as plaintiffs' tenants, this would operate as a ratification of the lease." 1. There was no evidence in the case to support this instruction. Mr. Endriss denies that he ever authorized the execution of the lease in the firm name. Mr. Tucker was not called as a witness, and Mr. Endriss stands uncontradicted. 2. The only evidence, as before stated, that Endriss ever lived in the house, was given by one witness, who testified that Endriss told him he lived in the house with Tucker. · This was denied. There was no evidence of ratification. The attempted settlement cannot be so construed. Endriss had a right to buy his peace, and evidently attempted to do so, but failed. 3. It has been seen that there was no evidence to support this charge. It is a general rule of law that one partner cannot bind his copartner upon a specialty unless he is authorized under seal, or unless he executes the instrument in the presence of and with the assent of his partner, or unless there is prior parol assent or subsequent parol ratification. Fox v. Norton, 9 Mich. 207. The court was asked to instruct the jury to return a verdict in favor of defendants. This instruction should have been given. Endriss having denied the execution of the lease under oath, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs to show authority in Tucker to execute it. This was not done, and the lease was not entitled to be put in evidence. Judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CASS COUNTY V. JOEL COWGILL. Landlord and tenant-County offices-Deputy register of deedsLiability for rent-Abstracts. 1. A deputy register of deeds is, by virtue of his appointment, entitled to the possession and use of the office furnished by the county for and occupied by the register of deeds. 2. The fact that a deputy register of deeds, while in possession of the office furnished by the county for the register of deeds, attends to private business of his own, does not make him a tenant of the county, nor raise an implied promise to pay rent to the county. So held, where a deputy register of deeds, at the request of the register, kept a set of abstract books in the register's office for use in his business of furnishing abstracts of title on his own account, the register having access to and the use of said books at all times. 3. The payment to a county, by an ex-deputy register of deeds, of rent for the use, for abstract purposes, of the office furnished by the county for the register of deeds, raises no presumption that the tenancy continued after his reappointment as such deputy. Error to Cass. (Buck, J.) Argued October 11 and 12, 1893. Decided November 10, 1893. Assumpsit. Plaintiff brings error. are stated in the opinion. L. B. Des Voignes, for appellant. Harsen D. Smith, for defendant. Affirmed. The facts GRANT, J. It appears from the findings of fact that the county building of Cass county contains four rooms, which are occupied as offices, respectively, by the county clerk, judge of probate, register of deeds, and county treasurer, and were set apart by the plaintiff for such offices. Defendant was the deputy register of deeds for such county continuously from January 1, 1873, to January, 1891, with the exception of the years 1883 to 1888, both inclusive. He is the owner of a set of abstract books, consisting of 24 volumes, which were kept in the register's office from January 1, 1873, to January, 1891, and were used by him in his business of furnishing abstracts, as occasion required. From 1883 to 1888, inclusive, he paid the county $50 per year for the use of the register's office, but never paid or agreed to pay any rent for the use thereof when he was deputy register. He receives an annual salary as deputy of $25, and 15 cents per page for recording papers. The register of deeds has access to and the use of said books at all times. The books do not interfere with the duties of the register of deeds or his deputy, are a convenience to the register of deeds, and are retained in the office at his request, and used by him, when occasion requires, in searching the records of said office. No charge was made for rent during defendant's first term as deputy register. October 23, 1889, the plaintiff passed a resolution that the defendant be charged $50 per year for the use of room in the register's office. Defendant had notice of this resolution, but gave no assent thereto, and denied plaintiff's right to charge him for rent. The office of deputy register of deeds is created by statute. How. Stat. § 609. He is required to take the prescribed oath of office, and the register and his sureties are responsible for the faithful performance of his duties. He is required to perform the duties of register during a vacancy or a disability of the register. Id. § 610. The defendant was, therefore, by virtue of his appointment, entitled under the law to the possession and use of the office. The fact 97 MICH.-29. that while so in possession he there attends to private business of his own does not make him a tenant of the county, and raises no implied promise to pay rent. The relation of landlord and tenant did not exist. The payment of rent during the time that he was not deputy raised no implication that the tenancy continued after his appointment. The learned circuit judge was correct in holding the defendant not liable. Judgment affirmed. The other Justices concurred. TOUSSAINT LA DUKE V. THE TOWNSHIP OF EXETER. Municipal corporations-Defective bridge-Injury to traveler Proximate cause-Evidence-Pleading-Damages- 1. Where the owner of a horse is injured by the struggles of the animal in attempting to extricate itself from a hole in a township bridge into which it has stepped, the negligence of the township in failing to keep the bridge in repair is the proximate cause of the injury.' 2. Proximity of residence on the part of a highway commissioner to a defective bridge is evidence tending to charge the township with notice of its dangerous condition. 3. Damages for permanent injury to a horse, as well as for the value of its services while disabled, are recoverable under a declaration averring that the horse was greatly injured and damaged, and became sick, bruised, lame, and injured, and so 1See, as to proximate cause, Lewis v. Railway Co., 54 Mich. 55, where the question is discussed by Chief Justice COOLEY, and the authorities reviewed; and see Rajnowski v. Railroad Co., 74 Mich. 20; MeKeller v. Township of Monitor, 78 Id. 485; Beall v. Township of Athens, 81 Id. 536; Langworthy v. Township of Green, 95 Id. 93; Mineral Springs Co. v. City of St. Clair, 96 Îd. 463. remained from thence hitherto, a period of two months, during which time the plaintiff was deprived of its use, to his damage $25.1 4. An averment in a declaration in a negligence case that the plaintiff, by reason of the injuries alleged to have been received, became bruised, sick, lame, disordered, and permanently injured and disabled in his left arm and shoulder, so that he was confined to his house, under the care of a physician, for six weeks, and suffered great pain, and was unable to attend to his accustomed business during all that time, and has lost the use of his said arm and shoulder, and is permanently disabled in the same, is sufficient to support a verdict for injury to the left arm and shoulder, although it does not appear, as alleged in another count, that the arm or wrist was broken or the shoulder dislocated. 5. It is error to permit the wife of a plaintiff in a negligence case, who was injured, as he claims, by reason of the struggles of his horse in attempting to extricate itself from a hole in a bridge into which it had stepped, to testify that after her husband had released the horse, and started to drive home, he stated to her that the horse had hurt his arm, and that he could not hold the lines in his hand; such statement being hearsay testimony, and not a part of the res gestæ, nor an expression of pain or anguish occurring at the time of the injury. 6. If the testimony of the plaintiff to the same specific injury is undisputed, the admission of such statement in evidence is non-prejudicial error. Error to Monroe. (Kinne, J.) Submitted on briefs October 13, 1893. Decided November 10, 1893. Negligence case. Defendant brings error. Affirmed. The facts are stated in the opinion. C. A. Golden and George M. Landon, for appellant. 1. R. Grosvenor, for plaintiff. HOOKER, C. J. One of the plaintiff's horses caught his 1 See Kalembach v. Railroad Co., 87 Mich. 509, where the declaration was held not sufficiently specific to admit testimony of any permanent injury. |