NEGLIGENCE-Continued.

2. Proximate cause of injury. LaDuke v. Township of Exeter,
450.

PROMISSORY NOTES.

What are and what are not. Crump v. Berdan, 293.

TAXES.

1. Assessing property without the name of owner, or in the
name of any person other than the owner.

Gratwick, Smith

& Fryer Lumber Co. v. Village of Oscoda, 222.

2. Holding provision of tax law of 1891, making it the duty of
supervisors to require tax-payers to make and verify state-
ments of their taxable property, mandatory. Id.

3. Jurisdiction of board of review, as to whether an assessment
is excessive. Id.

4. Payment of under protest, whether voluntary or not. Minor
Lumber Co. v. City of Alpena, 499.

5. Mandamus will not be granted to compel a supervisor to
spread upon his roll a clearly illegal tax. Union School-Dist.
v. Parris, 594.

TRANSFER OF SUIT.

See Davidson v. Elevator Co., 456.

INDEX.

Head-note references are to pages.

Cross-references are to subjects; and the number of the note is
added in parenthesis, unless the reference is to all.

ACCEPTANCE-See SALE (1, 3–5).

ACCOUNT STATED.

Where itemized statements of goods sold, showing the balances
claimed to be due, are presented monthly, and allowed to
pass unquestioned, satisfaction with the same, 'and acquies-
cence in the claimed balances, will be implied. Rossman v.
Bock, 430.

ACQUIESCENCE-See ACCOUNT STATED.

ACTION.

An action for use and occupation can be maintained on a lease
under seal. Beecher v. Duffield, 423.

See ASSIGNMENT; ESTATES OF DECEASED PERSONS (11); Hus-
BAND AND WIFE.

ADMEASUREMENT OF DOWER-See DOWER (2).

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

A holding in plain recognition of the title of those under whom
the occupant entered into possession, and to whom he, as
supervisor, repeatedly assessed the property, cannot be said
to be adverse. Butler v. Bertrand, 59.

AFFIDAVIT-See CAPIAS AD RESPONDENDUM; SERVICE.

AGENCY-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

AMENDMENT.

Where the question of the admissibility of evidence that an
applicant for life insurance failed to state his true place of
residence in his application, without giving notice of such
defense, is raised for the first time by a request to charge,
the defendant claiming that the testimony tends to show that
the assured's place of residence was in another state than
that given in his application during a portion of the time
covered by his statement, it is within the discretion of the
court to allow an amendment of the notice so as to cover
such special defense. Hann v. National Union, 514.
APPEAL.

1. It was not intended to hold in Merriman v. Circuit Judge,
95 Mich. 277, that the failure to perfect an appeal from
probate court within the 30 days limited by Act No. 174,
Laws of 1887 (3 How. Stat. § 6782), might not be waived,
nor to overrule Snyder v. Circuit Judge, 80 Mich. 511, but,
on the contrary, the distinction between the cases was
pointed out. Gorton v. Circuit Judge, 561.

2. Where, after an appeal is properly claimed, perfected, and
allowed in the probate court, the case is noticed for trial
for the following term of the circuit court, but is not
reached, and the appellees, after noticing it for trial for the
second term, move to dismiss the appeal on the ground of
the failure of the appellant to file the record in the circuit
court within the 30 days limited by Act No. 174. Laws of
1887, and the record is filed before the motion comes on for
hearing, the case is ruled by Snyder v. Circuit Judge, 80
Mich. 511, and mandamus will lie to vacate an order dis-
missing the appeal. Id.

3. The proper remedy by which to review the action of the
probate court in refusing to appoint commissioners to set off
dower is by an appeal from the order of denial. Pulling v.
Judge of Probate, 605.

4. The liability of a surety in a bond executed on an appeal
from justice's court cannot be extended by an order of the
circuit judge made for that express purpose, and on his own
motion, staying proceedings on the judgment rendered against
the appellant and surety. Gildersleeve v. Circuit Judge, 606.

5. The proper remedy by which to secure the allowance of a
contingent claim against the estate of a deceased person in
case of its disallowance in probate court is by appeal from the
order of disallowance. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Judge of Probate, 613.

6. There is an adequate remedy by appeal after the rendition
of judgment in the circuit court on certiorari to review the
proceedings of a highway commissioner in laying out a pri-
vate road. Gibson v. Circuit Judge, 620.

7. The question of the suppression of a deposition taken in a
chancery suit should be raised upon appeal. Chandler v.
Circuit Judge, 621.

8. There is no occasion for interfering by mandamus with the
discretion of a circuit judge in ordering a defendant, who
has appealed from a judgment in summary proceedings to
recover the possession of land, to file an additional appeal-
bond, where the appellant could have filed a new bond, or
made a showing before the circuit court of the sufficiency of
the sureties in the original bond. Felcher v. Circuit Judge, 633.
9. Mandamus will not lie to vacate an order dismissing an
appeal from probate court after the time limited by 3 How.
Stat. § 8686, for bringing certiorari has expired. Crittenden
v. Circuit Judge, 637.

See ATTACHMENT (1); BILL OF EXCEPTIONS; BILL OF PARTICU-
LARS (2); CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS (2); COSTS (4); PRACTICE
IN SUPREME COURT.

APPLICATION OF PAYMENTS-See PAYMENT (3).

ASSESSMENT-See CORPORATIONS (7); NOTICE (1); TAXES.
ASSIGNMENT.

It is true, as a general proposition, that a distinct right of
action for fraud is not assignable; but where the right to
enforce a claim which is in itself assignable depends upon
showing fraud incidentally, the rule has no application.
Howd v. Breckenridge, 65.

See GARNISHMENT (3).

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

1. A trustee to whom a corporation has executed valid mort-
gages to secure certain of its creditors prior to making a

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-Continued.

common-law assignment is entitled to be paid a dividend
based on the whole amount secured by the mortgages proved
against the insolvent estate, said dividend being less than
said amount; and the question of its distribution among the
creditors secured by said mortgages does not concern the
receiver or the court. High v. National Bank, 502.

2. A creditor who is secured for indebtedness due him from
the mortgagor, and also in a given amount on account of the
contingent liability of the mortgagor as indorser on notes
held by such creditor, a portion of which have since been
paid by the makers, is entitled on such distribution to a
dividend based upon the full amount of each of said claims,
not exceeding the sum remaining due thereon respectively.
Id.

See FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1).

ASYLUM-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2).

ATTACHMENT.

1. Notice of trial of an appeal from an order dissolving a cir-
cuit court writ of attachment is properly served upon the
attorneys of record for the plaintiff in the attachment suit,
who appeared and defended for the appellant in the dissolu-
tion proceeding, and one of whom made the affidavit for
appeal, in which he stated that he was one of the attorneys
for the appellant in said proceeding, and made the affidavit
for and in his behalf. Roskopp v. Circuit Judge, 628.

2. Shares of stock in which the debtor has only a beneficial
interest, and the legal title to which is vested in a third
person as trustee, are not subject to attachment.
Plaster, and Stucco Co. v. Circuit Judge, 631.

See EVIDENCE (8).

Gypsum,

ATTORNEY'S FEES-See COSTS (2-4); MORTGAGE (4-7). See note,
536.

AUTHORITY-See EVIDENCE (10, 14, 20, 21).

BAIL-See CRIMINAL LAW (8).

BANKS AND BANKING.

1. A depositor is not relieved from liability upon an accepted
draft, sent to his bank for collection, because of a custom