This would explain the Kaiser's remark at Kiel after the murder of Francis Ferdinand that it meant not only the death of a friend and prospective allied ruler (Francis Joseph was nearly eighty-four), but the endangering of whatever plans had been made.

The Kaiser had already shown to what a degree of belligerency he could be moved at the time of the expedition to China. He returned to Berlin from Kiel in much the same frame of mind. Serbia must be chastised in the interests of Deutschtum, even if, as seemed probable, Russia and France should be drawn in-for if there were to be war only against Serbia there was no need of the Potsdam war conference at all.

Germany was ready. There is a German proverb: When you want to hang a dog you can always find a rope with which to hang him. The assassination of the archduke was to be used for the execution of Serbia, for which preparations had already been under way. The unusual military measures taken by Germany before June, 1914, her buying of hospital and munition supplies, her embargo on the

shipment of pneumatic tires, etc., tend to confirm this.*

But in spite of the seeming clearness of the evidence historians should be critical of the intentions attributed by belligerents to their enemies especially in this most crucial matter of the responsibility for the war. No question at issue can interest us Americans, lovers of peace, more deeply than this or have more serious bearing on our plans for the future and that world peace which from the first our country and our President have desired.

We have seen how German and Austrian ambassadors like Wangenheim and Pallavicini, in the early days of what promised to be for them a successful war, gloried in the fact that their countries had provoked it. Perhaps, however, their patriotism led them to give their countries credit which they did not deserve. Some years have now intervened and the time has come when we can consult other wings of responsible and informed opinion in Germany. Let us consider first the final conclusions of Doctor Mühlon, whose position in the social

* "Le Mensonge du 3 Août," p. 9.

and industrial world brought him close to the leaders of Germany. It was not one at which he arrived hastily or through any personal pique, and he gave it of his own motion to the Journal de Genève, where it appeared on May 2, 1917.

"The essential points of my statement have been known for a long time, and the German government has not denied them. They are:

"I. That, according to the German point of view, Austria-Hungary was to chastise Serbia without a third power having the right to intervene.

"II. That the Russian mobilization would have as its immediate consequence the declaration of war of Germany.

"What is perhaps new in my statement is that I show that the attitude of the Emperor in person was resolutely fixed in the direction of the two points of view mentioned above. Whoever was familiar at that time with circumstances in Germany could not doubt that the Emperor in person would take a strong stand on the question. .

"The facts alone are important. Mobilization did not necessarily mean war, and the Austrians knew it better than anyone, they who were used to long mobilizations that did not imply war.

"There may have been in this world war a considerable number who were guilty in the

broad sense of the word, and for a long time back, but of guilty persons in the strict sense of the word, there is only a small number, and when we consider the events recounted, we see that they were orly in Berlin and Vienna."

The surest measure of the sincerity of a man's views is his willingness to suffer for them. Doctor Mühlon voluntarily gave up his distinguished position and his native land and removed to Switzerland in order to be free to speak the truth as he knew it. Of his sincerity there can, therefore, be no doubt. But some one may say, he may, in spite of his connections, not have been well informed.

Before, therefore, finally making the most serious accusations against Germany and taxing her with bad faith in her diplomacy and with the responsibility for the greatest war in history, let us call up, even at the risk of appearing tedious, one last witness of whose competence there can be no question. Prince Lichnowsky was the German ambassador in England from 1912 to the outbreak of the war, and he therefore held one of the most important diplomatic posts of his country. His testimony

is the more impressive, since he wrote not for his own time but sought to set down for his family archives a record that would be read and scrutinized in the light of all the facts by men who would call these times ancient. Through the indiscretion or treachery of an acquaintance they were published prematurely and their author acknowledged them. We reprint the sections that bear most directly on this momentous question.

"On board the Meteor we learned of the death of the archducal heir to the throne. His Majesty regretted that his efforts to win that prince's support for his ideas had thus been rendered vain. Whether the plan of an active policy against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt, I am not in a position to know.

"As I was not kept posted regarding views and proceedings in Vienna, I did not attach very great importance to this event. All that I could ascertain later was that among Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief outweighed other sentiments. On board the Meteor, also as a guest of His Majesty, was an Austrian, Count Felix Thun. In spite of the splendid weather, he had remained in his cabin all the time, suffering from sea-sickness. After receiving the news, however, he was well. Alarm or joy had cured him. .