down in the books, (Fulkerson v. Holmes, 117 U. S. 389,) although it was held in the case just cited that but slight proof of relationship will be required, since the relationship of the declarant to the family might be as difficult to prove as the fact in controversy. Most of the cases where this rule was laid down and applied were where the attempt was made to set up some right claimed to be derived through the declarant, and by the declarant's own statement to establish the right to share in the property of a family or individual to which he or she claimed to be related. Manifestly, this cannot be done without other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to such relationship. Where, however, it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not to establish a right, through him, to the property of others, his declarations with reference to his family and kindred have been held admissible though the relationship is not shown by other evidence. In Cuddy v. Brown, 78 Ill. 415, testimony of this character was admitted without objection, and the holding in that respect has never been overruled or questioned. In Wise v. Wynn, 59 Miss. 588, the authorities on this question were reviewed and distinguished, and it was held that such evidence should always be received; that such declarations to some extent stand upon the same footing as declarations against interest or self-serving declarations; that if not admitted, in many cases there would be a failure of justice. In reaching this conclusion in that case the court cited and relied on Cuddy v. Brown, supra. The doctrine in the Mississippi case was followed in Malone v. Adams, 113 Ga. 791, and Young v. State, 36 Ore. 417. That doctrine has also been sanctioned in 1 Elliott on Evidence, sec. 381, 9 Ency. of Evidence, 741, and 22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, (2d ed.) 643. Where the claimant is seeking to reach the estate of the declarant himself, we think, on principle as well as authority, such declarations, from

the very necessity of the case, are admissible without extrinsic proof of the relationship thus declared.

The appellant further insists that the declarations of Fredericke Grosse should not have been admitted because the facts were not ancient and there was no proof that better evidence could not be obtained. The usual rule is, that if the declarant is dead his declarations are not excluded by the fact that living members of the same family can be examined on the same point. (1 Elliott on Evidence, sec. 365.) In cases of pedigree the hearsay testimony is not confined to ancient facts but extends also to facts which have recently transpired. (Jones on Evidence, sec. 313.) Such evidence has been held primary and not secondary,―admissible on the ground that it is the best obtainable. (22 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,-2d ed.644.) What was said by this court in Greenwood v. Spiller, 2 Scam. 502, that in any way conflicts with this rule. was not necessary for the decision in that case, and that dictum has never been referred to in any later decision of this court. The great weight of authority supports the doctrine that hearsay testimony as to pedigree is not confined to ancient facts. That doctrine is sound in principle, and the trial court did not err in so ruling.

Appellant further insists that the evidence in this record is not sufficient to justify the decree. While hearsay evidence as to pedigree should always be received with caution, we are not prepared to say that the evidence in this record does not uphold the decree of the circuit court. On the contrary, taken all together, we are disposed to hold that it does.

The decree of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed. Decree affirmed.

THE DOLESE & SHEPARD COMPANY, Appellant, vs. WILLIAM L. O'CONNELL, County Collector, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

1. CORPORATIONS-word "manufacturing," used in the Revenue act, is not to be given a technical meaning. The word "manufacturing," as used in the Revenue act, concerning the assessment of the capital stock of corporations organized purely for manufacturing purposes, is not to be given a technical meaning.

2. SAME-when process of manufacturing takes place. Whenever labor is bestowed upon an article which results in its assuming a new form, possessing new qualities or new combinations, the process of manufacturing has taken place, whether the thing produced be a small article of commerce or a structure such as a house, road or bridge.

3. TAXES when a corporation must be regarded as organized purely for manufacturing purposes. A corporation organized to manufacture and deal in crushed stone, lime and cement must be regarded as organized purely for manufacturing purposes, even though it has power, under its charter, to build roads composed of sand, gravel or dirt, as it is not necessary, in order that a corporation may be regarded as a manufacturing corporation, that it must manufacture the materials it uses in constructing its product.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. ADELOR J. PETIT, Judge, presiding.

PRINGLE, NORTHUP & TERWILLIGER, for appellant.

FRANCIS S. WILSON, County Attorney, and WILLIAM F. STRUCKMANN, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant, the Dolese & Shepard Company, filed its bill to enjoin appellee from the collection of a tax extended against it on a capital stock assessment made by the State Board of Equalization. The bill alleged that appellant is a corporation organized under the laws of Illinois for purely

manufacturing and mercantile purposes; that it owns or exercises no franchise except the right to be a corporation; that its authorized capital stock is $2,000,000, of which $1,914,800 has been issued and paid for; that the capital stock and property of the corporation are used in the business of manufacturing and selling crushed stone, lime and cement and for no other purpose; that all of its tangible property in the State of Illinois is located in Cook county and consists of real and personal estate used in its business; that the principal office of the corporation is in the town of South Chicago. The bill alleges that previous to the year 1911 no capital stock assessment was made against it by the State Board of Equalization; that in that year appellant filled out and returned to the board of assessors the forms and schedules required by law in relation to the value of its capital stock and franchise and also a statement of its personal property; that the board of review determined that the capital stock and franchise of appellant had no value over and above their tangible property, and they determined the assessed value of its personal property to be $1017; that afterwards the State Board of Equalization, without notice to appellant, made a capital stock assessment against it of $15,000, certified the same to the county clerk, and a tax has been extended against appellant amounting to $756. Appellee filed a general demurrer to the bill. The court below sustained the demurrer and entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity, to reverse which this appeal is prosecuted by complainant below, the Dolese & Shepard Company.

Appellant contends it is exempt from capital stock assessment by the State Board of Equalization on the ground that it is organized for purely manufacturing and mercantile purposes, and that this appears from its charter powers set out in the bill, which are as follows: "To quarry stone and dig sand, clay, earth and gravel; to manufacture and deal in stone, brick, lime and cement, and deal also in

sand, clay, earth, gravel, sewer and water pipe, stucco, lumber and building materials of all kinds, coal and ice, and to contract for, make and construct public and private improvements in which any such materials are employed, including roads and bridges."

That the corporation was organized for manufacturing purposes is not controverted by appellee, but it is contended that it was not organized "purely" for manufacturing purposes. The only point made in support of this contention by appellee is, that appellant is authorized to build roads composed of sand, gravel or dirt; that those materials are not manufactured by the company and the building of roads out of them would not be manufacturing. As used in the statute the word "manufacture" is not to be given its technical meaning. The Century Dictionary defines it as "the production of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving these materials new forms, qualities, properties or combinations, whether by hand labor or machine." Whenever labor is bestowed upon an article which results in its assuming a new form, possessing new qualities or new combinations, the process of manufacturing has taken place, whether the thing produced be a small article of commerce or a structure such as a house, road or bridge. The determination of what is a manufacturing corporation has frequently been before the Federal courts in bankruptcy proceedings. In the case of In re First Nat. Bank, 152 Fed. Rep. 64, the court said: "The word 'manufacturing' is a generic term of broad significance, advisedly used by Congress to include many species of corporations, and its comprehensive meaning ought not to be whittled away by fine distinctions." See, also, In re Rutland Realty Co. 157 Fed. Rep. 296; In re Niagara Contracting Co. 127 id. 782; Commonwealth v. Filbert Paving and Construction Co. 229 Pa. St. 231.

One of the powers given appellant by its charter is to contract for, make and construct public and private im