Mandamus. Argued June 13, 1893. Granted October 13, 1893. Relator applied for mandamus to compel respondent to accept relator's bond and the tax for selling intoxicating liquors, and to issue the statutory receipt and card. The facts are stated in the opinion. Pratt & Davis, for relator. Totten & Phelps, for respondent. MCGRATH, J. This proceeding was instituted to test the validity of the action of the board of supervisors of Kalkaska county in ordering and declaring the result of an election by which it was determined to prohibit the sale of liquor in the county, under Act No. 207, Laws of 1889. The record of the proceedings is fatally defective, in that it contains no designation by the board of the paper in which the publication of the resolution of prohibition is to be made. Section 14 makes it the duty of the clerk to publish in a newspaper, to be designated by the board," a copy of the preamble and resolution relating to the order of prohibition, and provides that the affidavit of publication shall be filed with the clerk of the board, who shall spread the same on the records following the record of the adoption of the resolution of prohibition, and that "the said clerk shall state next on the record the date when said notice and affidavit of publication was entered for record, and shall then sign the record officially." This section makes the record of such resolution of prohibition, and of the publication of notice, etc., evidence of the facts therein stated. It is contended that inasmuch as the board of supervisors had in October, 1891, let the county printing to certain papers, that was a sufficient designation. But the statute requires a designation by the then present board. This action was taken in July, 1892. The contract for county printing had been let by a board composed of other parties. Nor was it contemplated by the Legislature that other proceedings of the board of supervisors should be resorted to, to sustain or support action under this law. It is unnecessary to consider the other questions raised. The mandamus will issue as prayed. The other Justices concurred. MARY STUART COFFIN AND MARY E. BURNETT V. THE Constitutional law-Female suffrage. Act No. 138, Laws of 1893, which provides "that in all school, village, and city elections hereafter held in this State women who are able to read the Constitution of the State of Michigan, printed in the English language, shall be allowed to vote for all school, village, and city officers, and on all questions pertaining to school, village, and city regulations, on the same terms and conditions prescribed by law for male citizens," is unconstitutional. Mandamus. Argued October 10, 1893. Denied in the former case, and granted in the latter, October 24, 1893. Relators Coffin and Burnett applied for mandamus to compel the first-named respondents to provide means for carrying out the provisions of Act No. 138, Laws of 1893; and relators Kennedy and Potter, to restrain the registration of women thereunder. Henry A. Haigh, John Atkinson, John B. Corliss, and Thomas T. Leete, Jr., for the law. James H. Pound, Edwin F. Conely, and A. A. Ellis, Attorney General, contra. MCGRATH, J. These proceedings are instituted to test the validity of Act No. 138, Laws of 1893, which is as follows: "SECTION 1. The People of the State of Michigan enact, That in all school, village, and city elections hereafter held in this State women who are able to read the Constitution of the State of Michigan, printed in the English language, shall be allowed to vote for all school, village, and city officers, and on all questions pertaining to school, village, and city regulations, on the same terms and conditions prescribed by law for male citizens. Before any woman shall be registered as a voter, the board of registration shall require her to read, and she shall read, in the presence of said board, at least one section of the Constitution of this State in the English language. "SEC. 2. All laws of this State prescribing the qualifications of voters at school, village, and city elections therein shall apply to women, and women who are able to read the Constitution of Michigan, as above provided, shall enjoy all the rights, privileges, and immunities, and be subject to all the penalties, prescribed for voters at such elections. "SEC. 3. Women who are entitled to vote under the preceding sections of this act shall be subject to all laws relating to the registration of voters, and be liable to all penalties attached to the violation of such laws, and their names shall be received and registered by the various boards of registration at the time and in the manner required by law for other voters." The general rule is that the source of all authority to vote at popular elections is the constitution; that the electorate is constituted by the fundamental law; and that the qualifications of electors must be uniform throughout the state. Mr. Madison, in the Federalist, No. 52, says: "The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican govern ment." In Attorney General v. Detroit Common Council, 58 Mich. 213, 216, Mr. Justice CAMPBELL says: * * "As the right of voting is the same everywhere, it is obvious that the conditions regulating the manner of exercising it must be the same in substance everywhere. * It cannot be lawful to create substantial or serious differences in the fundamental rights of citizens in different localities, in the exercise of their voting franchises." In Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (page 599) it is said: "Wherever the constitution has prescribed the qualifications of electors, they cannot be changed or added to by the legislature, or otherwise than by an amendment of the constitution." In McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Penn. St. 109, Strong, J., says: "It has always been understood that the legislature has no power to confer the elective franchise upon other classes than those to whom it is given by the constitution, for the description of those entitled is regarded as excluding all others." Section 1 of article 7 of the Constitution provides who shall be electors and entitled to vote, and is, according to its terms, applicable in all elections." To empower the Legislature to confer the elective franchise upon classes of persons other than those named, some other provision must be pointed out which confers that authority in express terms or by necessary implication. The only provisions to which we are cited are sections 13 and 14 of article 15, which are as follows: * "SECTION 13. The Legislature shall provide for the incorporation and organization of cities and villages. * * "Sec. 14. Judicial officers of cities and villages shall be elected, and all other officers shall be elected or appointed, at such time and in such manner as the Legislature may direct." In support of the act in question, it is contended that the sections last quoted empower the Legislature to provide qualifications for voters in village and city elections; and Belles v. Burr, 76 Mich. 1; Wheeler v. Brady, 15 Kan. 26; State v. Cones, 15 Neb. 444; Opinion of the Justices, 115 Mass. 602; Plummer v. Yost, 33 N. E. Rep. (Ill.) 191,—are relied upon to support this contention. These cases involved the validity of acts conferring upon females the right to vote for school-district officers, under constitutions which, like our own, name no school-district officer, do not prescribe or suggest how such officers shall be chosen, but in express terms relegate to the legislature the duty of providing for and establishing a system of primary schools. In Belles v. Burr, Mr. Justice CHAMPLIN reviewed at length the legislation in respect to the qualifications of voters at schooldistrict meetings under the Constitution of 1835, and says: "Viewing the question historically, it is apparent that for 50 years it has never been considered that the qualifications of voters at school-district meetings must be identical with those prescribed in the Constitution as qualifications of electors entitled to vote under that instrument. The authority granted by the Constitution to the Legislature to establish a common or primary school system carried with it the authority to prescribe what officers should be chosen to conduct the affairs of the school-districts, to define their powers and duties, their term of office, and how and by whom they should be chosen. School-districts are regarded as municipal corporations. As such they preceded the Constitution, and were recognized by that instrument. But no officer of the school-district is mentioned or recognized by that instrument. The reason is that the whole primary school system was confided to the Legislature, and it cannot be said that the officers of schooldistricts, chosen pursuant to the system adopted by the Legislature, are constitutional officers. The Constitution provided for no municipal subdivisions smaller than towns, * ** * * * * * * |