasure driveway under the jurisdiction of a park board, and the street railway company will not agree to the restrictions imposed by the park board as to the method of construction, the question for the court, in a proceeding by the company to enjoin interference by the park board, is whether the restrictions are reasonable.

5. PARKS-when park board has same jurisdiction over pleasure driveways as over boulevards acquired under act of 1879. Park commissioners have the same jurisdiction and control over pleasure driveways added to the park district prior to the act of 1879 as they have over boulevards or driveways acquired under such act.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. RICHARD E. BURKE, Judge, presiding.

Robert Redfield, (Edgar B. TOLMAN, and HENRY P. CHANDLER, of counsel,) for appellant.

ZANE, BUSBY & WEBER, (LEONARD A. BUSBY, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

The Chicago City Railway Company (hereafter called the company) was organized under an act of 1859, as amended by the act of 1865, with power and authority to construct, maintain and operate street railway lines within the then or future limits of the south and west divisions. of the city of Chicago, upon such terms and conditions and with such rights and privileges as the city council might, by ordinance, authorize and prescribe. Under these acts and under ordinances adopted by the city council the said company has constructed a system of street railways covering the entire south division of the city. Prior to 1889 Hyde Park was an independent municipality, and Hyde Park avenue, extending from Fifty-fifth street to and beyond Sixty-third street, was one of its public streets. In 1889

Hyde Park was annexed to and became a part of the city of Chicago, and Hyde Park avenue is now Stony Island avenue, one of the public streets of the city. The company desired to extend its line from Fifty-fifth street south to Sixty-seventh street, there to connect with lines already built and in operation. One of the streets along which it was proposed to lay its tracks was Stony Island avenue from Fifty-sixth street to Sixty-seventh street. The company secured the necessary frontage consents, and upon petition to the city for authority to build said line the council adopted an ordinance July 5, 1910, authorizing the company to build, maintain and operate the extension of its street railway as requested, subject to the terms, conditions and limitations imposed by ordinance. Under an act passed in 1869 to provide for the location and maintenance of a park for the towns of South Chicago, Hyde Park and Lake, a park district or system was created, consisting of what are now known as Jackson and Washington parks, a connecting strip between the two parks, called Midway Plaisance, and several strips, varying in width, for driveways or approaches to the park tracts and connecting with certain established boulevards. Under authority of an act passed in 1871, Fifty-seventh street from the east line of Stony Island avenue west to the Illinois Central railroad right of way was added to Jackson Park as a part of the park system. In building the proposed extension of the company's line from Fifty-fifth street to Sixty-seventh street, in Stony Island avenue, it was necessary, therefore, to cross Fifty-seventh street and Midway Plaisance, parts of the South Park system. The South Park Commissioners claimed exclusive jurisdiction and control over all park territory, including the intersections of Stony Island avenue with Fifty-seventh street and Midway Plaisance, and objected to the construction of the street railway across Fiftyseventh street and the Midway Plaisance except upon terms embraced in an ordinance adopted by the commissioners.

The company declined to accept the terms proposed, and the commissioners, as the bill alleges, forcibly prevented the building of the street railway line across the intersections over which they claimed jurisdiction. Thereupon the company filed the bill in this case to enjoin the park commissioners from interfering with the construction, maintenance and operation of the street railway over the intersections in question. The bill set up and relied upon the city ordinance as authority to build its line across said intersections, denied the jurisdiction of the park commissioners over them was exclusive, and alleged their jurisdiction was only for the purpose of improvement and maintenance as part of the boulevards, and alleged that all intersections for the purpose of public traffic were to be deemed public streets of the city of Chicago and subject to its jurisdiction. The bill alleged the ordinance adopted by the park commissioners defining the terms and conditions upon which the company might build and operate its street railway line across the intersections of Fifty-seventh street and Midway Plaisance was without warrant of law and void. The answer, in substance, set up and relied upon the original and subsequent park acts as conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the park commissioners over the disputed intersections, and averred that the ordinance of the city council of July 5, 1910, was ineffective as authority to the company to construct a street railway in any of the boulevards or parks comprised in the park system, and that so much of said ordinance as purported to authorize the construction of a street railway line on Stony Island avenue across Fifty-seventh street and Midway Plaisance is null and void, because the intersections are under the control of the South Park Commissioners as part of its park system. The superior court entered a decree granting the relief prayed in the bill, and the park commissioners prayed an appeal. The trial court certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved and that the public interest required.

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