inhabitants of said island out of the proceeds of said sale, and to punish any person failing to comply with the provisions thereof,' (in force July 1, 1909,) so as to enable us to use a portion of the income of said funds to aid us in levying said island, and also to include in said legislation, or by separate act, if necessary, the organization of a levy district comprising the lands upon said island, and the selection and appointment of three commissioners, all to be resident land owners of Kaskaskia island, and to provide for their appointment and succession by the circuit court of the said Randolph county, to carry out the provisions thereof for us; and for reasons there for we would respectfully show to your honorable body," etc. The reasons stated in the petition which follow that portion of the petition above. quoted are, in substance, that the annual income from the moneys received from the sale of the Kaskaskia commons, upon the island of Kaskaskia, exceeds the amount required annually for the maintenance of schools by approximately $9000, and that it would be more beneficial to the inhabitants of the island if such excess could be used in constructing levees and protecting the lands of the island from overflow than it would be to use it for school purposes. It appears from the evidence that this petition contained the genuine signatures of a majority of the land owners owning a major portion of the lands on Kaskaskia island, but it further appears that when it was signed the bill which was thereafter passed by the General Assembly organizing the Kaskaskia Sanitary and Levee District, and which, as enacted, appears in the laws of 1913, beginning at page 278, had not been drafted; that when the petition was circulated it had a heading stating that it was a request for the amendment of the School law, permitting the inhabitants of the island to use part of the proceeds from the sale of the Kaskaskia commons to build a levee; that it was explained to those who were asked to sign the petition that such was

its purpose, and that this was one reason why the people of the island signed the petition.

It is evident that the main purpose of the petition was to obtain legislation authorizing the use of a portion of the income from the proceeds of sale of the Kaskaskia commons in the construction of levees to protect the lands of Kaskaskia island from inundation. The organization of a levee district and the appointment of commissioners for such district were mere incidents to the main purpose of the petition. The petition did not request the legislature. to organize a drainage district and provide for the appointment of commissioners by the circuit court for the purpose of constructing levees by special assessment upon the lands to be benefited, but the legislature was requested to include in the act authorizing the use of a portion of the income from the proceeds of sale of the Kaskaskia commons in the construction of levees, or by separate act, if necessary, provisions organizing a levee district and providing for the appointment of commissioners by the circuit court of Randolph county to carry out the provisions authorizing the use of a portion of the income from the proceeds of sale of the commons in the construction of levees. The legislature did not modify or amend the act providing for the sale of the Kaskaskia commons, upon the island of Kaskaskia, so as to authorize the use of a portion of the income from the proceeds of sale in the construction of levees, nor did it by any act provide for the use of any portion of such income for such purposes. The legislature could not ignore the main purpose of the petition and treat the petition as a request by the petitioners for the organization of a drainage district by the legislature and for the appointment of the commissioners thereof by the circuit court of Randolph county to raise, by special assessment upon the lands of the island, the money necessary to construct levees to protect the island from overflow. The act in question was not in accordance with the request made by the land owners in

their petition to the legislature, and the petition, therefore, does not obviate the constitutional objection to section 3 of the act pointed out in Herschbach v. Kaskaskia Island Sanitary and Levee District, supra.

The decree of the circuit court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree as prayed for in the bill of complaint herein.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. LUDWIG WALCZNIAK, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed April 20, 1916.

CRIMINAL LAW-when a motion to strike testimony is properly overruled. A motion to strike out all of the testimony of certain witnesses, without pointing out the parts claimed to be incompetent, is properly overruled, where most of the testimony of such witnesses was unobjectionable.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN M. O'CONNOR, Judge, presiding.

MAX BORCHARDT, (JAMES P. Cook, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error.

P. J. LUCEY, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, and GEORGE P. RAMSEY, (EDWARD E. WILSON, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff in error, Ludwig Walczniak, was convicted in the criminal court of Cook county of the crime of taking indecent liberties with a female child under the age of fifteen years and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary.

He has sued out this writ of error to have said judgment reviewed.

The errors discussed in the brief and relied upon for a reversal of the judgment are, that the court erred in overruling motions by plaintiff in error to strike out certain testimony of some of the State's witnesses on the ground that it was incompetent and improper for consideration by the jury, and also that the evidence does not prove the crime charged in the indictment, but that if it proves any crime it is the crime of rape.

The child with whom plaintiff in error was charged with taking indecent liberties was three and one-half years old. Plaintiff in error and five other men boarded at the house of the child's parents. During the parents' absence on a Sunday afternoon at a meeting at a church one of the boarders attempted to go into the bath-room of the home but was unable to open the door. Some of the other boarders came to his assistance and by the use of a knife managed to throw the latch or hook by which the door was fastened on the inside. Plaintiff in error and the child were in the bath-room. Plaintiff in error's trousers were down. For obvious reasons we refrain from giving the name of the child or its parents, and because of the character of the crime and the testimony of the witnesses we decline to set it out in substance for publication. Nothing was said to the parents upon their return, by the child or anyone else, about what had happened. It was observed by the parents and some of the other witnesses who testified, that the child was pale. The child was nervous and restless at night and developed such a condition five days afterward that it was taken to a midwife. She found its private parts inflamed, swollen, discharging pus and offensive to the smell. She advised that it be taken to a physician, which was done. The physician found its private parts in such condition that it was taken to a hospital for a week, after which it was brought home but was again taken to the hospital for an

other week. The doctor gave it as his opinion that the child's condition was the result of an injury. On account of its tender years the trial judge refused to permit the child to testify.

Plaintiff in error testified in his own behalf and denied his guilt. He admitted being in the bath-room alone with the child, but said he went in for the purpose of adjusting its clothing to enable it to answer a call of nature. He contradicted the witnesses who testified that he did not make his presence known when they were trying to get into the bath-room and that they unfastened the inside hook or latch from the outside. We are not at all impressed by his testimony, and do not see how the jury could reasonably have arrived at any other conclusion than that he was guilty.

Some things were testified to by some of the witnesses which were technically objectionable. No objection was made, however, at the time the testimony was given, and not until the cross-examination was concluded, or until the whole evidence was concluded for the State and the defendant, was any objection raised. Plaintiff in error then moved to strike out all the testimony of the witnesses who had testified, perhaps, to some things that were incompetent. Most of their testimony was not objectionable, and the objectionable part was not pointed out in the motion to strike but the motion was to strike the whole testimony. The court did not err in overruling the motion. (Mash v. People, 220 Ill. 86; Fitzsimons & Connell Co. v. Braun & Fitts, 199 id. 390.) At all events, we would not be willing to reverse this judgment because of the admission of the testimony complained of. People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135; People v. Strosnider, 264 id. 434.

The errors complained of have had our careful consideration, and we are satisfied none of them would justify a reversal of this judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.