On cross-examination he said: "He gave me no direct, explicit instructions to publish anything uncomplimentary to Mr. Randall, or to attack him; but I could not avoid receiving the impression that he regarded Mr. Randall as an enemy, from what he said and his manner of saying it." Mr. McLeod testified that he went on the paper as city editor in January, 1887, and that, as near as he could remember, Mr. Scripps told him there were two men in the city whom he would not like to see boomed through the medium of his property, one of whom was Mr. Randall; but that he received no instructions to treat him unfairly. It is, in my judgment, contrary to reason and justice, and therefore contrary to law, to hold that these conversations, one of which happened at least five years, and the other about two and a half years, before the date of the publication complained of, and uncommunicated to the agent of defendant who wrote the article, are evidence that it was instigated by Mr. Scripps, or that he was in any measure responsible for it. Under these circumstances, the previous relations between Mr. Scripps and plaintiff, and the quarrels they might have had, were immaterial to the issue in this case. However great may have been his malice towards the plaintiff, the defendant cannot be held responsible for it, because he had nothing whatever to do with inspiring the article. A corporation cannot be held liable for the malice of one of its stockholders towards a person, unless it be shown that such stockholder inspired or counseled the corporate action complained of. This ruling applies to all the evidence of the relations between Mr. Scripps and Mr. Randall, and to Mr. Scripps' connection with the Evening News, both before and after the organization of the defendant corporation. 3. The court instructed the jury that there was no evidence of bribery, and refused to permit counsel to argue that question to the jury. The learned counsel for the defendant, in a long and exhaustive brief, has collated the evidence which he claims tends to establish the plaintiff's reputation in the use of corrupt methods, and the motive and the opportunity for the use thereof in connection with the boulevard bill. If this be conceded, still the evidence fails to establish any specific acts of bribery. However reprehensible it may be for a member of the Legislature to keep "open house" for the entertainment of members, where they may partake of "light refreshments, wine, beer, liquors, and cigars," it falls short of establishing a case of bribery. A bribe is defined to be "a price, reward, gift, or favor bestowed or promised with a view to pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct of a judge, witness, or other person." "To bribe" means "to give a bribe to a person; to pervert his judgment or corrupt his action by some gift or promise." To give entertainments for the purpose of unduly influencing legislation is wholly bad in morals, but does not constitute the crime of bribery. The court was therefore correct in this instruction to the jury. It still remained for the jury to determine whether such entertainments were given by plaintiff for the purpose charged, viz., improperly influencing the Legislature, the truth of which would be a complete defense to this portion of the article. 4. Defendant offered evidence tending to show specific acts of bribery committed by the plaintiff at different political gatherings prior to his nomination and election as a member of the Legislature. It requires no citation of authorities or argument to show that this testimony was properly excluded. Defendant had the right to show in mitigation of damages the general reputation of the plaintiff in this regard, but he could not be called upon at the trial to meet a charge of specific acts, of which he had no notice in the plea. 5. Complaint is made that the opening statement of plaintiff's counsel to the jury contained violent and unjustifiable language, tending to prejudice the jury, and that it was not confined to a statement of the facts and the law relied upon as a basis for recovery. Inasmuch as most of the language complained of was used in reference to Mr. Scripps, his connection with the defendant, and his relations with Mr. Randall, which we have held to be incompetent, we deem it unnecessary to comment upon this alleged error. 6. Mr. Murtagh, a member of that Legislature, testified, without objection, that "the general reputation of the Legislature at that time was very unsavory." On crossexamination the witness was asked as to the general reputation of individual members as to honesty and integrity. This was admitted, under objection and exception. The entire testimony as to the reputation of the Legislature at that time, and the reputation of the individual members thereof, except the plaintiff, was wholly incompetent and inadmissible, and should have been excluded by the court on its own motion, even if no objection was made. Whether the reputation of the Legislature or of its individual members was good or bad had no legitimate tendency to show that the plaintiff did or did not commit bribery, or that he was guilty or not guilty of any improper conduct in influencing legislation. It was competent to show statements made by plaintiff as to the purpose he had in going to the Legislature, his connection with the boulevard bill, his reputation there, his entertainments, his "open house," whether or not the members visited it and partook of his hospitality, and whether this was done for the purpose of improperly influencing the action and votes of members. But when the acts and motives of an individual member are assailed, his assailant cannot, in justification of his attack, and to prove its truth, say to him, "you were asso ciated with a body whose general reputation was bad, and some of whose members were of bad repute." The publication of the article was admitted. The sole issue was its truth, so far as it affected the plaintiff. If its truth was proven, the defendant had made a complete defense. If it failed to prove it, the plaintiff was entitled to the actual damages suffered. The issue was clear. The defendant had the right to show any improper conduct or language or offers of promise or reward to any member of the Legislature by the plaintiff; but it does not follow that, because he was interested in the passage of the bill, and it was reputed that some members were open to bribery, therefore the plaintiff was guilty of bribery or improper conduct. A member of the Legislature has not the choice of his company, and it would be a strange rule which would permit a jury to draw any inference against his honesty and integrity because of his association with that body, no matter what its reputation, or that of any of its members, may be. 7. Articles from the Evening News under dates October 22, 1888, January 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, and 19, 1889, were introduced in evidence, under defendant's objection that they were immaterial. We have carefully examined them, and find that only those of January 19 and October 22 have any materiality in this case. In the article of January 19 it is said: "James A. Randall has rented a furnished house at Lansing for entertaining purposes during his stay there to work the boulevard scheme. We think this material, in that it tends to show the animus of the article sued upon. The same reasoning applies to the articles of October 22. These articles are, with others, made the basis of another libel suit. Quaere, whether they are admissible for that reason in this suit; 97 MICH.-10. but, as this question was not argued, we pass no opinion upon it. The other articles show no malice, make no charge of bribery or improper conduct, and are legitimate discussions as to the propriety of the construction of the boulevard at the expense of the city. 8. William J. Chittenden, a witness for the defendant, testified that the "general reputation of plaintiff, in respect to the corrupt use of money in political connections, was bad." On cross-examination the witness was asked the following question: "These charges, such as you have heard against Mr. Randall, are common against our prominent politicians,that they have bought delegates or bought conventions,are they not?" The question should have been excluded. It is monstrous to contend that, because other politicians are or are reputed to be guilty of corrupt practices, which tend to thwart the will of the people and are dangerous to good government, this will excuse Mr. Randall, if he be guilty of the same misconduct. The inquiry was wholly incompetent and immaterial, and could have had no other effect than to divert the attention of the jury from the real issue upon this branch of the defense, viz., the reputation of plaintiff in respect to the corrupt use of money in political connections, an issue tendered by the offer of the testimony in chief, and accepted by the plaintiff, since no objection was made by his counsel to its introduction. -- 9. Counsel, in their closing arguments to the jury, made statements which were outside the record, and were therefore improper. One of them used this language: "If there be anything that is accepted and known of all men in the city of Detroit, it is that the Evening News has been prosecuted for libel as no paper that was ever published in the city of Detroit has been. The records of our criminal courts show that James E. Scripps, as the editor |