I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the first in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self-control, the efficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world.

"Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraints which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for them?"*

It is important for those who would understand the steps which brought the war to our doors to remember this initial act of our President. America, in the interest of all, was to be the peacemaker. Nothing could have better shown our friendly disposition toward all parties

* This proclamation was evidently issued after careful reflection on our relations to the World War in general. Belgium had already been invaded and the German chancellor had announced the violation of the treaty guaranteeing Belgium's neutrality. It would appear as if this had at first given us pause, for our proclamations declaring neutrality between various belligerents were dated as follows: Austria-Hungary and Serbia, Germany and Russia, Germany and France, August 4; Germany and Great Britain, August 5; Austria-Hungary and Russia, August 7; Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, August 13; France and

to the conflict. No one could have been more determined to keep our own country at peace than were the representatives of the American people in 1914. The policy they had outlined was to be maintained with strictest impartiality on our part, and if we were finally forced to surrender it, it was through no will of our own. It was to become plain, month by month, that against a belligerent like Germany an attitude of neutrality in the interest of a general world peace was impossible. Never from the first had she any intention of respecting our rights and sovereignty any more than she respected Belgium's. Slowly, and against his will, the President was therefore to become convinced of this until on April 2, 1917, he was compelled by the evidence to reach the following conclusion:

"One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian autocracy was not Austria-Hungary, August 14; Belgium and Germany (where the first blows in the war had been struck in the west), August 18. The delay in this latest declaration may be due to accident. To us it seems more probable that after consideration of the fact that we were not parties to the violated treaty, Washington decided to pursue steadily the policy of non-interference in European matters. The following day President Wilson's announcement to the American people was presented in the Senate, and ordered printed. Cf. American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, pp. 194-200.

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and could never be our friend is that from the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of Government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of council, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce.

"Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began, and it is, unhappily, not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the personal direction, of official agents of the Imperial German Government accredited to the Government of the United States."*

Not until the declaration of war, however, did the President or his advisers permit the government to depart in the slightest from the course formulated, a course of implied and frequently expressed good-will and friendship to Germany. The government was to cling desperately to this policy long after a great part of the American people recognized it as impossible. Indeed it was plain to most Americans that after what had

* A detailed account of the violations of American rights by German spies and German agents will be found in Chapter VIII.

happened in Belgium, it was useless to ask individuals to be neutral in "thought and opinion": toward a Power which was overriding all considerations of law and humanity. But this attitude of neutrality of thought which the President had enjoined upon us was neither necessary nor was it expected of us even by Germany. For the German conception had been officially defined in her war manual.

"It is here assumed that neutrality is not to be regarded as synonymous with indifference and impartiality with regard to the belligerent parties and the continuance of the war. As to the expression 'partisanship,' neutral states can only be expected to observe international courtesies; as long as these are observed, there is no reason to interfere.”*

These international courtesies were observed to the letter with regard to Germany even more so than with regard to England. As we look back, it is interesting to note the difference in our tone, and occasionally, indeed, in our attitude, toward England and toward Germany. It would almost seem as if the government had expected violations of international law from

* Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege, Berlin, 1902, p. 69.

Britain and a speedy and willing compliance from Prussia.*

Nothing illustrates this better than our correspondence with England with regard to lists of contraband at a time when we failed to protest to Germany against so flagrant an offense as that which the German Embassy committed in inserting in New York papers the notice warning American citizens not to take ship on the Lusitania; so serious an interference in our rights that it would have justified our government in immediately handing Count von Bernstorff his passports.

To understand the discussions with England we must remember that the Hague Conferences had fixed no lists of contraband to which all the Powers would agree. Such an attempt had been made in the Declaration of London, in 1908-9, but had not at the outbreak of the present war been ratified by a sufficient number of belligerent Powers to be reckoned a part of the ac

* It is merely necessary to call the reader's attention to Washington's insistence on the "ancient friendship between their people and our own" in the President's Address to Congress, announcing the severance of diplomatic relations on February 3, 1917. Phrases of like purport are found in the notes after the Lusitania and Sussex sinkings. No such special considerations are urged in our notes to England, and they appear curt in comparison.