101 Pac. Rep. 288; Partridge v. State, 88 Ark. 263; 114 S. W. Rep. 215; 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 321; State v. White, 71 Kan. 356; 80 Pac. Rep. 589; State v. Gilman, 22 W. Va. 146; 10 S. E. Rep. 283; 6 L. R. A. 847; Preston v. Drew, 33 Me. 559; 54 Am. Dec. 64; State v. Williams, 146 N. C. 618; 61 S. E. Rep. 61; 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 299; Eidge v. City of Bessemer, 164 Ala. 599; 51 So. Rep. 246; 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 394; Henderson v. Hayward, 109 Ga. 393; 47 L. R. A. 366; 34 S. E. Rep. 590.) The only decision to the contrary to which we have been referred is that of State v. Phillips, 56 L. R. A. (N. S.) 530, in which it was held that a State does not unconstitutionally deprive one of equal protection of the laws by forbidding the keeping of intoxicating liquor in any locker or other place in any social club or carrying it to such club, although a property right in such liquor is recognized by the law. The opinion in that case is based largely on the dissenting opinion in Eidge v. City of Bessemer, supra, and hence is contrary to the holding in that case, and also contrary, we think, to the great weight of authority. The court assumed that the ultimate purpose of the Mississippi law was to prohibit the use of liquor as a beverage, which is not the purpose of the Local Option law of this State nor within the powers granted to municipalities, which are limited in their power solely to regulating and suppressing the sale, and not the use, of liquor.

There can be no doubt that if it were possible by law to prevent any intoxicating liquor from being introduced into a town or kept there under any circumstances it would be most effective as a prohibition measure, as there would be no drinking if there were nothing to drink. The power of the appellee, however, extended only to licensing, regulating and prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor by adopting such ordinances as would be reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose, and not to the depriving of residents or persons within the municipality of their property. The

ordinance in question made it unlawful to keep or use what the law recognized as property, and under circumstances in which the public and others were in no way affected or interested. It amounted to depriving appellant and others similarly situated of their property, and to the extent to which it affected appellant, under the stipulation of facts in this case, was ultra vires and invalid.

What has been said about the second section of the ordinance applies to the third section. The power delegated to cities to determine what are nuisances does not include the power to declare something a nuisance which is not a nuisance per se or recognized as a nuisance by common law or statute. (City of Chicago v. Weber, 246 Ill. 304; City of Carthage v. Munsell, 203 id. 474.) Whether any of the places mentioned in the third section would be nuisances in fact, would, of course, depend on the manner in which they were conducted. If it were a case of a member of a family at his own or any private home, or the member of a private club where the public are not allowed, using liquors, that would not make the place where such liquors are used a nuisance. It is not within the power of the city or of the State, nor is it the policy of the latter, to regulate the private life or conduct of a citizen in the use of his property in matters in which he, alone, is affected and others are not necessarily affected. (Haskell v. Howard, supra, and cases cited.) As said in City of Carthage v. Munsell, supra, on page 478 of the opinion: "Nor do we think, under the agreed state of facts, that the delivery of such liquors transported from another State to purchasers in the city of Carthage, in this State, can be held to be a nuisance. In the case of Laugel v. City of Bushnell, 197 Ill. 20, we had before us the question of nuisances as applied to the sale of intoxicating liquors, and on page 26 we said: 'Nuisances may thus be classified: First, those which in their nature are nuisances per se or are so denounced by the common law or by statute; second, those which in their nature

are not nuisances but may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings or the manner in which they may be conducted, managed, etc.; third, those which in their nature may be nuisances but as to which there may be honest differences of opinion in impartial minds. The power granted by the statute to the governing bodies of municipal corporations to declare what shall be nuisances, and to abate the same, etc., authorizes such bodies to conclusively denounce those things falling within the first and third of these. classes to be nuisances, but as to those things falling within the second class the power possessed is only to declare such of them to be nuisances as are in fact so.' As we view this case, under the stipulations in this record the transaction properly falls within the second class of nuisances as above classified, and could only become a nuisance from the manner in which it might be conducted, managed, etc. The right of the citizen to purchase goods for his own consumption from dealers in other States, and the right to have those goods carried and delivered to him, are to be classed among the highest rights of the citizen, and can only be curtailed when, in the manner of conducting the business, they may endanger the health, life or property of other citizens. There is nothing in intoxicating liquor inherently dangerous. It can only be said to be dangerous to those who use it. It is not like explosives or dangerous drugs, that may carry with them a menace to the persons and property of others, and there is nothing in the stipulation to disclose that the business as conducted was other than the ordinary course in relation to the carrying and delivering of other articles of trade and commerce that might be, and ordinarily are, carried by such companies. In other words, there is nothing to show that in the method of delivery or in the manner of conducting the business there was anything that could be said to be offensive to the public morals or good order, or could in any way tend to disturb anybody in his tranquility of mind, health or body,

safety or right of property. In the absence of such showing it cannot be successfully contended that such business or transaction may be declared to be a nuisance."

Section 3 in effect declares any place a nuisance where two persons keep liquor to be divided between them. If any place is maintained within said town where persons assemble for the purpose of drinking liquor, and in so doing conduct themselves in a disorderly manner or in such a way as to interfere with the peace, comfort and rights of others,—or, in other words, if such place is, in fact, allowed to become a nuisance, it can be abated as such, but under the stipulation in this case there was nothing of that kind.

The sections of the ordinance in question, in the particulars that have been shown, were invalid and void, and for that reason the judgment of the lower court will be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

W. R. FITT, Defendant in Error, vs. THE CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed June 22, 1916.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-when the circuit court cannot inquire whether Industrial Board acted legally. Under section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation act, as amended in 1915, the circuit court, upon application for judgment on the award of the Industrial Board, has no jurisdiction to inquire into the question whether the Industrial Board has acted legally in making its award but is only authorized to enter judgment on the award, as the statute provides other methods by which the action of the Industrial Board may be reviewed. (People v. McGoorty, 270 Ill. 610, approved.)

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. WALTER BREWER, Judge, presiding.

JAMES VAUSE, JR., CLARENCE W. HUGHES, and CARL D. KIGER, for plaintiff in error.

EDWARD C. CRAIG, JAMES W. CRAIG, JR., Donald B. CRAIG, and WILLIAM M. MORAN, JR., for defendant in

error.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

A judgment was entered in favor of defendant in error in the circuit court of Coles county upon the award made by the Industrial Board of Illinois against plaintiff in error for compensation for injuries sustained by defendant in error while in plaintiff in error's employ. Plaintiff in error interposed written objections to the entry of the judgment, which were overruled, and thereafter the circuit court granted a certificate that the case was one proper to be reviewed by this court, whereupon, in due course, the clerk of this court issued the writ of error in this cause.

The record discloses that defendant in error, while in the employ of plaintiff in error and in the course of his employment, October 26, 1913, was injured, and as a result lost part of a phalange of the second finger on his left hand, and suffered also from a partially stiff joint next to this phalange; that on November 24, 1913, Dr. J. P. Deckard, who was attending defendant in error and who was not selected by plaintiff in error, certified, over his signature, that the defendant in error's disability had ceased. The defendant in error on that same date signed a receipt for the consideration of $32.50 in full compensation for said injury. Thereafter he made application for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation act of 1913. Counsel for plaintiff in error filed objections before the Industrial Board, based on the proposition that under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation act, a settlement having been voluntarily made by the parties, the Industrial Board was without jurisdiction to hear the matter. This objection was overruled and an order entered allowing as compensation for said injury $273.75, less $32.50 already paid, or $241.25. A certified copy of the decision of the Industrial