lecture our author said, "the whole force of the divine government.....depends upon the visible certainty of rewards and punishments." If the whole force of the divine government depends upon the certainly of rewards and punishments-that certainty is of more consequence in the human mind, than any consideration whatever relative to the duration of punishment: consequently he was mistaken in his opposing statement.

What he "said" in his last lecture has been noticed. He seems to doubt whether it be possible "in the nature of things, to reclaim one sinner from his wanderings unless he had been condemned to endless punishment." How very different was Paul's view of the cause of repentance. "Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance and long suffering, not knowing that the GOODNESS of God leadeth thee to repentance? Rom. 2. 4.

Mr. P. says "if the penalty of the law had been that sinners shall be punished until they repent, it certainly cannot be shown that one soul would ever repent, under the influence of such a penalty." This is a mistake. In the case supposed, the penalty of the law can never be inflicted till all sinners shall have been brought to repentance!

Mr. P says, "the same disposition which now prevents those who hold to a limited punishment, from repenting at the present time, might always operate to prevent repentance." I reply, the same disposition &c. might not always operate to prevent repentance because that disposition may be placed in different circumstances. Again the same disposition which now prevents those who hold to an endless

punishment, from repenting at the present time, might always operate to prevent repentance: so that endless punishment, for ought that appears, possesses no advantages over a limited punishment, to induce men to repent. The truth is, the fear of punishment never produces genuine repentance. The fear of punishment may restrain from overt acts of sin-and a punishment that is certain and unavoidable, is much more efficient for that purpose, than one which is endless and may be avoided by repentance. That repentance will absolve sinners from the just punishment of their sins, is the doctrine of Indulgence, as now taught by a majority of Protestants: but we think it no more favorable upon mankind in its moral influence, than the Catholic doctrine of Indulgences. It is the goodness of God and that alone, which produces true repentance.

On his 93d. page, Mr. P. tells much about what we do not know that is, he makes several suppositions, among which is the following "we know not, but gratitude for their deliverance, (deliverance of those who will be saved from eternal misery,) will be made the chief means by which they shall be rendered more secure than were the angels that sinned. Yet it is by no means certain that they could be secured unless this gratitude arose from a deliverance from eternal punishment, and unless this gratitude were kept alive by a constant example of some who were justly suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." As this is all supposition, about which he knows nothing, we will also make a supposition-it is by no means certain they could not be secured, unless this gratitude arise from a de

We

liverance from eternal punishment &e. As Mr. P. confessedly knew nothing on this subject, why did he make a supposition so horrible? Could his eternal felicity be increased or secured by the endless agony of his father, mother, wife, children, or any other part of the human race? What shocking cruelty there is in the religion of some people! sincerely hope their hearts revolt at their sentiments. Such a supposition is not only dreadful in contemplation, but it would furnish the inhabitants of hell with one source of unfailing consolation-that of knowing that their sufferings contribute to the happiness of their fellow creatures-a consolation which cheers every patriotic and benevolent heart in the field of danger and of battle, and in every sacrifice made for the welfare of others. Mr. P. says, "we know not the comparative magnitude of the prison Why then does he attempt to found an argument upon ignorance? If such a jail must always exist, the smaller it is, the better. Mr. P. is quite modest on this point in comparison with some others. Edwards says "the sight of hell torments will exalt the happiness of the saints forever. It will not only make them more sensible of the greatness and freeness of the grace of God in their happiness; but it will really make their happiness the greater; as it will make them more sensible of their happiness; it will give them a more lively relish of it; it will make them prize it more. When they see others who were of the same nature and born under the same circumstances, and they so distinguished, oh! it will make them sensible how happy they are." What barbarity! Such sentiments are enough to

of hell."

chill the purple current of life as it rushes warm from the human heart!

Mr. P. says "suppose that our present law against murder required that the murderer should suffer the loss of his right hand, instead of his life. It cannot be shown that the increase in the number of sufferers, would not more than make up the amount of punishment which is endured from the crime of murder, under the present law; while the dangers and sufferings of the innocent might be increased a thousand fold." To this, I reply; in the case supposed, it cannot be shown that the increase in the numbers of sufferers would more than make up the amount of punishment &c.; therefore his supposition amoun's to nothing. We have already shown that a limited punishment "saves more suffering, prevents more sin, and promotes more holiness" than an endless punishment "could possibly do." We are as certain of this, as we are that a part is less than the whole.

2. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the guilt of sinners deserves eternal punishment, when we consider the nature of sin." So says Mr. P. He says "the doctrine of the bible which teaches us that it (sin) deserves eternal punishment, does not seem unreasonable." Here is a very great mistake. The bible does not teach us that sin deserves eternal punishment. This we think we have already

shown.

Mr. P. says "should a child point you to your duty you would be bound to follow its direction; but if an elder brother had urged you to the same course, your obligation would be increased; if your father

commanded it, your obligation would be still farther increased; but if that same father were clothed with the power of the chief Magistrate of the nation, and should command it on the authority of the laws, by which the good order of the nation is secured, how manifestly would your obligation be heightened." This rule to determine the magnitude of sin is plausible, but extremely defective. Though he has not attempted to prove it, it may be expedient to show wherein it is defective. How would it apply to an idiot or a maniac? Not at all. How would it apply to infants? It would not be adapted to their circumstances. Why not? Because they do not possess capacity to understand moral laws. Then Mr. P. has omitted one important consideration in his rule that is, the capacity of those who become transgressors. Sin is necessarily limited by the limited powers of those who commit it. If a child should so point any person to his duty, as to make him understand it, it is manifest that such person would be under as strong obligations to perform that duty, as though the chief Magistrate of the nation had communicated the knowledge of it, or had commanded it. As soon as a moral being knows his duty,let him derive that knowledge from whom he may, he is under as strong obligation as he can be, to perform it. If the law or authority sinned against be infinite, sin cannot be infinite, because committed by a finite being. Man cannot sin against a law which is above his capacity. Such a law would virtually be no law; and where there is no law, there is no transgression. If it be objected, that this reasoning absolves man from infinite authority. I answer,it does