proved the insincerity of the German claim so completely as her answer to this frank and direct request. This idea of a peace based on principles plainly embarrassed her. She replied lamely and evasively that it was the view of the Imperial Government "that the great work for the prevention of future wars can first be taken up only after the ending of the present conflict of exhaustion." The reply proved, as all German history might have led us to foresee, that Germany wanted no concert of free peoples and no league to enforce peace. She did not wish to be forced to any statement of principle, so contented herself with assurances of friendship and the suggestion that "a direct exchange of views appears to the Imperial Government as the most suitable way of arriving at the desired result." In other words she wanted a peace not based on any recognition of the rights of small nations or on any other recognized principle that conflicted with her notion of her own "national evolution" and "free future." *

* German Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, December 26, 1916. Appendix II.

It is interesting to note that the German Government made no definite proposal and did not suggest even a return to the “status quo ante bellum" either in her own bid for peace or in her reply to President Wilson.

The reply of the Allies was far more definite. They were heartily in favor of the "creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world," and recognized "all the advantages for the cause of humanity and civilization which the institution of international agreements destined to avoid violent conflict between nations would prevent. "* They insisted, however, with right that the Central Empires were responsible for the war, and protested against the statement made in the President's request that all of the belligerents seemed to be fighting for the same thing. For to the last the President had remained charitable and refrained from judging the motives of the Central Powers. It was natural, however, that the Allies should have refused to allow themselves to be classed on the same footing with the Central Powers, and Belgium quite cor

Von Bethmann-Hollweg's statement to Ambassador Gerard shows that she counted on much more than this. In President Wilson's Note to the Russian People of June 9, 1917, he makes plain that the status quo ante could not be accepted as a satisfactory basis for future peace. "It was the status quo ante out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the empire and its wide-spread domination and influence outside that empire. That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again."

* Entente Reply to President Wilson's Peace Note, January 10, 1917. Appendix II.

rectly and in a spirit of wounded aggrievance sent a separate note in which she claimed the proud right to say that she had taken up arms to defend her existence, and that it was unfair to think that Germany was fighting for the same principle or the same ends.* All of the Allies, however, agreed that they wished to attain a peace which would assure them "reparation, restitution, and guarantees," to which they held themselves entitled by the aggressions committed against them. With regard to the conditions of peace for the different members of the Entente they specified how in general these principles must be applied, though they could not give all of the details until the beginning of negotiations. They closed with their assurance that they wished a peace based upon principles of liberty and justice, and the inviolable fidelity to international obligations. The results were exactly what might have been expected. Germany could hardly have set forth a principle for which she was fighting, as there was none which she had not violated in her fight. She wanted an

* Belgian Note Supplementary to Entente Reply. Appendix II.

nexations and prestige. Though the President was probably disappointed since he may have hoped the military situation of Germany was serious enough to abate her pretensions, yet he could hardly have expected much more. He has the satisfaction, however, of having given Germany every opportunity and made her every concession consistent with our honor and independence. The answer of Germany indicated that further efforts along this line would be useless, but the President made one more desperate and unavailing effort by stating before Congress on January 22, 1917, the bases and principles of the peace which America could accept, ratify, and assist in maintaining. It was to be the peace of justice. The rights of all peoples to determine their government in the future were to be recognized as well as the rights of all to the free highways of the sea (for which Germany claimed to be contending), and this peace was to be achieved without the crushing of any of the belligerents. It was to be the "peace without victory." But all his eloquence and good-will were wasted on the leaders of Germany. They were not

forcibly preventing after February 1, 1917, in a zone around Great Britain, France, Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean all navigation, that of neutrals included, from and to France, etc. All ships met within the zone will be sunk."*

The precipitancy of Germany's action showed that this move had been prepared in advance, that she had already decided upon her second alternative, and to any negotiated peace of principle she preferred a ruthless war. The hollowness of her peace proposals had already become painfully evident. She had made the manœuvre for the reasons discussed in the last chapter and with the hope of dividing the belligerent peoples and of making neutrals believe that a "new situation" had been created.

Apart from the great zones declared in the Mediterranean by her obedient ally, AustriaHungary, prohibited zones extended in a broad belt from Spain to the Faroe Islands. If she could do this there was no reason why she should not extend it to our own three-mile limit, and, indeed, to our very shores. But

* Department of State, Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Governments, etc., European War, No. 4, pp. 405–407.